The central thesis of Foucault's Critical Ethics is that Foucault's account of power does not foreclose the possibility of ethics; on the contrary, it provides a framework within which ethics becomes possible. Tracing the evolution of Foucault's analysis of power from his early articulations of disciplinary power to his theorizations of biopower and governmentality, Richard A. Lynch shows how Foucault's ethical project emerged through two interwoven trajectories: analysis of classical practices of the care of the self, and engaged practice (...) in and reflection upon the limits of sexuality and the development of friendship in gay communities. These strands of experience and inquiry allowed Foucault to develop contrasting yet interwoven aspects of his ethics; they also underscored how ethic practice emerges within and from contexts of power relations. The gay community's response to AIDS and its parallels with the feminist ethics of care serve to illustrate the resources of a Foucauldian ethics—a fundamentally critical attitude, with substantive (but revisable) values and norms grounded in a practice of freedom. (shrink)

One of the most distinguished cultural and intellectual historians of our time, Frank Turner taught a landmark Yale University lecture course on European intellectual history that drew scores of students over many years. His lectures—lucid, accessible, beautifully written, and delivered with a notable lack of jargon—distilled modern European history from the Enlightenment to the dawn of the twentieth century and conveyed the turbulence of a rapidly changing era in European history through its ideas and leading figures. Richard A. Lofthouse, (...) one of Turner’s former students, has now edited the lectures into a single volume that outlines the thoughts of a great historian on the forging of modern European ideas. Moreover, it offers a fine example of how intellectual history should be taught: rooted firmly in historical and biographical evidence. (shrink)

Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law is the first broad-based study of the law governing the giving and revocation of gifts ever attempted. First, gift-giving is everywhere governed by social and customary norms before it encounters the law. Second, the giving of gifts takes place largely outside of the marketplace. As a result of these two characteristics, the law of gifts provides an optimal lens through which to examine how different legal systems confront social practice. The law of gifts is (...) well-developed both in the civil and the common laws. Richard Hyland's study provides an excellent view of the ways in which different civil and common law jurisdictions confront common issues. The legal systems discussed include principally, in the common law, those of Great Britain, the United States, and India, and, in the civil law, the private law systems of Belgium and France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Hyland also serves a critique of the dominant method in the field, which is a form of functionalism based on what is called the praesumptio similitudinis, namely the axiom that, once legal doctrine is stripped away, developed legal systems tend to reach similar practical results. His study demonstrates, to the contrary, that legal systems actually differ, not only in their approach and conceptual structure, but just as much in the results. (shrink)

Verhalen bieden ons bijzonder veelzijdige en duurzame inzichten in de menselijke conditie en hebben al sinds Aristoteles de aandacht van de filosofie getrokken. Het leidmotief van Vertellingen is dat dit digitale en naar verluidt 'postmoderne' tijdperk niet de ondergang van het verhaal aankondigt, maar juist zelf een bron van nieuwe verhalen vormt. Richard Kearney, filosoof en schrijver, ontrafelt in een heldere en meeslepende stijl waarom verhalen deze uitwerking op ons hebben en betoogt dat het onvertelde leven niet waard is (...) om geleefd te worden. Vertellingen is onmisbaar, voor iedereen die helder wil nadenken over de rol van verhalen in ons leven en onze cultuur. (shrink)

This reissue of Richard Robinson's classic volume on Aristotle's Politics contains his clear and accurate translation of, and commentary on, books III and IV, brought up to date by a supplementary essay and new bibliography by David Keyt. This is the ideal companion to study these important books of a classic text in the history of political philosophy.

Rymarz, Richard An important theme in the contemporary disposition of the church toward the wider culture is the need for a new evangelisation. The thinking was given great impetus by St John Paul II. Whilst a bold strategy, there is little doubt that any attempt to evangelise contemporary secular cultures also presents significant challenges. The church, understood however as an agent of evangelisation not by choice but by its very nature, must carry on its Pauline mission with an eye (...) to more long-term goals and not be discouraged by the task ahead of it. The commitment to engage the wider culture needs to be consistent, realising that the task ahead is difficult but that its difficulty can be mitigated by intelligence and resourcefulness. As Lonergan remarked: 'Ours is a new age, and enormous tasks lie ahead. But we shall be all the more likely to surmount them, if we take the trouble to understand what is going forward and why'. (shrink)

A philosophical and narrative memoir, Ecology and Experience is a thoughtful, engaging recounting of author Richard J. Borden’s life entwined in an overview of the intellectual and institutional history of human ecology—a story of life wrapped in a life story. Borden shows that attempts to bridge the mental and environmental arenas are uncertain, but that rigid conventions and narrow views have their dangers too. Human experience and the natural world exist on many levels and gathering from both realms gives (...) rise to novel constellations. In a blend of themes and approaches based on a lifetime of interdisciplinary inquiry, the author wanders these intersections and invites us to exercise our capacities for ecological insight, to deepen the experience of being alive, and, most of all, to more fully enrich our lives. Contents Foreword by Darron Collins, president of the College of the Atlantic Preface Part I. Transects and Plots 1. The Arc of Life 2. Ecology 3. Experience 4. Human Ecology 5. Education Part II. Facets of Life 6. Time and Space 7. Death in Life 8. Personal Ecology 9. Context 10. Metaphor and Meaning Part III. Wider Points of View 11. Kinds of Minds 12. Insight 13. Imagination 14. Keyholes 15. Ecology and Identity 16. The Unfinished Course Part IV. Coda. (shrink)

"And I have felt / A presence that disturbs me with the joy / Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime."--William Wordsworth A Sense Sublime is a record of a life lived during the last years of the twentieth century on the northern edge of the tallgrass prairies of Illinois, where seas of flowing grasses give way to the glaciated hills of Wisconsin. With camera in hand, Richard Quinney walked the streets and byways and traveled the country roads. Quinney watched (...) through his viewfinder the rising and passing of all things, giving attention to the wonder of daily existence. He captures the transcendental landscape; land and sky powerfully meld into one. The black and white of shadow on snow explores the light and darkness we know and experience in human existence. Gothic images of weathered homes and barns of long-gone settlers and shaded cemeteries still haunt the landscape, while romantic vistas of clouds majestically drifting over magnificent prairies instill an agrarian sublimity akin to Wordsworth or Thoreau. The photographs, from the end of a century, document the passing of the seasons and the years. Quinney's photographs are historical artifacts, framed of portions of the world within his spiritual eye, the camera's viewfinder. The photos, accompanied with notes from Quinney's journals, as well as the words of others, are extensions of the long tradition of transcendental writers, romantic poets, and landscape painters. They are Quinney's own attempt to solve the mystery of human existence and a way to experience the sublime in everyday life. These were the years lived as a camera. (shrink)

When examined together, Swedburg argues, these books and other writings constitute an interesting alternative model of economic thinking, as well as a major contribution to political economy that deserves a place in contemporary discussions ...

Richard Wollheim grew up lonely and sad in London's wealthy suburbs during the 1920s and 1930s, yet his was a childhood more interesting than most. He had an impresario father and a “Gaiety Girl” mother; together they attracted important guests (Diaghilev, Kurt Weill, Serge Lifar) to the grand houses and hotels that punctuated the landscape of Wollheim's early years. Germs is his account of that time, of the years he spent adoring his charming but distant father; of his regret (...) for loathing his beautiful, mindless mother. Told in prose that with hypnotic ease moves from deadpan comedy to poignant loneliness, Germs is already a classic work of memoir. (shrink)

Discussion in the paper focuses on instituting a requirement that juries in criminal cases make public the reasons for their verdicts. The nature of such a requirement is elaborated, as is the way in which defects in the reasons provided might serve as a basis for appealing convictions. Various arguments for adopting such a requirement are considered, as are objections to doing so. In support of the requirement, I contend that it would enable defendants in criminal cases to ensure that (...) their procedural rights have been respected. Such a requirement can also be construed as a condition of the legitimacy of exercises of political power and as an implication of the right of each person to be treated with equal concern and respect. The main objections to such a requirement concern its possible interference with jury independence and the complications and inefficiencies appeals of reasoned verdicts would produce. (shrink)

This book is presented as “a study in ethno-metaphysics,” an exploration of the worldview of Canada's Native peoples. In offering this as a work of philosophy rather than of cultural anthropology or Native spirituality, authors Rabb and McPherson take as their point of departure anthropologist A. I. Hallowell's claim that a cultural worldview is a “cognitive orientation” from which a set of metaphysical claims might be deduced—even if it is not consciously recognized as such by those who live within it. (...) In other words, the guiding premise of this work is that something recognizable and significant as a metaphysical theory can be massaged out of the cultural belief-systems of Canada's Native peoples. (shrink)

Organic metaphors appear as early as §2 of the Phenomenology and throughout Hegel’s major works. The culmination of the dialectic is the moment where Life understands itself. Hegel even identifies the Notion with the “principle of all life”. Yet despite Hegel’s emphasis on the notion of Life, there is no general agreement about the significance of his notion of organism. Some commentators emphasize Hegel’s organicism only in connection with the notion of organic unities in Hegel’s social philosophy. Still others acknowledge (...) its basic position in Hegel’s metaphysics, but regard it as refuted by the development of mechanistic science. Some even regard Hegel’s organicism as broadly consistent with non-organic science, leaving the status of Hegel’s notion of organism in conceptual limbo. (shrink)

Mealey's sociopathy model is an exemplar of popular diathesis-stress models. Although such models, when presented in descriptive language, offer the illusion of integrative explanation, their actual scientific value is very limited because they fail to make specific, quantitative, falsifiable predictions. Conceptual and quantitative weaknesses of such diathesis-stress models are discussed and the requirements for useful models are outlined.

When is an indirect report of what a speaker meant correct? The question arises in the law. The Contract Law case of Spaulding v. Morse is a good example. Following their 1932 divorce, George Morse and Ruth Morse entered into a trust agreement in 1937 for the support of their minor son Richard. In that agreement, George promised to “pay to [Spaulding as] trustee in trust for his said minor son Richard the sum of twelve hundred dollars per (...) year, payable in equal monthly installments on the first day of each month until the entrance of Richard D. Morse into some college, university or higher institution of learning beyond the completion of the high school grades, and thereupon, instead of said payments, amounting to twelve hundred dollars yearly, he shall and will then pay to the trustee payments in the sum of twenty-two hundred dollars per year for a period of said higher education but not more than four years.” Richard graduated from high school on February 5, 1946 and, in the post-WWII continuation of the draft, was inducted into the army the following day. The question in the case is whether George, by the words of the trust agreement, meant that he would pay $1,200 per year for Richard’s support while he was in the army. Is that a correct indirect report of what George meant?The explanation I offer assumes Gricean analysis of speaker meaning, and it emphasizes the role of speaker meaning typically plays in solving coordination problems. A coordination problem is a situation “in which each person wants to participate in a group action but only if others also participate.” A classic example is a political protest: “each person might want to take part in an antigovernment protest but only if there are enough total protesters to make arrests and police repression unlikely.” Coordination problems arise in more mundane settings as well – in Spaulding v. Morse, for example. Ruth and George want to mutually agree on Richard’s support: Ruth wants to commit to an arrangement only if George does, and vice versa for George. In 1937, George and Ruth solved the problem through speaker meaning. By signing the trust agreement, George, with Ruth as his audience, meant that he obligated himself to a particular support agreement. When Ruth signed, she, with George as her audience, meant that she accepted the agreement. In general, parties often solve coordination problems through speaker meaning. If, for example, enough people can communicate their commitment to participate in the protest to enough people, the protest will take place.The account assigns a central role to the fact that speaker meaning facilitates coordination by creating relevant common knowledge. Common knowledge is “the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows X, A knows that B knows X, B knows that A knows X, ad infinitum.” Common knowledge facilitates coordination: “Actors coordinate when they have evidence for common knowledge, and refrain from coordinating when they do not.”. (shrink)

Free Will: Art and Power on Shakespeare's Stage is a study of theatre and sovereignty that situates Shakespeare's plays in the contraflow between two absolutisms of early modern England: the aesthetic and the political. Starting from the dramatist's cringing relations with his princely patrons, Richard Wilson considers the ways in which this 'bending author' identifies freedom in failure and power in weakness by staging the endgames of a sovereignty that begs to be set free from itself. The arc of (...) Shakespeare's career becomes in this comprehensive new interpretation a sustained resistance to both the institutions of sacred kingship and literary autonomy that were emerging in his time. In a sequence of close material readings, Free Will shows how the plays instead turn command performances into celebrations of an art without sovereignty, which might 'give delight' but 'hurt not', and 'leave not a rack behind'. Free Will is a profound rereading of Shakespeare, art and power that will contribute to thinking not only about the plays, but also about aesthetics, modernity, sovereignty and violence. (shrink)

Ethical Practice in the Human Services by Richard D. Parsons and Karen L. Dickinson moves beyond addressing ethical issues and principles to helping readers actually practice ethical behavior through awareness of their personal morals, values, and choices. With coverage of ethical standards from six different associations, the text addresses ethical issues and principles in social work, counseling, psychology, and marriage and family therapy. Robust pedagogy includes case illustrations and guided exercises to give readers a deeper understanding of the underlying (...) moral principles and values that serve as a foundation for the various ethical codes. (shrink)

Debates over postmodernism, analyses of knowledge and power, and the recurring issue of Heidegger's Nazism have all deepened questions about the relation between philosophy and the social roles of intellectuals. Against such postmodernist rejections of philosophical theory as mounted by Rorty and Lyotard, Richard Peterson argues that precisely reflection on rationality, in appropriate social terms, is needed to confront urgent political issues about intellectuals. After presenting a conception of intellectual mediation set within the modern division of labor, he offers (...) an account of postmodern politics within which postmodern arguments against critical reflection are themselves treated socially and politically. Engaging thinkers as diverse as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, Foucault, and Bahktin, Peterson argues that a democratic conception and practice of philosophy is inseparable from democracy generally. His arguments about modern philosophy are tied to claims about the relation between liberalism and epistemology, and these in turn inform an account of impasses confronting contemporary politics. Historical arguments about the connections between postmodernist thought and practice are illustrated by discussions of the postmodernist dimensions of recent politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY right at hand, without getting in the way. If it had been printed in as readable type and as elegant form as Steinmann's edition, it might be the ideal easily accessible version to familiarize us with the Pens~es as they were actually written and classified by Pascal himself. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Pascal. Quinta edizione riveduta e aumentata. By Michele (...) Federico Sciacca. (Milano: Carlo Marzorati Editore, 1962. Pp. 250. 2000 L.) This Pascal by Sciacca consists of three parts. The first gives and considers the Life of Pascal (1623-1662) in connection with his complex and restless century (pp. 13--72). The second part (pp. 75-112) analyzes the relationship of Pascal with Jansenism. Pascal is both dependent on and independent of it. The Jansenists discussed while Pascal felt. Jansenism could not find a stable equilibrium between nature and grace which Jansenism either contrasted or confused while Pascal well distinguishes these two orders. They are for him heterogeneous but the lower order leads to the higher. Without God, man is misery and darkness. With God, man can do all things (p. 118). The third part (pp. 115-219) is entitled The Christian Philosopher. It shows that man is made for the infinite. The true call of humanity is religious (p. 206). The final conclusion is that Pascal can still teach us to exist (p. 216). PAUL Y. FUHRMANN Columbia Theological Seminary Louis Thomassin (1619-95), ~tude bio-bibliographique avec vingt lettres et deux textes in~dits. By Pierre Clair. (Vol. I of the series Le mouvement des idles au XVH" si~cle, Collection dirig~e par Andr~ Robinet.) (Paris: 1964. Pp. 160. NF 12.) This small volume is the first in a new series devoted to bringing to light various figures and aspects of seventeenth-century thought that have either been set aside, forgotten, or are only dimly known. Louis Thomassin (as well as Bernard Lamy who is the subject of the second volume that has appeared in this series) certainly falls in these categories. Although his name often turns up in discussions of Cartesianlsm, Jansenism, Malebranchism, etc., very little consideration is ever given to him as a fairly important personage of the time, or to his ideas and the role they played. This volume by Dr. Clair will be of much use to seventeenth-century scholars in providing the basic data about his life, his connections with several of the vital movements of the period, the fundamental bibliographical materials, as well as publishing two texts and twenty letters not before available. The biographical section (pp. 1-84) traces (a bit too episodically) Thomassin's education, his career among the Oratorians as a professor of humanities, philosophy, and theology, his possible involvements with the Jansenists, his difficulties as a result of his first published work, Dissertations sur les Conciles (1667) (suppressed the same year), his later successes for his many other works in theology, philosophy, history, and pedagogy, and his relations with various major and minor figures of the mid- and late seventeenth century, like Arnauld, Malebranche, Richard Simon, Bayle, Huet, etc. Section II (pp. 85-99) gives a detailed bibliography of Thomassin's published works, plus a list of his manuscripts located in various French libraries. This is followed by twenty letters of Thomassin, an intriguing and interesting discourse on the difference between history and science, and one on the nature of chronology, plus three letters by Thomassin's secretary, Nicolas Barat. In a brief BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS Shadow History tl9 Richard Watson's essay looks as if it is breaking new ground, but on re-re-reading it, it seems to me that several incommensurable and unrelated problems and phenomena are being treated together. If separated into constituent parts, there may be less here than meets the eye. First of all, the phenomenon of "shadow history," and its role as foundation for a philosophy or (...) a philosophical position goes back, I think, at least to Aristotle's account of his predecessors, especially of his teacher, and beyond that perhaps to Plato's account of the Sophists. It appears in Maimonides's account of Arabic occasionalism, which was used to justify medieval Aristotelianism (and this account was accepted uncritically by Leibniz, Malebranche, and others in the seventeenth century). Bacon's, Descartes's, and Locke's presentation of Scholasticism is definitely "shadow history" that was used as the start of the "new" way of ideas, and as its justification.. Hegel's view of the history of philosophy is another major "shadow history." Hence the fact that Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty adopted similar strategies of using a spurious or dubious history of their predecessors is not so strange. Any historian of philosophy worth her or his salt is aware that historical philosophical personnages have used their own views of their predecessors' philosophies as ways of making their own "original" philosophical views more exciting or important or credible. We have learned long ago how to separate the alleged past from the historical past, and even to see that the alleged past plays a significant role in the writings of various philosophers. Watson has put it neatly in his four examples, but these are only intriguing because so litde history of analytic philosophy has been written up to this time. We have much, maybe too much, literature about how Kant misrepresented Hume, Hume misrepresented Berkeley, etc. In the decades to come we may have much about Russell, Ayer, Ryle and Rorty as misrepresenters. Then, Watson's point can help separate the charge that they were poor historians from the realization that they used history creatively as "shadow history." And we may even have historical evidence from the Russell papers and other archives that they knew full well what they were doing, and were not pretending to be good historians, or, on the other hand, that they themselves did not realize they were writing "shadow history," but thought they were actually real historians. Watson tries to make the activity of creating "shadow history" a challenge to historians of philosophy, and a plus for the creative philosophers. In the cases he discusses the "shadow histories" have had great influence on the development of twentiethcentury philosophy in England and America. Even though I am a sceptic, I have no doubt that historians of Anglo-American philosophy will explore his points, and distinguish the "shadow histories" from the best available historical interpretations of what previous philosophers said and meant. Both interpreting and understanding the "shadow histories" and the best available histories will change and develop depending on future interests and information. Watson uses "historians" without really making clear who he is talking about. Only three people are mentioned: Gregor Sebba, Etienne Gilson and Paul Oskar Kristeller. 120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31 : 1 JANUARY 1993 There are many others who consider themselves historians of philosophy, or are considered as such in the profession; I doubt that they are all as objectivist as Watson thinks, believing that they can ascertain exactly what happened in the past. But I think most of us share a view that we can do better or worse at this, depending on materials and techniques used, perspectives employed, etc. Almost all of us would contend that being able to read the basic source material in the original language and being able to understand it in context, yields a better understanding of what a historical philosopher said and meant. Watson appears to agree, but then says this does not matter, because a "shadow history" may be longer remembered and used in creative philosophy than a historian's history. The example he offers is that of Yolton's Locke... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 353-356 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Metaphysical Club The Metaphysical Club, by Louis Menand; xii & 546 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001, $27.00. "They didn't just want to keep the conversation going; they wanted to get to a better place" (p. 440). So much for the most prominent contemporary pragmatist, Richard Rorty, who remains unmentioned except in the (...) acknowledgments. That better place is participatory democracy (a phrase that does not appear in the book), which "means that everyone is equally in the game, but it also means that no one can opt out" (p. 441). The true name of the game is skeptical tolerance. There are no unquestionable duties or inalienable rights, no immutable natural laws, no absolute moral rules, no highest principles, no inherent virtues, no absolute standards, no stasis, no absolutely certain truth. There are no individual destinies, because the social comes before the individual, and the individual is embedded within and cannot exist without society. Scientific knowledge is always probabilistic, not necessarily because nature is indeterministic, but because we can never know enough to calculate its regularities if they exist. To wit, there are no Platonic Ideas or unchanging universals. All is change, nothing that happens is ever repeated, our general ideas and laws of nature are merely tools for getting along in the world. Above all, ideas do not refer to things, only to other ideas. What expedites our thinking is true. What expedites our acting is right. Whenever we act according to principle, rule, or law, we are making a bet that events will turn out the way [End Page 353] we think they will. If we keep this always in mind, we will never succumb to violence or war in the name of belief or principle. Whatever we believe, it could be otherwise. Such is a general summary of pragmatism as it has filtered down to the textbooks. It is (again befittingly) more or less accurate. The can-do American seeks out cash value in practical life.Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Charles Saunders Pierce, and John Dewey crafted the only indigenous philosophy that has so far been produced in America. Its roots are in Laplacean probability theory, Darwinian evolutionism, and Chauncey Wright's indeterminism. While James hoped to save a place for religion (if it works, go with it) and Pierce a place for God (he thought there had to be a designing intelligence to account for order), the pragmatic result is profoundly skeptical and secular. Neither Holmes nor Dewey thought that individuals imbedded in societies had any need of absolutes. Holmes said that people first decide on the basis of experience, then they deduce. Dewey said that people first behave commonsensically, then they rationalize.There is nothing as condensed as the above in Louis Menand's beautiful book on the ideas, personalities, and influence of Holmes, James, Pierce, and Dewey. I know of no clearer exposition of their ideas, and few biographers have made them come so alive. In particular, Menand's coverage of peripheral (but by no means insignificant) figures is very rich. He describes the development of graduate universities in America in detail from their autocratic beginnings to the institution of academic freedom as we know it today. University presidents, trustees, and administrators are presented luxuriously as the villains, and the professors gloriously as the heroes. Menand remarks with slight amazement that society bought the concept that professors were beholden to the public at large and not to the state or private university owners. He could have commented further on the fact that the concept of academic freedom has become virtually irrelevant in today's corporate research universities."It is a remarkable fact about the United States," Menand begins his book, "that it fought a civil war without undergoing a change in its form of government" (p. ix). This is a breathtaking fact, and I don't suppose Menand had any intent to explain it. "The Civil War swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it swept away almost the whole intellectual... (shrink)

This book investigates the potential role that states can play in cosmopolitan thinking and how states could be agents for the advancement of cosmopolitan responsibilities.

Students often study logic on the assumption that it provides a normative guide to reasoning in English. In particular, they are taught to associate connectives like “and” with counterparts in Sentential Logic. English conditionals go over to formulas with → as principal connective. The well-known difficulties that arise from such translation are not emphasized. The result is the conviction that ordinary reasoning is faulty when discordant with the usual representation in standard logic. Psychologists are particularly susceptible to this attitude.

An exploration into consciousness, the universe, and the nature of reality. Draws on transdimensional physics and biology, reincarnation and past-life memories, animal consciousness, multiple identities, thoughtforms, soul pictures, and paranormal phenomena like crop circles and poltergeists. Explores the riddle of personal identity and how it differs from consciousness. Reveals that consciousness is more than encompassing all that exists---it also speaks to what has yet to manifest.

本书评介了自柏拉图到罗兰·巴特的重要文艺思潮发展阶段以及这些阶段中的重要思想家,内容包括经典时代的文艺理论;中世纪文论;新古典主义的兴衰等.