Criminal Law

Title 18 §2103 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes forbids me from insulting the Pennsylvania flag. Title 42 §5552 forbids Pennsylvania’s prosecutors from holding me accountable now for insul...

This chapter examines the evolving debate on AI legal personhood, emphasizing the role of path dependencies in shaping current trajectories and prospects. Two primary path dependencies emerge: prevailing legal theories on personhood (singularist vs. clustered) and the impact of technological advancements. We argue that these factors dynamically interact, with technological optimism fostering broader rights-based debates and periods of skepticism narrowing discussions to limited rights. Additional influences include regulatory cross-linkages (e.g., data privacy, liability, cybersecurity) and historical legal precedents. Current regulatory frameworks, (...) particularly in the EU, generally resist extending legal personhood to AI systems. Case law suggests that without explicit legislation, courts are unlikely to grant AI legal personhood on their own. For this to happen, AI systems would first need to prove de facto legitimacy through sustained social participation. The chapter concludes by assessing near- and long-term prospects, from generative AI and AI agents in the next 5–20 years to transformative possibilities such as AI integration with human cognition via Brain-Machine Interfaces in a more distant future. (shrink)

Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (IPML) was originally intended to introduce a utilitarian penal code. Such a code would apply the principle of utility to the task of designing a system of criminal law. Part I, Section I of this two-part paper gives an overview of IPML, in which the basic moral assumptions of utilitarianism are presented, and the central concept of mischief is emphasised. The principle of utility favors making into criminal offences actions that (...) are mischievous and profitable to punish. Section II discusses Chapter XVI of IPML. This chapter is a taxonomy of possible offences and the penal code would explain which acts in the taxonomy are mischievous and profitable to punish. This chapter also suggests how Bentham was beginning to see the need for other utilitarian legal codes. Section III discusses Bentham’s concept of a ‘catechism of reasons’ to be included in the code, which would explain to the citizenry why each action in the code is mischievous. Section IV discusses two important sets of manuscripts that illustrate the reasoning that was to accompany the code. The first briefly treats the offence of cruelty to animals and expands on the thinking in the famous footnote to Chapter XVII that argues that non-human animals can be treated wrongly, while the second examines the remarkable treatment of ‘paederasty’, that is, consensual sex between adult males. IPML does not mention paederasty, although several passages are relevant to it. These passages suggest that paederasty is not mischievous. The manuscripts expand on these suggestions, and explicitly argue that paederasty ought not to be an offence. Several new issues are discussed, such as the effect of paederasty on population size. In the subsequent Part II of this paper, Bentham’s treatment of punishment in IPML, The Rationale of Punishment, and the penal code will be discussed. (shrink)

“Jury Nullification, Verdictal Asymmetry, and the Ultimate Logic of Anarchy” is a critical examination and analysis of the ‘anarchy objection’ to jury nullification, a common argument against informing juries of their nullification power. The anarchy objection posits that jury nullification leads to inconsistent verdicts (verdictal asymmetry) and, as a result, social anarchy and chaos. Through careful analysis, I argue that the anarchy objection is predicated on two flawed premises: first, that jury nullification promotes verdictal asymmetry, and second, that such asymmetry (...) leads to anarchy. Such commitments are, I argue, empirically unsupported and conceptually misguided. Verdictal asymmetry is an intrinsic feature of the common law system, present at nearly every adjudicative stages, and not uniquely linked to jury nullification; yet we certainly do not live in an environment of jural/social anarchy. Finally, I discuss how the principle of treating like cases alike is primarily a procedural constraint, not a mandate for verdictal symmetry. By dismantling the anarchy objection, I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the jurisprudence surrounding the jury nullification debate and its role within the legal system. (shrink)

George Fletcher, a foremost scholar in the fields of comparative and international criminal law, was a friend and colleague of Herbert Morris, a renowned scholar and teacher of law and philosophy at the UCLA School of Law. To commemorate and honor the late Herbert Morris, who died in 2022, Fletcher has assembled and edited the selection of essays in this book. Many of the contributors knew Morris on a personal and an academic level. Others only knew of Morris by reputation. (...) The essays fall into four categories: Criminal Law and Theory, Personal Reflections, Art and Literary Criticism, and Law and Religion. This commemorative volume reflects Fletcher's respect and admiration for his friend's accomplishments and lifetime achievements. "In two essays, the late Professor Herbert Morris addresses the fundamental issue in criminal law, whether thoughts alone could constitute a basis of criminal liability. The first essay was "Punishment for Thoughts" and the second, "Persons and Punishment". I consider these two of the most important articles ever published on the theory of criminal law." George Fletche. (shrink)

Whether or not we call a love-like relationship with robots true love, some people may feel and claim that, for them, it is a sufficient substitute for love relationship. The love relationship between humans has a special place in our social life. On the grounds of both morality and law, our significant other can expect special treatment. It is understandable that, precisely because of this kind of relationship, we save our significant other instead of others or will not testify against (...) her/him. How as a society should we treat love-like relationships humans with robots? Based on the assumption that robots do not have an inner life and are not moral patients, I defend the thesis that this kind of relationship should be protected by criminal law. (shrink)

Legal policy regarding crime and criminals in Indonesia.

Elgar Advanced Introductions are stimulating and thoughtful introductions to major fields in the social sciences, business and law, expertly written by the world's leading scholars. Designed to be accessible yet rigorous, they offer concise and lucid surveys of the substantive and policy issues associated with discrete subject areas. This Advanced Introduction to Substantive Criminal Law explores the doctrines, issues and controversies in the substantive field of criminal law. Chapters cover important theoretical and doctrinal topics, including the justifications for state blame (...) and punishment, the foundations for criminalization, the prima facie case, affirmative defences of justification and excuse, and sentencing. Stephen J. Morse uses copious concrete examples drawn from cases, statutes and extended case studies, including the intricate grading of homicide, to enliven the discussion. Key Features: - Concise and accessible format - Theoretical explication of doctrinal intricacies - Informative coverage and real world examples of criminal law - Discussion of the challenges and responsibilities surrounding legal concepts of the person. Providing a compact and succinct introduction to the rich scholarship of the field, this Advanced Introduction will be an ideal read for lawyers and law students interested in criminal law and justice. It will also be a valuable resource for law enforcement personnel and anyone looking to understand the role of criminal law as a means to achieve justice and social safety. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Criminal Law: An Introduction explores the central concepts of criminal law, such as intention, complicity, duress, and how they work, both within criminal law practice and in our everyday lives, from legal and philosophical perspectives. At the heart of the book is the central philosophical concept of responsibility: what does it mean to be responsible for an act, to hold someone responsible for an act, or to give an excuse in order to avoid responsibility for an act? (...) Offering talking points to enrich an ongoing conversation, this unique textbook addresses all of these questions in an accessible way for law and non-law students alike. Real cases are examined in detail and a critical approach to the criminal law is adopted throughout. The focus will be mainly on the criminal law of England and Wales, with occasional cases from other jurisdictions, and occasional examples from other areas of law This text will be ideal reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of law, philosophy and criminology, as well as political science and sociology. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point Miri Gur-Arye’s critical discussion of a legal duty to report crime, this paper sketches an idealising conception of a democratic republic whose citizens could be expected to recognise a civic responsibility to report crime, in order to assist the enterprise of a criminal law that is their common law. After explaining why they should recognise such a responsibility, what its scope should be, and how it should be exercised, and noting that that civic responsibility must (...) include a responsibility to report one’s own crimes; it discusses whether that civic responsibility could ground at least a limited legal duty to report certain types of crime. It then turns to the question of whether a civic responsibility to assist the criminal law’s enterprise of bringing wrongdoers to account could include a responsibility to arrest suspected or known offenders if the police cannot or will not do so—a responsibility to make a citizen’s arrest, and the legal power to discharge that responsibility: how far should citizens feel entitled, or duty-bound, thus to ‘take the law into their own hands’? (shrink)

According to a common view, criminal law should be structured in a way that allocates the conditions of criminal liability to different types of legal rules, given the content of the condition and the nature of the rule. This view classifies some conditions as elements of offenses and others as (part of) justificatory defenses or of excusatory defenses. While this view is attractive, I argue that it should be rejected, since it is incompatible with two plausible propositions about legal rules. (...) The first is that foundational reasons are not concerned with the structure of the law as such. The second is that legal rules should be constructed in a way that reflects (the balance of) all the applicable reasons and not just some of them. (shrink)