Drawing upon ancient Hindu philosophy, the author explores the human psyche and the importance of personal identity.

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about what you’ll do, you cannot rationally have credences for what you’ll do – you cannot rationally have option-credences. Versions of the thesis have been defended by authors such as Spohn, Levi, Gilboa, Price, Louise, and others. After registering a number of concerns about the thesis, I rehearse and rebut many of the main arguments for it, grouped according to their main themes: agency, vacuity, betting, and decision-theoretical considerations. I (...) go on to suggest many possible theoretical roles for option-credences. -/- I locate the debate about the thesis in a broader discussion: Are there rational credence gaps – propositions to which one cannot rationally assign credences? If there are, they spell trouble for various foundations of Bayesian epistemology, including the usual ratio formula for conditional probability, conditionalization, decision theory, and independence. According to the thesis, credence gaps are completely mundane; they arise every time someone rationally deliberates. But these foundations are safe from any threat here, I contend, since the thesis is false. Deliberation welcomes prediction. (shrink)

First published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which a belief is justified, in the sense of being well‐founded, only if there is an adequate reason to believe it, reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not (...) pose a problem for this view. The discussion touches upon the relation between believing for reasons and reflective knowledge. (shrink)

Let φ be a monadic second order sentence about a finite structure from a class K which is closed under disjoint unions and has components. Compton has conjectured that if the number of n element structures has appropriate asymptotics, then unlabelled (labelled) asymptotic probabilities ν(φ) (μ(φ) respectively) for φ always exist. By applying generating series methods to count finite models, and a tailor made Tauberian lemma, this conjecture is proved under a mild additional condition on the asymptotics of the number (...) of single component K-structures. Prominent among examples covered, are structures consisting of a single unary function (or partial function) and a fixed number of unary predicates. (shrink)

In the popular folklore three-score-years-and-ten is treated as a fair innings for people, and thereby serves as an informal reference point for judgements about distributive justice within a community. But length of life alone is an insufficient basis for such judgements - a person's health-related quality-of-life also needs to be taken into account. If one of the objectives of public policy is to reduce inequalities in lifetime health, it will be demonstrated that this is very likely to require systematic discrimination (...) against the older members of a community. The notion of community solidatity will also be tested, because a decision will need to be made as to whether the same fair innings applies to all members of the community, or whether some are entitled to more than others. The strength of the fair innings principle is that it brings these issues to the fore in a systematic way which should ais their resolition in a practical context. (shrink)

This paper targets the constitutive basis of social cognition. It begins by describing the traditional and still dominant cognitivist view. Cognitivism assumes internalism about the realisers of social cognition; thus, the embodied and embedded elements of intersubjective engagement are ruled out from playing anything but a basic causal role in an account of social cognition. It then goes on to advance and clarify an alternative to the cognitivist view; namely, an enactive account of social cognition. It does so first by (...) articulating a diachronic constitutive account for how embodied engagement can play a constitutive role in social cognition. It then proceeds to consider an objection; the causal-constitutive fallacy (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008; Block 2005) against enactive social cognition. The paper proceeds to deflate this objection by establishing that the distinction between constitution and causation is not co-extensive with the distinction between internal constitutive elements and external causal elements. It is then shown that there is a different reason for thinking that an enactive account of social cognition is problematic. We call this objection the ‘poverty of the interactional stimulus argument’. This objection turns on the role and characteristics of anticipation in enactive social cognition. It argues that anticipatory processes are mediated by an internally realised model or tacit theory (Carruthers 2015; Seth 2015). The final part of this paper dissolves this objection by arguing that it is possible to cast anticipatory processes as orchestrated as well as maintained by sensorimotor couplings between individuals in face-to-face interaction. (shrink)

It is argued that reasonable partiality allows an agent to attach value to particular objects of attachment via recognition of the value of the holding of that relation between agent and object. The reasonableness of partiality is ensured by a background context set by the agent's virtues, notably justice. It is argued that reasonable partiality is the only view that is compatible with our best account of the nature of self-knowledge. That account rules out any instrumental relationship between moral demands (...) and moral character, but that familiar claim is given an unfamiliar explanation. Instrumentality depends on a prior objectification of the self and it is that kind of objectification that, in the ethical case, represents a form of ethical evasion. Self-knowledge is transparent, incomplete and essentially connected with first person endorsement. The transparency condition is that knowledge of one's state of mind is "taken" transparently to its object. More specifically, ethical transparency is the feature that my virtues do not exhibit themselves to me in self-knowledge, but take me transparently to the way in which they saliently represent the world as containing evaluative properties calling for various forms of response. It is concluded that reasonable partiality grounded in the nature of the virtues is the only reflective account of morality compatible with the most plausible account of the nature of self-knowledge. The demands of impartiality are incompatible with a condition of having a personal point of view, namely, that a self can stand in a non-alienated relation to itself via its capacity for self-knowledge. (shrink)

For the complex or boundary objects in which I am interested . . . dimensions implode . . . they collapse into each other . . . story telling . . . is a fraught practice . . . In no way is story telling opposed to materiality, [sic] But materiality itself is tropic; it makes us swerve, it trips us; it is a knot of the textual, technical, mythic/oneric [sic], organic, political and economic.

This article compares the dialectics of Fredric Jameson and Roy Bhaskar. From a dialectical critical-realist standpoint, it argues that Jameson’s approach in his recent collection Valences of the Dialectic sits uncomfortably between Hegelian and Marxist presuppositions. This is seen in the way he configures the relation between thinking and being, and it leads to an alliance with poststructuralist thinking in which real negativity is denied. In consequence, his thought is caught between a critique of the present and the impossibility of (...) thinking real change within it. (shrink)

Bioethics as politics -- Bioethics and the politics of expectations -- Engendering consent : bioethics and biobanks -- Missing the big picture : bioethics and stem cell research -- Testing times : bioethics and "do-it-yourself" genetics -- Governing uncertainty : the politics of nanoethics -- Beyond bioethics.

The rapid development of biobanks internationally reflects the considerable expectations attached to the exploitation of genetics knowledge. However, establishing consent and legitimacy for the new generation of biobanks is not without its challenges because they tend to be prospective in nature, involving the collection of DNA, personal medical and lifestyle data generally held over a very long period of time for unspecified research purposes. Thus far, biobanks have tended to be established ahead of wide-ranging debate about their broad implications. Making (...) specific reference to the 'engagement' processes employed by UK Biobank during its establishment phase, this article focuses on the politics of 'public engagement'. It examines the context of arguments for 'public engagement', drawing attention to how particular approaches to 'engagement' within biobank projects may serve to limit debate on substantive questions arising from their development. Unless biobanks' 'engagements' substantially involve publics in deliberations about their development, it is argued, publics are likely to become distrustful of projects and perhaps resist other similar population-based health initiatives in the future. (shrink)

In this article I argue for a full appraisal of Hobbes's theory of punishment which takes account of its divergent and contradictory aspects. Examining his theory within the general context of his position in Leviathan, it is possible to see its centrality for the subsequent development of the modern philosophy of punishment. From this point of view, it is also possible to pinpoint the source of a central weakness in the retributive theory of punishment.

Foucault's work has had a profound impact on the medical humanities over the last decade or so. However, most work to date has focused on Foucault's earlier writings rather than his later contributions on the self and governmentality. This article assesses the significance of the concept of governmentality for critical scholarship in the medical humanities, particularly in creating ethical awareness in the field of health care. It examines the context for Foucault's later work, and contributions arising from scholarship building on (...) this work. The governmentality literature, it is argued, raises novel questions about the ways we have come to think about health care in late modern societies. However, there are some limitations with this body of work which have not been fully acknowledged by scholars. The article discusses some of these limitations and offers some suggestions for a fruitful way forward. (shrink)

This essay argues that critical realism provides a philosophical perspective from which to talk about good and evil. It draws on dialectical critical realism’s meta-ethics of freedom and solidarity, and the different grades of freedom identified there: from the basic spontaneity in agency to the possibility of a fully flourishing, eudaimonic social condition. It argues that evil acts can be understood as those which fundamentally deny basic human freedom (spontaneity) and solidarity, and that good acts are those which affirm human (...) flourishing and solidarity. It draws upon Hannah Arendt’s depiction of what was morally evil in the Holocaust, and recent English criminal trials involving mercy killing to depict the good. It suggests that moral framing in terms of good and evil lies beyond the terms in which modern law thinks of human actions. (shrink)

Knockout experiments in Tetrahymena show that linker histone H1 is not essential for nuclear assembly or cell viability. These results, together with a series of biochemical and cell biological observations, challenge the existing paradigm that requires linker histones to be a key organizing component of higher‐order chromatin structure. The H1 Knockouts also reveal a much more subtle role for H1. Instead of acting as a general transcriptional repressor, H1 is found to regulate a limited number of specific genes. Surprisingly, H1 (...) can both activate and repress transcription. We discuss how this architectural protein might accomplish this important regulatory role. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 96-98.

Through dialectical critical realism, Roy Bhaskar has made an important contribution to two different theoretical traditions. One is the philosophy of critical realism, where he aims for a more supple and reflexive approach. The other is dialectical theory, which he seeks to undergird and recast by locating on a realist terrain. Here an important question is how recasting affects existing dialectical thought. Bhaskar's own writings focus in this regard on dialectical critical realism's relation to Hegel. This paper addresses it by (...) comparing and contrasting dialectical critical realism with Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics, the approach which probably comes closest to dialectical critical realism. The first two main sections are accordingly directed to developing an account of Bhaskar's dialectical critical realism and comparing it to Adorno's negative dialectics. My argument is that what Bhaskar and Adorno have in common is a commitment to a realist ontology, but that Adorno's account is limited by a competing tendency towards irrealism. This gives his negative dialectics an unstable foundation, and this is brought out by the comparison with dialectical critical realism. The third and fourth sections bring out the implications of this tension for Adorno's account of modern freedom in his Negative Dialectics. Three competing views are identified, and it is argued that these coher on the basis of a realist reading of his analysis. An irrealist reading reduces them to incoherence. (shrink)