Political Power

There are many advantages and disadvantages to central locations. These have shown themselves in the long course of European history. In times of peace, there are important economic and cultural advantages (to illustrate: the present area of the Czech Republic was the richest country in Europe between the two World Wars). There are cross-currents of trade and culture in central Europe of great advantage. For, cultural cross-currents represent a potential benefit in comprehension and cultural growth. But under threat of large-scale (...) conflict, these locations have proved extremely dangerous. Historically, Germany and Austria may be regarded as having had two chief models of their relationships to Europe. In the Holy Roman Empire, Germany was at the center of an aspiring “universalistic” European cosmopolitanism. (In some ways similar to the present situation of the European Union.) Austria maintained a great multi¬cultural empire, until it was destroyed in the First Word War. Generally, middle-European powers have promoted the integration of European diversity, when peace and stability have been plausible objectives. But when European diversity has declined toward ethnic or national conflict, Germany has drawn away from Europe and into itself, seeking inner unity and distinctness to protect it against possible combinations of enemies. This is true of central Europe generally, in degree, but interest often centers on Germany. Generally, central Europe is a cultural pressure cooker. (shrink)

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power specifically helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we argue that Burman’s arguments for the conclusion that telic power can exist without deontic power are unsuccessful. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions as sets of constitutive rules, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Burman’s arguments are not persuasive because she disregards the plausible view that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a collective recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, a recognition of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require recognition of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is particularly useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and the forms of telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)

There is a SURFACE unity of a text which may be described as that which is reflected by taking for granted that the object of desire to be fulfilled in the text contributes EQUALLY to the parts constituting the text as a whole. The DEEP unity of a text on the other hand is that which is reflected by specifying that to which the object of desire underlying the text contributes the most content. The other parts while bearing some superficial (...) content have ONLY poetic (or evocative) function. They constitute FORMS serving aesthetic fortification and condensation not really condensation of content relevant to the object of desire. They are ultimately contingent in terms of the underpinning the text. The Freudian mythology is susceptible to conflating contingent forms as essential content. -/- . (shrink)

The question that "how one should live?" constitutes the ultimate question of philosophy according to Aristotle. According to Camus "there is only one really serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." The riddle and our predicament is that these two questions are exactly one and the same question. [Why?] ------ [Because for example] Nietzsche, in claiming that "the beggars should be entirely abolished ... truly it is annoying to give to them and it is annoying one not to give to (...) them", has spectacularly failed to notice that there is another logical option: simply to abolish the observer. (Especially that nowadays we witness live-stream misery of other human beings comfortably numb.) The option also resolves the problematic that "if I must love my fellow man, he had better hide himself, for no sooner do I see his face than there is an end to my love for him". (shrink)

A Cultural Criticism --- Clearly there can be nothing more praiseworthy than conferring virtues on things. Then the most celebrated strand of ecstasy of communication can be identified as the factor responsible for conferring an extra virtue to an already virtuous. This is problematic because, according to Nietzsche, one virtue is more of a virtue than two, because it is more of a knot for one's destiny to cling to. Excessive communication is the antipode of authenticity. Because where there is (...) reinforcement there is lack. (For instance: talking much about oneself can also be a means to conceal oneself). (shrink)

Earlier semioses (implicating at least sometimes political forces to establish a sign) enabled by anonymous intentions permeate later semioses and shape the structure of language. The same way earlier neuroses shape the epistemically embattled structure of unconscious.---Contingent but primordial relations of power semiotically implicated, on both sides of inter-translation of distant languages, so effectively permeate language and literature that there is ever an ineradicable textual residue in the translation reminiscent of the political contexts.---Every belated text a corollary to the primordial (...) proof of establishment of precursor texts. (shrink)

Dit werkstuk betrekt zich op de vraag of de de facto legitimiteit van Knoet de Grote als koning van Angelsaksisch Engeland, te verklaren is aan de hand van de theorieën over legitimiteit zoals gepostuleerd door Maximilian Carl Emil Weber (1864—1920). Bestaande literatuur over Knoet de Grote zijn troonsbestijging, zoals dat van vooraanstaand 19e-eeuws historicus Edward Augustus Freeman, zou een ‘geromantiseerd’ beeld hebben geschetst van de kwestie. Dit werkstuk zal kijken of dit beeld, aan de hand van Webers theorie over waar (...) legitimiteit in gegrond kan zijn, ten eerste terecht te noemen is en, ten tweede, of het Knoets status als legitiem vorst van het ‘Angelsaksische’ volk goed kan verklaren. (shrink)

Las políticas estatales e internacionales que se derivan de la concepción china de “civilización ecológica” (shengtai wénmíng) representan una variante filosófico-política que, en nuestro momento posindustrial, resurge como vía para intentar “corregir” la relación de extrañamiento entre el ser humano y la naturaleza. La noción se entiende, pues, como una alternativa –filosófica y gubernamental– que aboga por la coexistencia armónica entre la humanidad y la naturaleza, estableciendo su visión en una perspectiva más amplia que la de la mera “protección medioambiental” (...) al incluir expresamente la dimensión cultural. -/- En lo que sigue, primeramente, se expondrá la historia conceptual de la noción. Esta es necesaria para conocer su génesis y comprender algunos de los motivos para su recuperación en la actualidad, desde su adopción a partir de postulados filosóficos soviéticos a su adaptación y regeneración en la política interna y externa de China del siglo veintiuno. Luego, se repasarán los motivos por los cuales, hoy en día, el gobierno chino promueve su propia agenda nacional alrededor de la “civilización ecológica” y de qué modo opera como agenda contrincante a la del “desarrollo sostenible”. A continuación, se subrayará la importancia de comprender a la “civilización ecológica” en su doble filiación con respecto al pensamiento antiguo chino y al marxismo ecológico, pues ambas raíces filosóficas coinciden en la defensa de una relación simbiótica entre ser humano y naturaleza. Se finalizará exponiendo algunas reacciones a la idea de “civilización ecológica”, como las que ven en ella una herramienta de diplomacia cultural para rivalizar con el modelo europeo medioambientalista o como una tópica ideológico-culturalista dirigida contra Occidente. (shrink)

This chapter outlines a framework for thinking about justice in the global digital economy. The chapter first proposes to understand the digital economy as about infrastructure, then describes some of the problems of justice raised by the global digital economy and sketches potential reforms.

: In this paper I will focus on the notion of “dominant patterns”, as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey’s fragmentary and incomplete preliminary lecture notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy. I will show that the way the notion of “dominant patterns” is dealt with in the text of the lecture notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in China (...) as published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen, but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question to the development of Dewey’s philosophical project during this period. In particular, I will argue that a comparative reading of the lecture notes and of the Lectures in China allows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey’s understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey has developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination which is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the lecture notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition – and in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function – and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations. -/- domination, habits, social philosophy, struggle for recognition, conflict, groups, hegemony, power, institutionalization. (shrink)

Scholarship on the politics of new media widely assumes that communication functions as a sufficient conceptual paradigm for critically assessing new media politics. This article argues that communication-centric analyses fail to engage the politics of information itself, limiting information only to its consequences for communication, and neglecting information as it reaches into our selves, lives, and actions beyond the confines of communication. Furthering recent new media historiography on the “information theory” of Shannon and Wiener, the article reveals both the primacy (...) of communication in midcentury information theory, and also a striking resonance between these postwar communication theories and Habermas’s more recent communicative theory of democracy. To achieve a critical perspective beyond communication, the article proposes a media genealogy of the politics of subjects as a methodology for developing an analysis of how information formats us as subjects of data. (shrink)

In his influential 1949 essay, The Intellectuals and Socialism, F.A. Hayek prophesied that the “revival of liberalism” must coincide with the resurgence of “the courage to be Utopian.” Today, at a time when liberalism is under attack from multiple fronts, we need courage more than ever. Indeed, the rediscovery of the Utopian potential of liberalism coincides with going back to its roots. My paper shows that liberalism, especially in its so-called “epistemic” or "evolutionary" branch whose notable theorists include Adam Smith, (...) J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and F.A. Hayek, provides a framework for “real Utopian” theory and practice. However, I argue that evolutionary liberalism should be enriched with the insights of contemporary evolutionary theory and complexity theory to properly account for the downsides of social evolution and to overcome the understandable charge of social Darwinism. Only then can it robustly realise its emancipatory aspirations and real Utopian promise. (shrink)

Pessimistic empirical evidence about the reformatory and deterrent effects of punitive treatment poses a challenge for all justificatory theories of punishment. Yet, the dominant progressive view remains that punishment is required for the most serious crimes. This paper outlines an empirically sensitive prospectus for justifying punitive treatment through understanding the importance of reintegration. On this view, punishment can be viewed as a preferred alternative to the rigours of social ostracism, a common way of dealing with offenders in lieu of formal (...) criminal justice. Adopting reintegration as a primary aim encourages taking a longer view which focuses on desistance from criminality rather than only on reform at the point of release from formal punishment. The view outlined in this paper enables a vindication of reintegrative punishment even when it is not the most immediately efficient means of reforming offenders. In making this argument, I develop the modern retributive platform in criminal justice theory, identify various overlooked yet key nuances in the relationship between reintegration and reform, and argue for greater theoretical and practical attention to how the state can make the communities they serve more receptive to reintegrating offenders. (shrink)

Constituent power is an idea with a long tradition in modern political thought but has been largely abandoned since the middle of the twentieth century. Here I offer a new account of constituent power that avoids problems of the classical account, including the paradox of constitutionalism, and clarifies how individuals contribute to creating their shared political order. I argue that constituent power should be understood as an individual power-with: the agential power to constitute a legal order with others. Our individual, (...) banal acts of law-abidingness each partially effect the collective outcome. We generally exercise constituent power unconsciously and automatically, guiding our actions to succeed as defined by law and relying on the legal system to take up our contributions and effectively combine them with others. (shrink)

I pursue three interrelated goals. Firstly, through a Hohfeldian analysis of the concept of a right, I aim to clarify what we mean by attributing to political authority a general right to rule (through legal norms) and to the recipients of its decisions a general obligation to obey these norms, which is con¬tent-independent and preemptive. In this regard, careful differentiation between legal and moral rights and obligations appears crucial. Secondly, I argue that, in contrast to the standard approach in political (...) and legal theory interpreting the right to govern as a Hohfeldian claim and the obligation of obedience as a Hohfeldian duty, conceiving these positions as symmetrical and inseparable (“correlative”), it is more fitting to focus on the Hohfeldian power and the corresponding liability. This implies abandoning the assumption of the content-independence and preemptiveness of authority’s decisions. Thirdly, in contrast to the majority of con¬tributions, I emphasise that morality cannot remain a theoretical black box, the content and validity of which are simply assumed in discussions about legitimate authority, and I show how this can be circumvented. The paper seeks to find a stable theoretical position that does not slide either towards the acceptance of the “self-image of the state” as in the case of the standard approach, or towards the “nightmare” of philo¬sophical anarchism. (shrink)

This article reflects on the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising in Iran (2022/23) in light of the politicisation of mourning. It argues that this uprising represented a singular afterlife of Antigone’s impediment of burial. In other words, the initial event of the murder of a Kurdish woman that sparked this uprising should not be reduced to the tension between one woman and the clerical class over the compulsory dress code, the clash between two value systems or worldviews, nor to the saga (...) of a heroic individual fighting abstract institutions as the liberal narrative would have it. Rather, at stake is the Marxian problem of the exposure of contradictions and cracks in the social reality itself, the unveiling of deep-rooted antagonisms of a power structure grounded on the simultaneous acknowledgment and disavowal of a great portion of the population. The article shows how the very bodies of the dead protesters became the sites of relentless struggle and subversion. The excessive violence of the state in this uprising manifested itself in the denial of proper burial rites and blockage of funerals, a deprivation and violation that came back to haunt the state and challenge its symbolic power. Just like the unburied corpse of Polyneices, the mistreated dead bodies of the demonstrators bring to light what remains unconcealable and uncontainable in the desperate, brute force of the power-structure to prolong its own lifespan and buy legitimacy for its reign. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Field, S. L. (2014). 'Hobbes and the question of power'. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 52(1), 61-86. Thomas Hobbes has been hailed as the philosopher of power par excellence; however, I demonstrate that Hobbes’s conceptualization of political power is not stable across his texts. Once the distinction is made between the authorized and the effective power of the sovereign, it is no longer sufficient simply to defend a doctrine of the authorized power of the sovereign; such (...) a doctrine must be robustly complemented by an account of how the effective power commensurate to this authority might be achieved. Nor is this straightforward: for effective political power can fluctuate, sometimes severely. In this light, the prevalent juridical reading of Hobbes’s political philosophy is inadequate. (shrink)

This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual’s relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state’s right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other (...) words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund’s theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable. (shrink)

The human race has been socially organizing itself for probably about 1.8 million years. The first form of human organization was the hunter-gatherer, which was the form of organization in which man lived for about 99 % of his history. This mode of life caused humans to organize themselves into small groups and lead a nomadic life. The nomadic life ensured that these groups had no possessions and no wealth could be accumulated. In this manner, this form of human organization (...) ensured egalitarianism, a form of primitive communism. This changed dramatically with the development of agriculture in the so-called Neolithic Revolution in 10,000 BC. With the development of agriculture and the consequent development of technology, man became sedentary, the first towns were formed, and the class system made its appearance, that is, the separation between an administrative class and a productive class. The egalitarian and communist primitive society gave way to an increasingly centralized and hierarchical society. From network theory, they have been insisting for years on the benefits of the so-called scale-free networks, networks governed by certain privileged nodes called hubs. These networks are said to be slightly vulnerable and highly robust to errors. In this work, we perform a deep network analysis of a group of centralized-hierarchical networks and a group of decentralized-distributed networks. This work provides clear and compelling evidence that, contrary to what is maintained, decentralized-distributed networks are the least vulnerable and most robust networks, and are the networks that ensure an equitable and equal distribution of power and influence among their members. These results are analyzed in the context of network theory, and are discussed in relation to the theories of Jeremy Rifkin, Ernst Schumacher, Alexander Bogdanov and Aldous Huxley. (shrink)

The ascendance of populism to power in various liberal democracies around the world triggered vigorous public debates. More often than not, scholars, politicians and analysts warn of the dangers populism poses to democracy and its institutions, expecting populism to turn authoritarian once in government. Viewing populism as a feature of the opposition alone, others argue that populism in government is not meant to last - but rather consolidated into the mainstream of political and party systems. This chapter provides a critical (...) overview of the literature on populism in power, putting into scrutiny dominant theoretical paradigms in the field of so-called populism studies. It discusses the multi-faceted trajectories populist actors globally may take in their transition from opposition to power. It concludes that distinct types of populist actors have distinct implications on democracy depending on factors such as ideology and context. (shrink)

There are two rival conceptions of power in modern sociopolitical thought. According to one, all social power reduces to power-over-others. According to another, the core notion is power-to-effect-outcomes, to which even power-over reduces. This article defends seven theses. First, agential social power consists in a relation between agent and outcomes (power-to). Second, not all social power reduces to power-over and, third, the contrary view stems from conflating power-over with a distinct notion: power-despite-resistance. Fourth, the widespread assumption that social power presupposes (...) the capacity to overcome resistance is false: social power includes the capacity to effect outcomes with others’ assistance. Fifth, power-with can be exercised via joint intentional action, strategic coordination and non-strategic coordination. Sixth, agential social power is best analysed as a capacity to effect outcomes, with the assistance of others, despite the resistance of yet others. Seventh, power-over and power-with are not mutually exclusive: each can ground the other. (shrink)

In response to the growing social discontent at what is perceived as generational injustice, due to younger generations of voters facing long-term negative consequences from issues disproportionately decided by the votes of older generations of voters, there have been suggestions to introduce an upper age voting threshold. These have been all but universally dismissed as offensive and contrary to basic democratic values. In the present article, I show that the idea is in fact entirely consonant with present-day democratic practices and (...) far from without a precedent. Hence, I describe how the aforementioned generational injustice can be rectified using a simple vote weighting scheme which is easy to implement and interpret. Lastly, I discuss the societal effects that this alteration of the voting system would have on the distribution of the origins of political power. (shrink)

Existing social disparities in the United States are inconsistent with the promise of democracy; therefore, there was a need for critical conceptualization of the first principles that undergird American democracy and the genesis of democratic social change in America. This constructivist grounded theory study aimed to construct a grounded theory that provides an understanding of the process of American democratic social change as it emerged from the nation’s founding documents. A post hoc polytheoretical framework including Foucault’s, Bourdieu’s, and Marx and (...) Engels’s theories of power was used to understand power dynamics. The research question focused on understanding the process of democratic social change in America. The sample comprised the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Declaration of Independence, The Federalist Papers, and the U.S. Constitution. The documents were retrieved from the National Archives and Library of Congress. The data analysis plan incorporated successive comparison, situational and dramaturgical analysis, deconstruction, and perspective taking as strategies. The result was the construction of a democratic social change process theory preceded by five grounded theories: (a) first principles of democracy, (b) first principles of democracy conceptual framework, (c) socio-ethical principles of democracy, (d) demoralizing process, and (e) either-or approach to democracy. Positive social change implications include applying a democratic social change process to future social change endeavors across domains and levels of analysis, a normative framework for a republican form of government, and a tool to analyze and minimize the latent consequences of social justice policies. (shrink)

This book investigates Duterte’s brand of authoritarianism from a multidisciplinary approach. It brings together views from scholars and activists from diverse disciplines and areas of work to investigate the core of Duterte’s disastrous authoritarianism and how it takes specific forms in various contexts (e.g., the church, peace process, discourse, Lumad schools, state). The book and its contributors do not in any way hide behind the language of academic neutrality. What is at work here is an engaged scholarship that does not (...) investigate the problem of authoritarianism from a neutral ground supposedly devoid of all values, beliefs, and interpretations. Rather, the book recognizes scholarship to be a political practice which aims to elucidate a theoretical position that intends not only to understand authoritarianism but also to imagine the prospects for a democratic future. (shrink)

European police and judicial cooperation was initiated as a counterpart to the progressive abolition of internal border controls under Schengen. Since then, the security policy of the European Union (EU) has developed into one of the most dynamic and fastest growing policy areas of the Union. The aim of this contribution is to outline the main trends and characteristics of this policy field. I suggest to conceptualised them as instances of ‘pre-emptive security’. This is an approach to security that focuses (...) on hypothetical future events and aims to prevent the most serious events (e.g. serious criminal offences) by means of risk assessments and probability forecasts, without addressing the phenomenon as a whole (e.g. crime) and its causes. Pre-emptive understandings of security differ from both reactive and pre-emptive approaches. In the paper, I outline the main characteristics of this model both in historical terms and with regard to the latest developments in the field of EU security policy. Finally, I discuss the problematic normative implications of the pre-emptive understanding of security, both for the rule of law and democracy and for human autonomy. (shrink)

This paper develops a new theory of the morality of promissory obligations. T. M. Scanlon notoriously argued that promising consists in assuring the promisee that we will do something. I disagree. I argue that it is true that promising consists in assuring the promisee, but what the promisor gives to the promisee is not an assurance that they will do something, but that the normative situation is in a certain way.

The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one’s vote. I argue that this classic conception of voting power, which fails to account for partial decisiveness or efficacy, produces erroneous results because it saddles the concept of voting power with implausible microfoundations. This failure in the measure of voting power in turn reflects a philosophical mistake about the concept of social power in general: a failure to (...) recognize that an agent can exercise individual social power with others’ assistance, in virtue of the group’s collective power, sometimes even when she could not unilaterally scuttle the group’s collective power. I therefore develop a conception of efficacy that admits of degrees and defend a Recursive Measure of voting power that takes partial efficacy into account. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the situation generated by the unequal distribution of vaccines that -at the international level- has occurred in the framework of the epidemic generated by COVID-19. For this, the concepts of «act» and «word» derived from the theoretical-political theses of Hannah Arendt (1993) are used, with which it was sought to evidence the situation of neocolonialism of vaccines derived from this situation, from the philosophical deconstruction to raise the urgent consequence of neocolonialism in health, which allowed us to (...) infer how Human Rights are not the central axis of the national and state discourses or praxis of the government systems of countries with more stable and stronger economies, since the decisions and behaviors reflect the interests of the main actors of the National States that have economic support for the large-scale purchase of vaccines against COVID-19. Which in turn are the protagonists of a sociopolitical phenomenon that can be categorized as global health neocolonialism, which is presented as a phenomenon of neocolonialism that began with the confidentiality agreements signed between the States of the countries and the pharmaceutical corporations, inside or outside COVAX in the year 2020. Concluding that the massive purchase of vaccines was subject to an exclusivity character to acquire the batches, where some factors of discrimination or non-inclusion are revealed, affirming that COVAX did not comply with the purpose for what was initially created. (shrink)

I propose a theory of popular power, according to which a political order manifests popular power to the extent it robustly maintains an egalitarian basic structure. There are two parts to the theory. First, the power of a political order lies in the basic structure's robust self-maintenance. Second, the popularity of the political order’s power lies in the equality of relations between the society's members. I will argue that this theory avoids the perverse consequences of some existing radical democratic theories (...) of popular power which focus on mass expression, either in plebiscites or in social movements, as popular power's canonical instances. In particular, my theory does not valourise momentary expression over durable effect, and it offers a ready framework for conceptualising the sometimes-oligarchic substructure of the supposedly canonical instances of popular power. I will show that this theory has strong precedents within a certain republican tradition of political philosophy. (shrink)

In a 1978 lecture in Tokyo, Foucault drew a comparison between his own philosophical methodology and that of ‘Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy’, claiming the label ‘analytic philosophy of politics’ for his own approach. This may seem like a somewhat surprising comparison given the gulf between contemporary analytic and continental philosophy, but I argue that it is a very productive one which indeed might help us reconsider this gulf. I proceed through a comparison between Foucault and the speech act theory of J. (...) L. Austin, one of the analytic philosophers Foucault had in mind in his Tokyo lecture. By focusing on the methodological commonalities between Foucault and Austin, this article identifies the core of a philosophical methodology that cuts across the analytic/continental divide in philosophy in general while constituting a powerful alternative to the methods applied by analytic political philosophers specifically. This approach, which I term ‘analytic critique’, is one that starts from a critical analysis of what happens in ordinary lived experience and theorizes ‘bottom-up’ in an avowedly politically engaged way – thereby challenging the conceptual and political aloofness of contemporary political philosophy in the liberal-Rawlsian tradition. Foucault’s appropriation of the label ‘analytic philosophy’, it is argued, ought to function as a call to more imaginative methodological-theoretical engagement across the traditional division between continental and analytic approaches. (shrink)

What are we to make of the fact that world leaders, such as Canada’s Justin Trudeau, have, within the last few decades, offered official apologies for a whole host of past injustices? Scholars have largely dealt with this phenomenon as a moral question, seeing in these expressions of contrition a radical disruption of contemporary neoliberal individualism, a promise of a more humane world. Focusing on Canadian apology politics, this essay instead proposes a nonideal approach to state apologies, sidestepping questions of (...) what they ought to do and focusing instead on their actual functioning as political acts. Through a sociologically informed speech act theory and Foucault’s work on power, apology is conceptualized as a speech act with an essentially relational nature. The state, through apologizing, reaffirms the norms governing its relationship to its subjects at a moment when a past transgression threatens to destabilize this relation. From a Foucauldian point of view, the state’s power inheres in the very stability of the state–citizen relation, and we should therefore see apologies as defensive moves to protect state hegemony. In the context of Western liberal democracies, such as Canada, apologies embody, rather than challenge, the logic of neoliberal governmentality by suggesting that everything, including resentment against the state, can be managed within the current status quo. Nevertheless, total cynicism about apology politics is not warranted. In many indigenous apology campaigners’ demands for contrition we see another side of apologies: their potential to bring about change by enacting counterhegemonic relations to the state. (shrink)

Istoria antropologiei culturale a înregistrat nu puţine descrieri mitologice sau interpretări ficţionale ale datelor etnografice, în așa măsură încât recursul la imaginaţie în caracterizarea „naturii umane” sau a diverselor grupuri sociale constituie un subiect de studiu în sine. El prezintă o cazuistică impresionantă când vine vorba de referirile la trăsăturile distinctive ale grupurilor etnice sau ale tradiţiilor naţionale, discursul politic despre acestea fiind încărcat de stereotipuri și reprezentări antropologice itologizate, care spun mai multe despre cei ce le vehiculează decât despre (...) obiectul la care se referă. Studiul de faţă prezintă comparativ două exemple de manifestare a acestor reprezentări ficţionale cu implicaţii antropologice în discursul public românesc post-socialist. (shrink)

How much injustice and oppression must be tolerated before a revolution is justified? In theory, the United States’ political structure, by design, makes the question of revolution obsolete: by putting political power into the hands of the people via democratic mechanisms such as voting, the division of power among separate branches of government, and representative influence and control, there should be no need for revolution because everything the government does either has the consent of the people or is (relatively swiftly) (...) checked by their dissent. In practice, the United States’ political structure has failed to bring about such democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when, if ever, a revolution in the United States would be justified. To begin answering this question, we first turn to three traditional theories of revolution prominent in Western political theory, all of which have serious theoretical and practical problems, many of which are exacerbated by the contemporary American context in which our discussion is situated. We conclude that, if the aim of revolution is to bring about justice more equally enjoyed by all, then classic Western justifications of revolution are deeply flawed and possibly untenable. We propose a Confucian-inspired account of revolution, which promises to provide criteria for engaging in revolution that are neither solely directly democratic nor completely rights-based. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables us to take into consideration not only the role of government, the nature of the ruler, and the nature of the governed, but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. We contend that our proposal provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when, and under what conditions, a revolution would be justified in the contemporary United States. (shrink)

This article presents Minobe Tatsukichi’s emperor organ theory as a novel understanding of the temporality of founding. In contrast to a conventional framework of founding which legitimizes the constitution by postulating the pre-constitutional power of “the people,” emperor organ theory invents “the people” out of the Meiji Constitution as a democratically empowered subject to-come. In so doing, emperor organ theory calls upon the transformation of shin-min (臣民), the presumed subject of the emperor, into koku-min (国民), the people of this constitutional (...) state. However, emperor organ theory also highlights the contingency of founding moments: though koku-min emerged through the Diet as a conceptually new political actor in Japan’s nascent constitutional state, it never solidified its sovereign status as “the people.”. (shrink)

Recent empirical work has offered strong support for ‘biased pluralism’ and ‘economic elite’ accounts of political power in the United States, according a central role to ‘business interest groups’ as a mechanism through which corporate influence is exerted. Here, we propose an additional channel of influence for corporate interests: the ‘policy-planning network,’ consisting of corporate-dominated foundations, think tanks, and elite policy-discussion groups. To evaluate this assertion, we consider one key policy-discussion group, the Council on Foreign Relations. We first briefly review (...) the origins of this organization and then review earlier findings on its influence. We then code CFR policy preferences on 295 foreign policy issues during the 1981–2002 period. In logistic regression analyses, we find that the preferences of more affluent citizens and the CFR were positive, statistically significant predictors of foreign policy outcomes while business interest group preferences were not. These findings are discussed with a consideration of the patterns of CFR ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ for the issues in our dataset. Although a full demonstration of a causal connection between corporate interests, the policy-planning network and policy outcomes requires further research, we conclude that this has been shown to be a plausible mechanism through which corporate interests are represented and that ‘biased pluralism’ researchers should include it in their future investigations. (shrink)

The issue of political violence is mostly absent from current debates about power. Many conceptions of power treat violence as wholly distinct from or even antithetical to power, or see it as a mere instrument whose effects are obvious and not in need of political analysis. In this paper, I explore what kind of ontology of power is necessary to properly take account of the various roles that violence can play in creating and maintaining power structures. I pursue this question (...) by contrasting the views of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. For Arendt, power is generated and maintained by communicative practices. She argues that power and violence are ‘opposites’ because violence can only destroy but not create these practices. In contrast, Foucault’s conception explicitly allows violence to play a constitutive role in generating power. I argue that while Arendt is right to insist that power and violence are not identical, it does not follow that violence cannot play any role in constituting power. Guided by Foucault’s approach, I formulate a non-dualist account of the relationship between power and violence that takes seriously the role that bodies, material things, and built infrastructures play in making social relations ‘more durable’ and constituting power. (shrink)

As they make their way through Louis Althusser’s and Jacques Derrida’s texts, readers will cross innumerable curtains – ‘the words and things’, as Derrida says, as many fabrics of traces. These curtains open onto a multiplicity of scenes and mises en scène, performances, roles, rituals, actors, plays – thus unfolding the space of a certain theatricality. This essay traces Althusser’s and Derrida’s respective deployments of the theatrical motif. In his theoretical writings, Althusser’s theatrical dispositive aims to designate the practical and (...) material dimension of the scenes of ideology, materially enacted through roleplays, performances, acts, or discourses. At the horizon: a scientific discourse on ideology or, later, a strategic intervention in the class struggle. This scientific and/or strategic orientation echoes Althusser’s definition of materialism: ‘no more storytelling’. But Derrida’s ‘closure of representation’ reminds us that there’s no presence – even the most ‘material’ – no ‘truth’ or ‘correctness’ – in theoretical or strategic terms – without effects of re-presentation, differential repetition, narrative reconstruction: theatricality and materiality suppose a force of resistance, a secret heterogeneity, curtain foldings. Hence the irreducible necessity of reading, storytelling, transformative interpretation. What are the implications for thinking inheritance and debt – for example, the one binding Althusser and Derrida, and us to them? (shrink)

The paper focuses on the analysis of conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy theories by taking into consideration some of the major contributions about the topic presently provided by several disciplines. A definition is given that helps illustrate the most prominent features of these beliefs, namely monological bias, logical and conceptual fallacies, dispositional influence and pseudorationality. Other important psychological preconditions are also provided (such as, among others, credulity, hypersensitive agency detection devices and proneness to self-deception), but, as the paper argues, they are (...) features shared to a greater or lesser extent with other belief systems, like radical political ideologies and religious fundamentalisms. As a result, it is suggested that a more proper understanding of the phenomenon is attainable by approaches combining psychological data with the analysis of groups and sociopolitical dynamics. Exceptional contingencies and shifts in power distribution among group/social actors seem to be the most influential factors that explain formation, spread and salience of this kind of beliefs. (shrink)

The text of this interview is based on a conversation between Bagryana Popov and Juliane Römhild on 1 September 2021. In this interview, Bagryana discusses two works which unite her research into political trauma and site-specific performance in the context of political repression under the communist regime in Bulgaria. For her choreography He is not here and the performance event Traces (2011) Bagryana returned to Sofia, the city of her birth, to explore her own family history and her grandfather’s incarceration (...) as a political prisoner. He is not here is a meditation on the body at the receiving end of political power developed in collaboration with dancer Simon Ellis. Traces takes the audience first to the courthouse in Sofia, where Bagryana’s grandfather was trialled, and then to her family’s flat where Bagryana’s daughter reads from the diaries of her grandmother. Both works were a part of Bagryana’s PhD project at Melbourne University. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For several decades now, a steady flow of scholarly contributions from both intellectual history and political theory has been reasserting Benjamin Constant as a theorist of liberal democracy. Constant’s visionary understanding of liberal democracy is usually conflated with his understanding of limited popular sovereignty. In this article, I reconstruct Constant’s positive conception of popular sovereignty, i.e. his conception of what popular sovereignty means within its limits and take it as the starting point of an analysis of Constant’s understanding of (...) democracy. I argue that Constant’s understanding of popular sovereignty as ‘the assent of all’ leads to a distinction between ‘governmental authority’ and ‘sovereign power’. The latter is exercised by the individual members of the political community and has features that align with contemporary aggregative and contestatory approaches to democracy. Even though according to this analysis, Constant’s conception of democracy allows for both pluralism and dynamism, those are operative against the background of a more fundamental conservatism: Constant’s understanding of sovereign power is predicated on an institutional status quo. (shrink)

It is widely thought that if one cannot effect outcomes without others’ assistance, then one has agential power to effect those outcomes only if one has power over those whose assistance one requires. The corollary is that someone who just happens to find herself amongst people who share her preferences and would be disposed to help effect her preferred outcomes, but over whom she has no power, is lucky, but not thereby more powerful. This view is false. It ignores the (...) independent force of the power of numbers: the agential social power enjoyed by someone who finds herself amongst others disposed to act in concert with her, even if she has no power over them. The power of numbers is the power one may have in virtue of one’s position in social structures that shape preferences. It is the power enjoyed by members of persistent majorities. It is the power of whites in European and European-settler societies in virtue of their position in these societies’ racial structures. Sure, those with numbers on their side are lucky; but that’s just to say they are lucky to be powerful. (shrink)

The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism—and even representative institutions—are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy’s core normative commitments—namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails to account for the power of numbers and thereby fails to explain the inequality faced by members of persistent minorities. Although strict majority rule serves the democratic (...) values of political agency and equality as interpreted by a set of formal conditions, an adequate conception of power shows why in real-world conditions formal-procedural inequalities, instantiated by counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism, are sometimes required to serve democratic equality. (shrink)

Contemporary critics of the administrative state are right to highlight the dangers of vesting too much power in a centralized bureaucracy removed from popular oversight and accountability. Too often neglected in this literature, however, are the dangers of vesting too little power in a centralized state, which enables dominant groups to further expand their social and economic advantages through decentralized means. This article seeks to synthesize these concerns, understanding them as reflecting the same underlying danger of state capture. It then (...) articulates a set of heuristics for the design of public and administrative institutions, which aim at minimizing the risks of capture from both public and private sources. By following these heuristics, it claims, we can successfully employ the administrative state as a weapon against concentrated private power, rather than allowing it to serve as a tool of dominant groups. (shrink)