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Emotions
Edited by Demian Whiting (University of Hull)
About this topic
| Summary | Philosophers working on the emotions are interested in answering the following kinds of questions: What are emotions? Are they thoughts, feelings, perceptual or quasi-perceptual states, or something else? Or perhaps they are combination of all these things? Do emotions form a natural class? Are emotions natural kinds? Are emotions in some sense ‘socially constructed’? What emotions are there? Is love an emotion? How about Schadenfreude? Are moods emotions? What about so-called moral or aesthetic or religious emotions? Are these emotions proper? Again, how are different emotions to be characterized? What distinguishes them from one another? What is the relationship between emotion and reason? Can emotions be evaluated for their rationality? Or are emotions non-rational mental states? Do we need emotions in order to be ‘rational’? Closely related to the last few questions, what is the nature of the relationship between emotion and morality? Are emotions needed to have insight into the evaluate realm? Can a person who lacks certain emotional capacities be a moral agent? How might emotion be important for understanding character, vice and virtue? How might emotion be a hindrance to morality? Each of the emotion subcategories contains details of work on the emotions that is devoted to answering and shedding light on the above sorts of questions, along with many others. |
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Related
Subcategories
Theories of Emotion (944 | 203)
Varieties of Emotion (1,467 | 917)
Classifying Emotions (101)
Moods (67)
Aesthetics and Emotions* (660)
Emotions and Feelings (184)
Moral Emotion* (1,011 | 437)
Philosophy of Love* (1,705 | 952)
Jealousy* (83)
Happiness* (1,307)
Anger* (270)
Disgust* (97)
Aspects of Emotion (864 | 157)
Emotions, Misc (1,117 | 1,117)
Music and Emotion* (156)
Sport and Emotion* (6)
Psychopathology and Emotion* (140)
Animal Emotion* (71)
Moral Emotion* (1,011 | 437)
Animal Emotion* (71)
See also
- Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology (4,219)
- Pain (1,154 | 817)
- Pleasure (1,152 | 24)
History/traditions: Emotions
- Hume: Emotion (58)
- Spinoza: Affects (168)
Contents
8108 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 8108 |
Material to categorize
- Action‐based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:e13058.This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
- The Medicalization of Grief.Michael Cholbi - forthcoming - In Thomas Schramme & Mary Jean Walker, Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer.Medicalization occurs when a phenomenon comes to be subject to medical study, diagnosis, treatment, or prevention. Whether a phenomenon ought to be medicalized should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Recent moves to remove “bereavement exclusions” from psychiatric diagnostic manuals and to introduce grief-specific medical disorders have elicited criticisms from skeptics about grief’s medicalization, but these criticisms can largely be blunted. This article first clarifies the nature of disputes about medicalization, highlighting how these disputes do not concern whether a condition (...)
- Action‐based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-16.This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
- Philosophical Insights for a Science of Long-Term Affect Dynamics.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - Emotion Review.Emotions in scientific research are typically portrayed as short-lived responses or dispositions to manifest such responses. Some philosophers have argued that this fails to capture long-term emotions (e.g., love, hate, and grief). This article examines whether the emerging field of affect dynamics (or emotion dynamics), which studies how emotions fluctuate over time, can address the philosophical critique. I argue that there are still aspects of long-term emotion (i.e., their temporal components and temporal dynamics) missing from affect dynamics. I end by (...)
- Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - 2025 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):72-87.In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism—the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant (...)
- Sadness is not about Loss.Maria Zanella - 2025 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 32 (1):42-49.I argue that sadness is not about loss. I present two counterexamples to the Loss View: the view that if one is sad about something one takes it to be a loss. I suggest an alternative and defend it.
- The Sociology of Emotions: Basic Theoretical Arguments.Jonathan H. Turner - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (4):340-354.In this article, the basic sociological approaches to theorizing human emotions are reviewed. In broad strokes, theorizing can be grouped into several schools of thought: evolutionary, symbolic interactionist, symbolic interactionist with psychoanalytic elements, interaction ritual, power and status, stratification, and exchange. All of these approaches to theorizing emotions have generated useful insights into the dynamics of emotions. There remain, however, unresolved issues in sociological approaches to emotions, including: the nature of emotions, the degree to which emotions are hard-wired neurological or (...)
- Right in the Feels. Academic Philosophy, Disappointed Students, and the Big Questions of Life.Leonard Dung & Dominik Balg - 2025 - Teaching Philosophy 48 (1):37-45.It is plausible that there is a contrast between the rich emotional content which is often connected to laypeople’s interest in philosophy and the emotional austerity of doing academic philosophy. We propose the hypothesis that this contrast is one cause of the disappointment some students experience when they begin to study philosophy in college. We also propose a more demanding hypothesis, according to which this emotional contrast is confused with a semantic difference, which misleads students to think that the questions (...)
- Nostalgia for the Past, Present and Future.Saulius Geniusas - forthcoming - Emotion Review.In my response to the three commentaries, I emphasize the importance of philosophical reflections on nostalgia, and especially those that are oriented phenomenologically. I criticize the methodological commitments that underlie the approach taken by Constantine Sedikides and Tim Wildschut as well as their contention that nostalgia for the past is the only legitimate form of nostalgia. I reflect on the importance of various implications that James Morley and Kathleen Higgins draw in their commentaries. I accept the view presented by the (...)
- Shared Aesthetic Experience, Community, and Meaningfulness.Anthony Cross - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.Aesthetic communities offer us opportunities for collective, communal, and value-disclosing shared aesthetic experiences. This paper develops an account of shared aesthetic experiences and provides an answer to the question of their significance: when they occur within aesthetic communities, their distinctive phenomenology is a powerful resource for creating a sense that our lives are aesthetically meaningful.
- The Emotion of Gratitude and Communal Relationships.Coleen Macnamara - 2025 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 42 (1):96-114.Emotions are typically dual-faced: they involve both an evaluative and a practical aspect. What is more, an emotion's evaluative and practical aspects tend to exhibit a kind of fit. For example, Sakshi's fear of the bear involves apprehending the bear as a threat to something she cares about, i.e., her wellbeing. And it motivates her to act on behalf of this care: it motivates her to act in ways that protect her wellbeing. Both dimensions of Sakshi's fear are about her (...)
- Unfair Emotions: Their Morality and Blameworthiness.Jonas Blatter - 2025 - New York: Routledge.This book provides a novel philosophical account of the unfairness of certain emotions. It explains how the concept of unfairness can be applied to emotions and how emotions can be the proper objects of second-person moral evaluation. Emotions are an integral part of our moral practices. While the links between emotions and morality have received much philosophical attention recently, the phenomenon of unfair emotions remains under-explored. This book examines an everyday phenomenon: that we often perceive other people's emotions as unfair, (...)
- Fitting Love and Uniqueness.Xian He - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.According to the Quality Account of love, only lovable properties of the beloved person, such as beauty, wisdom and kindness, can make love for that person fitting. The account has been criticized for leading to implausible conclusions. If this account is correct, it would seem fitting to replace one’s lover with someone who possesses the same or more lovable properties, or stop loving someone who has lost these properties. Moreover, it is unclear how the Quality Account can differentiate between the (...)
- Action-based Benevolence.Waldemar Brys - 2025 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-16.This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the (...)
- Loneliness and Ressentiment.Kaitlyn Creasy - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.Loneliness, while a common human experience, is something to which people often respond quite differently. Here, I examine how an individual’s social position, as well as his socialization into a particular cultural milieu, can shape his response to the fact of his loneliness (as well as the features of human existence that loneliness makes salient). Specifically, I argue that in cases where the individual experiencing loneliness has been socialized to disvalue the features of existence that loneliness makes salient (e.g., our (...)
- Unconscious Emotions.Sarah Arnaud - 2025 - Erkenntnis 90 (1):285-304.According to some authors, emotions can be unconscious when they are unfelt or unnoticed. According to others, emotions are always conscious because they always have a phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to resolve the ongoing debate about the possibility for emotions to be unfelt. To do so, I focus on the notion of “unconscious emotions”. While this notion appears paradoxical, by way of a distinction between two meanings of emotional consciousness I show that it is not so. These (...)
- (1 other version)Being Moved: Motion and Emotion in Classical Antiquity and Today.David Konstan - 2021 - Emotion Review 13 (4):282-288.Efforts to identify in the expression “being moved” a new emotion have found a hospitable environment in the recent turn to the body in emotion and cognitive studies, exemplified herein affect theory, with a particular focus on the effects of music. Although classical Greek and Latin had comparable expressions, however, they did not single out a specific emotion. Given that music played an important role in ancient educational theories, and was imagined as having arousing powerful reactions, this might seem a (...)
- In Opposition to Alethic Views of Moral Responsibility.Robert Pál-Wallin - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for ɸ-ing if and only if it is fitting to have – depending on the nature of ɸ – a negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of A’s ɸ-ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Perceiving the Event of Emotion.Rebecca Rowson - 2025 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12.I argue that the direct perception of emotion (DP) is best conceived in terms of event perception, rather than fact perception or object perception. On neither of these two traditional models can the perception of emotion be as direct as its counterpart in ordinary perception; the proponent of DP must either drop the ‘direct’ claim or embrace a part-whole model of emotion perception and its problems. But our best account of how we perceive events directly can be applied to emotion (...)
- On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love, Berislav Marušić.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2025 - Mind 134 (533):277-284.Berislav Marušić’s On the Temporality of Emotions is a lovely book. Marušić confronts a puzzle about grief and anger that many will find familiar from their own.
- What is an Emotion? An Early Chinese Perspective from the Xing Zi Ming Chu.Wenqing Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.What is an emotion? Recent studies of cultural psychology suggest that there is no universally shared way of drawing the boundaries around the domain of emotion. In early Chinese philosophy, the abstract category of emotion that superordinates joy, anger, and sadness is sometimes identified with the term qing. This paper extracts, crystallizes, and examines the conception of qing from the excavated “Xing Zi Ming Chu” (XZMC) text, the most important philosophical work on emotion from early China. The paper argues that (...)
- Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions.Adam J. Andreotta - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4):1375-1397.This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion. While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), (...)
- Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability of Early Vision?Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4):1307-1330.Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter being the result of indirect effects of emotional stimuli on (...)
- Why are emotions epistemically indispensable?Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):91-113.Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive (...)
- Grievance Politics and Identities of Resentment.Paul Katsafanas - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (2):605-627.Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call Negative Orientation: although you claim (...)
- When is Jealousy Appropriate?Arina Pismenny - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (3):333-360.What makes romantic jealousy rational or fitting? Psychologists view jealousy’s function as preserving a relationship against a “threat” from a “rival”. I argue that its more specific aim is to preserve a certain privileged status of the lover in relation to the beloved. Jealousy is apt when the threat to that status is real, otherwise inapt. Aptness assessments of jealousy must determine what counts as a “threat” and as a “rival”. They commonly take for granted monogamous norms. Hence, compared with (...)
- Is there a place for emotions in solutions to the frame problem?Carlos Barth - 2024 - Síntese 51 (161):527-547.The frame problem, a long-standing issue in Artificial Intelligence (AI), revolves around determining the relevance of information in an ever-changing array of contexts, posing a formidable challenge in modeling human reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that emotions are able to solve, or at least enable a substantial step towards a solution. I argue that, while emotions are integral to cognitive processes, they do not offer a solution to the frame problem, nor can they play (...)
- A percepção afetiva de affordances.E. M. Carvalho - 2024 - Síntese Revista de Filosofia 51 (161):413-435.Rob Withagen has rendered the distinction between affordances and invitations more radical in two aspects: (i) affordances do not explain behavior anymore, invitations do; (ii) invitations do not boil down to affectively charged affordances, they also encompass affectively charged misperceptions. I argue that Withagen went too far. If we understand affordances as a relation between the abilities of an individual organism and its environment, then we already have sufficient resources to incorporate affectivity in the ecological approach. Affective states constitute perceptual (...)
- Yearning for the Irretrievable: Nostalgia and Time.Saulius Geniusas - forthcoming - Emotion Review.Situating phenomenological reflections on nostalgia within a historical context, I argue that Kant's temporalization of nostalgia remains incomplete. Bringing into question the widespread assumption that the object of nostalgia must be the past, I argue that nostalgia can be spoken of in three fundamental ways: as nostalgia for the past, for the present, and for the future. I further clarify the relation between the three forms of nostalgia here distinguished, and some other nostalgia that have been addressed in the literature. (...)
- The Cartesian Shift: Redefining Passions from Medieval to Contemporary Perspectives.A. Filipovic & Aleksandar Drašković - forthcoming - Belgrade Philosophical Annual.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- No reason to focus on emotional episodes.Rodrigo Díaz - forthcoming - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum.Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes or to reserve the term “emotion” for them.
- Grant Bollmer, The Affect Lab: The History and Limits of Measuring Emotion Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2023. Pp. 290. ISBN 978-1-5179-1546-9. $28.00 (paperback). [REVIEW]Riana Betzler - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Science 57 (2):295-297.
- Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl’s philosophy.Emanuela Carta - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (6):1329-1349.In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of (...)
- Fear as a Reactive Attitude.Robert Pál-Wallin - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin, The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. Bloomsbury.In the wake of Peter Frederick Strawson’s landmark essay Freedom and Resentment (1962), much of the theorizing about moral responsibility has centered around the reactive attitudes – with a particular emphasis on guilt, resentment, and indignation. Although philosophical interest in previously unexamined reactive attitudes has grown rapidly in recent years, remarkably little has hitherto been said about fear as a candidate reactive attitude. The aim of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of fearing other human agents qua agents. Drawing (...)
- Teasing Apart the Roles of Interoception, Emotion, and Self-Control in Anorexia Nervosa.Sarah Arnaud, Jacqueline Sullivan, Amy MacKinnon & Lindsay P. Bodell - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):723-747.Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is widely considered to be a bodily disorder accompanied by unrealistic perceptions about one’s own body. Some researchers thus have wondered whether deficits in interoception, a conscious or non-conscious sense of one’s own body, could be a primary cause of AN. In this paper, we make the case that rather than interoception being a primary cause, deficits in interoception may occur as by-products of emotions that arise upstream in the pathogenesis of AN and interact with feelings of (...)
- Empathy through Listening.Seisuke Hayakawa & Katsunori Miyahara - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-16.[The two authors contributed equally to this work.] We often seek empathy from others by asking them to listen to our stories. But what exactly is the role of listening in empathy? One might think that it is merely a means for the empathizer to gather rich information about the empathized. We shall rather argue that listening is an embodied action, one that plays a significant role in empathic perspective-taking. We make our case via a descriptive analysis of a paradigm (...)
- Stigma and Rawlsian Liberalism.Euan Allison - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.Rawlsian liberals face the challenge of providing reasons to oppose stigma that do not appeal to a rejection of controversial stigmatic attitudes, but rather to political values that are undermined by stigma. One prominent strategy (the Self-Respect Strategy) appeals to the threat stigma poses to self-respect. Another strategy (the Hierarchy Strategy) appeals to the dependence of stigmas on social hierarchies, which are taken to be intrinsically problematic. I argue that the Self-Respect Strategy needs further resources in order to answer important (...)
- Affective Injustice and Moral Responsibility.Katherine Villa - 2024 - Dissertation, University of MiamiThis dissertation contributes to feminist critiques of moral responsibility by exposing cases where asymmetries of blame perpetuate oppression by diminishing or disabling the moral agency of individuals from traditionally subordinated social groups. It also engages the recent literature on “affective injustice,” briefly defined as a wrong done to someone at the level of their emotional life. In the first chapter, I connect feminist critiques of moral responsibility with the concept of affective injustice by arguing that the moral wrong that lies (...)
- (1 other version)Interpersonal Hope and Loving Attention.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Imagine that your lover or close friend has embraced a difficult long-term goal, such as advancing environmental justice, breaking a bad habit, or striving to become a better person. Which stance should you adopt toward their prospects for success? Does supporting our significant others in the pursuit of valuable goals require ignoring part of our evidence? I argue that we have special reasons – reasons grounded in friendship – to hope that our loved ones succeed in their difficult goals. I (...)
- Emotional Cues and Misplaced Trust in Artificial Agents.Joseph Masotti - forthcoming - In Henry Shevlin, AI in Society: Relationships (Oxford Intersections). Oxford University Press.This paper argues that the emotional cues exhibited by AI systems designed for social interaction may lead human users to hold misplaced trust in such AI systems, and this poses a substantial problem for human-AI relationships. It begins by discussing the communicative role of certain emotions relevant to perceived trustworthiness. Since displaying such emotions is a reliable indicator of trustworthiness in humans, we use such emotions to assess agents’ trustworthiness according to certain generalizations of folk psychology. Our tendency to engage (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Why Delight in Screamed Vocals? Emotional Hardcore and the Case Against Beautifying Pain.Sean T. Murphy - 2024 - British Journal of Aesthetics 64 (4):625-646.Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain, all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals (...)
- Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness.Tricia Magalotti - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):114-131.In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are (...)
- Three Kinds of Argument of the Perception Theory of Emotions and Its Drawbacks.Yu Zhang - forthcoming - Wuda Philosophical Review.The perception theory of emotions mainly argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from different perspectives, including the argument for non-inferential structure, which proposes that emotions and perception share non-inferential structure and non-conceptual content; the argument from the epistemic role, which advocates for the similarity between emotions and perception from an epistemic perspective; and the argument from phenomenology, which argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from a phenomenal perspective. However, these arguments all have some problems. In the (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion and Its Drawbacks.Yu Zhang - 2024 - Foreign Philosophy 47:261-283.The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly suggest that emotions can be reduced to evaluative beliefs or judgments. Specifically, evaluative beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for evaluative judgments. And reducing emotions to evaluative judgments requires the subject’s conceptualizing ability. However, the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion has many problems, including that evaluative beliefs are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions; the evaluative judgment theory of emotion presupposes the subject’s conceptual content, but conceptual content is not a necessary and (...)
- Some Emotions Play a Reasonable Role in Akratic Actions, Not a Rational Role.Yu Zhang - 2021 - Paris: Atlantis Press 575:10-14.According to Donald Davidson, an akratic action is opposed to the agent’s better judgment if the agent act freely and intentionally. Davidson says akratic actions are possible and all akratic actions are irrational. However, although akratic actions are possible, akratic actions could be rational. The reasons are that some of these actions are rational; these rational akratic actions are caused by some emotions sometimes, while some emotions cannot make akratic actions rational, including excessive negative emotions, recalcitrant emotions, etc. Therefore, it (...)
- Comment: Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision.Dan Zahavi - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (3):187-189.
- Shame and the question of self-respect.Madeleine Shield - 2024 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 50 (5):721-741.Despite signifying a negative self-appraisal, shame has traditionally been thought by philosophers to entail the presence of self-respect in the individual. On this account, shame is occasioned by one’s failure to live up to certain self-standards—in displaying less worth than one thought one had—and this moves one to hide or otherwise inhibit oneself in an effort to protect one’s self-worth. In this paper, I argue against the notion that only self-respecting individuals can experience shame. Contrary to the idea that shame (...)
- Insurgent subjectivity: Hope and its interactant emotions in the Nicaraguan revolution.Jean-Pierre Reed - 2023 - Theory and Society 52 (3):387-421.This article examines the role of emotions during insurgent conditions by focusing on the Nicaraguan revolution, in particular the two-year period (1977–1979) leading to the overthrow of the Somoza regime. Based on an analysis of testimonial accounts from an oral history volume, ¡Y Se Armó La Runga!, and a NVivo-10 content analysis of testimonies therein, it sets out to make a case for the significance of hope as a dominant emotion during guerrilla offensives. The manuscript answers the following questions: 1) (...)
- Fear, Pathology, and Feelings of Agency: Lessons from Ecological Fear.Charlie Kurth & Panu Pihkala - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin, The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. Bloomsbury.This essay examines the connection between fear and the psychopathologies it can bring, looking in particular at the fears that individuals experience in the face of the climate crisis and environmental degradation more generally. We know that fear can be a source of good and ill. Fears of climate-change-driven heat waves, for instance, can spur both activism and denial. But as of yet, we don’t have a very good understanding of why eco-fears, as we will call them, shape our thoughts (...)$104.50 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Does perceived parental emotional warmth contribute to adults’ higher compassion? The mediating role of moral identity.Alexandra Maftei & Camelia Alexandra Burdea - 2024 - Ethics and Behavior 34 (7):506-521.Previous studies suggested that parenting is critically important in the development of both moral identity and compassion, but more research is needed concerning the stability of these effects and whether they carry over into adulthood. The present study addressed this issue by examining the link between a specific dimension of perceived parental style and compassion and the mediating role of moral identity in this relationship. The research sample comprised 208 adults aged 18 to 60 (M = 25.44, SD = 7.09, (...)
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