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| Summary | This philosophy of anthropology section is within philosophy of social science, so the term 'anthropology' is here taken as short for social and cultural anthropology. Philosophy of anthropology aims to contribute to our understanding of anthropology as a discipline through doing philosophy. Most works within this category fall into one or more of the following areas. (1) Attempts to answer questions about the nature or value of anthropology, e.g. what distinguishes anthropology from other disciplines? is it possible to pursue anthropology as a science? what moral obligations does anthropology give rise to? (2) Attempts to identify the commitments of a given type of anthropology, e.g. functionalist anthropology, structuralist anthropology; and also philosophical evaluations of these commitments. (3) Attempts to define more general concepts that are closely connected to anthropological research, e.g. the concept of a culture, the concept of a belief system; and also assessments of their value to anthropology. |
| Key works | Wittgenstein 1967, Quine 1957, Jarvie 1967 and Davidson 1973 are key works written by philosophers. A number of key works are by anthropologists reflecting on their discipline. See Malinowski 1922 (introductory chapter), Radcliffe-Brown 1940, Evans-Pritchard 1961, Levi-Strauss 1969, Geertz 2003, Harris 2001, Sperber 1985, Sperber 1996, Clifford & Marcus 1986, Spiro 1986, Spiro 1996, Strathern 1987, Strathern 1987, Strathern 1990, Moore 2013, Csordas 1990, Gell 1992, Gell 1992, Abu-Lughod 1991, Henare et al 2005 and Ingold 2014 |
| Introductions | Jarvie 1967 and Sperber 1985 are good places to start. Hacker 1992 is useful for understanding Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frazer. Lynch 1997 serves well as an introduction to what a conceptual framework is and whether there can be alternative conceptual frameworks. Zahle 2015 provides information on how participant observation relates to the divide between the natural and social sciences. |
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Contents
1990 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 1990 |
- Human Person According to John Dewey.Baiju Anthony - manuscriptDewey’s approach to the study of human nature is consistent with the standpoint of scientific psychology. Man according to him is the product of the process of evolution. His nature has changeable and unchangeable elements. Dewey’s approach to the study of human nature is characterized by a scientific spirit. He rejects the dualistic view, faculty view, and the tabula rasa view on human nature. Deweyan presentation on human nature is in a way was one of his most cherished dreams. In (...)
- What is Spoken of when We Speak about Being.Niel Bezrookove - manuscriptτὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα καὶ μένειν οὐδέν: Another look at being, asking what a interlocutor means to show by saying they feel themselves to be something. An ambiguity of the verb "to be" is disambiguated to reveal that it can be meant to show what something is and a process of being something. The relationship between being and essence is made by describing engagement through the encounter, giving us a non-exhaustive account of something's essence. Practice is then understood as (...)
- A sixth kind of legitimate fieldwork in social anthropology: cross-disciplinary.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptI present the concept of cross-disciplinary legitimacy: the fieldwork which an anthropologist has done is considered legitimate fieldwork in another discipline as well. Also, I present a puzzle regarding how the anthropologist untrained in another discipline can do such fieldwork and a response.
- A third solution to a Victorian anthropology paradox: structural-functionalism.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper presents a structural-functionalist solution to a paradox that historian of anthropology George Stocking dug up: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components.
- Max Gluckman’s objections to Sir James Frazer.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis is a one page handout presenting objections from Gluckman's book Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society.
- The Golden Bough as the handmaiden of colonialism? A response to Mary Beard.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper responds to Mary Beard’s assessment of the claim that Frazer’s book The Golden Bough was popular because it provided practical aid for colonialists. Beard rejects this as an inadequate explanation: reference to colonialism is part of an adequate explanation, but a full explanation must go beyond this particular ism. I present two objections to the case she makes for her inadequacy conclusion, though I don’t think his book aided much with colonialism.
- Fieldwork places: legitimate, illegitimate, obviously legitimate, better, worse.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptJeanette Edwards observes a pattern of questions of the form “Why do anthropology fieldwork in location X?” - she only hears the question posed of some places - and she explains this pattern by saying that some places are taken to be obviously legitimate for anthropology fieldwork whereas others are not. I draw distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate, obviously legitimate and not obviously legitimate, and better and worse. The distinctions lead to a different explanation.
- Savage and civilized on controlling the weather, from The Golden Bough.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptSir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough presents a puzzle regarding how primitive peoples believe they can control something which civilized people regard as beyond their control: the weather. I clarify the puzzle and consider Frazer’s solution to it, as well as other solutions.
- Against structural skepticism: Max Gluckman’s response to Elizabeth Colson.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptA quite recent book casts the anthropologist Elizabeth Colson as a systems skeptic, with Max Gluckman attempting to counter her skepticism. In this paper, I offer clarifications of the skepticism and of the counter.
- On a quick argument downplaying British anthropology’s colonialist role.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptI introduce and examine an argument presented by American anthropologist Herbert S. Lewis against thinking that British anthropology played a significant role in supporting colonialist projects: the British empire was large and centuries old, so it seems very unlikely that two dozen anthropologists late on made much difference.
- Anthropology away versus anthropology at home: a deconstruction.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptIt is tempting to represent anthropology at home versus anthropology in exotic places like so: “Whereas the latter is obviously legitimate and of interest to the discipline, the former is a borderline phenomenon at best and no department could function with just it. It is probably parasitic.” This paper offers a deconstruction of this portrait, but not a spectacular one, in which anthropology at home is presented as essential for accountability.
- The social organism analogy in British anthropology and analytic political philosophy.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis is a one page handout, which specifies four uses of the social organism analogy in British structural-functionalist anthropology and contrasts these uses with uses in analytic political philosophy.
- Social anthropology summary: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s objections to Sir James Frazer.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis is a one page handout presenting some objections A.R. Radcliffe-Brown makes to Frazer on rites and Frazer's evolutionism.
- British social anthropology, wider processes, and causal overdetermination.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptBritish structural-functionalist anthropology famously faces an objection that it is incapable of dealing with the influence of wider processes. An analytical response to this objection, which at least needs to be registered, is that some wider processes can be ignored when there is causal overdetermination.
- The virgin birth debate: is there practical value in the denial of paternity?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptVarious tribes deny that males have a role in causing pregnancy. Edmund Leach thinks members don’t actually believe tribal dogma. I propose that there is a practical value in denying our biological knowledge.
- On outsiders who know your society better.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptHow can an outsider know your society better than you? Philosophers call this kind of question “epistemological.” A well-known answer amongst anthropologists is that they may know an aspect of it better: if everyone unthinkingly makes a certain assumption and the anthropologist is aware of an alternative to that assumption. I contrast that answer with an answer “derived” from the writings of George Bernard Shaw, who claimed to know America better despite never having been there.
- A built-in objection against if-I-were-a-horse argument.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptMax Gluckman introduces us to if-I-were-a-horse arguments, but what is wrong with them? In this paper, I draw attention to an objection built-in to the terminology.
- Gluckman versus Frazer: if-I-were-a-horse arguments.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptI present anthropologist Max Gluckman’s explanation of what “if-I-were-a-horse” arguments are and introduce three questions. How do we define this kind of argument? Are earlier anthropologists “guilty” of them? And is it a bad idea to make them? I address the first two questions, proposing that Frazer is not much guilty of precisely these, though his project calls for them.
- (2 other versions)Societies differ in how they handle the same facts: an axiom of social anthropology?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper challenges Marilyn Strathern’s claim that it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present a set of foundational commitments for conducting social anthropology which leave the truth of the proposition as an empirical question of the discipline.
- Victorian anthropology paradox: another solution.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptParts of the Victorian middle class were troubled by how Victorian society was both highly evolved and contained savage parts. I propose a solution to the paradox they faced.
- On the meaning of “legitimate fieldwork” in social anthropology.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis is a one-page handout specifying five kinds of legitimacy.
- A fourth solution to a Victorian anthropology paradox: underdeterminism.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptHistorian of anthropology George Stocking tells us: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components. Why don’t they change their ways, or why didn’t they? There is a Quinean solution.
- “The term ‘function’ has no place outside mathematics”: is this even coherent?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper argues that a criticism attributed to Gregory Bateson – that the term ‘function’ is from mathematics and has no place in social science – looks incoherent, when subject to clarification.
- A solution to Elizabeth Colson’s paradox of anthropological empathy.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper presents a relativistic interpretation of Elizabeth Colson's paradox of empathy and a solution.
- Anthropology at home and the paradox of analysis.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptA worry that was once raised about anthropology at home is that the anthropologist will end up producing a report that is uninformative. In this paper, I draw a parallel between this worry and the paradox of analysis, from the analytic tradition of philosophy. I reveal that a solution to the latter would also address the former.
- (2 other versions)Societies differ in how they handle the same facts: an axiom of social anthropology? II.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptMarilyn Strathern claims that it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present two clarifications neither of which looks suitable for axiomatic status.
- Why Bacup? An Oxford-style response.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper presents what I at least regard as a University of Oxford style response to a question often posed to social anthropologist Jeanette Edwards, “Why Bacup?” The question can be a brief way of communicating various puzzles which an inquirer is seeking to solve and I presume “an Oxford person” is going to ask for a clarification of the question, perhaps offering some options.
- Off the verandah? A puzzle from Malinowski and British social anthropology.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis one page handout presents a seemingly inconsistent triad from Malinowski, concerning the requirement to do intensive fieldwork, and solutions to it.
- A solution to a Victorian anthropology paradox.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper considers a paradox which the historian of anthropology George Stocking draws attention to: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components. I clarify the paradox and propose a solution.
- Imperialism and British anthropology again, with European intellectual cults.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptI address the problem that British social anthropologists ignored the wider colonial relations which the societies they studied were part of, by proposing a solution from reflecting on the structure of European intellectual cults.
- (2 other versions)Societies differ in how they handle the same facts: an axiom of social anthropology? III.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptAccording to Marilyn Strathern, it is, or was, an axiom of social anthropology that societies differ in how they handle the same facts. I present a challenge which I anticipate and respond to it.
- Why did Frazer not do fieldwork?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptProbably the most famous story about the armchair anthropologist Sir James Frazer is about how, when asked by William James about doing fieldwork, he said, “But Heavens forbid!” I propose that it was rational for Frazer to avoid fieldwork given his theory of what is rational for so-called savages: to kill returning tribesmen and visitors, to protect against disease.
- On the very idea that social anthropology can contribute to the study of specialization.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptI present an argument against the very idea that anthropology can contribute to the study of specialization. But an obvious reply is “Actually anthropologists at home can study specialization.” I provide some details concerning this reply, focusing on incentives to specialize directed at sensitive souls.
- Against the diversity objection to group worldview description.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays the group as homogeneous.
- Is that a myth? A dilemma for Malinowski.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper quotes a story about Bronislaw Malinowski trying to find out a myth and extracts a dilemma from it. The story content seems related to self-referential puzzles.
- The Golden Bough as an argument against diffusionism.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis paper interprets Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough as presenting an objection to diffusionism: the diffusionist theory cannot account for the isolation of the rite Frazer focuses on, in the societies studied by classicists.
- What is an exotic culture?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptThis brief paper distinguishes between two intuitive concepts of what an exotic culture is. The first concept applies when the customs and beliefs of others are very different. The second concept applies when there is a significant departure from a natural baseline.
- (1 other version)R.K. N*r*yan on the invasion of Ukraine and specialization.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptIn this paper, I present a challenge to Adam Smith’s specialization recommendations, at least according to the “unzany” interpretation suggested by his famous pin factory example. I present it while attempting the style of a notable fiction writer from the Indian sub-continent, as befits the challenge. I have adapted the style slightly for the Western setting.
- Searle’s Contradictory Theory of Social Reality.Danny Frederick - manuscriptJohn Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.
- The need for an Evolutionary Perspective in Philosophy and in Psychology (July 2024).Christophe Menant - manuscriptThe nature of human mind is a key subject for philosophy and for psychology. It is agreed that many of its characteristics and performances have been built during the last 7 million years of our primate evolution. That period began with what is called the pan-homo split, the divergence in primate evolution from the Last Common Ancestor (LCAncestor) we share with chimpanzees. The mental specificities that differentiate us from our chimpanzee cousins have been built up during that time. As consequence, (...)
- In Vino Veritas: a new way of understanding the intoxication of knowledge.Victor Mota - manuscriptSaturation, intoxication to the medias of realization and porsuit of happyness.
- A Pulga Pum.Mota Victor - manuscriptHumanity recognizes himself by desire and it's manifestation in terms of dialogue and words.
- Àgua Política.Mota Victor - manuscript
- The Social Function of the Philosopher.Mota Victor - manuscriptAn anthropologist talks to a Philosopher, so that I can not be forgetted from the whole of the Society, includind finantial interests.
- Bringing back Frazer, avoiding the charge of relativism.Terence Rajivan Edward - This paper examines the debate between Marilyn Strathern and I.C. Jarvie. Writing in 1987, Strathern argues that the time is ripe for reincorporating Sir James Frazer. Jarvie thinks Strathern does so in a way that treats revolutions in anthropology as not involving scientific progress. There is a familiar defence against this charge while pursuing the same, or much the same, line of argument.
- Escenaris de la corporeïtat.Lluís Duch & Joan-Carles Mèlich - unknown - In Luis Duch (ed.), Antropologia de la vida quotidiana. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Antropologia de la vida quotidiana.Luis Duch - unknown - Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat. Edited by Joan-Carles Mèlich.Reflexió dedicada al cos humà. Per tal d’analitzar algunes de les característiques del cos humà en la societat dels nostres dies, es procedeix, d’entrada, a una breu exposició de la història del cos en la cultura occidental i, més endavant, s’analitzen alguns aspectes laterals, però tanmateix essencials per a un tractament antropològic del cos com poden ser, per exemple, el cos de la dona en la cultura occidental i el patriarcalisme com a forma d’organitzar els cossos humans.
- Art and the anthropologists.Gregory Currie - unknown - In .
- Climate Change Adaptation and the Back of the Invisible Hand.H. Clark Barrett & Josh Armstrong - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions B.We make the case that scientifically accurate and politically feasible responses to the climate crisis require a complex understanding of human cultural practices of niche construction that moves beyond the adaptive significance of culture. We develop this thesis in two related ways. First, we argue that cumulative cultural practices of niche construction can generate stable equilibria and runaway selection processes that result in long-term existential risks within and across cultural groups. We dub this the back of the invisible hand. Second, (...)
- Respect for Subjects in the Ethics of Causal and Interpretive Social Explanation.Michael L. Frazer - forthcoming - American Political Science Review.Rival causal and interpretive approaches to explaining social phenomena have important ethical differences. While human actions can be explained as a result of causal mechanisms, as a meaningful choice based on reasons, or as some combination of the two, it is morally important that social scientists respect others by recognizing them as persons. Interpretive explanations directly respect their subjects in this way, while purely causal explanations do not. Yet although causal explanations are not themselves expressions of respect, they can be (...)
| 1 — 50 / 1990 |
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