The only collection of Mead's writings published during his lifetime, these essays have heretofore been virtually inaccessible. Reck has collected twenty-five essays representing the full range and depth of Mead's thought. This penetrating volume will be of interest to those in philosophy, sociology, and social psychology. "The editor's well-organized introduction supplies an excellent outline of this system in its development. In view of the scattered sources from which these writings are gathered, it is a great service that this volume renders (...) not only to students of Mead, but to historians."—H. W. Schneider, _Journal of the History of Philosophy_. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

The controversy in the American Philosophical Association between the analysts and the pluraliste, a controversy initiated by the so-called pluraliste, invites philosophers to explore the meanings of pluralism in philosophy. Toward this public end I propose the present modest sketch of the history of pluralism.

REASON AND REVOLUTION, to which Henry F. May has called attention in his noteworthy book, The Enlightenment in America, mentioned in the first article in the present series, marks the period of American colonial history from 1763 to 1776. The Declaration of Independence, I have maintained, is a consummate expression of these Enlightenment features, influenced by the thought of John Locke and others in philosophy. From cautious moderation the American movement of protest against British rule climaxed in a revolution. The (...) dynamic structure of the epoch unfolded as a kind of sorites, of which the major premises are a general philosophy of rights and a particular theory of the British Empire, the minor premises are numerous allegedly factual violations of these theoretical premises, and the conclusion is a decisive act of separation or independence. Since, however, the Enlightenment mode of revolution rested, to reiterate May's statement, on "the belief in the possibility of constructing a new heaven and earth out of the destruction of the old," the moment in history expressed by the Declaration of Independence logically leads to other moments, one of which is the formation of the American republic as both a federal and national union. This singular moment is crystallized in the Constitution of the United States, a document equal in importance to the Declaration of Independence as a symbol of the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Ushenko's speculative vision opened on the problem of time and its relation to logic. Profoundly concerned about the theme of time--the theme that intrinsically defines romantic irrationalism--he yet endeavored to vindicate within the bounds of temporality the sovereignty of logic so essential to the continuance of classical philosophy. The dual preoccupation with time and logic urged him into the fields of symbolic logic and relativity physics. From the flux of unrepeatable events he disengaged the laws of logic and the propositions (...) of scientific discourse, while at the same time he sought to keep both orders of entity united without injury to either. He ventured into nature as disclosed by contemporary physics and selected the category of event to supplant substance. He undertook to expound a metaphysics of events, grappled with the problem of the unity not only of nature but of the singular events that make up nature, and fixed upon the overarching structure of the space-time of relativity physics to resolve the problem. But this did not suffice. The metaphysical vision at work in these early books glimpsed at moments a principle beyond time, beyond propositions, beyond events--the principle of power. Power and Events: An Essay on Dynamics in Philosophy focused on the principle of power, integrating the other themes in terms of it. As the mature work of a significant and original thinker, Power and Events posed the principle of power as the central idea for the future course of philosophical investigation. In pursuit of its implications Ushenko embarked upon the philosophy of art in his last book Dynamics of Art and in a consistent yet startling fashion advanced the thesis that the substance of art is in effect a dynamic equilibrium of powers. (shrink)

Stressing the immediacy of Being, Hegel placed it categorially first in his logic. But the immediacy of Being, its presence no matter which content or lack of content be presented, signals a purity which ironically deprives it of every specific reality. Hence Hegel emphasized that Being, immediate and pure, is vacuous and collapses into Nothing. Extending a philosophical argument derived from Parmenides and Plato, Hegel further inferred Becoming from the dialectic of Being and Nothing, as though with static concepts he (...) could create the concrete flux. (shrink)

In the foreground of Father Lonergan's analysis of the cognitional process are insight and the heuristic structures it employs. A close study of paradigms of insight exhibits mental acts apprehending intelligibilities logically distinct from, though psychologically conveyed by sense data and images. Because these intelligibilities, e.g., in contemporary physics, bear witness to entities which are unimaginable, knowing is not merely looking. Knowing involves entertaining intelligible meanings and reflecting on them, and though it exists, for men at least, within the boundaries (...) of sensible experience, knowing in its primary activity as insight goes beyond the empirical presentations to grasp intelligible meanings and to judge reflectively their truth or falsity. When judging, a rational self-consciousness affirms a proposition, i.e., an intelligible meaning, in view of its sufficient reason or grounds. In this sense affirmative judgment renders the conditioned "virtually unconditioned" by linking it up with its conditions, as structures immanent and operative within the cognitional process effectuate this linkage of the conditioned with its conditions. These structures, which Father Lonergan supposes he can express as rules for the construction of situations which give rise to insight so that method and not genius suffices to gain truth, are held to be constitutive of the acts of insight and understanding. Accordingly, the positive content of Insight is summed up in the slogan: "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding". (shrink)

In the Principles of Psychology William James enunciated the well-known statement: “Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly”. And although in this work he never regarded metaphysics to be central to his purpose of establishing psychology as a natural science, he nonetheless sketched a theory of the nature of metaphysics.

MICHAEL KAMMEN in his book, A Machine That Would Go of Itself, has provided a comprehensive but highly readable history of the role of the Constitution in American culture. He has commented, with notable insight, on the capacity of Americans "to view their Constitution with a vision that was occasionally clouded and frequently bifocal: bifocal in the sense that the Constitution as a cultural symbol, rationalized in various ways, could be seen on a separate plane--or literally through a discrete lens--from (...) the Constitution as a 'practical system.' " While Kammen has devoted much detailed attention to "that discrepancy between the applied Constitution and the symbolic constitution," the bulk of his large book centers on the role of the Constitution as cultural icon. In this paper I shall explore what the Constitution as icon represents, although I shall also attend to some critical facets of the Constitution as a practical system. What the Constitution symbolizes has been a major moral and intellectual strand threading together the fabric of Western civilization from antiquity to the present. (shrink)

THE opening paragraph of the Declaration of Independence invokes, as every American should know, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God." The import of this invocation may be discerned by examining the appeals to natural law in the polemical literature of the American revolutionary period against the background of natural law/natural rights philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, within the particular historical context of events constituting the American Revolution. The (...) phrase "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God" in the Declaration is revealing. It simplifies what had, in earlier times, been referred to as "fundamental law," omitting and de-emphasizing, however, some rather essential elements. Historically, fundamental law had always been esteemed to be a law superior to statutory or positive law. Unless the latter conforms to the former, it is not valid, and invalid positive laws are null and void, so that there is no obligation to obey them. In the history of British jurisprudence, which includes colonial American jurisprudence, fundamental law embraced divine law, natural law, the British constitution beginning with Magna Carta, common law, and the colonial charters. Appeals to fundamental law were made when protesting statutory or positive laws and decrees. Thus the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress in October, 1774, invokes "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the British constitution, and the several charters and compacts" as the moral, rational, and ultimate legal basis for protesting alleged British encroachments on American rights. Yet less than two years later, the Declaration of Independence, abandoning the British constitution and dissolving the political band—the charters and compacts—between Great Britain and America, rests simply on "the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.". (shrink)

A review‐article of Loren Baritz, City On a Hill, A History of Ideas and Myths in America, John Wiley and Sons C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism, Paine‐Whitman Publishers Roderick M. Chisholm, Herbert Feigl, William K. Frankena, John Passmore, Manley Thompson, Philosophy, Prentice‐Hall Max Black, Philosophy in America, Cornell University Press.