We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed patients. We explore (...) the legal and clinical consequences of this result. (shrink)

The exercise of judgement is an aspect of human endeavour from our most mundane acts to our most momentous decisions. In this book Wayne Martin develops a historical survey of theoretical approaches to judgement, focusing on treatments of judgement in psychology, logic, phenomenology and painting. He traces attempts to develop theories of judgement in British Empiricism, the logical tradition stemming from Kant, nineteenth-century psychologism, experimental neuropsychology and the phenomenological tradition associated with Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger. His reconstruction of vibrant but (...) largely forgotten nineteenth-century debates links Kantian approaches to judgement with twentieth-century phenomenological accounts. He also shows that the psychological, logical and phenomenological dimensions of judgement are not only equally important but fundamentally interlinked in any complete understanding of judgement. His book will interest a wide range of readers in history of philosophy, philosophy of the mind and psychology. (shrink)

I assess a series of arguments intended to show that 'ought' implies 'can'. Two are rooted in uses of 'ought' in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources of deontic logic. I show that, in each case, the arguments leave scope for forms of infinite moral consciousness—forms of moral consciousness in which a moral obligation retains its authority even in the face of the conviction that the obligation is impossible to fulfil. In this respect the (...) paper sides with Martin Luther against Erasmus and Kant. (shrink)

The paper assesses Martin's recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian's "Allegory of Prudence" , the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin's views on Kant's logic in general and his theory of singular (...) existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin's key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject. (shrink)

This new interpretation of Fichte's Jena system focuses on the problem of the objectivity of consciousness.

Fichte’s early review of C. A. L. Creuzer’s neglected and idiosyncratic skeptical book on free will posed a serious challenge to what at the time was emerging as a consensus Kantian position on the role of free choice in the generation of imputable action. Fichte’s review was directed as much against Reinhold’s important letter on freedom of the will as it was against Creuzer himself. In the course of his brief review, Fichte suggests an important recasting of the strategy of (...) the Kantian postulates of rational faith; he poses a dilemma for the Reinholdian understanding of the relationship among an autonomous practical will, a free power of choice, and the actions of natural human organisms; and he hints at a radical reappropriation of the rationalist doctrine of pre-established harmony in re-orienting the search for a defensible reconstruction of a broadly Kantian position on the problem of free will. (shrink)

The United Nations human rights system has in recent years been divided on the question as to whether coercive care interventions, including coercive psychiatric care, can ever be justified under UN human rights standards. Some within the UN human rights community hold that coercive care can comply with human rights standards, provided that the coercive intervention is a necessary and proportionate means to achieve certain approved aims, and that appropriate legal safeguards are in place. Others have held that coercive care (...) is never justified. Disagreement over this issue has produced an impasse in the UN human rights system. We survey the impasse with particular attention to the legal arguments that inform the divergent positions. In doing so we introduce a distinction among a variety of different ‘abolitionist’ positions regarding coercive care, and draw a distinction between ‘non-consensual’ and ‘coercive’ treatment. We conclude with three proposals for moving beyond the current impasse. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTime-consciousness has long been a focus of research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. We advance and extend this tradition of research by focusing on the character of temporal experience under conditions of mania. Symptom scales and diagnostic criteria for mania are peppered with temporally inflected language: increased rate of speech, racing thoughts, flight-of-ideas, hyperactivity. But what is the underlying structure of temporal experience in manic episodes? We tackle this question using a strategically hybrid approach. We recover and reconstruct three hypotheses (...) regarding manic temporality that were advanced and modeled by two pioneers of clinical phenomenology: Eugène Minkowski and Ludwig Binswanger. We then test, critique, and refine these hypotheses using heterophenomenological methods in an interview-based study of persons with a history of bipolar and a current diagnosis of acute mania. Our conclusions support a central hypothesis due to Minkowski... (shrink)

Hegel's very first acknowledged publication was, among other things, an attack on Fichte. In 1801, Hegel was still laboring in almost complete obscurity, while Fichte was an international sensation, though already somewhat past the peak of his meteoric career. In the 1801 Differenzschrift, Hegel cut his teeth by criticizing Fichte's already widelycriticised Wissenschaftslehre, and by demonstrating that Schelling's philosophical system was not simply to be equated with it. Fichte himself never bothered to respond to Hegel's criticisms; indeed he never publicly (...) acknowledged their existence. This was not because he was unconcerned with criticisms of his views; quite the contrary. But at the time he had bigger fish to fry. He responded to Jacobi's criticisms, and to Schelling's; he replied in great detail to critical questions raised by Reinhold, and with vituperative intensity to objections raised by skeptics and purportedly loyal Kantians. But Hegel's Differenzschrift was left without a Fichtean rebuttal. This is a pity, both because of the missed opportunity to illuminate by controversy central issues at stake in the post-Kantian period, but also because it made it easier for Hegel simply to reiterate his youthful criticism as if it were the last word. And reiterate it he did: in one form or another Hegel's early criticisms of Fichte reappear at every subsequent stage of his career: in the Phenomenology, in the Science of Logic, in the Encyclopaedia, as the final chapter in Hegel's History of Philosophy, and in countless other minor works and documents from the Nachlass and correspondence. (shrink)

Assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC) can be difficult in acquired brain injury (ABI) particularly with the syndrome of organic personality disorder (OPD) (the “frontal lobe syndrome”). Clinical neuroscience may help but there are challenges translating its constructs to the decision-making abilities considered relevant by law and ethics. An in-depth interview study of DMC in OPD was undertaken. Six patients were purposefully sampled and rich interview data were acquired for scrutiny using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Interview data revealed that awareness of deficit (...) and thinking about psychological states can be present. However, the awareness of deficit may not be “online” and effectively integrated into decision-making. Without this online awareness of deficit the ability to appreciate or use and weigh information in the process of deciding some matters appeared absent. We argue that the decision-making abilities discussed are: (1) necessary for DMC, (2) threatened by ABI, and (3) assessable at interview. Some advice for practically incorporating these abilities within assessments of DMC in patients with OPD is outlined. (shrink)

Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...) the criticism that it does not attend to the authenticity of a decision. In ordinary language, this is the idea that someone is deciding while “not their self” or that it is the “illness speaking.” There is a... (shrink)

It is customary to identify transcendental philosophy as the distinctive and original invention of Immanuel Kant. Certainly this was a view that Kant himself did much to encourage. But this chapter argues that traces of the transcendental strategy can be found already among the ancients. One such ancient precedent is associated with the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis. It is argued that oikeiosis is best understood as a form of normative orientation associated with 'being at home (oikos)' in one's body and (...) environment, and that it involves a distinctive form of ontological self-consciousness. This chapter assesses the merits of Stoic claims that oikeiosis figures as a condition on the possibility of desire (Cicero), pleasure (Diogenes), and even perception (Hierocles), and the chapter considers the case for describing these arguments as examples of transcendental investigation. (shrink)

In this paper I lay the foundations for an understanding of one of Fichte's most neglected and least understood texts: the late lecture course on Transcendental Logic. I situate this work in the context of Fichte's lifelong struggle with the problem of understanding the relation between logic and philosophy – a problem that I show to figure centrally both in Fichte's own revolutionary thinking and in his response to Kant's notorious denunciation of the Wissenschaftslehre. By attending to this context we (...) can understand Fichte's philosophical ambitions in the late lectures: a critique of particular doctrines of general logic; a critique of the conception of thought presupposed both by the traditional logic and by Kant himself; and a new conception of the relation between logic and the philosophical theory of experience. (shrink)

In their discussion paper of November 2020, Cooket alpresent a draft protocol for navigating circumstances in which emergency services are overwhelmed. Their paper suggests that COVID-related triage decisions should be based on clinical assessment, patient and family consultation, and a range of ethical considerations. In this response, we note that the protocol exhibits an ambiguity that is likely to result in irresolvable dilemmas when put into practice. This ambiguity is exemplified in the paper’s prime ethical imperative (to ‘save more lives (...) and more years of life’), which takes the form of an undefined conjunction whose practical implications are left unspecified. We see this ambiguity in the prime imperative as one manifestation of a broader set of tensions in the protocol. We show that the discipline of human rights provides an essential supplement to the ethical framework on which Cook and colleagues rely, providing a framework for understanding and working through triage dilemmas involving age, discrimination and equality. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Husserl's Cartesianism Heidegger's Ontological Critique References and Further Reading.

In 2014 the Essex Autonomy Project undertook a six month project, funded by the AHRC, to provide technical advice to the UK Ministry of Justice on the question of whether the Mental Capacity Act is compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Over the course of the project, the EAP research team organised a series of public policy roundtables, hosted by the Ministry of Justice, and which brought together leading experts to discuss and debate (...) the issues. A one-day public conference was held at the Institute for Government in July. In September 2014, the EAP research team submitted its findings to the Ministry of Justice. (shrink)

We undertake to bring a phenomenological perspective to bear on a challenge of contemporary law and clinical practice. In a wide variety of contexts, legal and medical professionals are called upon to assess the competence or capacity of an individual to exercise her own judgement in making a decision for herself. We focus on decisions regarding consent to or refusal of medical treatment and contrast a widely recognised clinical instrument, the MacCAT-T, with a more phenomenologically informed approach. While the MacCAT-T (...) focuses attention on individual cognitive performance criteria, an approach oriented by second-person phenomenology brings into view the complex role of time, others and identity in constituting the capacity for individual autonomous judgement. Our phenomenological analysis has consequences both for the practice of capacity assessments and for further research in this arena. Good practice in capacity assessment must attend to decision communities, distributed capacity, and temporal competence, while research on mental capacity will miss the phenomenon if it trains its focus ‘between the ears.’ We illustrate our approach by considering two recent cases of contested capacity: one involving cognitive disability in a dysfunctional decision community, the second presenting the possibility of competent decision-making under conditions of paranoid schizophrenia. (shrink)

Few periods in the history of philosophy manifest the degree of dynamism and historical complexity that characterize early post-Kantian philosophy. The reasons for this special character of so-called “classical German philosophy” are no doubt themselves quite complex. Institutional and political circumstances certainly played an important role. The end of the eighteenth century marks a point at which philosophy was seen as being deeply implicated in the political developments of the day (in particular: the upheavals in France). What’s more, this intense (...) political context for philosophy coincided with the reemergence of “academic” philosophy: the first point in the modern period when the leading figures on the philosophical scene were members of a common (and flourishing) academic community.2 But more narrowly philosophical factors are also important. Kant’s philosophical accomplishment was widely seen as marking a watershed in philosophy’s development, but it was an accomplishment whose lessons and viability were highly.. (shrink)

Wayne Martin and colleagues argue that decisions about patients’ best interests must sometimes take into account the interests of others Doctors often find themselves in circumstances where they must make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated patient. As a matter of both ethics and law, such decisions must be taken in the best interests of the patient, but uncertainty remains about what is meant by best interests, especially in relation to the interests of others. Should the interests of others enter (...) into a determination of the patient’s best interests? We believe that they should and argue against a recent trend to focus solely on the patient. It only takes a moment’s reflection to appreciate that the interests of one person are often wrapped up with the interests of others. A patient has an interest in recovering from her illness, but so do her family, employer, care providers, etc. Sometimes these various interests can be independently specified, but in other cases they are inextricably intertwined. Suppose that I am a single parent whose overriding interest is to ensure the wellbeing of my children. In that case the proper specification of my best interest is a function of theirs; I simply cannot determine the one without considering the other. This can create an ethical problem in medical decision making. In circumstances where medical staff must make a decision in the best interests of an incapacitated patient, to what extent can or should they take account of the interests of other people whose lives are affected by the outcome? These ethical issues have taken on a concrete legal shape in the UK with the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which specifies that, “An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity …. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

In the Spring and Summer of 2014, a group of experts convened a series of meetings at the Westminster headquarters of the UK Ministry of Justice in order to determine whether the Mental Capacity Act 2005 complies with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The meetings were organised by the research team of the Essex Autonomy Project, a research and public policy initiative funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and based at the University (...) of Essex. The working group included civil servants from the MoJ, the Office of the Public Guardian, and the Department of Health, as well as the Official Solicitor, a senior judge of the Court of Protection, leading academic experts from psychiatry, law and ethics, and representatives of user-group organisations. In September 2014, the EAP research team reported to the MoJ on its findings. This article summarises some of the key arguments and conclusions of that report. Both the report itself and this article represent the views of their respective authors; they should not be taken to represent the views of the MoJ, the AHRC, or the other participants in these consultations. (shrink)

An influential interpretation of phenomenology construes Husserl's project as an attempt to generalize the Fregean notion of sense- an attempt to extend Frege's analysis of the structure of meaningful expressions to a more general account of the structure of meaning in experience . Michael Dummett has articulated a broadly Fregean critique of this Husserlian program, arguing that the project is misguided and retrograde-a relapse into the psychologism and idealism that Frege sought to avoid. A defense of Husserl is offered, based (...) in part on key elements of the theory of meaning articulated in his Logical Investigations . But the main aim is neither to acquit nor to convict Husserl of Dummett's charges; rather it is to use the exchange to investigate some of the philosophical commitments of a broadly Husserlian phenomenology. If we are to understand how Husserl avoids psychologism then we must come to terms with the paradoxical idea of an anti-psychologistic investigation of consciousness (an anti-psychologistic psychology). If we are to understand his complex stance toward idealism then we must not only understand the grounds for his rejection of subjective idealism but also be attuned to the other forms of idealism to which his project is committed. In the course of investigating these matters the author considers how Husserl can reply to the charge of explanatory vacuity, and shows that Frege himself recognizes the legitimacy of something like the Husserlian project. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Very Brief Primer on Dutch Still‐Life Painting Bubbles and Skulls: Pieter Claesz and the Transformation of a Visual Theme The Temporality of Self‐Consciousness in a Late Painting of David Bailly A Concluding Word about Two Portraits.

I set out to trace the history of a distinctive conception of self-consciousness -- from its first formulation in the 3rd century BC, through its reception among Roman philosophers around the 1st century AD, and finally to its fate in Enlightenment thought of the 18th century. I use this history to clarify and defend an idea that figured centrally in the history of philosophy, but which has recently come under sustained attack: the idea that human beings are in some very (...) fundamental way self- conscious beings, and that our self-consciousness serves as a kind of foundation or transcendental condition for our other cognitive capacities. Obviously, given the scale of these ambitions, the presentation here should be considered at best a sketch. It is intended not to settle any matters, but at least to bring back into view a line of argument that has been covered over by more recent developments. (shrink)

The current state of mental health law in England and Wales exhibits a set of systematic antinomies. This should not be seen as a flaw of the legislation; the antinomies in law reflect an underlying antinomial structure at work where the vocations of care are practiced and regulated in a broadly liberal legal environment. The aim of this paper is to identify these antinomial structures and to deploy resources from the post-Kantian idealist tradition to diagnose them and to consider how (...) they might be managed. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the representation of self-consciousness in the still life tradition in the Netherlands around the time of Descartes’ residence there. I treat the paintings of this tradition as both a phenomenological resource and as a phenomenological undertaking in their own right. I begin with an introductory overview of the still life tradition, with particular attention to semiotic structures characteristic of the vanitas still life. I then focus my analysis on the representation of self-consciousness in this tradition, (...) identifying both a Cartesian mode of representation of self-consciousness but also a counter trend. (shrink)

IN PLACE OF AN ABSTRACT: I here report on my work-in-progress addressing Rousseau’s naturalistic account of human agency. In the first half of these notes I attempt to throw light on the distinctive character of Rousseau’s philosophical naturalism. I compare Rousseau’s naturalism both to that of his own contemporaries and to some of our own (§1), but argue that Rousseauian naturalism is better understood as a development of ancient forms of ethical naturalism, particularly as mediated by Seneca (§2). I then (...) turn to consider how Rousseau’s distinctive naturalistic commitments shape his treatment of the problem of self-consciousness, in particular with regard to the self-consciousness involved in action. I argue that Rousseau identifies two fundamental structures of self-consciousness essential to beings with natures like ours. The first is Rousseauian conscience, understood following the Stoics as a form of natural selfsentiment (§3); the second is associated with the distinctively human task of confession, understood as a form of self-judgment (§4). (shrink)

Fichte’s introduction to the Sittenlehre rather strikingly says nothing about Sitten or Sittlichkeit, nothing about Moral, virtually nothing about die Ethik. Aside from one very pregnant promissory note with no immediate bearing on ethical matters, it says nothing about the specific tasks and strategy of the book it introduces. What it provides instead is a concise statement of Fichte’s fundamental philosophical commitments and a powerful illustration of his distinctive combination of transcendental and phenomenological approaches in philosophy in general and to (...) the problems of action in particular. In approaching Fichte’s text we will do well to focus on three points: the systematic place of the text in Fichte’s corpus and in his system; Fichte’s sketch of the phenomenology and transcendental conditions of agency; and the problem of understanding the distinctive normativity of Fichte’s transcendental/phenomenological laws. (shrink)

Es fällt auf, daß in Fichtes Einleitung in die Sittenlehre von Sitten oder von Sittlichkeit ebensowenig die Rede ist wie von Moral; auch über Ethik wird so gut wie nichts gesagt. Abgesehen von einer vielversprechenden Ankündigung, die jedoch keinen unmittelbaren Bezug auf ethische Fragen hat, gibt sie keinerlei Auskunft über die spezifischen Aufgaben und die Argumentationsstrategie des Buches, dessen Einleitung sie ist. Was sie statt dessen bietet, ist eine konzise Darlegung der fundamentalen philosophischen Prämissen Fichtes und eine wirkungsvolle Illustration der (...) für Fichte typischen Kombination von transzendentalen und phänomenologischen Herangehensweisen an die Philosophie im allgemeinen und an die Probleme des Handelns im besonderen. Wenn wir uns Fichtes Text nähern, dann tun wir gut daran, uns auf drei Punkte zu konzentrieren: auf den systematischen Ort des Textes im Korpus seiner Schriften und in seinem System, auf Fichtes Skizze sowohl der Phänomenologie als auch der transzendentalen Bedingungen der Tätigkeit und schließlich auf das Problem, wie die spezifische Normativität von Fichtes transzendentalphänomenologischen Gesetzen zu verstehen ist. (shrink)

I review Adrian Moore’s lucid account of Fichte’s contribution to the Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. I support Moore’s contention that Fichte should indeed be considered a metaphysician, but I propose an adjustment to Moore’s interpretation, guided by Fichte’s own claim that the infinite I is an unattainable ideal, rather than a fact about the constitution of reality as it actually is. The resulting position embeds Fichte’s metaphysics firmly within his ethics and politics. In reconstructing Fichte’s position I demonstrate the centrality (...) of work in Fichte’s proposed resolution of Kant’s third antinomy. (shrink)

This chapter explores one of the most problematic theoretical commitments of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological projects: the idea of a logic of consciousness or phenomenologic. It shows why Husserl is committed to this idea and why it is so out of step with contemporary approaches in the philosophy of mind. It then tries to render the idea intelligible along two paths. First, to take the idea of a logic of consciousness seriously, we must challenge our entrenched atomistic assumptions about conscious states. (...) Second, to recognize the sense in which a science of consciousness might be logical, we must come to terms with Husserl's conception of an ideal science. For on a Husserlian conception, apophantic logic and phenomenology must be seen as two varieties of ideal science: systematic articulations of the content and structure of an ideal that is constitutive for conscious experience of a world. (shrink)

In this review of Robert Pippin's recent book, elements of Hegel's Practical Philosophy are assessed both against opposed philosophical positions and by the guidance they offer in thinking through the practical matter of deciding what to eat.

My aim in what follows is to contribute to recent discussions concerning the place of phenomenology within the tradition of transcendental philosophy. Very broadly, the issue here is whether phenomenology aspires to provide transcendental results, and if so, whether it can hope meet those aspirations. This is a large and many-faceted question; my aim here is to explore one rather narrow slice of it. I shall for the most part confine my attention to the version of the phenomenological enterprise found (...) in Division I of Being and Time. And I shall concern myself not with the full range of questions raised by the idea of a transcendental inquiry but rather myopically with a set of questions concerning the distinctive logical modality of purported transcendental results. This modality can be identified in various ways, but we can see it at work in the oft-repeated thought that transcendental philosophy aims to identify the conditions on the possibility of certain facts or features of our experience. If A is a condition on the possibility of B, then it would seem that A must obtain, given the actuality of B. We might accordingly frame the issue as a question about the modality of necessity in the context of Heideggerian phenomenology. Even so narrowed, the issues here are still pretty large and thorny. I don’t pretend here to be able to resolve them; my hope is that I can at least sharpen the questions and perhaps thereby render them more tractable. In pursuing these issues I shall pay particular attention to a recent illuminating analysis proposed and elaborated by Taylor Carman. (shrink)

Outline: 1. Why Judgment? 2. Inverse Psychologism: General Issues 3. Inverse Psychologism in the Phenomeno-Logic of Judgment 4. Judgment and Language 5. [De-]stabilizing Kant ’s Inverse Psychologism.

this is a review of the Emma Cameron Exhibition at Chappel Galleries, February 2007 forthcoming in Artists’ Papers.

Suppose that three patients each independently confront the same high-stakes treatment decision. Perhaps it is an option to terminate a high-risk pregnancy, or to accept a blood transfusion after a catastrophic hemorrhage. Suppose further that the three patients approach their choice in radically different ways. The divergence lies not in the choice made, but in the pathway followed in arriving at it. P1 is a classic analytical reasoner. She enumerates the potential costs and benefits of each option, reviews the probabilities, (...) and makes a decision on the basis of her analysis. P2 does none of that analytical work. She has a settled and robust prior... (shrink)

Acts of criticism characteristically display a negative and a positive dimension. I undertake a qualified defense of the thesis that both dimensions are essential, at least in the case of logical criticism – criticism that relies either implicitly or explicitly on the resources of logic. Such criticism presupposes at least a minimal grasp on what is involved in ‘getting it right’ in the domain that is subjected to critique. In making the case I distinguish between positive and negative logic. Traditional (...) logic is positive insofar as it takes as primitive a positive notion, typically truth. I consider to what extent logic might be reconstructed on an exclusively negative basis – as a tool for avoiding falsity and fallacy. Negative logic faces serious obstacles which suggest a prima facie case that logical criticism is essentially, not just accidentally, positive. (shrink)

I investigate Stoic accounts of the structure and function of self-consciousness, specifically in connection with the Stoic notion of Oikeiosis. After reviewing the tortured history of attempts to translate this ancient notion into modern terms, I set out to determine its content by identifying its inferential role in Stoic moral psychology. I then provide a reconstruction of the Stoic claim that Oikeiosis is or involves a form of self-consciousness (Chrysippus), self-sentiment (Seneca), or synæsthesia (Hierocles). I show how the Stoic conception (...) of self-consciousness differs fundamentally from modern accounts of selfconsciousness as a form of psychic self-presence or epistemic self-certainty, and I exhibit the limitations of Long’s treatment of Stoic self-consciousness as proprioception. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of the Stoic claim that self-consciousness figures as a condition on the possibility of perception and desire, providing a form of normative orientation essential for intentional determinacy. (shrink)

Since Kant, theorists of human consciousness have often made the claim that man's cognitive or theoretical forms of consciousness are rooted in practical forms of consciousness or in one or another form of practice . Although the ancestry of this view can be traced to Rousseau and Kant, it is among the post-Kantian idealists that it first comes to full expression. I examine the emergence of this theme in the first formulations of post-Kantian idealism: the Jena texts of Johann Gottlieb (...) Fichte. ;The first task in understanding Fichte's "primacy of practice" thesis is to understand the general character of his philosophical project. Traditionally, Fichte's philosophy has been thought of as marking the repudiation of Kant's "critical" project in favor of a program of "speculative metaphysics." On this reading, the core of Fichte's thought is a quasi-theological view of the universe as the product of a self-constituting absolute ego. One of my central claims is that this metaphysical reading of Fichte is fundamentally mistaken. Examining Fichte's philosophical aims in their original context , I show that Fichte's central philosophical concern is not a metaphysical but a transcendental issue: the "referentiality" or "objectivity" of consciousness. How, Fichte wants to know, do we come to think of our conscious states as referring to something that we take to exist independently of them? ;At the heart of Fichte's account of referentiality, I argue, is his rejection of naturalistic accounts of subjectivity. If we treat the subject as a natural object in a network of causal relations, he claims, then referentiality remains inexplicable. The first Wissenschaftslehre is then intended to provide an alternative to such naturalism: an account of referentiality that centers on the notion of a self-relating, self-determining subject. It is in this context that the primacy of practice thesis emerges: Any account of theoretical consciousness requires an appeal to an account of human beings as agents. (shrink)