Ontology

A common distinction in emotion theory is between ‘occurrent emotions’ and ‘dispositional emotions’, ‘emotional episodes’ and ‘emotional states’, ‘emotions’ and ‘sentiments’, or more neutrally between ‘short-term emotions’ and ‘long-term emotions’. While short-term emotions are, or necessarily comprise, experiences, long-term emotions are generally seen as states that can exist without experience. Given the theoretical importance of experience for emotion theorists, long-term emotions are often cast aside as of secondary importance, or at any rate as in need of separate treatment. In this (...) paper, I cast doubt on the distinction. I argue that the considerations that support a view of long-term emotions as non-experiential states equally support a view of short-term emotions as non-experiential states, and so long-term and short-term emotions are ultimately the same sort of thing. If I am right, the dominant experience-centered accounts of emotions are at best accounts, not of emotions per se, but of some closely related phenomenon. (shrink)

We argue that four-dimensionalists should adopt a contextualist semantics, according to which ordinary speakers’ judgments may concern person-stages, person-segments or person-worms, depending on the context. We explain how context helps select the boundaries of the temporal parts we refer to or quantify over and show that contextualism offers the best treatment of ordinary predications and ordinary counting judgments. Contextualism implies an error theory; however, we explain why this error theory is less problematic than those entailed by the worm and stage (...) theories. (shrink)

Сборникът съдържа статии и студии във връзка със семинара „Хаос и безредие (философия, литература, наука)" в Софийския университет „Св. Климент Охридски“ през академичната 2014-15 г. Темите, на които са посветени отделните разработки, са: случайността; материалността на художествената творба; техниката в езика и философията; отношението между контекст и дистекст; миметичността и саморефлексията в литературата; философското осмисляне на дистанцията и нейната промяна (близост и далечина); както и двойничеството, изродното (das Unheimliche) и технологичното като фигури на нечовешкото. Повечето понятия, които се свързаха в (...) обсъжданията и дискусиите ни, са функционирали всъщност като аномалии - така се отварят общи полета на несъгласия, които разширяват сетивността или теоретическата чувствителност. (shrink)

The philosophical tradition says that Immanuel Kant’s critique of the theoretical reason is an attempt to epistemological foundation. The model is based on the relationship between subject and object and aims to determine the limits of the possibility of knowledge. This would follow from the Kantian denial to the pure metaphysical intelligibility. Such ontology, however, would not focus on the naming of pure objects or pure intelligibility. It is then intended to debate the possibility of a transcendental ontology that is (...) based on the objectuality of empirical objects, which points to the Heideggerian interpretation of Kantian thought. Thus, this paper hopes to contribute to the theme of the possibility of a Kantian ontology with view to the objectuality of the objects. (shrink)

In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger develops an account of non-being according to which it is understood as a part of Different. Yet the precise language he uses to characterize the form Non-Being and other negative forms has two variations. In the first, a negative form is characterized as a part of the nature of Different contraposed to the nature of the form negated. Thus, Non-Beautiful is described as ‘something different among beings that is marked-off from some one kind and (...) in turn contraposed with something among beings’ (257e2-4), and Non-Being is identified as ‘the part of the nature of Different contraposed with the being of each thing’ (258e2). In the second variation, however, a negative form is characterized as the contraposing (antithesis) of the nature of a part of Different relative to the nature of the form negated. Hence, Non-Beautiful ‘turns out to be a contraposing of being in relation to being’ (257e6-7) and Non-Being is ‘the contraposing of the nature of a part of Different and of the nature of Being’ (258a11-b1). In this essay, I develop an account of the parts of Different that explains the two variants in the Stranger’s characterization of negative forms, focusing on the Stranger’s description of the Non-Beautiful as a part of Different. Since the Stranger’s account of the parts of Different is based on an analogy with parts of knowledge, I begin by examining what it means to be a part of knowledge, drawing on Socrates’ account of knowledge in Republic V. (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda la recepción de los 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' (1844) de K. Marx en la obra de H. Marcuse. En sus ensayos «Nuevas fuentes para la fundamentación del materialismo histórico» (1932) y «Sobre los fundamentos filosóficos del concepto científico-económico de trabajo» (1933), Marcuse empieza a tomar distancia respecto de su anterior pretensión de hallar un soporte ontológico para el materialismo histórico recurriendo exclusivamente a la fenomenología existencial de Heidegger. A partir de la primera publicación de los (...) 'Manuscritos de economía y filosofía' en 1932, el autor berlinés buscará fundamentar ontológicamente el materialismo histórico con el recurso a la obra juvenil de Marx. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer—despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of substantial form. This (...) examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of information beyond its common role as descriptive data. It suggests that information operates as an intrinsic structure, influencing and defining systems across different dimensions and contexts, much like a universal “instruction set.” From societal bonds to natural phenomena, information is not passive but dynamic and often self-propagating, like a force. This document examines the function, autonomy, and density of information, considering it as fundamental to existence itself.

The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences, has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to its subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological (...) view’, according to which the subject, in being pre-reflectively self-conscious, is just aware of their own occurrent mental state. In this paper, I argue in favour of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured ‘fact-like’ entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one’s own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. (shrink)

During the 1950s XIONG Shili’s 熊十力(1885–1968) ti-yong metaphysics underwent some profound changes. Focussing on his 1958 publication, Tiyong lun 體用論 (Treatise on reality and function), this paper seeks to explain the role that the concept of change played in the articulation of his core metaphysical tenet, “the non-duality of ti and yong” (體用不二). It will further propose that this understanding of the role of change also served as his mature solution to the Buddhist problematic of avoiding the two extremes v(二見、二邊) (...) of reification and nihilism, which XIONG characterizes in terms of believing either that things endure over time (continua) or that things cease to exist. -/- . (shrink)

Some philosophical pluralists argue that both a top-down and a bottom-up approach serve as equally justified methods for engaging in ontological inquiry. In the top-down approach, we start with an analysis of theory and extrapolate from there to the world. In the bottom-up approach, we begin with an empirical investigation of the world and let our theory respond accordingly. The idea is that ontological conclusions arrived at via these two equally justified methods are then also equally justified. In this paper, (...) I argue that top-down/bottom-up methodological pluralism inadvertently grants primacy to the top-down approach. I go on to suggest that this is, in fact, unavoidable because it applies to ontological inquiry in general. Ontological inquiry invariably adopts the top-down approach because (a) ontological conclusions are not revealed during empirical investigations; instead, they are conceptual (i.e. theoretical) posits asserted top-down and (b) even if we consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches during ontological inquiry, such a consideration itself occurs from within theory (i.e. top-down). (shrink)

The debate on the nature of the artefacts is very important for contemporary metaphysicians. In this paper we will discuss the standard position in the debate, what we will call it Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism – such as Baker, Evnine or Thomasson –, that considers the essence of artifacts in terms of intentions of the makers. The aim will be to introduce a new criticism to this proposal based on the undesirable metaphysical and moral consequences that this proposal involve. To do this, (...) in the first section an important notion into the feminist metaphysics, and we will be inspired into this in order to introduce a new important notion for our debate: the artifactification. Nextly, we will explain the debate on the nature of artifacts and the Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism. Consequently, we will introduce two different scenarios based on the artifactification’s notion that it will show problems for Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism because they show how easily would be produce artifacts using persons as their matter, that involve undesirable consequences. (shrink)

Both relativistic mechanics and Newtonian mechanics are based on principles that have ontological implications. We propose a series of formalisms that rigorously define the ontology underlying mechanical theories, in order to clarify and formally establish the ontology of the physics of motion. Special attention has been paid to relativistic theories. Through the proposed methodology, the concept of ontological consistency is developed and the conditions required for such consistency to be satisfied in any theory are established. In particular, the consistency test (...) is performed for Newtonian mechanics, special relativity theory, and general relativity theory. (shrink)

Translation of the book "Metaphysik: Eine Einführung" by Christof Rapp published in C.H. Beck Verlag.

The paper seeks to delve into the complex philosophical landscape of Deleuze and Guattari’s “A thousand plateaus” and to propose a comparation between their concept of “War Machine” and that of “Artistic Alienation” from Herbert Marcuse’s mature work. The analysis will be conducted through an initial yet obliged brief deconstruction of Deleuze and Guattari’s relational ontology, with a particular focus on the concepts of Ritornello and Territory. Ultimately, the insights gained from the combination of Marcuse’s philosophy of art and Deleuze (...) and Guattari’s ontology will be used to interpret the function of education in contemporary society. Specifically, I propose to promote artistic alienation to encourage imagination and creativity in learning. Furthermore, I argue that education should function as a "war machine," challenging traditional teaching paradigms and enabling students to explore nowadays' critical issues. (shrink)

Intuition and Knowledge in Nicolai Hartmann (1911-1926). On the Premises of Critical Ontology. The author considers Nicolai Hartmann’s main points on the relationship between intuition and knowledge in his early and middle works (1911-1926). The author first shows how Hartmann’s critical ontology emerged as a reaction to the approach of the logical idealism of the Marburg School, against which Hartmann defends the existence of an irrational dimension of knowledge that legitimizes a minimum of metaphysics even in the gnoseological sphere. The (...) author then focuses on the way in which Hartmann interprets the relationship between intuition and givenness, apriority, status of a priori principles, and understanding. Hartmann argues that intuition is not exclusively the same as empirical intuition, and that the problem of knowledge should no longer be considered in terms of the distinction between sensibility and understanding, but through the difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. (shrink)

Il presente lavoro di ricerca apre il pensiero e l’agire dell’aver cura della vita e della salute all’analitica della relazione fondamentale tra essere e speranza nella dimensione della cura. Attraverso l’analisi del rapporto tra “cura”, “limite” e “speranza” nel tempo della tecnica, si sono ricercate le condizioni ermeneutiche di uno sguardo rinnovato verso l’essere della cura, orientato dalla possibilità della speranza. A partire dal confronto con la concettualizzazione heideggeriana dell’ “aver cura”, dalla ricomprensione della nozione jaspersiana di “situazione limite” e (...) dalla possibilità dell’ “apertura” marceliana alla speranza nelle pratiche concrete della cura, la ricerca si è indirizzata verso la valutazione di un’analitica della cura alla luce della speranza e l’indicazione della trascendenza valoriale della cura. La speranza emerge infatti quale «fondamento originario e originante della cura», radice di un con-essere curante comunionale proteso «tra situazionalità limite dell’esistenza e apertura trascendente della speranza». In tale orizzonte si sono scorti gli apporti alla filosofia ed etica della cura, alla luce della speranza di bene che apre e illumina «la dimensione ontologica, esistenziale e trascendente della cura». (shrink)

Modal phenomena in general, and modal claims in particular, present a problem for contemporary philosophers. The truth conditions of modal claims differ from those of nonemodal claims. I discuss a widely accepted strategy that posits possible and impossible worlds in order to analyze modal claims and thus systematize our intuitions about modal reality.

These comments were presented as part of an exchange with Peter van Inwagen in January of 2014 during the California Metaphysics Conference at the University of Southern California. They have not been updated or changed since their presentation. (I refer to van Inwagen as ‘Peter’, which I would not do in a published paper. I make some jokey remarks that might have been sort of alright if you heard them only once spoken aloud, but as I read them now make (...) me cringe a bit. And so on.) These comments were never published. (shrink)

This title from the De Gruyter Book Archive has been digitized in order to make it available for academic research. It was originally published under National Socialism and has to be viewed in this historical context. Learn more. >.

An attempt to vindicate naive set theory by postulating a universal set V which is describable in two distinct description languages: predicative and extensional. The extensional description of a set consists of describing all its elements whereas its predicative description consists of describing what sets it is an element of. -/- Extensionally described V has an uncapturable description length, akin to its cardinality. But predicatively described, in virtue of being the set that is not contained in any set whatsoever, V (...) has a minimal description length, a counterbalance to its cardinality. -/- Descriptive efficiency can genuinely be attributed to V (achieved in a third description language) only if it contains predicatively indiscernible but extensionally discernible sets. (shrink)

The book results from several years of work on the problems of consciousness and the self as they are currently posed in the Philosophy of mind and Philosophy of psychiatry. I debate various theories of the self, including those found in contemporary versions of dualism, panpsychism, structuralism, enactivism, and predictive processing, while working towards naturalising the phenomenology of subjectivity.

Frontmatter -- Einleitung -- Erster Teil: Allgemeiner Begriff der Kategorien -- I. Abschnitt. Die Kategorien and das ideale Sein -- 1. Kapitel. Gleichsetzung von Prinzipien und Wesenheiten -- 2. Kapitel. Aufhebung der Gleichsetzung. Die Abgrenzung -- 3. Kapitel. Die Kategorien des idealen Seins -- 4. Kapitel. Inhaltlicher Überschuß der Realkategorien -- II. Abschnitt. Ontologische Fassungen und Fehlerquellen -- 5. Kapitel. Didaktischer Wert der Vorurteile -- 6. Kapitel. Der kategoriale Chorismos und die Homonymie -- 7. Kapitel. Kategoriale Grenzüberschreitung und Heterogeneität -- (...) 8. Kapitel. Kategorialer Teleologismus und Normativismus -- 9. Kapitel. Kategorialer Formalismus -- III. Abschnitt. Erkenntnistheoretische Fassungen und Fehlerquellen -- 10. Kapitel. Neue Aufgaben der Vernunftkritik -- 11. Kapitel. Kategorialer Apriorismus und Rationalismus -- 12. Kapitel. Vorurteile in den Identitätsthesen -- 13. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil der logisch-ontologischen Identität -- 14. Kapitel. Konsequenzen aus der Kritik der Identitätsthesen -- IV. Abschnitt. Fehlerquellen der philosophischen Systematik -- 15. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des Einheitspostulats -- 16. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des kategorialen Dualismus -- 17. Kapitel. Das Vorurteil des Harmoniepostulats -- Zweiter Teil: Die Lehre von den Fundamentalkategorien -- I. Abschnitt. Die Schichten des Realen und die Sphären -- 18. Kapitel. Die Erkenntnissphäre und ihre Stufen -- 19. Kapitel. Das Hineinspielen der idealen und logischen Sphäre -- 20. Kapitel. Die Lehre von den Schichten des Realen -- 21. Kapitel. Schichten des Realen und Schichten der Kategorien -- 22. Kapitel. Einordnung der sekundären Sphären in die Schichten des Realen -- II. Abschnitt. Die elementaren Gegensatzkategorien -- 23. Kapitel. Die Stellung der Seinsgegensätze. Geschichtliches -- 24. Kapitel. Die Tafel der Seinsgegensätze -- 25. Kapitel. Die innere Bezogenheit in der Gegensätzlichkeit -- 26. Kapitel. Gegenseitige Überordnung und Implikation der Gegensätze -- III. Abschnitt. Die Abwandlung der Seinsgegensätze in den Schichten -- 27. Kapitel. Kategorien minimaler Abwandlung -- 28. Kapitel. Relation und Substrat, Form und Materie -- 29. Kapitel. Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit -- 30. Kapitel. Gegensatz und Dimension, Diskretion und Kontinuität -- 31. Kapitel. Determination und Dependenz -- 32. Kapitel. Einstimmigkeit und Widerstreit -- 33. Kapitel. Element und Gefüge -- 34. Kapitel. Inneres und Äußeres -- IV. Abschnitt. Die Kategorien der Qualität -- 35. Kapitel. Das Positive und das Negative -- 36. Kapitel. Identität und Verschiedenheit -- 37. Kapitel. Allgemeinheit und Individualität -- 38. Kapitel. Die qualitative Mannigfaltigkeit -- V. Abschnitt. Kategorien der Quantität -- 39. Kapitel. Eines und Vieles -- 40. Kapitel. Das Unendliche und das Continuum der reellen Zahlen -- 41. Kapitel. Die Rechnung und das Berechenbare -- Dritter Teil: Die kategorialen Gesetze -- I. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Geltung -- 42. Kapitel. Das Problem der kategorialen Gesetzlichkeit -- 43. Kapitel. Das Geltungsgesetz des "Prinzips" -- 44. Kapitel. Die drei übrigen Geltungssätze -- II. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Kohärenz -- 45. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Verbundenheit -- 46. Kapitel. Die Gesetzlichkeit der interkategorialen Relation -- 47. Kapitel. Das Wesen der kategorialen Implikation -- 48. Kapitel. Zur Geschichte und Metaphysik der kategorialen Kohärenz -- 49. Kapitel. Hegels Idee der Dialektik -- ¿II. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Schichtung -- 50. Kapitel. Das Höhenverhältnis der Kategorien -- 51. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Wiederkehr -- 52. Kapitel. Zur Metaphysik der kategorialen Wiederkehr -- 53. Kapitel. Gesetz der Abwandlung und Gesetz des Novums -- 54. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Schichtendistanz -- IV. Abschnitt. Gesetze der kategorialen Dependenz -- 55. Kapitel. Schichtung und Abhängigkeit -- 56. Kapitel. Das kategoriale Grundgesetz -- 57. Kapitel. Das Gesetz der Indifferenz und die lnversionstheorien -- 58. K. (shrink)

A speculative exploration of the distinction between a relational formal ontology and a classical formal ontology for modelling phenomena in nature that exhibit relationally-mediated wholism, such as phenomena from quantum physics and biosemiotics. Whereas a classical formal ontology is based on mathematical objects and classes, a relational formal ontology is based on mathematical signs and categories. A relational formal ontology involves nodal networks (systems of constrained iterative processes) that are dynamically sustained through signalling. The nodal networks are hierarchically ordered and (...) exhibit characteristics of deep learning. Clarifying the distinction between classical and relational formal ontologies may help to clarify the role of interpretative context in physics (eg. the role of the observer in quantum theory). (shrink)

Tetrainertia, as a universal process, function of moving matter, is its structural characteristic. And the sphere is a product of matter, its concrete form and a figurative model for studying the properties of tetrainertia. This thinking is a supplement to the first publication: The mechanics of existence.

This chapter introduces psychologism as the thesis that social facts can explained in terms of more basic facts about individuals, their psychological states, their actions, their relations, and their environments. It argues psychologism should be our default stance toward social reality. It reviews psychologistic approaches to shared intention and how shared intentions can help explain conventions, status functions, and organizations. It provides a deflationary account of corporate attitudes. It argues that neither physical nor social externalism about thought content are incompatible (...) with psychologism. It argues that social construction views of the self that conflict with psychologism are implausible. Finally, it points out that it is no objection to psychologism that social facts can change without changes in psychological facts because this is compatible with psychologism as explained here. (shrink)

This essay examines the contributions of Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras to the question of the relationship between faith and reason. Although a comprehensive analysis of the entire body of his work is beyond the scope of this project, we will attempt to demonstrate through a selective survey, from the early `On the Absence and Unknowability of God' (1970) to the later `The Effable and the Ineffable' (1999), that he presents a convincing `third way' between rationalism and deism. We (...) will argue that Yannaras accomplishes this by methodologically deconstructing the presuppositions of rationalism and advocating for a more `empirically correct' approach grounded in apophaticism and social verification of knowledge. In doing so, he introduces a paradigm that not only challenges the binary opposition between faith and reason but also establishes a distinctive point of encounter between Orthodox Christian theology and contemporary philosophical discourse. (shrink)

The study examines the creative process using the logical and methodological analysis of Plato’s concepts. It presents the modern scientific research related directly or indirectly to his philosophical views (the structural analogy method, the theory of archetypes and fractals and many others). A number of modern studies and concepts, such as the theory of fractals, evolutionary epistemology, the concept of autopoiesis, and others, confirm Plato’s views on the structure of the world and creativity. For this reason, the authors define creativity (...) as the activity of a rational and social subject to produce a qualitatively new thing based on universal patterns of the fractal and archetype nature in accordance with the ideal. This activity needs in creativeness which is the state of love as a creative force arising from social interaction as a desire to create and expand space for life, connecting space inside the subject of creativity and outside it, creating a resonance between the creative self and other persons. (shrink)

The Spiritual Forms in Nicolai Hartmann’s critical ontology. For a critical-genetic interpretation of The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author critically discusses the theoretical assumptions underlying Nicolai Hartmann’s 1933 The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author deals with the main categorial problems involved in the Hartmannian discussion about the spiritual being, also looking at his previous production. In particular, the Author analyzes the position of the ontic level of spiritual being with respect to the previous three real ontic levels (inorganic, (...) organic, psychological) and the mutual relationship between the three fundamental forms of spiritual being identified by Hartmann (personal, objective, objectified). The Author believes that the 1933 volume has been poorly considered in its direct links with the overall project of critical ontology. (shrink)

Discussions about the role of universities have long been framed in terms of questions of what is good for the public, as well as how and whether higher education serves that good. Today, the language of societal impact has become an accepted way for policymakers to frame the matter, but just who is included in the underlying definition of society that this formulation presupposes? In this paper, we consider how society has been constructed in discussions of the societal impact of (...) humanities research in Denmark, through an engagement with legislation, national political commentary, and institutional policy. We draw on the work of Martin Heidegger and Simone Weil to analyse the vision of society these policies construct. We conclude with proposals for alternative societies and forms of policy that these philosophers make possible. (shrink)

Although he is best known as the founder of pragmatism, the name that Charles Sanders Peirce prefers to use for his comprehensive system of thought is "synechism" because the principle of continuity is its central thesis. This paper arranges and summarizes numerous quotations and citations from his voluminous writings to formalize and explicate his distinctive mathematical conceptions of hyperbolic and topical continuity, both of which are derived from the direct observation of time as their paradigmatic manifestation, and then apply them (...) in normative science and metaphysics, especially logic as semeiotic and cosmology. The resulting conclusion is that the intelligibility of the universe is plausibly explained by conceiving it as one immense sign, a vast inferential process: a semiosic continuum whose connected constituent signs are indefinite until deliberately marked off, with God the Creator as its overall dynamical object in the infinite past and God completely revealed as its overall final interpretant in the infinite future. (shrink)

Im besonderen philosophischen Kontext des Zwischenkriegsdeutschlands entwickelte der junge Marcuse eine originelle Rezeption in marxistischer Perspektive der existenziellen Phänomenologie und der Lebensphilosophie (I). In seinen ersten Aufsätzen »Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus« (1928) und »Über konkrete Philosophie« (1929) orientierte sich diese Rezeption am Projekt der Erarbeitung einer dialektischen Phänomenologie und in Verbindung damit an dem Versuch, die radikale Tat auf den ontologischen Begriff der Geschichtlichkeit zu gründen, ohne eine materielle Komponente zu vernachlässigen (II, III, IV). In der Auseinandersetzung (...) mit dem fundamentalontologisch anmutenden ›Verfall‹ des Daseins entwarf Marcuse überdies die Grundlagen seiner konkreten Philosophie der Praxis (V). (shrink)

In this tour de force of scholarship and vision, Ken Wilber traces the course of evolution from matter to life to mind and describes the common patterns that evolution takes in all three of these domains. From the emergence of mind, he traces the evolution of human consciousness through its major stages of growth and development. He particularly focuses on modernity and postmodernity: what they mean; how they impact gender issues, psychotherapy, ecological concerns, and various liberation movements; and how the (...) modern and postmodern world conceive of Spirit. This second edition features forty pages of new material, new diagrams, and extensively revised notes. (shrink)

My aim in this book is to propose a comparativist, Buddhist-Neoplatonic interpretation of the idea of “logos” in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John. To do so, I proceed in three steps. I begin with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna thinks that that all things are empty because they depend on causes and conditions in a way that makes it impossible for them to genuinely exist. Nevertheless, they are not completely non-existent, for they possess the appearance of something (...) that exists. This corresponds, in turn, to Vasubandhu’s response to Nāgārjuna. Emptiness is not ultimate because there is the appearance of empty things. The place where this appearance unfolds is the mind, which, in an absolute sense, exists, but which, in the sense of external, objectifiable reality does not exist. Vasubandhu thus thinks of the mind as an entity that does not conform to the categories of ordinary existence. This, then, corresponds to what Meister Eckhart says about God. God is a Mind ("intellectus"). But due to his fundamental ontological role, God transcends ordinary existence and cannot be compared to any specific being. God is the mind of which Vasubandhu states that it is non-dual, transcendent knowledge. To conclude, I use this triadic constellation of Buddhist and Neoplatonic concepts to read John’s Prologue. The Prologue describes the generation of a foundational concept, “logos,” by a primordial, divine Mind. Since this Mind is, in a Buddhist sense, “empty,” the concept that it generates can be said to be absolute. It has no beginning and no cause. Against this background of Buddhist and Neoplatonic ideas, John’s Prologue can thus be interpreted as a narrative describing the foundation of reality as an intellectual process. (shrink)