A Genuinely Untyped Explanation of Common Belief and Knowledge

Review of Symbolic Logic:1-26 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper provides a consistent first-order theory solving the knower paradoxes of Kaplan and Montague, with the following main features: 1. It solves the knower paradoxes by providing a faithful formalization of the principle of veracity (that knowledge requires truth), using both a knowledge and a truth predicate. 2. It is genuinely untyped i.e., it is untyped not only in the sense that it uses a single knowledge predicate applying to all sentences in the language (including sentences in which this predicate occurs), but in the sense that its axioms quantify over all sentences in the language, thus supporting comprehensive reasoning with untyped knowledge ascriptions. 3. Common knowledge predicates can be defined in the system using self-reference. These facts, together with a technique based on Löb’s theorem, enables it to support comprehensive reasoning with untyped common knowledge ascriptions (without having any axiom directly addressing common knowledge).

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
Solution of a problem of Leon Henkin.M. H. Löb - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (2):115-118.

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