Addresses the nature of human religious belief in a series of vignettes and questions that explore humankind's relationship to the divine, from ancient times to the present, in the context of a taxi ride.

Through careful interpretative essays on Greek poets, Shakespeare, and the Hebrew Bible, Athens, Arden, Jerusalem explores fundamental questions about God, human nature, and the political order. The collection of essays addresses topics ranging from friendship and marriage to sovereignty and tyranny, from piety and sin to comedy and contemplation.

The industrial revolution and the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were two of the most important events in the whole of human history and the question of how these two relate to each other must therefore form one of the most vital of all inquiries in the history of science. As the industrial revolution began in England- and largely provincial England- the question of how scientific knowledge came to be disseminated to these regions forms a crucial part (...) of such an enquiry. Using Derby as a case study, this paper examines how Newtonian philosophy came to be spread, how and why science became a cultural activity as part of the Habermasean public sphere, and how scientific theory related to early industrial and technologicalventures in an English provincial town. The richness of Derby's scientific culture is revealed by the careers of John Whitehurst FRS, John Arden, Thomas Simpson FRS, Benjamin Parker and George Sorocold and the importance of science in the curriculum of the local Dissenting academy. (shrink)

This paper extends a trivalent semantics for indicative conditionals to a language including the modal operators "might" and "must". Specifically, we combine Cooper's (1968) truth-functional, trivalent analysis of the conditional connective with Kratzer's (1986, 2012) idea that if-clauses restrict modal operators. By hard-wiring both trivalence and the restriction operation into the truth conditions of conditional-modal expressions, we obtain an attractive theory that yields plausible predictions for the interaction of conditionals and modals, explains the intuitive appeal of the Restrictor View and (...) avoids the typical problems of Kratzer-style accounts, especially regarding the probability of conditional-modal expressions. (shrink)

Ressentiment describes a psychological process in which a subject responds to feelings of inadequacy by altering his evaluative orientation in a way that enables him to blame the inadequacy on some outgroup. Ressentiment is taken to have far-reaching applicability: it has been used to explain many different forms of political antagonism, including those present in the authoritarian far-right, the far left, identity politics, populism, neo-Nazi movements, the manosphere, incels, and fanaticism. This essay asks what exactly ressentiment is and whether it (...) gives a good account of political antagonism. Is ressentiment an emotion? If so, what kind of emotion is it? How is it linked to strife and discord? Section 1 begins by analyzing the key features of ressentiment. Section 2 asks how ressentiment is linked to the narratives or ideologies with which people and groups operate. Section 3 considers the way in which ressentiment leads to changes in the subject’s identity. Section 4 concludes by discussing the way in which ressentiment generates politically antagonistic emotions and stances. (shrink)

This paper provides a new framework for formalizing conditional obligations in natural language: it pairs a unary deontic operator with trivalent semantics for the indicative conditional and Kratzer's idea that the antecedents of conditionals restrict the scope of modals in the consequent. Combining these three ideas, we obtain a fully compositional theory of "if" and "ought'" that validates plausible principles for deontic reasoning. Moreover, it resolves classical challenges such as the "if A then ought A" problem, the paradox of the (...) miners and the modeling of contrary-to-duty obligations (e.g., Chisholm's quartet). All in all, our proposal is attractive from a logical point of view and squares well with general theories of natural language reasoning. (shrink)

In this article, we present a neo-Aristotelian formulation of the doctrine of the mean. We begin by describing the classical formulation of the doctrine by Aristotle, as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. We also introduce the fundamental elements that govern the matrices of concepts (Franceschi 2002). We then propose a new formulation of the doctrine of the mean, directly derived from the very structure of the matrices of concepts. We also compare the present formulation of the doctrine of the mean (...) with that of Aristotle, highlighting the similarities and differences. We further offer an interpretation of the Aristotelian formulation of the doctrine of the mean. Finally, we demonstrate how the neo-Aristotelian version of the doctrine of the mean addresses several objections, particularly those traditionally raised against its Aristotelian version. (shrink)

This paper presents a large-scale simulation study evaluating the relative success of competing moral theories in strategic interactions. Rather than relying on abstract philosophical argumentation, we adopt a game-theoretic framework in which agents governed by distinct moral principles interact across the entire range of symmetric 2-player, 2-strategy, normal form games, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Hawk-Dove. We analyze 32 moral theories, including five foundational frameworks—average consequence utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, selfishness, maxi-min, and empathy-based morality—as well as 26 synthesized moralities (...) formed by combining these base theories. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we determine which moral rules yield the highest expected material payoffs, both in homogeneous interactions (where all agents follow the same rule) and in mixed populations that include selfish agents. Our findings reveal that synthesized moralities systematically outperform their foundational counterparts, highlighting the practical advantages of moral autonomy. In particular, the synthesis of utilitarianism and deontology (UD) emerges as the 'optimific champion', achieving the highest payoffs under the assumption of universal adherence. However, in mixed societies where agents must coexist with selfish individuals, a different moral rule, what we call the 'realist’s champion', prevails: the synthesis of deontology and selfishness (SD). These results have significant implications for moral philosophy, challenging the traditional focus on isolated moral theories and suggesting that moral rules are best understood in relation to their interactive success. The study also underscores the essential role of deontology in viable moral syntheses, raising fundamental questions about the evolutionary robustness and practical viability of moral systems. -/- . (shrink)

Kant’s aim in the Transcendental Deduction is to prove that the a priori categories of the understanding necessarily apply to objects of experience. He claims that he will do this simply by explaining how they could so apply. But the idea that a mere explanation of this possibility should provide a defence of the categories’ actual (let alone necessary) applicability is surprising. We argue that it can be understood by attending to the source of the scepticism that the Critique’s Analytic (...) is supposed to overcome: Hume’s inability to explain causal knowledge in the Enquiry. (shrink)

Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call _Negative Orientation:_ although you claim (...) to value X, you are more accurately described as disvaluing Y. I argue that we cannot make sense of Negative Orientation at the level of evaluative judgments, for nothing about the etiology, content, or justification of evaluative judgments will support the Negative Orientation claim. we can make sense of it by attending to the psychology of valuing. Using spiteful hatred as a paradigm case, I explain how certain outlooks and ideologies induce and sustain spiteful hatred in their adherents and thereby render the Negative Orientation claim true. (shrink)

Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call Negative Orientation: although you claim (...) to value X, you are more accurately described as disvaluing Y. I argue that we cannot make sense of Negative Orientation at the level of evaluative judgments, for nothing about the etiology, content, or justification of evaluative judgments will support the Negative Orientation claim. we can make sense of it by attending to the psychology of valuing. Using spiteful hatred as a paradigm case, I explain how certain outlooks and ideologies induce and sustain spiteful hatred in their adherents and thereby render the Negative Orientation claim true. (shrink)

English translation and postprint of a paper originally published in French under the title 'Une classe de concepts' in Semiotica (2002), vol. 139, pp.121-3. In this article, I aim to develop the construction of a general class of concepts, which notably integrates a number of commonly used polarized opposites. The starting point of this construction does not lie in conventional, lexicalized concepts—that is, concepts for which there exists a corresponding word in the everyday language of a given language. On the (...) contrary, the approach guiding the construction of this class of concepts involves an abstract definition of the latter, without consideration of whether the corresponding concepts are lexicalized or not. Once such a construction is achieved, it becomes possible to verify that the concepts thus constructed do indeed correspond to lexicalized concepts, while others cannot be matched with any word in everyday language. Ultimately, this construction allows for the proposal of a taxonomy of concepts that serves as an alternative to the one based on the semiotic square defined by Greimas. (shrink)

There appears to be a paradox at the heart of the psychology of partisan sport fandom. Fans regularly relish the prospect of or retrospect fondly upon a tough contest, yet during the contest they want to get out of sight as quickly as possible. The essay tries to explain why the paradox cannot be adequately or usefully understood as a mere conflict of desires or clash between purism and partisanship. Instead, four partially intersecting explanatory themes are identified and unpacked: self-understanding, (...) self-affirmation and self-celebration; the significance of the narrative; Hegel, reinterpretation, necessity, and redemption; and volitional and affective dissonance. The themes play host to the notions of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, the plurality of life-values in a self-enclosed domain, and the fusion of the Apollonian and Dionysian. The last theme (volitional and affective dissonance) might mean that, however profitable the others, the partisan sport fan typically has an irreducible clash of standpoints. (shrink)

We introduce Broad Infinity, a new set-theoretic axiom scheme based on the slogan “Every time we construct a new element, we gain a new arity.” It says that three-dimensional trees whose growth is controlled by a specified class function form a set. Such trees are called broad numbers. Assuming AC (the axiom of choice) or at least the weak version known as WISC (weakly initial set of covers), we show that Broad Infinity is equivalent to Mahlo’s principle, which says that (...) the class of all regular limit ordinals is stationary. Assuming AC or WISC, Broad Infinity also yields a convenient principle for generating a subset of a class using a “rubric” (family of rules); this directly gives the existence of Grothendieck universes, without requiring a detour via ordinals. In the absence of choice, Broad Infinity implies that the derivations of elements from a rubric form a set; this yields the existence of Tarski-style universes. Additionally, we reveal a pattern of resemblance between “wide” principles, that are provable in ZFC, and “broad” principles, that go beyond ZFC. Note: this paper uses a base theory that is weaker than ZF but includes classical first-order logic and Replacement. (shrink)

One of the most common contemporary approaches for developing an ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) involves elaborating guiding principles. This essay explores the limitations of this approach, using the history of bioethics as a comparative case. The examples of bioethics and recent AI ethics suggest that principles are difficult to implement in everyday practice, fail to direct individual action, and can frequently result in a pure proceduralism. The essay encourages an additional attention to virtue, which forms the dispositions of actors, (...) directs them to valued ends, and encourages right action in particular situation to complement principles. Practices and professions like medicine or warfighting that already have rich traditions of reflection on virtue ethics will be especially fruitful fields for developing an AI ethics of virtue. (shrink)

Background Flourishing and belonging are key concepts for the wellbeing of staff and the success of a profession. Alienation and anomie are distinct types of psycho-social ills which inhibit flourishing and belonging. A better understanding of these may offer hope in preventing many negative work endpoints, including burnout and intention to leave. Objectives To systematically review and narratively synthesise alienation and/or anomie in pharmacists across the globe, reviewing all types of methodological designs, published in peer-reviewed journals. Methods We identified published (...) peer-reviewed research through searching eight electronic databases (MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, Cochrane Library, Web of Science – Core Collection, Scopus, and Google Scholar) and extensive hand/citation searching. Two independent reviewers identified and critiqued eligible studies, extracted data, and synthesised the findings. The synthesis evaluated the focuses, causes, associated factors, and/or consequences of alienation and/or anomie and aligned these to six deductive themes from alienation theory: care; values; meaning; recognition; autonomy; and shared responsibility. Results Searches identified 886 papers, with 47 included in the final results. From the synthesis, ten key causes of alienation and/or anomie were identified; 1) Changing Professional Identity, 2) Reimbursement Models & Corporatisation, 3) Focus on Medicines Rather than People, 4) Misunderstanding & Deprofessionalisation, 5) Environments & Culture, 6) Suboptimal Societal Mandate, 7) Roles Misaligned with Aspirations, 8) Systematic Underutilisation, 9) Lack of Professional Agency, and 10) Value Conflict. From the evidence, there was high confidence that inhibitions of care, values, recognition, and/or autonomy (four of the six deductive themes) were associated with alienation and/or anomie. Conclusion Alienation and/or anomie are present across many countries and regions. This paper helps us understand the aetiology of this complex psycho-social syndrome, a necessary first step in creating an inclusive profession where all pharmacists can flourish. Future research needs to trial new interventions targeted at correcting this professional malady. (shrink)

Despite resisting easy translation into the cadences of analytic philosophy, certain parts of John Dewey's thought have something important to offer analytic aesthetics. One way to show this is to consider how an account that makes no reference to Dewey might have been benefited from taking on board some of the insights from Art as Experience. To that end, this essay will consider Vid Simoniti's recent study of socially engaged art, with a particular focus on Simoniti's comments about the work (...) of Theaster Gates and on the gap between what Simoniti says about the work and what Gates himself says. It is of course possible for artists to say misleading, indefensible, and even incoherent things about their own work, but it is also possible for them to say fairly straightforward things that philosophers have trouble hearing over the din of their own theoretical commitments. The argument will be that a Deweyan sensibility makes it easier to register aspects of Gates's comments that Simoniti missed and, as a result, to arrive at a less puzzling account of the artistic enterprise that Gates represents. (shrink)

This paper provides a consistent first-order theory solving the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague, with the following main features: 1. It solves the knower paradoxes by providing a faithful formalization of the principle of veracity (that knowledge requires truth), using both a knowledge and a truth predicate. 2. It is genuinely untyped i.e., it is untyped not only in the sense that it uses a single knowledge predicate applying to all sentences in the language (including sentences in which this (...) predicate occurs), but in the sense that its axioms quantify over all sentences in the language, thus supporting comprehensive reasoning with untyped knowledge ascriptions. 3. Common knowledge predicates can be defined in the system using self-reference. These facts, together with a technique based on Löb’s theorem, enables it to support comprehensive reasoning with untyped common knowledge ascriptions (without having any axiom directly addressing common knowledge). (shrink)

Schelling's Philosophy of History Paul Collins HAYNER. CHAPTER TWO THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY TO 1809 I. SCHELLING AS DlSCIPLE OF FlCHTE The earliest philosophical expressions of Friedrich Wilhelm ...

:The “new institutionalist revolution” in social sciences has led to a repositioning of social norms to the forefront of the pre-analytic vision in institutional theory and to the consolidation of the contextual analysis approach. That has significant epistemological, methodological, and political philosophy implications. This essay follows the logic of these developments showing: why they inherently lead to the feasibility problem, the key of applied theory, toward which both contemporary philosophy and institutional analysis converge from different venues; how feasibility is a (...) nexus of empirical, counterfactual, normative, and contextual elements, that is, something more complex than a mere matching between empirical reality and institutional design; what are the governance implications of all of the above, with an emphasis on an alternative approach and in which the public choice process is seen mainly as endogenized, socialized, and institutionalized, as opposed to formalized, intellectualized, and externalized. (shrink)

This article is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the Colloque ‘Histoire des Mentalités, Histoire des résistances, ou les Prisons de longue durée, Aix-La Baume, 20–21–22 septembre 1980.

L'auteur veut montrer que la création ou créativité (poiêsis) fait partie de l'essence même du sujet : lequel peut se définir tout entier comme un générateur de création, un être créateur (zôon poiêtikon) qui, de par ses attributs ontologiques mêmes, recrée le monde avec lequel il est en contact et le peuple de ses propres productions. Mais, dans le même temps, il manifeste une tendance constante à s'oublier lui-même derrière ses créations et à doter celles-ci d'une réalité objective, hypostasiée : (...) d'où l'évocation métaphorique proposée du myosotis, cette fleur qu'on appelle couramment « ne m'oubliez pas ». The author wants to show that creation or creativeness (poiêsis) is part of the very intrinsic nature of the subject: which can be wholly defined as a generator of creation, a creative being (zôon poiêtikon) who by his very ontological attributes recreates the world he is in contact with, and fills it with his own productions. But, in the same time, he manifests a constant tendency to forget himself behind his creations and endow them with a substantial objective reality: hence the metaphorical evocation suggested by the myosotis, this flower commonly called « forget me not ». (shrink)

Descartes a occupé le centre de la scène intellectuelle en Angleterre bien que son influence ait été due à des circonstances accidentelles et à de vigoureuses critiques plutôt qu’à des disciples consciencieux. Son rationalisme offrait la certitude en religion et une interprétation de la science. Mélangé à l’expéri- mentalisme anglais, il a créé une ambiguïté dans la méthode scientifique et il a conduit à des controverses sur la nature de la connaissance. Son mécanisme a inspiré une étude critique et il (...) a influencé les théories anglaises de l’espace et du temps. Quand sa science a été employée à la défense de la religion, elle a signifié le développement d’interprétations nouvelles sur Dieu, et elle a conduit aux controverses du déisme. (shrink)

For half a century, Ernest Fortin's scholarship has charmed and educated theologians and philosophers with its intellectual search for the best way to live. Written by friends, colleagues, and students of Fortin, this book pays tribute to a remarkable thinker in a series of essays that bear eloquent testimony to Fortin's influence and his legacy. A formidable commentator on Catholic philosophical and political thought, Ernest Fortin inspired others with his restless inquiries beyond the boundaries of conventional scholarship. With essays on (...) subjects ranging across philosophy, political science, literature, and theology Gladly to Learn and Gladly to Teach reflects the astonishing depth and breadth of Fortin's contribution to contemporary thought. (shrink)

Comment la sexualité se parle-t-elle dans le couple qu’elle unit de façon si impérieuse et précaire à la fois? Le paradoxe est que, d’une part, l’union des corps rend la parole superflue et que, d’autre part, l’amour tient au signifiant chez les êtres parlants. Parler de sa sexualité pour un couple ne se décrète pas. Dans l’après-acte se rétablit, au-delà du réel de l’étreinte, la séparation des êtres parlants. La sexualité n’est donc pas qu’un registre relationnel ou communicationnel. Ainsi se (...) dessine un savoir de l’inconscient qui ne ferait pas fi de l’impossible du rapport sexuel, sauf à parler de « lit de plein emploi » – entre-deux du « parlêtre » et du corps. Il s’agit ici d’en suivre la dialectique, des effets divisants de la parole à la réconciliation sur l’oreiller, de la sujétion sexuelle à l’éloignement, les figures de la crise imposant traumatiquement une parole d’éveil. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Paul Woodruff ROUSSEAU, MOLIÈRE, AND THE ETHICS OF LAUGHTER Rousseau attacks comedy on the grounds that it is bad for our morals. He tries to show that to make a comedy moral is to take the fun out of it. No one would deny that some jokes are bad, and bad for us. But I think Rousseau is mistaken in his belief that the fun of comedy depends (...) on the bad sort of joke. In this essay I examine the ethics of laughter and the techniques of comedy, and find them rooted in a common metaphysics of human nature. It turns out, if I am right, that the most effective comic techniques are the most innocent. A comic playwright can make us laugh at almost anything, even at things that unsettle or horrify us outside the theater. Surprised by our own laughter, we are grateful to see our bugbears turned ridiculous. But what if we find ourselves laughing at virtue in the theater, and are shocked by our own laughter? Laughter, it seems, can be elicited to good or bad effect, depending on the nature of its object. And even towards the same object there can be good and bad laughter. An ethnic joke can be told in a way that brings warm laughter, bridging impossible gulfs, or it can be told in a racist way, with unforgivable laughter driving us apart. Comic playwrights are dangerous people. Plato thought them so (though not so dangerous as tragedians) and argued for restrictions on the use of ridicule. It should always be good-natured, he says in the Laws, and ought never to be directed against citizens.1 Rousseau goes beyond this. In his Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theater2 he appeals to the danger of comedy as he vehemently defends Geneva's law against theater. Comedy, he argues, must be bad for our morals, or be nothing but a dull sermon. We must not dismiss Rousseau's critique of comedy lightly. Rousseau 325 326Philosophy and Literature was fascinated by the theater, and particularly by Molière, whom he admired as the grand master of comedy. And he knew something of what he admired and why he admired it. He had tried his hand at writing comedy and comic opera. He was not without a sense of humor (as readers of his Confessions are well aware), and he had ideas about how audiences are made to laugh. So it is not out of ignorance that he writes of comedy, "It is all bad and pernicious;... since the very pleasure of the comic is founded on the vice of the human heart,... the more the comedy is amusing..., the more its effect is disastrous for morals." At best, comic playwrights "make fun of vices without making virtue loved." At worst, like Molière in the Misanthrope, they make fun of virtues. Molière's misanthrope, Alceste, is a good man; so good, indeed, that no audience could be comfortable with him. So to please the audience (says Rousseau) Molière is forced to make Alceste ridiculous by adding to his scrupulous honesty a disposition to childish rages, thereby reenforcing the audience's corrupt belief that virtue in the extreme is foolish. But why could the play not be turned to virtuous effect, and Alceste's foils be made ridiculous in his place? Rousseau shows us what changes he thinks would have to be made—they reduce a great comedy to a dull sermon. Rousseau concludes that the same play cannot both make us laugh and be good for our morals.3 This radical case against comedy rests on two principles. First, as an audience we want only to find bad characters exciting and good characters amusing, so that successful comedy must make us laugh at good characters. Second, when we laugh at good characters in comedy, we do so without sympathy; by laughing at them we repudiate their example. Rousseau thinks it comforts us to laugh at Alceste in the Misanthrope because it enables us to set aside an example of immaculate honesty that would otherwise make us ashamed of our own deficiencies. Such laughter, he argues, is bad for... (shrink)