On a souvent considéré qu'une philosophie de l'esprit devait choisir parmi les traits distinctifs du mental celui qu'elle retiendrait pour le mettre en relief. Il ne serait pas possible de faire place dans une même philosophie aux trois faits majeurs : l'intentionnalité du mental (on discerne les pensées de quelqu'un en disant à quoi il pense), le holisme du mental (impossible de concevoir un état d'esprit isolé du tout d'une vie mentale), la part impersonnelle du mental (les acteurs ne manifestent (...) pas seulement des capacités mentales attachées à leurs personnes respectives, mais aussi des manières de penser communes, des institutions de sens formant ce qu'on appelle un esprit objectif). Ainsi, les théories intentionalistes de l'esprit ont généralement exalté le sujet aux dépens des totalités symboliques, tandis que les théories des structures de l'esprit ont paru faire de l'acteur un simple figurant sur la scène du signifiant. De tels partis pris signalent l'échec de bien des philosophes à concevoir clairement les conditions d'une analyse holiste des phénomènes de l'esprit. Ce livre utilise les ressources analytiques de la logique des relations de C.S. Peirce pour développer une conception holiste de l'intentionnalité de l'esprit (tant subjectif qu'objectif). Ce faisant, il introduit, par l'analyse d'exemples plutôt que par un simple survol historique des doctrines, aux problèmes discutés dans les grandes philosophies de l'esprit de ce temps : phénoménologie, individualisme, structuralisme, pragmatisme. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a concept of stakeholder dialogue in responsible innovation (RI) processes. The problem with most concepts of communication is that they rely on ideals of openness, alignment and harmony, even while these ideals are rarely realized in practice. Based on the work of Burke, Habermas, Deetz and Levinas, we develop a concept of stakeholder dialogue that is able to deal with fundamentally different interests and value frames of actors involved in RI processes. We distinguish four main (...) characteristics of stakeholder dialogue. Dialogical responsiveness (1) enhances self-criticism, (2) is characterized by the constitution and the destruction of the self or identity of the actors involved, (3) consists only in the actual enactment of the dialogue and (4) is primarily responsive to the grand challenges of our time. Based on our findings, we provide a novel conceptualization of the central notion of responsiveness in the RI literature. (shrink)

Scholars refute the dichotomy of subject and object in the study of technology. Basing on relational ontology and revised empirical study, namely the social historical phenomenology of technology, inspired by post-phenomenology and actor-network theory, this study adopts an approach informed by the genetic phenomenological sociology (Zhang 2017; 2020) of technology, and examines the formation of Apple’s technology in the process of its emergence and diffusion. Unlike post-phenomenology and actor-network theory, which mainly examine the role of technology in the relation of (...) human-technology-world after technology was formed, this study examines technology in the process of its formation. The relationship between the intentionality of humanity and the potentiality of technology is explored empirically and ontologically, thus transcending the dichotomy of subject and object in the examination of technology through the relational ontology indicated in potentiality, intentionality, embodiment, and genealogy, and simultaneously building a foundation for the critique, ethics, and normative theory of media and technology. (shrink)

Although both EU policy makers and researchers acknowledge that public or stakeholder engagement is important for responsible innovation (RI), empirical evidence in this field is still scarce. In this article, we explore to what extent companies with a disposition to innovate in a more responsible way are moving towards the ideal of mutual responsiveness among stakeholders, as it is presented in the RI literature. Based on interviews with companies and non-economic stakeholders in the Dutch Food industry, it can be concluded (...) that innovative food companies are still far from implementing the ideal of mutual responsiveness in a significant way. The tension between the call for the active involvement of stakeholders in the literature and actual stakeholder engagement practices is explained by identifying a number of critical issues regarding stakeholder engagement, which are specific to actors involved in RI in the private sector. Finally, management practices designed to deal with these critical issues regarding stakeholder engagement are identified. (shrink)

Quantum gravity’s suggestion that spacetime may be emergent and so only exist contingently would force a radical reconception of extant analyses of laws of nature. Humeanism presupposes a spatiotemporal mosaic of particular matters of fact on which laws supervene; primitivism and dispositionalism conceive of the action of primitive laws or of dispositions as a process of ‘nomic production’ unfolding over time. We show how the Humean supervenience basis of non-modal facts and primitivist or dispositionalist accounts of nomic production can be (...) reconceived, avoiding a reliance on fundamental spacetime. However, it is unclear that naturalistic forms of Humeanism can maintain their commitment to there being no necessary connections among distinct entities. Furthermore, non-temporal conceptions of production render this central concept more elusive than before. In fact, the challenges run so deep that the survival of the investigated analyses into the era of quantum gravity is questionable. (shrink)

in this article, we explore how responsible research and innovation (RRI) interacts with the current political context. We examine the (1) possible consequences for RRI and related agendas if values associated with ‘populist’ movements become more pervasive, (2) the role that a lack of RRI has potentially played in the development of this political context, and (3) how RRI as a concept, practice, and research agenda should respond. We argue that whilst RRI is threatened, it is now more important than (...) ever. We propose that RRI needs to go beyond being a method for facilitating societal input into research and innovation and for highlighting desired impacts. RRI needs to evolve to provide an effective conduit for criticisms and the input of critical thinking and reflexivity into science and innovation, including in terms of economic policy and politics. (shrink)

Much of cognitive science is committed to the modular approach to the study of cognition. The core of this approach consists of a pair of assumptions - the anatomical and the functional modularity assumptions - which motivate two kinds of inference: the anatomical and the functional modularity inferences. The legitimacy of both of these inferences has been strongly challenged, a situation that has had surprisingly little impact on most theorizing in the field. Following the introduction of an important, yet rarely (...) made, distinction between two functional concepts - the distinction between cognitive working and cognitive role - this paper analyses these kinds of inference, and refocuses the attention on new aspects of their main limitations. It is argued that both the anatomical and functional modularity inferences can, and do, operate in three distinct modes in contemporary cognitive science, and that seeing this is essential to understanding both the power and the limitations of these methodological tools. (shrink)

In this chapter, I philosophically reflect on the management of corporate responsibility in the case of innovation. I first set the scene by contrasting responsibility in corporate social responsibility and innovation ethics, and arguing that classical conceptualizations of backward and forward looking responsibility are inappropriate in the case of innovation. Next, I introduce the concept of responsible innovation as a lens to understand the management of corporate responsibility in the case of innovation and show that the notions of virtue ethics (...) and practical wisdom are inappropriate for understanding what is at stake in innovation ethics, because the notion of practical wisdom is at odds with the nature of innovation. I conclude this chapter by proposing a concept of action-based responsible management of corporate innovation, which will be framed in terms of innovation as ethos. (shrink)

This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...) the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks’ proposal for cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents—Though not for conscious agents. (shrink)

In the present study, we combined first-, second-, and third-person levels of analysis to explore the feeling of being and acting together in the context of collaborative artistic performance. Following participation in an international competition held in Czech Republic in 2018, a team of ten artistic swimmers took part in the study. First, a self-assessment instrument was administered to rate the different aspects of togetherness emerging from their collective activity; second, interviews based on video recordings of their performance were conducted (...) individually with all team members; and third, the performance was evaluated by external artistic swimming experts. By combining these levels of analysis in different ways, we explore how changes in togetherness and lived experience in individual behavior may shape, disrupt, and stabilize joint performance. Our findings suggest that the experience of being and acting together is transient and changing, often alternating phases of decrease and increase in felt togetherness that can be consistently recognized by swimmers and external raters. (shrink)

"Réfléchir à la réflexion, penser la pensée et philosopher sur la philosophie, voilà ce que l'on propose de faire ici. Cette démarche est moins formelle qu'il n'y paraît, car interroger la nature et les exigences de la pensée philosophique engage toute une philosophie. Une philosophie qui n'est pas dupe d'elle-même et qui commence par examiner sa propre finitude. "La dernière démarche de la raison, c'est de connaître qu'il y a une infinité de choses qui la surpassent. Elle est bien faible (...) si elle ne va jusque là", disait Pascal. Nous montrons dans un esprit proche que la réflexion est d'autant plus puissante qu'elle reconnaît son impuissance, comme la philosophie authentique doit se savoir doublement bornée, par la pensée scientifique d'une part, et par la pensée mystique d'autre part. Il ne s'agit pas de rabaisser la philosophie, mais au contraire de lui permettre de comprendre ce qui la comprend et de trouver sa juste place dans le champ intellectuel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

No philosopher in the second half of the twentieth century or the opening decade of the twenty-first did more to recover the voice of philosophy in the conversation of humankind than John Edwin Smith (1921-2009). From The Social Infinite (1950), his landmark study of Josiah Royce, to "Niebuhr's Prophetic Voice" (2009), he has shown in compelling detail how philosophical reflection is relevant to contemporary life. Indeed, virtually all of the eventual developments within contemporary philosophy in recent decades worthy of our (...) unqualified support (above all, the acknowledgment of history, the abiding importance of the religious dimension of human experience, the hermeneutic character of all our intellectual understandings, including those of experimental inquirers, the irreducibility of persons, the ubiquity of symbols, and the cutting edge of philosophical critique) were ones to which Smith was committed at the outset of his career. He not only anticipated these developments but also pointed the way forward beyond the stultifying impasses of so much contemporary thought. In particular, his conceptions of subjectivity, symbolization, interpretation, experience and philosophy itself provide invaluable resources for twisting free from our present impasses. The essays in this volume make the salience and implications of Smith's writings on these and other topics manifest. The authors assembled here bear eloquent witness to the wit of the man no less than the depth of the philosopher from whom they learned how to take up the urgent task of philosophical reflection in a world riven by seemingly intractable conflicts and characterized by mutual misunderstanding. John E. Smith was a widely learned man; he was also a deeply wise one. Hence, it should be no surprise that he aids us in creating ways to address such conflicts and to counter such misunderstanding. (shrink)

The first installment of the planned How to Live trilogy describes how the power of habit and the lure of the ordinary conspire to make change and improvement difficult and offers routine-breaking challenges to inspire positive transformation.

Entrepreneurship education with a focus on sustainable development primarily teaches students to develop a profit‐driven mentality. As sustainable development is a value‐oriented and normative concept, the role of individual ethical norms and val‐ ues in entrepreneurial processes has been receiving increased attention. Therefore, this study addresses the role of moral competence in the process of idea generation for sustainable development. A mixed method design was developed in which would‐ be entrepreneurs were subjected to a questionnaire (n = 398) and to (...) real‐life deci‐ sion‐making processes in a case assignment (n = 96). The results provide stepping stones for implementing (moral) competencies in entrepreneurship education as a possible avenue to move away from a sole focus on a profit‐driven mentality. (shrink)

Religious believers understand the meaning of their lives and of the world in terms of the way these are related to God. How, Vincent BrU;mmer asks, does the model of love apply to this relationship? He shows that most views on love take it to be an attitude rather than a relationship: exclusive attention (Ortega y Gasset), ecstatic union (nuptial mysticism), passionate suffering (courtly love), need-love (Plato, Augustine) and gift-love (Nygren). In discussing the issues, BrU;mmer inquires what role these (...) attitudes play within the love-relationship and examines the implications of using the model of love as a key paradigm in theology. (shrink)

This paper presents the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of artificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understanding of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so (...) we suggest that “AI Philosophy” provides a new method for philosophy. (shrink)

Thomas Piketty’s Capital and Ideology offers a powerful critique of ideological justifications for inequality in capitalist societies. Does this mean we should reject capitalist institutions altogether? This paper defends some aspects of capitalism by explaining the epistemic function of market economies and their ability to harness capital to meet the needs of the relatively disadvantaged. We support this classical liberal position with reference to empirical research on historical trends in inequality that challenges some of Piketty’s interpretations of the data. Then (...) we discuss the implications of this position in terms of limits on the efficacy of participatory governance within firms and the capacity of the state to levy systematic taxes on wealth. (shrink)

A central question that arises when interpreting the U.S. Constitution is which theory of interpretation is the best? In his recent book, “How to Interpret the Constitution,” Cass Sunstein reviews various theories of constitutional interpretation currently in vogue and then offers what he believes would be the best approach going forward. In this Article, I want to take up a more basic question presupposed by the very idea of a theory of interpretation. That is, whether it is even possible to (...) arrive at more than a provisional understanding of what would be the best interpretation in any given area of study, including constitutional law. That said, I do believe some of the interpretations suggested by Cass Sunstein and elsewhere by myself and others to be more persuasive than most others, even if only partially so. For, as Sunstein himself points out, no theory seems perfect to figure out the Constitution’s meaning in every possible world in which we could imagine it to exist. So, we best just focus on our own world or what we take to matter in our world. In keeping with this idea, I plan to begin by looking first at how we might interpret the world around us based on our past experiences by considering a somewhat imaginative recent experience of my own. Next, I consider some recent studies in the neurosciences and a previous but highly influential article by the philosopher Donald Davidson concerning conceptual schemes and whether we could ever hope to make any sense of a scheme radically different from our own. Here it should be pointed out that I will use the word “scheme” when referring to a very broad system of thought for which there may not be much outside, versus when I use the word “framework,” as referencing something far narrower than a whole system of thought, even if what is referenced might purport to be a significant part of a still larger system. My goal is to eventually adopt John Rawls’ public reason method to separate out non-workable systems of thought as might be part of a particular religious or philosophical tradition that cannot be easily tied to any other system of thought easily imagined within a pluralistic society. I plan to do this by relating how Rawls’ public reason might allow for the creation of a moral interpretation of the Constitution adopting the moral theory of Alan Gewirth. The latter I adopt because its grounding does not presuppose any prior moral or religious framework. I then apply that interpretative method to five cases Sunstein believes are fixed points in our current constitutional understanding. In short, I plan to isolate out an area of human rights where even very different understandings of the world might be able to meet, while acknowledging that there will still be other areas that simply evade any common connection. I hope what I offer here to be of help for a theory of constitutional interpretation that focuses on morality, without having to compete with various religious frameworks going forward. (shrink)

In this article I review the Supreme Court’s current use of its major questions doctrine to see if the justifications commonly offered for its existence can explain its current use. In the process of doing so, I examine what the doctrine is about, how it came into existence and how the Court has applied it, especially in context to two recent cases, West Virginia v. EPA and Biden v. Nebraska. As both of these cases implicate the regulatory state, I place (...) the primary focus of this article on how the doctrine should apply in context to judicial evaluation of the regulatory state. In so doing, I discover that the Court’s current reliance on constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances analyses seem too narrow both with respect to the concerns of the founding generation but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the Constitution’s goals for the kind of government it sought to establish going into the future. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of smallholder supply chains on sustainable sourcing to answer the question how food and agribusiness multinationals can best include smallholders in their sourcing strategies and take social responsibility for large-scale sustainable and more equitable supply. A sustainable smallholder sourcing model with a list of critical success factors (CSFs) has been applied on two best-practise cases. In this model, business and corporate social responsibility perspectives are integrated. Design/methodology/approach – The (...) primary data of the value chain analyses of the two smallholder supply chains of a food and agribusiness multinational have been applied. Both cases were of a join research program commissioned by the multinational and a non-governmental organization using the same methods and research tools. Similarities, differences and interference between the cases have been determined and assessed in order to confirm, fine tune or adjust the CSFs. Findings – Both cases could be conceptualized through the smallholder sourcing model. Most CSFs could be found in both cases, but differences were also found, which led to fine tuning of some CSFs: building of a partnership and effective producers organization, providing farm financing and the use of cross-functional teams in smallholder supplier development programs. It was also concluded that the smallholder sourcing model is applicable in different geographical areas. Research limitations/implications – The findings of this study are based on just two cases. More best-practise cases are recommended in order to confirm or to adjust the developed sourcing model and the CSFs. Originality/value – This paper/research fills the need in sustainable supply chain management literature to study supply chains that comply with the triple bottom line concept, rather than supply chains that are just more “green.” Keywords Small- to medium-sized enterprises, Food products, Supply chain management, Developing countries, Business development, Food industry, Commodity markets Paper type Research pape. (shrink)

The so-called daxue zhi dao 大學之道, though a Confucian way of self-cultivation, can inspire contemporary universities through a process of creative interpretation. Having examined the ethos of modern university in its four historical stages, I come up with its last stage of reaching out in the era of globalization and dialogue among civilizations, in which we have to rethink the idea of university from the fuller development of human reason. This can be achieved only through increasingly reaching out toward many (...) others by means of mutual waitui 外推 and self-reflection, which presuppose and announce an ethics of generosity in priority over and implementable by reciprocity. Universities today should learn from classical Confucianism, and we should keep in mind their initial generous spirit as exemplified by Confucius himself. Strangification and self-reflection, being moved by original generosity and implemented by reciprocity, will eventually bring us the hope of reason. (shrink)

This book features the full scope of Susan Petrilli's important work on signs, language, communication, and of meaning, interpretation, and understanding. Although readers are likely familiar with otherness, interpretation, identity, embodiment, ecological crisis, and ethical responsibility for the biosphere—Petrilli forges new paths where other theorists have not tread. This work of remarkable depth takes up intensely debated topics, exhibiting in their treatment of them what Petrilli admires—creativity and imagination. Petrilli presents a careful integration of divergent thinkers and diverse perspectives. While (...) she abandons hope of attaining a final synthesis or an unqualifiedly comprehensive outlook, there remains a drive for coherence and detailed integration. The theory of identity being advocated in this book will provide the reader with an aid to appreciating the identity of the theorizing undertaken by Petrilli in her confrontation with an array of topics. Her theory differentiates itself from other offerings and, at the same time, is envisioned as a process of self-differentiation. Petrilli's contribution is at once historical and theoretical. It is historical in its recovery of major figures of language; it is theoretical in its articulation of a comprehensive framework. She expertly combines analytic precision and moral passion, theoretical imagination and political commitment. (shrink)

The human intestinal ecosystem, previously called the gut microflora is now known as the Human Gut Microbiota. Microbiome research has emphasized the potential role of this ecosystem in human homeostasis, offering unexpected opportunities in therapeutics, far beyond digestive diseases. It has also highlighted ethical, social and commercial concerns related to the gut microbiota. As diet factors are accepted to be the major regulator of the gut microbiota, the modulation of its composition, either by antibiotics or by food intake, should be (...) regarded as a fascinating tool for improving the human health. Scientists, the food industry, consumers and policymakers alike are involved in this new field of nutrition. Defining how knowledge about the HGM is being translated into public perception has never been addressed before. This raises the question of metaphors associated with the HGM, and how they could be used to improve public understanding, and to influence individual decision-making on healthcare policy. This article suggests that a meeting of stakeholders from the social sciences, basic research and the food industry, taking an epistemological approach to the HGM, is needed to foster close, innovative partnerships that will help shape public perception and enable novel behavioural interventions that would benefit public health. (shrink)

This is a discussion of the reaction to the recent research article publication in the journal Protein & Cell by a group of scientists at Sun Yat-sen University using the CRISPR/Cas9 technique on editing non-viable human zygotes. Many commentators condemned the Chinese scientists for overstepping ethical boundaries long accepted in Western countries and accused China of having lax regulations on genomic research in general. We argue that not only did this research follow strict ethical standards and fully comply with current (...) regulations, but China also has a well-developed regulatory framework governing such research comparable to many developed countries. We see the reactions among Western commentators as a misunderstanding of the current situation and an expression of a lack of willingness to acknowledge China as an equal partner in the international debate about proper limits to the development of new biotechnologies. (shrink)

Meu propósito abrangente é oferecer um esboço pragmatista da racionalidade deliberativa derivada dos textos coligidos no volumoso conjunto de C. S. Peirce. Embora em alguns casos, as formulações sejam minhas, e não de Peirce. Porém, isso não torna meu esforço um caso de ventriloquismo : a posição em relação à racionalidade é dele, e não minha. Minha tese é que, para Peirce, a razão é no fundo, um conjunto mais ou menos integrado de hábitos, possibilitando aos agentes serem deliberativos. Ou (...) seja, para ele, a deliberação é o cerne da racionalidade. Esta é, fundamentalmente, uma capacidade agencial: aplica-se primordialmente a agentes, sendo conhecedores teóricos um papel importante desempenhado por agentes deliberativos. O que espero demonstrar neste trabalho é a razão pela qual este retrato da razão é distintamente pragmático e verdadeiramente peirciano. O que também espero demonstrar é como a posição de Peirce implica o que, na filosofia contemporânea, é identificado por Christine Korsgaard como autoconstituição, por Sabrina Lovibond como autoformação e por outros teóricos com designações outras. Agentes deliberativos são, segundo Peirce, agentes radicalmente responsáveis. São responsáveis pelos verdadeiros critérios nos quais razoabilidade e responsabilidade são definidas e desenvolvidas. A questão de maturidade e a relação entre ser moral e ser maduro são essenciais à explicação de Peirce de racionalidade. Seu retrato pragmatista da racionalidade deliberativa é, a meu ver, não só sustentável quanto convincente. Acima de tudo, isto é o que espero demonstrar neste ensaio. (shrink)

I ARGUE IN THIS PAPER that there are profound and legitimate worries concerning the application of organic and personal criteria to groups. I try to specify the reasons why we object to such ideas, while contending that some of these objections are misguided. Primarily, to refer to a group as a person is not necessarily the same as referring to it as either organic or as an individual. Further, each term--organic, individual, and person--must be carefully unpacked and analyzed. One conclusion (...) of this analysis is that there are important senses in which these concepts both overlap and also diverge. One should not therefore automatically conflate them. Another conclusion is that there are senses of these terms which are perfectly innocuous. Finally, there are clearly ways in which we can sensibly use the notion of personality to apply to groups. The groups in question are usually diverse, and do not have to include the state. In fact, despite the absence of such "group person" usage from mainstream political theory, such language is more of a commonplace in international politics and legal discourse and practice. I attempt, in the final part of the paper, to schematize the various uses of personality. I conclude by suggesting the fruitfulness of one particular sense of juristic personality. (shrink)

The central preoccupation of Peirce and Polanyi was to undertake (in the words of the former) an inquiry into inquiry, one in which the defining features of our heuristic practices stood out in bold relief. But both thinkers were also concerned to bring into sharp focus the deep affinities between our theoretical pursuits and other shared practices. They were in effect sketching a portrait of the responsible inquirer and, by implication, that of the responsible agent more generally. This essay is, (...) in structure, a series of études for how we might reconstruct that portrait, since there is no extended treatment in the writings of either author of these central figures (the agent and, in particular, the responsible inquirer). It is accordingly a preliminary study, though in some particulars a detailed one. Its ultimate aim is to join—and thereby to invite others to join—Peirce and Polanyi as inquirers into the very nature of inquiry itself. (shrink)

This article examines Schürmann’s oeuvre in light of his reflections on language. Schürmann’s meditations raise the question whether language is capable of truly expressing the ultimate conditions of human experience. This article argues that, after hegemonies have been broken, or rather are seen to have always been broken from within, one can continue to speak, but only on condition that tragic irony doubles every natal general word with a mortal singular shadow.

ABSTRACT This article explores relations, ruptures, and rituals in light of repetition. In turn, it considers repetition in light of Freud, Kierkegaard, and Dewey. The author’s engagement with Freud is however partly mediated by attention to how Jonathan Lear, especially in a recent book, Imagining the End: Mourning and Ethical Life (2022), criticizes the Freudian conception of repetition. While Freud valorizes remembrance over repetition, Kierkegaard does just the opposite: he elevates repetition above recollection, at least in the modern age (that (...) is, in his own age as envisioned by Kierkegaard). The insights to be derived from Lear’s critique of Freud’s one-sided understanding of repetition (especially Freud’s failure to appreciate how “repetition” might be healthy) and from Kierkegaard’s treatment of this topic need to be extricated from the context in which they are articulated. Dewey’s formulation of a nuanced, variable, and multifaceted understanding of habit provides us with a framework in which these—and indeed other—insights might be more tightly integrated and sharply focused on some of the salient features of everyday experience. One of these features concerns the repeated forms of activity through which the fleeting moments of our quotidian lives are given meaning shape and worthwhile foci (that is, rituals). (shrink)

This topical collection is dedicated to the formal representation of arguments involving temporal reasoning and tensed truths; in particular, arguments with a clear significance to everyday life. In a broad perspective, temporal reasoning can be rigorously encoded via intensional logic, treating tenses as modalities, or via extensional logic, quantifying over domains of temporal objects (e.g., instants, intervals, etc.). Nowadays there are several formal devices (languages, systems, semantics, etc.) able to deal with time in many regards. Each of these devices is (...) characterized by peculiar features, such as a certain choice of primitive notions and, arguably, a certain kind of ontological commitment (see, e.g., the surveys of approaches offered by Prior 1967, van Benthem 1983, Gabbay, Hodkinson & Reynolds 1994 and Øhrstrøm & Hasle 1995). The truth-conditions of (the propositions expressed by) statements involving tenses can be explained either in terms of the “past-present-future” opposition (McTaggart’s A-theory) or in terms of the “earlier-later” opposition (McTaggart’s B-theory). Moreover, taking into account the difference between chronologically definite propositions and chronologically indefinite propositions (Rescher 1966), it is possible to distinguish between atemporal and temporal (or tensed) notions of truth. This topical collection will primarily focus on the latter. (shrink)

A controversy over the pudgala or “person” raged among Indian Buddhists for more than a millennium. Their polemics were at least as much a matter of canonical exegesis as of reasoning and argument, for the “mainstream” Buddhist doctors had to account for—and explain away—the numerous places in scripture where the Buddha speaks of the “person.” The Bhārahārasūtra or “sūtra on the bearer of the burden” was one of the scriptures most frequently quoted and discussed in this connection. The present paper (...) is aimed at presenting a reconstructed Sanskrit version of this sūtra and providing an overview of the doctrinal and argumentative uses that were made of it in the context of the debates about the status of the “person.”. (shrink)