This thesis examines how we should understand the concept of harm, and its moral and prudential importance. It discusses various analyses of harm and normative principles that appeal to harm. In broad terms, it offers a defense of the view that harm is normatively important and useful for philosophical theorizing. Further it proposes a novel analysis of harm, which aligns with that view. The first paper, "The Harm Principle and the Nature of Harm", defends John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle against (...) the criticism that the principle has unacceptable implications regardless of which analysis of harm we plug into it. I argue that the criticism is built on mistaken assumptions – most importantly, the assumption that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there exists an unproblematic analysis of harm. The second paper, "Feit on the Normative Importance of Harm", criticizes Neil Feit’s suggested solution to the so-called Failing to Benefit Problem for the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA). Feit argues that CCA’s inability to align with some commonsense views about harm’s moral importance is no flaw since those views are false. I object to that argument, in part by showing that the cases that Feit appeals to are not genuine counterexamples. The third paper, "Doing Away with Skepticism about Harm", scrutinizes the elimination thesis, which states that we should do away with the concept of harm in philosophical theorizing. I examine various claims in support of that thesis – for instance that the concept is defective – but conclude that we lack good reasons to accept it. The fourth paper, "Misfortune and Missing Out", focuses on Kaila Draper’s famous challenge for deprivationism – the view that death harms a subject in so far as it deprives her of life’s goods. Since not winning the lottery is also a deprivation, the challenge is to explain why only death is a misfortune in the sense that it merits negative emotional responses. I argue that the challenge is serious, in part by criticizing some prominent suggested solutions, and identify a parallel challenge for CCA. The fifth paper, "A Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Harm", puts forward a novel analysis of harm. Roughly, this analysis says that an event harms me if, and only if, it is fitting for me to disfavor the event for my own sake. (shrink)

The pursuit of artificial consciousness requires conceptual clarity to navigate its theoretical and empirical challenges. This paper introduces a composite, multilevel, and multidimensional model of consciousness as a heuristic framework to guide research in this field. Consciousness is treated as a complex phenomenon, with distinct constituents and dimensions that can be operationalized for study and for evaluating their replication. We argue that this model provides a balanced approach to artificial consciousness research by avoiding binary thinking (e.g., conscious vs. non-conscious) and (...) offering a structured basis for testable hypotheses. To illustrate its utility, we focus on "awareness" as a case study, demonstrating how specific dimensions of consciousness can be pragmatically analyzed and targeted for potential artificial instantiation. By breaking down the conceptual intricacies of consciousness and aligning them with practical research goals, this paper lays the groundwork for a robust strategy to advance the scientific and technical understanding of artificial consciousness. (shrink)

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world’s scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a ‘10 second survey’, where the participant is presented with a single statement (...) to consider, and a standard five-point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. (shrink)

Recent philosophical inquiry into the relations thought to metaphysically structure the world has largely focused on the notion of metaphysical grounding, whereas previously analytic metaphysicians tended to talk in terms of ontological dependence. This raises the question of how metaphysical grounding and ontological dependence relate to one another. In this article, I sketch a picture of grounding as a form of metaphysically substantive sufficient condition and ontological dependence as a form of metaphysically substantive necessary condition, anchored in widely accepted principles (...) for how these relations work. As a case study, I apply this picture to Jack Casey's recent attempt to reduce ontological dependence to a special case of grounding. I argue that Casey's account fails and I show how the picture of grounding and ontological dependence presented here helps us diagnose where the account goes wrong, as well as how it makes sense of the phenomena Casey's account struggles with without having to resort to any ad hoc maneuvers. Thinking of grounding as a form of metaphysically substantive sufficient condition and ontological dependence as a form of metaphysically substantive necessary condition is thus shown to help sharpen our understanding of these phenomena and provide minimal constraints on any purported reductive account of one of the phenomena in terms of the other. (shrink)

In recent years, the hope to confirm the existence of dark matter by experimentally detecting it has diminished significantly. After more than 30 years of experimental searches, many of the most promising candidates have since been ruled out, leaving the epistemic and scientific condition of dark matter in a state of suspension. In efforts to improve the epistemic justification for the dark-matter hypothesis, physicists have turned to philosophical arguments and historical narratives. In this paper, I explicate two such strategies -- (...) explanatory unification and historical continuity -- applied in the context of dark matter. I argue that greater care and attention should be invested in the explanatory arguments to increase their strength, and that a survey of primary historical sources in astronomy renders the historical evidence for the continuity of dark matter substantially weaker. The quality and rigor of the philosophical and historical arguments which physicists are constructing could be substantially improved by increasing interdisciplinary practices. (shrink)

The paper defends the thesis that future tensed statements have truth values that can change over time. In relativistic approaches to the evaluation of future contingents (MacFarlane, 2003, 2007), only changes in the truth status of such statements from neither-true-nor-false to definitely true (or definitely false) are taken into consideration. More precisely, given the monotonicity property of the model of historical possibilities, for which historical alternatives to a world w at a time t increase moving backward and shrink moving forward (...) in time with respect to t (Thomason, 1984), only such changes are predicted to be possible. I will consider the theoretical possibility of truth value transitions for future contingents from true to false and from false to true, as well as some potential linguistic evidence for such transitions - drawn from certain uses of phase adverbs like still, no longer, and always in English and Romance. To deal with the natural language data, I will propose a situation-based version of Branching Time which accommodates partiality of information, and a revision of the Kaplanian notion of truth-in-context. (shrink)

In this philosophical reflection, I consider a certain ethical quandary that arises upon loving another person in order to reduce one’s loneliness. More specifically, I suppose that there is something right about the Frankfurt School psychologist and social philosopher Erich Fromm’s powerful dictum that an infantile love takes the form of ‘I love you because I need you’, whereas a mature love is typified by ‘I need you because I love you’. On the face of it, it seems that loving (...) another person in order to reduce one’s loneliness would unavoidably be an instance of the infantile form. However, after spelling out this challenge, I advance three potential responses to it, that is, three ways one could love to reduce one’s loneliness while successfully avoiding an infantile form. One strategy involves drawing a distinction between treating another merely as a means and treating another as a means, a second between reducing loneliness as an end of love and as a constraint on it, and a third between reducing loneliness as a final end and as an intermediate end towards the benefit of the beloved. (shrink)

Within educational science and communication science, the concepts of scientific literacy and effectiveness of science communication have been intensely debated in relation to the free types of education, but the research did not focus on the specificity of their target (the general public) in relation to the specificity of their object (science). In general, research maintained an exclusively externalist view for these concepts and associated them with the complexity and diversity of teaching science and less with the epistemic dimension of (...) science communication as a transfer of understandable knowledge in particular conditions. This prospected research advances an internalist view on these concepts, aiming to answer the question of whether science communication (with a conceptual meaning that embeds understanding, message, and goal) to the general public is possible and in what form, within an epistemological theoretical framework. (shrink)

We have, to some extent, a duty to help the needy—to meet their basic needs for food, water, shelter, and health care. Call this the duty of beneficence. Below, I argue that it is best understood as a duty both (a) to adopt helping the needy as “a serious, major, continually relevant, life-shaping end” (HILL 2002, 206) and (b) to never behave in a way (via act or omission) that’s incompatible with having such an end. I call this the Kantian (...) View, and I argue that it has several advantages over four of its rivals. In particular, I argue that it has the advantage of being able to account for all the following: (1) a diachronic (over-time) duty to take a sufficient number of favorable opportunities for helping the needy over the course of our lives, (2) a synchronic (at-a-time) duty to take every golden opportunity to help the needy that arises, and (3) the relationship between the two. (shrink)

Tatiana Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa was an important physicist, mathematician, and educator in 20th century Europe. While some of her work has recently undergone reevaluation, little has been said regarding her groundbreaking work on dimensional analysis. This, in part, reflects an unfortunate dismissal of her interventions in such foundational debates by her contemporaries. In spite of this, her work on the generalized theory of homogeneous equations provides a mathematically sound foundation for dimensional analysis and has found some appreciation and development. It remains to (...) provide a historical account of Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa's use of the theory of homogeneous functions to ground (and limit) dimensional analysis. We take as a central focus Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa's contributions to a debate on the foundations of dimensional analysis started by physicist Richard Tolman in 1914. I go on to suggest an interpretation of the more thoroughgoing intervention Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa makes in 1926 based on this earlier context, especially her limited rehabilitation of a "theory of similitude" in contradistinction to dimensional analysis. It is shown that Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa has made foundational contributions to the mathematical foundations and methodology of dimensional analysis, our conception of the relation between constants and laws, and our understanding of the quantitative nature of physics, which remain of value. (shrink)

Hermann Hesse's works often explore deep philosophical themes and the human quest for self-understanding and enlightenment. His writing draws heavily from Eastern philosophy, Jungian psychology, and Western existentialism, creating a rich tapestry of ideas that challenge and inspire readers. Hermann Hesse's philosophical exploration in his works offers profound insights into the human condition, emphasizing the importance of personal experience, the integration of dualities, and the interconnectedness of all life. His writings encourage readers to embark on their own journeys of self-discovery, (...) recognizing that enlightenment is a continuous, evolving process. Here, we'll examine some of the key philosophical elements present in his most famous works. -/- The Search for Self-Identity At the heart of Siddhartha is the quest for self-identity. Siddhartha's journey represents the human struggle to understand one's true self and purpose in life. This theme resonates with existentialist philosophy, which emphasizes the individual's responsibility to create meaning in an inherently meaningless world. Siddhartha's refusal to accept predefined paths and doctrines underscores the existentialist belief in the necessity of personal experience and authenticity in the search for self-identity. -/- 1. Siddhartha: The Quest for Authenticity In Siddhartha, the protagonist's journey is a vivid representation of the search for self-identity. From the outset, Siddhartha is dissatisfied with the conventional teachings and practices of his Brahmin upbringing. His quest for authenticity drives him to leave his home and explore various paths, including asceticism, sensual indulgence, and finally, a contemplative life by the river. Siddhartha's journey reflects existentialist themes, particularly the idea that true self-identity cannot be handed down through tradition or external teachings. Instead, it must be discovered through personal experience and introspection. This aligns with the existentialist notion that individuals must create their own essence through their actions and choices, rather than conforming to predefined roles or expectations. -/- 2. Steppenwolf: The Duality of the Self In Steppenwolf, Hesse delves into the complexities of self-identity through the character of Harry Haller. Harry is torn between his human side, which longs for connection and meaning, and his "wolf" side, which is driven by instinct and isolation. This inner conflict illustrates the duality inherent in human nature and the struggle to reconcile these opposing aspects. Hesse's exploration of Harry's psyche resonates with the Jungian concept of the individuation process, where the integration of the conscious and unconscious parts of the self leads to wholeness. Harry's journey is a quest for self-identity that involves confronting and accepting the darker, shadowy parts of his personality. This process of self-discovery is both painful and liberating, underscoring the idea that true self-identity emerges from embracing all facets of one's being. -/- 3. Demian: The Role of the Unconscious Demian is another key work in which Hesse explores the search for self-identity, focusing on the protagonist Emil Sinclair's journey toward self-realization. Guided by the enigmatic Max Demian, Sinclair learns to listen to his inner voice and question societal norms. The novel emphasizes the importance of the unconscious mind in the search for self-identity, drawing on Jungian psychology. Sinclair's experiences highlight the tension between conforming to societal expectations and following one's inner truth. His journey reflects the existentialist idea that individuals must break free from external constraints to discover their true selves. Hesse suggests that the path to self-identity involves a deep engagement with the unconscious mind and an acceptance of one's inner conflicts and desires. -/- ………………………………….. The Concept of Impermanence -/- One of the central philosophical concepts in Siddhartha is impermanence, a fundamental tenet of Buddhist philosophy. The novel illustrates the transient nature of all things, emphasizing that nothing in life is permanent or unchanging. Siddhartha's experiences with love, wealth, and asceticism teach him that attachment to transient phenomena leads to suffering. This aligns with the Buddhist teaching of Anicca, which posits that recognizing and accepting impermanence is essential for achieving enlightenment. -/- Siddhartha: The Transient Nature of Life In Siddhartha, Hesse’s exploration of impermanence is central to the protagonist’s spiritual journey. Siddhartha’s experiences reflect the Buddhist teaching of Anicca, which posits that all things are in a constant state of flux and that clinging to anything impermanent leads to suffering. -/- Throughout the novel, Siddhartha undergoes various transformations—from a Brahmin’s son to an ascetic, a lover, a merchant, and finally, a ferryman. Each phase of his life teaches him about the transient nature of existence. His realization that neither extreme asceticism nor indulgence provides lasting fulfillment underscores the futility of seeking permanence in an impermanent world. -/- The river, a recurring symbol in the novel, epitomizes the flow of life and the constant change inherent in all things. Siddhartha’s enlightenment comes when he embraces the river’s wisdom, understanding that true peace lies in accepting the impermanence of all experiences. -/- Steppenwolf: The Ephemeral Nature of Identity Steppenwolf delves into the theme of impermanence through the internal conflict of its protagonist, Harry Haller. Harry’s struggle with his dual nature—the civilized man and the untamed wolf—reflects the fluidity and transient nature of identity. Hesse portrays identity not as a fixed entity but as a dynamic interplay of opposing forces. -/- The novel’s surreal episodes, particularly in the Magic Theater, emphasize the impermanent nature of reality and the self. Harry’s experiences in the theater reveal the illusory and ever-changing aspects of his perceptions and identity. Hesse suggests that true self-understanding requires embracing the impermanence and multiplicity of one’s nature. -/- The Glass Bead Game: The Impermanence of Human Endeavors -/- In The Glass Bead Game, Hesse explores the impermanence of human knowledge and cultural achievements. The game itself, a complex intellectual synthesis of arts and sciences, represents the pinnacle of human endeavor. However, the novel’s setting in a distant future where the game’s origins and significance have been largely forgotten underscores the transient nature of all human creations. -/- The protagonist, Joseph Knecht, ultimately realizes that the pursuit of intellectual perfection through the game is insufficient for a meaningful life. His decision to leave the Order and experience the impermanent, unpredictable world outside reflects his acceptance of life’s impermanence. Knecht’s journey illustrates that true wisdom involves embracing the fleeting nature of human existence and engaging fully with the present moment. -/- Hesse’s exploration of impermanence invites readers to reflect on their own lives and the ways in which the recognition of life’s fleeting nature can lead to greater wisdom and fulfillment. By embracing the impermanence of all things, Hesse suggests, individuals can attain a deeper appreciation of the present moment and the interconnectedness of all experiences. (shrink)

This essay explores the discoved place in human noosphere called as "Cosmos-not-Here," encompassing the speculative realms of science fiction, religious eschatology, and theoretical astrophysics. The content of "Cosmos-not-Here" contrasts with the same of "Cosmos-Here," representing humanity's tangible explorations and mastery of the physical universe. The text delves into how the Cosmos-not-Here operates as a mental construct, offering humanity an imaginative escape into utopian visions and hypertextual narratives, while disregarding the constraints of established physical laws. -/- The discussion emphasizes humanity's innate (...) psychological drive, metaphorically expressed as "forward and upward," linking it to a sacred yearning for cosmic harmony and expansion. This drive manifests culturally in phenomena like Russian aspirations, illustrated by the "Gagarin Smile," and the global fascination with cosmic-themed speculative fiction, games, and spiritual constructs such as astrology. -/- The essay concludes by identifying a universal "Cosmic-We" ethos, characterized by a shared attraction to the cosmos as a concept of transcendence and infinite potential, reflecting humanity's enduring pursuit of meaning beyond the utilitarian confines of terrestrial existence. The analysis reveals the philosophical resonance of this semantic cluster with ancient and medieval cosmologies, suggesting its timeless significance in human thought. (shrink)

This essay delves into the potential non-Western contributions to the technosphere by exploring Russian perspectives within Yuk Hui’s framework of cosmotechnics. Hui's concept emphasizes "good technology"—aligned with local cosmologies and moral practices, integrating sustainability and ecological preservation. By drawing parallels with China's distinct cosmological underpinnings in technical creativity, the essay questions whether Russian civilization can provide similarly unique contributions. The text investigates the evolution of the technosphere, distinguishing between instrumental and bio-artificial components, while situating Russian technical thought within broader global (...) contrasts. Despite an outward resemblance to Western technological development, Russia’s distinctiveness emerges in social technologies, state-driven innovation, and its cosmological foundation, particularly the "Russian cosmism" of the 1960s. Through a focus on co-creation with God, universal responsibility, and theoretical prioritization, the essay identifies multidimensional understanding and the moral imperative of service as hallmarks of Russian technical creativity. These features highlight a unique trajectory that complements Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics, emphasizing Russia’s potential to enrich global discussions on decolonizing technology. (shrink)

This essay explores the distinct characteristics of Russian technical thinking within the framework of Yuk Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics. Hui’s proposal emphasizes “good technology,” which aligns with local cosmological perspectives and moral practices, as an essential component of the technosphere’s decolonization. The analysis contrasts Russian approaches to technical creativity with those of the West and China, highlighting the synthesis of collective and individual efforts through archetypal imagery such as the campfire and the reverence for “bookish wisdom.” Central to the essay (...) is the idea that Russian technical thinking, rooted in cosmism and conciliarity, integrates multidimensional understanding and co-creation with God, fostering a sense of universal responsibility. This perspective manifests in the prioritization of theoretical knowledge, unconventional problem-solving, and the moral imperative to serve humanity. Despite similarities to Western technological practices in material aspects, Russia’s unique contributions lie in its social technologies and motivational frameworks, which remain underexplored within global perspectives. The essay argues that these features provide a valuable addition to cosmotechnics and demonstrate the potential for alternative intellectual trajectories beyond Western paradigms. (shrink)

This papers responds to a recent argument by Sophie Gibert concerning the wrong of wrongful manipulation. I argue that the more serious explanatory question is whether manipulation is wrong by default, not whether, when manipulation is wrong, this wrong is ‘basic’. The former better elucidates the significance of Gibert’s arguments. I then respond to her argument, construed as the argument that manipulation is not wrong by default. First, the putative counterexamples she presents are drawn from areas of work and play (...) – legal advocacy, negotiation, and gameplay – where the moral status of manipulative tactics is very much in dispute; thus, her reported intuitions are not persuasive. Second, even if we grant that manipulation in these contexts is morally permissible, we can explain how it remains wrong by default by appealing to competitive conventions that realize common epistemic, aesthetic, and hedonistic goods. I also show why Gibert’s reply to this conventionalist maneuver fails. (shrink)

Decision making is a fundamental aspect of cognition that lies at the heart of theories about behaviour, learning, and mental processing. It spans multiple levels of complexity, from high-level planning to low-level movement control and perceptual recognition. Tracking the evolutionary trajectory of this elementary cognitive process can illuminate the foundations of behaviour and brain functions. This paper highlights a previously understudied defining feature of decision mechanisms: the ways in which mutual exclusion between alternatives is achieved. We argue that any decision (...) is defined by a set of mutually exclusive alternatives, and this exclusivity – rather than the specific identity of the alternatives – requires specialized mechanisms. We demonstrate how the physical body of simple decision-making entities can serve as such a mechanism, and that the detachment of these mechanisms from bodily and environmental constraints enabled complex decision-making. Furthermore, while many theories emphasize how the evolution of neural circuits enhanced integration and control through associative structures, we propose that the evolution of mutual exclusion requires non-associative constructions. We conclude that understanding the evolution of these mechanisms is crucial for studying cognitive evolution, and we propose a potential evolutionary trajectory. (shrink)

This article targets the use of unclaimed bodies at American medical schools. Despite a growing sensitivity to the ethics of whole body donation in the field of clinical anatomy, unclaimed bodies continue to be used in teaching and research across the United States. I argue that the ongoing use of unclaimed bodies is unethical on the basis of its disregard for autonomy and consent, its potential to harm various individuals and groups, considerations of justice, and the threat it poses to (...) public trust in medical institutions. Additionally, I show how the best available defenses of the use of unclaimed bodies fail to be ethically persuasive. I argue that whole body donation ethically requires either the prior consent of the deceased or the explicit permission of their next of kin. Finally, I offer practical suggestions for institutions transitioning away from the use of unclaimed bodies. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. Although spiritual experiences do occur, they are better explained by the science of superdeterminism then by a spiritual realm. In (...) order for a spiritual realm to interact with our universe, it would have to be part of our universe and hence cannot be a spiritual realm. The afterlife, divine communication and mysterious phenomena, like consciousness, can all be explained by the known science of superdeterminism without resort to an unknown spiritual realm. (shrink)

The field of AI safety seeks to prevent or reduce the harms caused by AI systems. A simple and appealing account of what is distinctive of AI safety as a field holds that this feature is constitutive: a research project falls within the purview of AI safety just in case it aims to prevent or reduce the harms caused by AI systems. Call this appealingly simple account The Safety Conception of AI safety. Despite its simplicity and appeal, we argue that (...) The Safety Conception is in tension with at least two trends in the ways AI safety researchers and organizations think and talk about AI safety: first, a tendency to characterize the goal of AI safety research in terms of catastrophic risks from future systems; second, the increasingly popular idea that AI safety can be thought of as a branch of safety engineering. Adopting the methodology of conceptual engineering, we argue that these trends are unfortunate: when we consider what concept of AI safety it would be best to have, there are compelling reasons to think that The Safety Conception is the answer. Descriptively, The Safety Conception allows us to see how work on topics that have historically been treated as central to the field of AI safety is continuous with work on topics that have historically been treated as more marginal, like bias, misinformation, and privacy. Normatively, taking The Safety Conception seriously means approaching all efforts to prevent or mitigate harms from AI systems based on their merits rather than drawing arbitrary distinctions between them. (shrink)

After reporting in detail Aristotle’s texts and comments on the well-known motion paradoxes Arrow, Dichotomy, Achilles and Stadium, tracking back to the 5th century BCE and credited by Aristotle to Zeno of Elea, we next explain and dis-cuss traditional continuous solutions of the paradoxes, based on Cauchy’s limit concept. Afterward, the heated philosophical debate on supertasks and infinity machines is reported before the paradoxes are examined within the context of modern quantum theory. Already in 1905, Einstein concluded that matter could (...) not be a continuous thing. Classical continuous spacetime is replaced by ‘granular’ spacetime, and the concept of distance in granular spacetime is discussed. This is followed by a detailed presentation of modern discrete solutions in granular spacetime, several of which are published here for the first time. Finally, a procedure is presented to determine when traditional continuous methods suffice instead of discrete methods, and the handling of discrete versus continuous in physics is briefly reported. (shrink)

In this introductory essay, I articulate a puzzle that is central for our understanding of ourselves as minded beings bound to live finite lives. I argue that our finitude is not something that can be set aside for the purposes of the philosophical inquiry into the mind. Grappling with it is an essential component of this inquiry.

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The unity of our universe originates from its creation from the same nothingness under the zero energy universe theory. However, (...) nothingness cannot actually cause a universe to exist on its own under superdeterminism due to the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, nothingness is the absence of anything real and cannot logically be the reality underlying our universe. Consequently, our universe must exist from the reality of the logic or Logos underlying our physical reality resulting from the origination of our universe from the same nothingness or common creation. (shrink)

This chapter explores the conceptual relation of facts about racial injustice to two key aspects of Rawls’s ideal theory. First, it explains why Rawls excludes race from his representation of a well-ordered society and why he believes this exclusion does not mean that justice as fairness cannot support racial justice. Second, it considers three recent accounts of the justificatory role of facts about racial injustice in justice as fairness, focusing on the methods of the Original Position and Reflective Equilibrium. It (...) concludes with a reinterpretation of the method of Reflective Equilibrium that shows why it provides a promising pathway for showcasing the explicit role of facts about racial realities in ideal theory. Namely, their consideration can add justification to the idea of justice as fairness. (shrink)

Aristotelian Naturalism is an ethics on which moral goodness is a species of natural goodness—the kind of goodness we find on display in other creatures whose habits and activities enable them to thrive. What it takes for humans to be good is to have habits and engage in activities that contribute to human flourishing. The primary aim of the book is to present a version of Aristotelian Naturalism enriched by empirical evidence and responsive to criticisms from feminist and disability ethics. (...) On the revisionist, Pluralist Aristotelian Naturalism developed here, human goodness is not a single, unitary ideal to which all humans should aim. Instead, it instead admits of real diversity, just as goodness in general admits of diversity across various species. There is a plurality of human goodnesses, and consequently, a variety of sets of human virtues that promote human flourishing in its many forms. The book explicates an Aristotelian methodology of ethics on which we must use philosophical reasoning to integrate observational evidence about the shape life forms take and the dispositions that contribute to good human lives. When we observe about what humans are and do in order to thrive in a wide array of bodies, social-political contexts, and environments, this puts pressure on the standard Aristotelian Naturalist singular ideal of human goodness as depicted by a flourishing neurotypical, able-bodied, resource-rich mature adult. Rather, we have reason to think that there is such substantial variation in human forms of life, and in what people can do and be in order to flourish, that there is not one human goodness and one set of virtues. Instead, there is a diversity of forms of human goodness, all equally valuable—whether the goodness of young children, adolescents, for people with intellectual disabilities, in old age, for people living in affluent democratic states, and for those managing to be good while under oppression in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, when we achieve one kind of human goodness, this changes what we are able to do and be. By being good in one way, we acquire the capacity to be good in another way. Thus we learn that most of us, for most of our lives, are simultaneously being and becoming good. (shrink)

A conversation between three characters: Credulus, who thinks conscious mental states can and should be attributed to other animals without any need for scientific inquiry; Skepticus, a critic with behaviorist leanings; and Moderus, who sees a middle path in the emerging science of animal consciousness.

Philosophers across a range of historical traditions and in contemporary metaethics have debated how nature relates to moral obligations. This debate among interpreters of Aquinas has seemed particularly intransigent. The present essay proposes an interpretation of Aquinas’s view of moral obligations that embraces elements of both the neoscholastic view and the New Natural Law view, standard moral naturalism and nonnaturalism, by holding together two things typically thought to be in opposition: there is a necessary role for facts about human nature (...) in the very grounds of moral obligations, and those facts are insufficient to determine what specific obligations there are, so a person’s practical reasoning must operate to generate obligations. Practical reason’s role in grounding moral obligations does not make the natural facts morally inert, and the place of natural facts in the grounds of obligations does not jeopardize the place of non-natural facts about individuals’ practical reasoning in those grounds. (shrink)

In ‘Treating Adolescents Differently’, Skelton, Black, and Forsberg develop their wellbeing-based justification of the asymmetrical treatment of adolescent consent and refusal in the context of health care to justify the differential and paternalistic treatment of adolescents more generally. The core of the Skelton, Black, and Forsberg’s view is a variabilist theory of what is fundamentally and non-instrumentally prudentially good for adolescents, which includes the prudential value of what they call shielding—or the value of being insulated from full responsibility for their (...) choices. This theory of wellbeing, they argue, explains why adolescents may be treated differential and paternalistically in numerous domains. It is good for them to be shielded because it allows for a variety of freedom from making certain kinds of decisions in the absence of a safety net provided by others in supportive and caring relationships. Skelton, Black, and Forsberg argue that their account of the justification of differential and paternalistic treatment of adolescents has attractive implications for a range of cases and holds up well in the face of philosophical criticism. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. A prominent theory in cosmology is that our universe originated from a random quantum fluctuation. However, some object that such (...) a large universe creating quantum fluctuation is much less likely to occur than Boltzmann Brains or even a small universe creating quantum fluctuation. But, any quantum event can be predetermined to occur at any time by the Creator of our universe. Consequently, a large universe creating quantum fluctuation occurring at the beginning of time can be predetermined to occur before any appearance of Boltzmann Brains or small universe creating quantum fluctuations. The philosophy of superdeterminism regards our universe from quantum fluctuation to be a predetermined miraculous quantum event by a Creator God. (shrink)

Purity is the principle that fundamental facts only have fundamental constituents. In recent years, it has played a significant role in metaphysical theorizing—but its logical foundations are underdeveloped. I argue that recent advances in higher-order logic reveal a subtle ambiguity regarding Purity’s interpretation; there are stronger and weaker versions of that principle. The arguments for Purity only support the weaker interpretation, but arguments that employ it only succeed if the stronger interpretation is true. As a result, nearly every metaphysician who (...) has appealed to Purity has made a mistake—in that the inferences that they make are not justified by the arguments that they provide. (shrink)

As mounting evidence highlights the human-driven extinction of avian species, reconnecting people with nature—particularly these feathered creatures—has become essential for engaging the public in conservation and the preservation of avian biodiversity. Paradoxically, heightened awareness of the benefits birds bring has fueled the rise of aviary bird-keeping for entertainment in Vietnam. This paper seeks to unravel the absurdity of bird keepers who claim to love nature and support conservation while engaging in practices that exploit and commodify birds for human interests. By (...) contrasting the values generated by birds in aviaries with those in their natural habitats, it underscores the role of an eco-deficit culture—or, more fundamentally, humanity's insatiable greed—in fostering this absurd form of "nature love.". (shrink)

Why are computers so smart these days? And why are humans apparently still a bit smarter? Does this have something to do with the difference between data and meaning? Does this in turn mean that at least some abstract entities, such as numbers, exist independently of human thought? Wouldn’t that require an expansion of our scientific world view? And would that at all be compatible with what we know about our world from physics and chemistry, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and the (...) theory of evolution? Finally, what would this tell us about ethical and aesthetic value theories? These and related questions will be discussed in this book. We will find that the difference between data and meaning, i.e. quantitative and qualitative information, does indeed appear to be of central importance for understanding both artificial and natural intelligence. And then the independent existence of abstract entities not only appears to be a particularly promising hypothesis, but also one that is entirely compatible with the sum of our scientific knowledge, especially with regard to value theories. The book thus arrives at the exploration of a scientifically tenable, panpsychistically inspired, objective idealism that can be derived from our most fundamental intuitions as subjects that perceive qualities, but that can also take into account the structuring of the world already at the micro-scale, found in the modern natural sciences. The result is a Platonic, but in a second step also a scientific realism and a naturalism in the sense that it is informed by the natural sciences in terms of an inductive metaphysics. An objective idealism, not in a rationalistic maximum form, but in a pragmatic minimum form; without eternal truths, but dependent on the continued philosophical-scientific and also philosophicalsocial dialog. The proposed model could offer interesting solutions to a number of problems at and near the mind/matter boundary: Proposals are being considered for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the problem of molecular symmetry, the neuronal code and the binding problem in neuroscience, mental causation, a more holistic understanding of mental processes, and so on and so forth. However, the extent to which the model threatens to promise far too much is also being discussed. In sum, the core question is how we can imagine human thinking beyond physically conceived information processing. An alternative model of human thinking is then put up for discussion, for which not only machine-like cognitive performance, but above all the intentional perception of qualitative information, i.e. of abstract entities, would be central, as well as the free, ultimately creative linking of patterns of quantitative information (signals, data) with such qualities (meanings). (shrink)

The convergence of humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems introduces new dynamics into the cultural and intellectual landscape. Complementing emerging cultural evolution concepts such as machine culture, AI agents represent a significant techno-sociological development, particularly within the anthropological study of Web3 as a community focused on decentralization through blockchain. Despite their growing presence, the cultural significance of AI agents remains largely unexplored in academic literature. Toward this end, we conceived hybrid netnography, a novel interdisciplinary approach that examines the cultural and (...) intellectual dynamics within digital ecosystems by analyzing the interactions and contributions of both human and AI agents as co-participants in shaping narratives, ideas, and cultural artifacts. We argue that, within the Web3 community on the social media platform X, these agents challenge traditional notions of participation and influence in public discourse, creating a “hybrid marketplace of ideas”—a conceptual space where human- and AI-generated ideas coexist and compete for attention. We examine the current state of AI agents in idea generation, propagation, and engagement, positioning their role as cultural agents through the lens of memetics and encouraging further inquiry into their cultural and societal impact. Additionally, we address the implications of this paradigm for privacy, intellectual property, and governance, highlighting the societal and legal challenges of integrating AI agents into the hybrid marketplace of ideas. (shrink)

Abstract. Gettier’s famous examples intended to show that knowledge cannot always be equated with justified true belief. The Gettier problem can also be considered as a problem for topological epistemic logic: If knowledge and justified belief are conceived as topological operators K and B on topological spaces (to be considered as universes of possible worlds), one may ask whether it happens that there is a proposition A such that KA ≠ A & BA or not. If this is the case, (...) the epistemological logic defined by the topological operators K and B may be said to be non-traditional since there is for them a “Gettier proposition” where knowledge does not coincide with justified true belief. As far as we know, for the first time, this topological Gettier problem is discussed in Steinvold’s PhD dissertation (Steinsvold 2012). In Baltag, Bezhanishvili, Özgün, and Smets (2013), Steinvold’s co-derived set account is criticized since it can be easily “Gettierized”. Baltag et alii claim (without proof) that their topological account of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief does not have this flaw. In the following we will give some topological conditions that determine whether a topological KB model does or does not cope with the Gettier challenge. First, it will be shown that every KB model defines a (topologically slightly simplified) model that is rather similar to it but a is a model of traditional JTB (knowledge = justified true belief) logic of knowledge and belief. The existence of such doppelgangers of all KB models may be read as a qualified and partial topological rehabilitation of traditional JTB epistemology. Second, we consider the Gettier problem for a special class of models of Stalnaker’s combined logic of knowledge and belief KB, namely, for T0 Alexandroff spaces. We prove that, that almost all Alexandroff spaces do not face Gettier counterexamples. Third, we prove that the Stone spaces of Boolean algebras of regular closed subsets of Hausdorff (or T2) spaces X do not face Gettier counterexamples if the X are not pseu–docompact, and these Stone spaces do face Gettier counterexamples for compact spaces X. Succinctly formulated, Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief can avoid Gettier problems for some models, while it falls back to traditional pre-Gettier JTB epistemology for other models. In contrast, co-derived set semantics is doomed to fail always in the sense that its models always fall prey to Gettier counterexamples. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will discuss employing exemplars in moral and character education promoting virtue development with the involvement of embodiment. Virtue ethicists propose two phases of virtue development: early virtue habituation and later phronesis cultivation. I will overview prior research on the mechanism of habituation at the biological and neural levels to examine why embodiment is fundamental during the first phase, virtue habituation. Then, I will review recent philosophical and psychological studies about the nature of phronesis, i.e., practical wisdom, (...) to consider how educational activities cultivate it. Based on these preliminary examinations of the course of virtue development, I will examine the previous literature about the role and importance of using exemplars in moral and character education involving concrete and interactive activities with the exemplars involving embodiment during the learning process. Finally, I will draw upon the Self-determination theory about supporting students’ need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness to consider a way to improve the effectiveness of exemplar-applied education along with embodiment. After examining the relevant theoretical frameworks mentioned above, I will discuss several practical guidelines for using exemplars involving character embodiment for virtue development. (shrink)

We argue that four-dimensionalists should adopt a contextualist semantics, according to which ordinary speakers’ judgments may concern person-stages, person-segments or person-worms, depending on the context. We explain how context helps select the boundaries of the temporal parts we refer to or quantify over and show that contextualism offers the best treatment of ordinary predications and ordinary counting judgments. Contextualism implies an error theory; however, we explain why this error theory is less problematic than those entailed by the worm and stage (...) theories. (shrink)

The extraordinary success of recent Large Language Models (LLMs) on a diverse array of tasks has led to an explosion of scientific and philosophical theorizing aimed at explaining how they do what they do. Unfortunately, disagreement over fundamental theoretical issues has led to stalemate, with entrenched camps of LLM optimists and pessimists often committed to very different views of how these systems work. Overcoming stalemate requires agreement on fundamental questions, and the goal of this paper is to address one such (...) question, namely: is LLM behavior driven partly by representation-based information processing of the sort implicated in biological cognition, or is it driven entirely by processes of memorization and stochastic table look-up? This is a question about what kind of algorithm LLMs implement, and the answer carries serious implications for higher level questions about whether these systems have beliefs, intentions, concepts, knowledge, and understanding. I argue that LLM behavior is partially driven by representation-based information processing, and then I describe and defend a series of practical techniques for investigating these representations and developing explanations on their basis. The resulting account provides a groundwork for future theorizing about language models and their successors. (shrink)

This poster presents results from applying agent-based modeling to an exploration of risk attitudes and rational decision making in the context of group interaction. We are also interested in the place of agent-based modeling and computational philosophy within the computational humanities. Computational philosophy has not typically been included in Digital Humanities; computational work has been done using philosophy texts as a source for analysis (Kinney 2022; Malaterre et al. 2021; Fletcher et al. 2021; Zahorec et al. 2022), but there are (...) few examples of philosophical arguments being made based on computation (Zahorec et al. 2022). Modeling is largely accepted as a computational humanist method (McCarty 2004; So 2022), but typically models are based on data rather than designed simulations as a method analogous to a thought experiment (Mayo-Wilson / Zollman 2021). Agent-based modeling is not as common in computational humanities, but we are interested in its potential; for instance, see work modeling correspondence networks to better understand lost information and biases in correspondence data sets (Buarque / Vogl 2023), or work simulating past human societies (Romanowska et al. 2021). Our project explores Lara Buchak’s theory of risk-weighted rational decision making by extending it to the context of group populations and interactions. Buchak has proposed risk-weighted expected utility maximization, which incorporates individual risk attitudes into the standard expected utility (EU) calculation based on utility and probability of outcomes (Buchak 2017). This theory provides an explanation for differences of behavior seen in human populations, while still allowing those different choices to be rational. Buchak’s theory has previously only been applied to individual decision making; our work uses agent-based modeling to develop and analyze simulations which incorporate a variety of risk attitudes (risk avoidance and risk seeking) into game theoretic interactions. This project is a collaboration between a philosopher and a research software engineer; we have worked together to develop simulations that implement agents with risk attitudes making risky choices. This presentation focuses on results from an implementation of a hawk/dove game with multiple risk attitudes and risk attitude adjustment. In the hawk/dove game cooperation, or playing dove, is better for the population, but acting aggressively, or playing hawk, is better for an individual if they are in a neighborhood of doves. To set up the game, we place agents on a grid and have them play against each of their neighbors, and accumulate payoffs based on the success of their plays. We define risk attitudes 0 through 9, where that number corresponds to the minimum number of neighbors playing dove for an agent to play hawk. An agent with risk attitude 0 is most risk seeking and always plays hawk; an agent with risk attitude 1 will play hawk if at least one neighbor plays dove; an agent with risk attitude 9 always takes the safe choice and plays dove; an agent with risk attitude 4 or 5 is risk neutral (breaking ties in different ways), which corresponds to expected utility. In this simulation we randomly set agent initial risk attitudes, and then every ten rounds agents compare their payoffs with their neighbors and adopt the most successful risk attitude in their neighborhood. The simulation is coded to stop once risk attitude adjustments stabilize. We define 13 different population states based on primary and second majority of risk averse, risk inclined, or risk moderate, and analysis of over 1 million runs indicate that while it’s more likely to stabilize with the population having become majority risk inclined, that is not the only outcome; we also see cases where the population stabilizes as risk neutral, risk avoidant, and many cases with no clear majority. This diversity of stable populations provides support for the argument that no one risk attitude is uniquely rational, but rather that risk attitudes are conventional. This matches what we observe in the real world: that different populations have different risk attitudes. Our simulations include numerous parameters to vary grid size; adjustment frequency, strategy, and wealth comparison; neighborhood sizes for observing previous choice, playing against, and comparing payoffs for adjusting risk attitudes; and different distributions for initializing risk attitudes. Analysis of parameters and adjusted risk attitudes shows that the strongest correlations are the initial distribution of risk attitudes, which tend to be preserved. * * * This poster was accepted and presented at the DH2024 conference in Washington, D.C. (shrink)

Reconciling the many “faces” of Peirce – the Scientist, Philosopher, and Metaphysician - helps to make sense of the open-endedness and versatility of semiotics. Semiosis, for Peirce, knows no rigid hermeneutic or disciplinary bounds. It thus forces us to be open to interdisciplinary and holistic inquiries. The pragmatic maxim sets limits on metaphysical speculation, but it also legitimates the extension of the experimentalist method into cosmological, metaphysical, and even religious domains. Although Peirce's religious speculations are ultimately unsatisfactory, understanding why Peirce (...) expanded his thinking to such domains reveals the expansionist logic of Peircean semiotics beyond the mere idiosyncracies of the man. The triadic, dynamic logic of pragmatist inquiry seeks to expand to all social processes of fixing belief and forming habits, however quixotic; but it remains dubious whether such expansion can fully comport to the scientific, experimentalist method that Peirce preferred. (shrink)

Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie geht hinsichtlich ihres Verständnisses von Erkenntnis vom heuristischen Kurzschluss des Inhalts mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Diesem Kurzschluss korrespondiert die Idee von Wahrhei im Sinne einer irgendwie gearteten Übereinstimmung zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Das Problem das daraus entsteht ist die Frage der Überprüfbarkeit dieser Übereinstimmung, die einen transzendenten Standpunkt voraussetzen würde, der mangels Existenz zu einem reinen Fluchtpunkt der Reflexion wird. Der Standpunkt der Reflexion entspricht der Einnahme eines transzendenten Standpunkts, der dennoch im erkennenden Subjekt (...) verankert ist. Die Frage der Übereinstimmung wird so zu einer Frage der Gewissheit. Diese führt zu einem zweiten, diesmal theoretischen Kurzschluss, nämlich der Verquickung der eigentlichen Frage einer Theorie des Phänomens Erkenntnis, der Frage nach der Genese (bzw. Generierung) des Inhalts der Erkenntnis, mit der Frage der Gewissheit dieses Inhalts. Diese Verquickung führt schließlich zur Frage, welche (per definitionem subjektiven) Elemente des Erkenntnisvorgangs Gewissheit verbürgen können, und somit zu einer weiteren, dritten, nämlich methodischen Kurzschluss durch die Definition der (in Wahrheit holistischen) Erkenntnissituation im Sinne eines Subjekt-Objekt-Gegensatzes und den damit verbundenen Ausschluss des Wissens der empirischen Naturwissenschaften aus der Erkenntnisreflexion. Ziel dieser kurzen Arbeit (die die Einleitung zu einer kürzlich erschienen Publikation mit dem Titel: 'Rehabilitation der reinen Vernunft' darstellt), ist es, im Wege der Rückabwicklung dieser Kurzschlüsse in umgekehrter Reihenfolge zu einem adäquaten Verständnis des Phänomens Erkenntnis zu finden, also ausgehend von der affirmativen Kenntnisnahme des Holismus der realen Erkenntnissituation, der subjektive Gewissheit als vernünftiges Erkenntnisziel von vornherein ausschließt. (shrink)

The pursuit of science is a specific form of cognitive activity that is guided by concrete heuristic objectives and corresponding standards in terms of its methodological approach. The philosophy of science pursues the goal of analyzing scientific cognitive activity against the background of epistemology. The core problem of traditional philosophical epistemology, and with it the current philosophy of science, according to my thesis, consists in the heuristic short-circuiting of the content with the object of knowledge. This manifests itself directly in (...) its focus on the heuristic standard of certainty of our knowledge, based on the metaphysical assumption of the determinacy of things in themselves (which correlates with the supposition of the mode of description as the paradigm of cognitive activity in general). The main thesis of this paper will be that this short-circuit leads to a suppression of the role of heuristics as a fundamental factor of cognitive activity, and in its consequence to a descriptive misunderstanding of the deconstructive mathematical heuristic of physics (with its focus on dynamical phenomena) in terms of mere decomposition. Owing to the role of physics as a fundamental science, the consequences of this misunderstanding are far-reaching. Particularly for the scientific self-understanding of biology, namely in the sense of the heuristic goal of analytically decomposing biological entities into physical ones and reducing biological phenomena to physical laws. This goal clearly contradicts the deconstructive methodological approach of physics, whose only yardstick is the appropriateness of the reconstruction of the phenomena under consideration. (shrink)

Das Betreiben von Wissenschaft ist eine spezifische Form von Erkenntnistätigkeit, die bezüglich ihrer methodischen Vorgangsweise von konkreten heuristischen Zielsetzungen und korrespondierenden Maßstäben geleitet ist. Die Wissenschaftstheorie verfolgt das Ziel einer Analyse der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnistätigkeit vor dem Hintergrund der Erkenntnistheorie. Das Kernproblem der traditionellen philosophischen Erkenntnistheorie, und mit ihr der gängigen Wissenschaftstheorie, so meine These, besteht in dem heuristischen Kurzschluss des Inhalts mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Dieser manifestiert sich auf direkte Weise in ihrem Fokus auf den heuristischen Maßstab der Gewissheit (...) unseres Wissens, gestützt auf die metaphysische Annahme der Bestimmtheit der Dinge an sich (der die Annahme von Deskription als Paradigma von Erkenntnis im allgemeinen korrepondiert). Die Hauptthese dieser Abhandlung wird sein, dass dieser Kurzschluss zu einer Ausblendung der Rolle der Heuristik als grundlegender Erkenntnisfaktor führt, und in seiner Konsequenz zum deskriptiven Missverständnis der dekonstruktiven mathematischen Heuristik der Physik (mit ihrem Fokus auf die dynamnischen Phänomene) im Sinne von bloßer Dekomposition. Die Folgen dieses Missverständnisses sind, der Rolle der Physik als Grundlagenwissenschaft geschuldet, weitreichend. Insbesondere für das wissenschaftliche Selbstverständnis der Biologie, im Sinne des Ziels, biologische Entitäten analytisch in physikalische zu zerlegen und biologische Phänomene auf physikalische Gesetze zu reduzieren. Dieses Ziel widerspricht klar der dekonstruktiven methodischen Vorgangsweise der Physik, deren einziger Maßstab in der Angemessenheit der Rekonstruktion der betreffenden Phänomene besteht. (shrink)

Traditional epistemology bases its understanding of cognition on the heuristic short-circuiting of the content with the object of cognition. This short-circuit corresponds to the idea of truth in the sense of some kind of correspondence between the content and the object of knowledge. The problem that arises from this is the question of the verifiability of this correspondence, which would presuppose a transcendent standpoint that, for lack of existence, becomes a mere vanishing point of reflection. The standpoint of reflection corresponds (...) to the adoption of a transcendent standpoint that is nevertheless anchored in the cognizing subject. The question of correspondence thus becomes a question of certainty. This leads to a second, this time theoretical short-circuit, namely the conflation of the actual question of a theory of the phenomenon of cognition, the question of the genesis (or generation) of the content of cognition, with the question of the certainty of this content. This conflation ultimately leads to the question of which (by definition subjective) elements of the cognitive process can guarantee certainty, and thus to a further, third, namely methodological short-circuit through the definition of the (in truth holistic) cognitive situation in terms of a subject-object opposition and the associated exclusion of the knowledge of the empirical natural sciences from cognitive reflection. The aim of this short paper (which is the introduction to a recent publication entitled 'Rehabilitation of Pure Reason') is to find an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of cognition by reversing these short-circuits in reverse order, i.e. by starting from the affirmative acknowledgement of the holism of the real cognitive situation, which excludes subjective certainty as a reasonable goal of cognition from the outset. (shrink)

Eco-cognitive computationalism is a cognitive science perspective that views computing in context, focusing on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. It emphasizes the role of Turing in the development of the Logical Universal Machine and the concept of machines as “domesticated ignorant entities”. This perspective explains how machines can be dynamically active in distributed physical entities, allowing data to be encoded and decoded for appropriate results. In this perspective, we can clearly see that the concept of computation evolves over time due (...) to historical and contextual factors, and it allows for the emergence of new types of computations that exploit new substrates. Taking advantage of this eco-cognitive framework I will also illustrate the concepts of “locked and unlocked strategies in deep learning systems, indicating different inference routines for creative results. Locked abductive strategies are characterized by poor hypothetical creative cognition due to the lack of what I call eco-cognitive openness, while unlocked human cognition involves higher kinds of creative abductive reasoning. This special kind of “openness” is physically rooted in the fundamental character of the human brain as an open system constantly coupled with the environment (that is an “open” or dissipative system): its activity is the uninterrupted attempt to achieve the equilibrium with the environment in which it is embedded, and this interplay can never be switched off without producing severe damage to the brain. Brain cannot be conceived as deprived of its physical quintessence which is its openness. In the brain, contrary to the computational case, ordering is not derived from the outside thanks to what I have called in a recent book “computational domestication of ignorant entities”, but it is the direct product of an “internal” open dynamical process of the system. (shrink)