John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s argument. It proposes (...) that there are two possible types of unfairness that have to be avoided in conflict cases, as far as possible: ‘selection unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not giving individuals an equal chance of being saved; and ‘outcome unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not actually saving them, when others are saved. Since saving the greater number generates less outcome unfa-irness than coin-tossing, it is argued that, in many conflict cases, fairness demands that we save the greater number. (shrink)

The article considers patterns of reactivity in organ systems mediated by the autonomic nervous system as they relate to central neural circuits activated by affectively arousing cues. The relationship of these data to the concept of discrete emotion and their relevance for the autonomic feedback hypothesis are discussed. Research both with animal and human participants is considered and implications drawn for new directions in emotion science. It is suggested that the proposed brain-based view has a greater potential for scientific advance (...) than the traditional model that emphasizes specific states of mind as mediators or reflectors of visceral action. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was (...) severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-. (shrink)

At the very end of Plato's Philebus Socrates and Protarchus place the goods of a human life in a hierarchy (66a-67b). Previous interpretations of this passage have concentrated upon its relevance to the good human life, including the allowance of (true and pure) pleasures. This view picks up Plato's metaphor of a mixture of reason and pleasure, but the ranking of the goods is emphatically a vertical stratification and not a mixture in which all elements are equally fundamental. In this (...) article I argue that each and all of the higher ranked goods are necessary conditions for the goods of the level immediately below. The ranking represents an attempt to identify as far as possible what is responsible for the characteristics of the good in human life, and therefore to narrow down the definition of the good itself. (shrink)

Theories of self-defence tend to invest heavily in ‘liability justifications’: if the Attacker is liable to have defensive violence deployed against him by the Defender, then he will not be wronged by such violence, and selfdefence becomes, as a result, morally unproblematic. This paper contends that liability justifications are overrated. The deeper contribution to an explanation of why defensive permissions exist is made by the Defender’s non-liability. Drawing on both canonical cases of self-defence, featuring Culpable Attackers, and more penumbral cases (...) of self-defence, involving Non-Responsible Threats, a case is assembled for the ‘Non-Liability First Account’ of self-defence. (shrink)

Acid fracturing is the most important stimulation method in the carbonate reservoir. Due to the high cost and high risk of acid fracturing, it is necessary to predict the reservoir productivity before acid fracturing, which can provide support to optimize the parameters of acid fracturing. However, the productivity of a single well is affected by various construction parameters and geological conditions. Overfitting can occur when performing productivity prediction tasks on the high-dimension, small-sized reservoir, and acid fracturing dataset. Therefore, this study (...) developed a stacking heterogeneous ensemble model with a hybrid wrapper-based feature selection strategy to forecast reservoir productivity, resolve the overfitting problem, and improve productivity prediction. Compared to other baseline models, the proposed model was found to have the best predictive performances on the test set and effectively deal with the overfitting. The results proved that the hybrid wrapper-based feature selection strategy introduced in this study reduced data acquisition costs and improved model comprehensibility without reducing model performance. (shrink)

In their article, ‘Responsibility, Second Opinions, and Peer-Disagreement—Ethical and Epistemological Challenges of Using AI in Clinical Diagnostic Contexts,’ Kempt and Nagel argue for a ‘rule of disagreement’ for the integration of diagnostic AI in healthcare contexts. The type of AI in question is a ‘decision support system’, the purpose of which is to augment human judgement and decision-making in the clinical context by automating or supplementing parts of the cognitive labor. Under the authors’ proposal, artificial decision support systems which produce (...) automated diagnoses should serve chiefly as confirmatory tools; so long as the physician and AI agree, the matter is settled, and the physician’s initial judgement is considered epistemically justified. If, however, the AI-DSS and physician disagree, then a second physician’s opinion is called on to resolve the dispute. While the cognitive labour of the decision is shared between the physicians and AI, the final decision remains at the discretion of the first physician, and with it the moral and legal culpability. The putative benefits of this approach are twofold: healthcare administration can improve diagnostic performance by introducing AI-DSS without the unintended byproduct of a responsibility gap, and assuming the physician and AI disagree less than the general rate of requested second opinions, and the AI’s diagnostic accuracy supersedes or at least …. (shrink)

AbstractIn her article from 2019, Fleur Johns describes a change: from a style of development work marked by a propensity for ‘planning’, to one marked by a propensity for ‘prototyping’. Our project in this paper is to propose a modest shift in perspective. Where Johns traces a transition from old to new styles, we emphasise the enduring links between planning and prototyping, such that both styles are best understood through their ongoing relationships and entanglements. Returning to Pulse Lab Jakarta (PLJ), (...) the site of Johns’ initial inquiry, we offer a reinterpretation of what might be novel about PLJ for development practice. Our claim is that to understand the particular intervention that PLJ represents, and the new modes of practice it produces, it may be helpful to understand PLJ's work in the manner of a ‘modular’ attachment to existing development apparatuses, that combines big data analytics with design thinking. We then develop some reflections and speculations on the forms and novelty of PLJ in light of our redescription of its work in the language of modularity. (shrink)

When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights. Democratic Rights challenges this view by (...) showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights. Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government. (shrink)

Machine learning is an increasingly significant part of modern healthcare, transforming the way clinical decisions are made and health resources are managed. These developme...

Virtue ethics has long provided fruitful resources for the study of issues in medical ethics. In particular, study of the moral virtues of the good doctor—like kindness, fairness and good judgement—have provided insights into the nature of medical professionalism and the ethical demands on the medical practitioner as a moral person. Today, a substantial literature exists exploring the virtues in medical practice and many commentators advocate an emphasis on the inculcation of the virtues of good medical practice in medical education (...) and throughout the medical career. However, until very recently, no empirical studies have attempted to investigate which virtues, in particular, medical doctors and medical students tend to have or not to have, nor how these virtues influence how they think about or practise medicine. The question of what virtuous medical practice is, is vast and, as we have written elsewhere, the question of how to study doctors’ moral character is fraught with difficulty. In this paper, we report the results of a first-of-a-kind study that attempted to explore these issues at three medical schools in the United Kingdom. We identify which character traits are important in the good doctor in the opinion of medical students and doctors and identify which virtues they say of themselves they possess and do not possess. Moreover, we identify how thinking about the virtues contributes to doctors’ and medical students’ thinking about common moral dilemmas in medicine. In ending, we remark on the implications for medical education. (shrink)

Recent discussion of Scanlon's account of value, which analyses the value of X in terms of agents' reasons for having certain pro-attitudes or contra-attitudes towards X, has generated the problem (WKR problem): this is the problem, for the buck-passing view, of being able to acknowledge that there may be good reasons for attributing final value to X that have nothing to do with the final value that X actually possesses. I briefly review some of the existing solutions offered to the (...) WKR problem, including those by Philip Stratton-Lake and Jonas Olson, and offer a new, better one, which accommodates all the relevant cases presented in the literature. (shrink)

The ‘Responsibility Objection’ to Judith Thomson's famous argument for the permissibility of abortion challenges the relevance of her ‘Violinist Analogy’ to certain types of voluntary unwanted pregnancy, on the grounds that those pregnancies, even though they may be unwanted, are pregnancies for which the woman can be plausibly held responsible. This article considers the force of a number of recent objections to the Responsibility Objection, advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan, and judges them to be unpersuasive. It (...) is concluded that, in the absence of further considerations, the Responsibility Objection carries force. (shrink)

IN Physics VIII, 10, Aristotle seems to commit a serious mistake: just before concluding that the first mover required by all motion everywhere remains invariable and without parts or magnitude, Aristotle apparently locates this mover on the circumference of the cosmos.

ARISTOTLE IS UNIVERSALLY credited with inventing the concept of teleology: "nature is among the causes which act for the sake of something." "That for the sake of which" is a thing's purpose, its end, the goal at which it aims. Taking Aristotle's physics as a focal point for his philosophy of nature, I shall argue that teleology functions within his theory of nature not only substantively, but also procedurally. First, then, I shall explain what I mean by teleology as procedure (...) and then show how this procedure relates both to problems within physics and to Aristotle's conception of physics as a science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Berel Lang PLOTTING PHILOSOPHY: BETWEEN THE ACTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL GENRE When Hegel wrote that philosophy's Owl of Minerva takes wing only at the falling of dusk, he did not mean that philosophy is always tardy, only that it comes late in the day. It may, however, seem both late and tardy to call attention now to the role of genres in philosophical writing, and still more beside the (...) point to assess the importance of philosophical genres to our philosophical and not only to our literary understanding. Even if we find a way past the varieties of aesthetic nominalism for which any allocation to genres is a snare and a trap— recall here Croce's declaration of"eternal war" against the obscurantism of genres1—we confront the growing skepticism of literary theory as it now disputes not only the formalism presupposed in the taxonomic distinctions of genre, but also the mimetic or representational function of discourse more generally.2 If texts as such can no longer rely on a mimetic ground, it would be impossible for the formal features ofgenre, rooted in the then archaic distinction between form and content, to represent a literary (or indeed any kind of) idea; that is, it would be impossible for them to be philosophically significant. This difficulty only intensifies, of course, for philosophical writing: philosophy, we learn, ought no longer to delude itself with hopes for success as a "mirror of nature" (in Rorty's phrase of opprobrium),3 and it would then be delusion added to delusion to believe that the genres of philosophical discourse might, at another remove, mirror an object which philosophy had mistakenly been supposed to represent in the first place. That original "representation" turns out now to represent nothing at all—and Plato's attack on the deceptions ofart thus discovers a new and finer object in philosophy itself: his indictment of art at least 190 Berel Lang191 supposed that there was something for art to be deceptive about. On this postmodernist account, then, there could be no philosophical point in plotting the course of philosophical genres; and indeed there could hardly be any other point except perhaps for antiquarians intent on finding a place for genres among the other historical curiosities which philosophers, quite inexplicably, once took seriously, like Descartes's piece of wax or Plato's aviary or Berkeley's tar water. Such intimations of the death of genres, however, may be not only premature but misdirected in rather a special way. For even in a less suspicious age, when the prima facie claims for the existence of genres might have been accepted at face value, their role was shadowy, fixed in a rhetorical limbo. Evidently (or so I would argue), there have existed generic conventions of which philosophical writers have been aware and to which their writings conformed. But even among writers in whom this pattern is most explicit and self-conscious, it is not as though the writer, after first reviewing a list of genres, would then simply choose the one among them that most recommended itself. No doubt, a writer's style—including the genre of his writing—is deliberate, in some sense a matter of choice. But the conception of "choice" in this context is an unusual one. Plotting genre could not be like trying on suits until one finds a likely fit— because this would imply that when the philosopher is trying out various possibilities, what he measures them by exists in his own mind as a philosophical Ur-genre, something which itself transcends the requirements of genre. We might suspect the presence here of the genre of all genres that is not itself, however, the member of a genre. And although it is possible that such a philosophical bedrock exists—this would be, in a way, a true philosopher's stone—all that philosophers have turned up in their history as a matter offact is a considerable number and variety of—well, we have to say it—philosophical genres. Genres, in other words, have rarely been read or written as "natural kinds," and yet they have surely been read and written. The distinctions among them and even the broad tide... (shrink)

UP. Berel Lang shows in this penetrating book how Heideggeer's own silence on the 'Jewish Question' --how (or if) the Jews were to live among the nations- ...

Virtue-approaches to medical ethics are becoming ever more influential. Virtue theorists advocate redefining right or good action in medicine in terms of the character of the doctor performing the action. In medical education, too, calls are growing to reconceive medical education as a form of character formation. Empirical studies of doctors’ ethics from a virtue-perspective, however, are few and far between. In this respect, theoretical and empirical study of medical ethics are out of alignment. In this paper, we survey the (...) empirical study of medical ethics and find that most studies of doctors’ ethics are rules- or principles-based and not virtue-based. We outline the challenges that exist for studying medical ethics empirically from a virtue-based perspective and canvas the runners and riders in the effort to find virtue-based assessments of medical ethics. (shrink)

This essay offers a liberal, neo-Millian account of free speech, which attempts to fix some familiar bugs in Mill's account of free speech by focusing primarily on the right of free association, together with the permissibility of imposing restrictions to deal with, as Mill put it, ‘violations of good manners’ and ‘offences against decency’. It also uncovers a number of more conceptual puzzles with free speech. These can be resolved, it is contended, by regarding free speech as a practice.

En este ensayo se propone una lectura de la novela Sopa de caracol (2002) del escritor guatemalteco Arturo Arias, centrada en el tema de la función de la sexualidad como elemento desubjetivante del protagonista. Se examina también cómo la estética del grotesco y el modelo carnavalesco son puestos en movimiento para desestabilizar la identidad de género y así mostrar la imposibilidad de reconstruirse después de la catástrofe de la guerra.

In his Rights Forfeiture and Punishment, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that his preferred ‘strong’ version of rights forfeiture theory makes the moral rights of due process and a fair trial null and void for guilty offenders. They may still possess legal rights to due process, but these are not strong pre-institutional moral rights. I explain here why I disagree with Wellman. I also suggest that he is not entitled, by his own lights, to affirm strong forfeiture theory, at least in (...) our social world. (shrink)

Philosophical Papers, Volume 41, Issue 1, Page 129-147, March 2012.

_ One Another’s Equals _, by WaldronJeremy. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. x + 264.

The explicit objective for the 2014 Symposium hosted by the University of North Florida, which serves as the basis for this collection of papers, was to explore the relationship and potential for mutual support between the disciplines of child rights and pediatric bioethics in advancing the health and well-being of children in the United States and around the world. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child served as the locus for this discussion. A significant question emerged in the (...) Symposium about whether the CRC could serve any beneficial purpose in the United States, where it has not yet been ratified. Further, there was.. (shrink)