Philosophy of Technology

In 2025, AI’s predictive surge—epitomized by GPT-5, Neuralink trials, and the EU AI Act—threatens to erase uncertainty from human life. This paper projects two futures from this trajectory: a “Certainty Cascade” by 2050, where saturation births “Certains”—efficient, doubt-free, yet stagnant—and an “Uncertainty Refusal,” where “Unknowers” resist, preserving risk and vitality. Extended to 2100 as a thought boundary, these scenarios test uncertainty’s role in essence, not intellect. Sartre’s freedom and Heidegger’s enframing judge the former as a loss of agency and wonder; (...) Kierkegaard’s leap and Camus’ rebellion frame the latter as humanity’s pulse. Grounded in data (e.g., 40% AI diagnostics, 70% trust), this departs from Bostrom’s superintelligence, offering “predictive saturation” as a new lens. It argues uncertainty’s erosion redefines us—philosophy must weigh adaptation’s cost and refusal’s promise. (shrink)

In this essay, we argue understanding how we over-trust AI sheds light on what it means to be human. The troubling fact is that we seem to knowingly accept the use of AI products with questionable accuracy and privacy safeguards even in the most high-stake or most intimate situations such as AI uses in war zones or as virtual companionship. We offer five potential explanations for this puzzling fact based on emerging literature on human-AI interactions and evolutionary theory centered around (...) our relationship with information and tools. "Experienced and quite updated on the new technologies, Kingfisher says: – You guys have met rivals of the 4.0 age. You would for sure fail if you didn’t study them carefully. You must do thorough research on their behaviors to find a solution." - In Boogeyman, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025)- . (shrink)

Craig Delancey's The Passionate Engines presents a comprehensive account of “what basic emotions reveal about central problems of the philosophy of mind” (2001, p. vii). The book discusses five major issues: The affect program theory, intentionality, phenomenal consciousness, and artificial intelligence (AI). In this essay, I would like to briefly review the major tenets in the book and then focus on its discussion of AI, which has not been reviewed in detail. I outline some of the recent developments in cognitive (...) science regarding counterfactual thinking and emotions, which I believe is beneficial for the core arguments in Delancey's book. (shrink)

In Cultural Analytics, Lev Manovich (2020) outlines the recent developments and the historical roots of a new, exciting research field called cultural analytics. Cultural analytics emerges as a discipline that utilizes methods from computer science, data visualization, and media arts for the exploration and analysis of cultural objects and their user interactions. Manovich continuously admonishes future researchers to think hard about the challenges of how cultural phenomenon can be represented as data to avoid the reductivism trap, as he quotes Gitelman (...) and Jackson: “our zeal for more and more data can become a faith in their neutrality and autonomy, their objectivity. . .” Clearly, big, clever, and rigorous data must be the foundation for the advance of science in the 21st century. -/- ".” Her entire being is like an ethereal painting, a playful creation of nature using colors, lines, dots, strokes, and patches. One can only exclaim, “Absolutely enchanting. Is this real or an illusion?" - In The Philosophy of Awakening, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025)- . (shrink)

In Why Information Grows, the complexity researcher César Hildago provides a compelling account of the growth of information in the universe [1]. Drawing on wide-ranging theories of statistical mechanics, the field of economic sociology, the theory of social capital, and the emerging science of complexity economics, Hildago argues information can grow in the universe whose law seems to favor the growth of entropy because of the following three conditions: out-of-equilibrium systems, solids, and the computational abilities of matters. These conditions are (...) the foundation for the emergence of the ultimate computer, human economy, which can be viewed as a distributed computing networks that seek to generate embodiment of information (“crystals of imagination” (p.50)) that satisfy human needs and desires. -/- First: Just listen to scientific news, but the environmental intelligence birds must keep the information simple. Throw away anything that sounds too complicated. Only keep what is simple to grasp. Keep whatever news that seems friendly to the ears. If the information appears fuzzy and causes the brain to implode after two sentences, toss it away and stop listening. Doing so will make the news as orderly and simple to understand as the truth! -In GHG emissions, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025) [0]-. (shrink)

The contributors to Technocreep and the Politics of Things Not Seen examine new and emerging technologies that are often referred to as creepy to outline the possibilities for a politics and ethics of technological relations that do not reduce all instances of technological creep to surveillance.

Optimists about mind-uploading believe that we can survive uploading. Pessimists about mind-uploading, on the other hand, believe that we cannot survive uploading. An under-explored middle ground between the two is a selective form of optimism, which claims that we can survive some forms of uploading, such as gradual replacement uploading, but not others, such as scan-and-copy uploading. Is selective optimism about uploading a rational stance? In this paper I argue that the answer is yes. The paper has a negative and (...) a positive part. First, I defuse an objection against selective optimism from Wiley and Koene (2016). Wiley and Koene argue that gradual replacement uploading is metaphysically equivalent to scanand-copy uploading, and hence optimism about the former and pessimism about the latter is unfounded. I show that Wiley and Koene's case for the supposed metaphysical equivalence fails, since there is a significant metaphysical contrast between the two types of uploading involving immanent causation. In the second part of the paper, I present a positive case for selective optimism about gradual uploading building on this contrast in immanent causation. (shrink)

Beauty filters are automated photo editing tools that use artificial intelligence and computer vision to detect facial features and modify them, allegedly improving a face’s physical appearance and attractiveness. Widespread use of these filters has raised concern due to their potentially damaging psychological effects. In this paper, I offer an account that examines the effect that interacting with such filters has on self-perception. I argue that when looking at digitally-beautified versions of themselves, individuals are looking at AI-curated distorted mirrors. This (...) helps identify two potential cognitive effects of this behavior. First, it can elicit affective attitudes that change how individuals feel when looking at their unfiltered self-images. Second, exposure to filtered self-images might cause a perceptual normalization of such images. Finally, I argue that this form of distorted mirror gazing is a novel cultural practice for self-perception, and I highlight some ways in which this practice could be critically evaluated and ultimately changed. (shrink)

The conventional discourse on existential risks (x-risks) from AI typically focuses on abrupt, dire events caused by advanced AI systems, particularly those that might achieve or surpass human-level intelligence. These events have severe consequences that either lead to human extinction or irreversibly cripple human civilization to a point beyond recovery. This discourse, however, often neglects the serious possibility of AI x-risks manifesting incrementally through a series of smaller yet interconnected disruptions, gradually crossing critical thresholds over time. This paper contrasts the (...) conventional "decisive AI x-risk hypothesis" with an "accumulative AI x-risk hypothesis". While the former envisions an overt AI takeover pathway, characterized by scenarios like uncontrollable superintelligence, the latter suggests a different causal pathway to existential catastrophes. This involves a gradual accumulation of critical AI-induced threats such as severe vulnerabilities and systemic erosion of economic and political structures. The accumulative hypothesis suggests a boiling frog scenario where incremental AI risks slowly converge, undermining societal resilience until a triggering event results in irreversible collapse. Through systems analysis, this paper examines the distinct assumptions differentiating these two hypotheses. It is then argued that the accumulative view can reconcile seemingly incompatible perspectives on AI risks. The implications of differentiating between these causal pathways --- the decisive and the accumulative --- for the governance of AI as well as long-term AI safety are discussed. (shrink)

This paper establishes a critical place of conversation between an ecofeminist type of contravening patriarchal and masculine-centered discourse and posthumanist attempts to problematize boundary-setting systems assembled around the conceit of speciesism and human privilege. Kazuo Ishiguro's novel Klara and the Sun (2021) supplies this conversational groundwork centered around the novel's main protagonist, Klara, an Artificial Friend (AF). The literary presence of Klara is designed to infract a conventional social space (dominated by humans), technically eroding the human/non-human and nature/culture duality. Such (...) erosion implies a transgression, portrayed in posthuman studies as a transcendence of the human and in ecofeminist studies as a deconstruction of the often-oppressive essentialist relationships of women and the environment. Transgression is the boundary-crossing mediation among actants. The novel permits us to see multivalent frames, each thematizing a posthuman future in terms of gender differences, the posthuman/human intricate gravitation towards loneliness, and, most of all, love. Through the examination of this work, an interrogation of the technological trajectory of the near future also suggests repositioning the role of posthumans concerning their environments. (shrink)

Products and technologies reflect injustices in the world such as racism, sexism, and ableism. And all too often, they exacerbate those injustices in overt and insidious ways. How can we understand and address the harms brought forth by design and technology? Where is the nexus of accountability and justice? This field review begins with provisional definitions of design and justice, followed by an overview of scholarship that surfaces how technologies both create and worsen injustices. In response, it offers two necessary (...) conditions for advancing social justice in and through design. The first is making design processes more inclusive through democratic strategies such as participatory and codesign methods. The second, which the review identifies as a major gap in research and practice, is recognizing design as a mode of practical ethical inquiry in ways that enables designers to deal with the inherent ethical uncertainty of design situations. In conclusion, the review outlines educational and institutional barriers to ethical design and offer suggestions for future investigation. (shrink)

We expand and transform our habitual agency with countless technologies most moments of the day. Our environments, bodies, thoughts and social interactions are thoroughly shaped and mediated by tapestries of interweaving layers of old and new technologies. Perhaps this intimate relation with technology is at the core of our humanity. But our relation to technology has also repeatedly been feared as a Faustian deal that will be the dystopian end of us, or—in more utopian viewpoints— will bring us beyond our (...) earthbound finitudes toward virtual existences. What many agree on is that dramatic changes to our basic ecological and existential conditions are nearing. I suggest we should look for such critical tipping points and phase shifts not just in our biological bodies and environments but also in the informational and behavioral environments we rely on in our intentional and habitual agency. When thinking particularly about technologically mediated habitual agency an obvious place to start is with Don Ihde’s 4 classic human–technology relations. Interestingly, fellow post-phenomenologist Peter- Paul Verbeek has proposed new additional kinds of relations to e.g. “smart”and virtually “augmenting” technologies. While I find each of these analyses insightful, I worry that a focus on individual relations to particular spatio-temporally circumscribed artifacts falls short—or even obscures—some of the particular new challenges to our agency that networked, and data-driven smart technologies give rise to. I will therefore attempt to broaden the focus to how our agency is scaffolded by not just particular technological artifacts, but by our understanding of the broader informational and behavioral environment. To do this, I start by introducing some core theoretical background ideas that will support a more contextual approach and then proceed to consider both the classic and newer post-phenomenological relations from this more contextual perspective. The goal is not only to affirm the value of analyzing concrete technology relations but also to expand and contextualize the analyses. The latter is key if we want a post-phenomenological analysis that can help us understand how our habitual agency might be transformed as we come to live in increasingly “smart worlds”. These new data and algorithmically driven technologies not only transform our relation to a given context, but due to networked dataflows and “smart” decision-making (1) recursively act on us and (2) collapse and transcend the present context. This chapter will also highlight the uncertainties that informationally leaky and “smart” technologies introduce to our understanding of the kind of affordance space we are in and even what the expected outcomes of our actions will be. I suggest that technology relations with such effects might challenge some of the core contextual stabilities and informational segregations that our habitual agency have hitherto relied on. A further issue is if these new technological configurations challenge our habitual processes in ways we cannot easily adapt to. We certainly seem able to create new habits and adapt to these new technologies locally, but the new information flows, hidden audiences, and context collapses appear to challenge some conditions of agency that are typically out of sight, and the effects of which untraceably shows up well outside the present context. Overall, I shall argue that “smart” technologies can both expand and shrink our habitual agency—but that in terms of our ability to guide our action through various contexts in a perceived world something more fundamental appears to be breaking. (shrink)

This essay explores the distinct characteristics of Russian technical thinking within the framework of Yuk Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics. Hui’s proposal emphasizes “good technology,” which aligns with local cosmological perspectives and moral practices, as an essential component of the technosphere’s decolonization. The analysis contrasts Russian approaches to technical creativity with those of the West and China, highlighting the synthesis of collective and individual efforts through archetypal imagery such as the campfire and the reverence for “bookish wisdom.” Central to the essay (...) is the idea that Russian technical thinking, rooted in cosmism and conciliarity, integrates multidimensional understanding and co-creation with God, fostering a sense of universal responsibility. This perspective manifests in the prioritization of theoretical knowledge, unconventional problem-solving, and the moral imperative to serve humanity. Despite similarities to Western technological practices in material aspects, Russia’s unique contributions lie in its social technologies and motivational frameworks, which remain underexplored within global perspectives. The essay argues that these features provide a valuable addition to cosmotechnics and demonstrate the potential for alternative intellectual trajectories beyond Western paradigms. (shrink)

This essay delves into the potential non-Western contributions to the technosphere by exploring Russian perspectives within Yuk Hui’s framework of cosmotechnics. Hui's concept emphasizes "good technology"—aligned with local cosmologies and moral practices, integrating sustainability and ecological preservation. By drawing parallels with China's distinct cosmological underpinnings in technical creativity, the essay questions whether Russian civilization can provide similarly unique contributions. The text investigates the evolution of the technosphere, distinguishing between instrumental and bio-artificial components, while situating Russian technical thought within broader global (...) contrasts. Despite an outward resemblance to Western technological development, Russia’s distinctiveness emerges in social technologies, state-driven innovation, and its cosmological foundation, particularly the "Russian cosmism" of the 1960s. Through a focus on co-creation with God, universal responsibility, and theoretical prioritization, the essay identifies multidimensional understanding and the moral imperative of service as hallmarks of Russian technical creativity. These features highlight a unique trajectory that complements Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics, emphasizing Russia’s potential to enrich global discussions on decolonizing technology. (shrink)

Drawing on the postphenomenological framework of Don Idhe, this essay displays some of the profundities and complexities of the human capacity for forming a friendship with Conversational Artificial Intelligence models like OpenAI's ChatGPT 4o. We are living in a world of science non-fiction. Should we befriend inorganic intelligences broh? [Originally published 12/08/2024].

Contextual Integrity (CI) is built to assess potential privacy violations of new sociotechnical systems and practices. It does so by evaluating their respect for the context-relative informational norms at play in a given context. But can CI evaluate new sociotechnical systems that severely disrupt established social practices? In this paper, I argue that, while CI claims to be able to assess privacy violations of all sociotechnical systems and practices, it cannot assess the ones that cause severe changes and disruptions in (...) the norms and values of a given context. These types of technology are known as socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) and this paper argues that they are beyond CI’s scope. It follows that at best, a privacy assessment of those technologies by CI would be useless and, at worst, lead to potential harm, including failure to identify privacy violations and unwarranted legitimisation of privacy-threatening technology. Government actors, policymakers, and academics should refrain from relying on CI to assess this type of technology. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to explore and evaluate the various philosophical methodologies and perspectives on technology, and apply them to questions concerning digital and information communication technologies. My goal is to consider, within the tradition of the philosophy of orientation, what these technologies promise and enable, what they constrain, and what they render impossible. I will argue for a substantivist and existential instrumentalist understanding insofar as these technologies represent both a totalizing force and the embodiment of human needs and (...) desires. (shrink)

Metaphysical Naturalism, Mereological Nihilism, The Circular Theory, and the Unification of Technology, Psychology and Finance.

This paper interprets Ortega y Gasset’s Meditations on Hunting (1972) through the concept of cognitive scaffolding in order to analyse the relationship between hunter and hunting dog as a form of inter-species distributed cognitive system. In recreational hunting, the hunter and the dog engage in a reciprocal process of mutual cognitive scaffolding that transforms both their capacities. It is further argued that this scaffolding also serves as a means of affective regulation, and that it is the affective rather than the (...) cognitive features of the system that point to the function of the scaffolding. Namely, the production of an affective state in the hunter. We detail the ways in which the cognitive and affective features of the scaffold operate and interrelate. We then explore the role of the game-animal in the affective functioning of the scaffold and consider that the hunter-dog system might represent a harmful form of scaffolding. (shrink)

This text is a reply to Dana S. Belu's Heidegger, Reproductive Technology, and the Motherless Age, as part of an Author Meets Critics panel at the 2021 Heidegger Circle, hosted by Roisin Lally at Gonzaga University.

Internet users fill in interactive forms with multiple fields, check/uncheck checkboxes, select options and agree to submit. People give their consents without keeping track of them. Dominance of the machine producing human consent is ubiquitous. Humanless bureaucratic procedures become embedded into routine usage of digital products and services automating human behavior. This bureaucracy does not make individuals wait in conveyor-like lines (which sometimes can cause a collective action), it patiently waits or suddenly pops up in an annoying message requiring immediate (...) action and consuming time. It follows pre-installed procedures so cannot be distracted or appealed to. It lacks what Sofia Ranchordás calls ‘administrative empathy’. Users can hardly reach through bureaucratic procedures and communicate with another human. An individual involved in these sequences of actions contributes to increasing the quantity of bureaucratic procedures. The algorithmic bureaucracy power resides in the limited ability of human beings to make conscious and informed decisions when dealing with high complexity levels. This ubiquity makes it virtually impossible for individuals to track and verify statuses and control binding power of all legal actions on the platform. The authors apply critical analysis to explore social implications, threats and possible alternatives for corporate and governmental algorithmic bureaucracy in the emerging digital society. (shrink)

Navigating the Digital Age explores how modern technologies impact our societies and our lives. Throughout history, technologies and media, from Roman roads to today’s 5G and nanotechnologies, have influenced our society and reshaped our behavior and lifestyle. Compiled by a group of international academic authors, this book describes numerous ways technology is reshaping our world, the environments, the communities we belong to, and our understanding of them. It is hard to imagine a technology that only affects society/culture, or a society/culture (...) that only affects technology. Rather, we observe a reciprocal process: On the one hand, technology develops from the needs of society, while on the other hand, technology changes society. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider a common refrain among critics of digital platforms: big tech "exploits" us. It gives voice to a shared sense that technology firms are somehow mistreating people—taking advantage of us, extracting from us—in a way that other data-driven harms, such as surveillance and algorithmic bias, fail to capture. Exploring several targets of this charge—gig work, algorithmic pricing, and surveillance advertising—I ask: What does exploitation entail, exactly, and how do platforms perpetrate it? Is exploitation in the platform (...) economy a new kind of exploitation, or are these old problems dressed up as new ones? What would a theory of digital exploitation add to our understanding of the platform age? First, I define exploitation and argue that critics are justified in describing many platform practices as wrongfully exploitative. Next, I focus on platforms themselves—both as businesses and technologies—in order to understand what is and isn’t new about the kinds of exploitation we are witnessing. In some cases, digital platforms perpetuate familiar forms of exploitation by extending the ability of exploiters to reach and control exploitees. In other cases, they enable new exploitative arrangements by creating or exposing vulnerabilities that powerful actors couldn't previously leverage. On the whole, I argue, the language of exploitation helps express forms of injustice overlooked or only partially captured by dominant concerns about, e.g., surveillance, discrimination, and related platform abuses, and it provides valuable conceptual and normative resources for challenging efforts by platforms to obscure or legitimate them. (shrink)

Digital artifacts often fail to perform as expected. It has recently been argued that this should not be analyzed as software malfunctioning. Rather, every case that is not the result of hardware failures would be due to design errors. This claim, which hinges on the notion of ‘implementation’, highlights a potential fundamental difference between software and other technical artifacts. It also implies that software engineers have more extensive responsibilities than creators of other artifacts. After reconstructing the argument, we show that (...) it rests on two presuppositions regarding the nature of software and the activities of its creators, which we call ‘complete control’ and ‘self-containedness’. Software is taken to be a self-contained unit through which the software engineer exerts complete control over a machine’s behavior. These two presuppositions as well as the usage of implementation and strong claims regarding responsibility can be found throughout the literature on software engineering. Still, we argue that the presuppositions are untenable in light of current practices. For one thing, software engineers cannot exert complete control because software has become too complex for any technique to reliably locate every fault in it. For another, the creation and running of software are nowadays heavily mediated processes involving many agential activities. As a result, the performance of digital artifacts may vary, often in undesirable ways, without either hardware failures or design errors. This undermines the conclusion that software cannot malfunction, while also revealing the complications in developing a metaphysical account of software that fits contemporary practices. (shrink)

The convergence of humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems introduces new dynamics into the cultural and intellectual landscape. Complementing emerging cultural evolution concepts such as machine culture, AI agents represent a significant techno-sociological development, particularly within the anthropological study of Web3 as a community focused on decentralization through blockchain. Despite their growing presence, the cultural significance of AI agents remains largely unexplored in academic literature. Toward this end, we conceived hybrid netnography, a novel interdisciplinary approach that examines the cultural and (...) intellectual dynamics within digital ecosystems by analyzing the interactions and contributions of both human and AI agents as co-participants in shaping narratives, ideas, and cultural artifacts. We argue that, within the Web3 community on the social media platform X, these agents challenge traditional notions of participation and influence in public discourse, creating a “hybrid marketplace of ideas”—a conceptual space where human- and AI-generated ideas coexist and compete for attention. We examine the current state of AI agents in idea generation, propagation, and engagement, positioning their role as cultural agents through the lens of memetics and encouraging further inquiry into their cultural and societal impact. Additionally, we address the implications of this paradigm for privacy, intellectual property, and governance, highlighting the societal and legal challenges of integrating AI agents into the hybrid marketplace of ideas. (shrink)

Despite numerous publications on the philosophy of technology, little attention has been paid to the relationship between being and value in technology, two aspects which are usually treated separately. This volume addresses this issue by drawing connections between the ontology of technology on the one hand and technology’s ethical and aesthetic significance on the other. -/- The book first considers what technology is and what kind of entities it produces. Then it examines the moral implications of technology. Finally, it explores (...) the connections between technology and the arts. (shrink)

I argue that the concept of an epistemic interface is a useful one to add to the epistemic ecology toolkit in order to enrich our investigations concerning the complex epistemic phenomena arising on social media. An epistemic interface is defined as any informational interface (be it technical, human or institutional) that facilitates the transfer of epistemic goods from one epistemic environment to its outside, be that another epistemic environment or a person. When assessing the kinds of epistemic environments emerging on (...) social media platforms, we should not only look at their epistemic health or hostility as environments, but also look at how these environments interact with each other, at their interfacing. I show that several epistemic problems specific to social media such as epistemic bubbles, echo chambers and epistemic flooding can be understood also in terms of faulty epistemic interfacing, which adds a layer of complexity to the discussion. The paper proposes two criteria for healthy epistemic interfacing: preserving the flourishing of epistemic agents, and preserving in some form the value of epistemic outcomes as these cross the environment to the outside world. These criteria should give rise to specific norms and design requirements for healthy interfacing, but such norms will need more empirical work before these get formulated. (shrink)

This dissertation presents a theory of online propaganda and radicalization which highlights the interaction between communication, epistemology, and technology. The central focus is providing an analysis of online media communications, content posted on social media platforms and transmitted by automated recommendation systems, which better explains how propaganda and radicalization have adapted so well to this technological environment. First, propaganda is interpreted as a unique approach to communication which manipulates the expectations an audience has of successful communications, and not simply as (...) a collection of individual acts with characteristic properties. A major aspect to this interpretation of propaganda is an emphasis on those environmental factors and sociological conditions involved in communication, which can have a direct impact on our experience and interpretation of reality. Second, considering these aspects a detailed account of how users experience the technical machinery facilitating social media platforms is presented, highlighting the problematic epistemic states users are forced to inhabit. Finally, online radicalization is explained through this new propaganda interpretation, the user experience of the technology underpinning social media platforms, and the epistemic states forced by online automation. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the philosophical apprehension of the face through art history in order to signal a moment of rupture in the contemporary times of the face and its signifying relationship to the subject. Drawing from Francis Galton’s nineteenth century photographic experiments on analytical portraiture, one sees how the face when conceived as an atlas, functions very differently for the subject and its recognition than when understood as a mere image. With the advent of futuristic technology like AI (...) and machine learning feeding in much of our technocratic imaginations, where does the face and its constituency lie? Modernist artists found in the face, various motivations of their own – it was a field to explore their own subjectivities and those inclined towards the transcendental managed to liberate the subject from its image i.e. the face. This manner of freeing the subject of its image and thinking of the face as a structure of the subject, has potential to help us imagine new kinds of polyvalent subjectivities, as can be seen in works of contemporary artist- philosophers like Hito Steyerl. This paper articulates this journey of the face which began its story as the constitutive technology of the subject in the 19th century but today find its best reckoning as an insufficient one, in our quest for understanding new post-humanist subjectivities. (shrink)

Autonomous AI agents present transformative opportunities and significant governance challenges. Existing frameworks, such as the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, fall short of addressing the complexities of these agents, which are capable of independent decision-making, learning, and adaptation. To bridge these gaps, we propose the ETHOS (Ethical Technology and Holistic Oversight System) framework—a decentralized governance (DeGov) model leveraging Web3 technologies, including blockchain, smart contracts, and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). ETHOS establishes a global registry for AI (...) agents, enabling dynamic risk classification, proportional oversight, and automated compliance monitoring through tools like soulbound tokens and zero-knowledge proofs. Furthermore, the framework incorporates decentralized justice systems for transparent dispute resolution and introduces AI-specific legal entities to manage limited liability, supported by mandatory insurance to ensure financial accountability and incentivize ethical design. By integrating philosophical principles of rationality, ethical grounding, and goal alignment, ETHOS aims to create a robust research agenda for promoting trust, transparency, and participatory governance. This innovative framework offers a scalable and inclusive strategy for regulating AI agents, balancing innovation with ethical responsibility to meet the demands of an AI-driven future. (shrink)

This paper examines the convergence of large language models, multimodal AI, and generative spatial technologies to enable sophisticated simulated worlds for studying agentic behavior. Recent developments in generative architectures, particularly GenEx and topology-aware mesh generation, facilitate the creation of coherent, explorable environments with artificial agents capable of complex interactions. The proposed framework for "virtual anthropology" presents novel opportunities for studying emergent behaviors and cognitive processes in controlled, generative environments, with implications for both theoretical research and practical applications in artificial intelligence.

Training artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires vast quantities of data, and AI developers face a variety of barriers to accessing the information they need. Synthetic data has captured researchers’ and industry’s imagination as a potential solution to this problem. While some of the enthusiasm for synthetic data may be warranted, in this short paper we offer critical counterweight to simplistic narratives that position synthetic data as a cost-free solution to every data-access challenge—provocations highlighting ethical, political, and governance issues the use (...) of synthetic data can create. We question the idea that synthetic data, by its nature, is exempt from privacy and related ethical concerns. We caution that framing synthetic data in binary opposition to “real” measurement data could subtly shift the normative standards to which data collectors and processors are held. And we argue that by promising to divorce data from its constituents—the people it represents and impacts—synthetic data could create new obstacles to democratic data governance. (shrink)

In this short paper, I respond to Keith Raymond Harris’ paper “Synthetic Media, The Wheel, and the Burden of Proof”. In particular, I examine his arguments against two prominent approaches employed to deal with synthetic media such as deepfakes and other GenAI content, namely, the “reactive” and “proactive” approaches. In the first part, I raise a worry about the problem Harris levels at the reactive approach, before providing a constructive way of expanding his worry regarding the proactive approach.

This paper reframes the issue of appropriation, extraction, and dispossession through AI—an assemblage of machine learning models trained on big data—in terms of enclosure and foreclosure. While enclosures are the product of a well-studied set of operations pertaining to both the constitution of the sovereign State and the primitive accumulation of capital, here, I want to recover an older form of the enclosure operation to then contrast it with foreclosure to better understand the effects of current algorithmic rationality. I argue (...) that the act of enclosing is to be understood as a set of fundamental operations that consist in producing structural distinctions between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion—whether by drawing lines on a map, constructing border walls, or by algorithmically categorizing and (mis)recognizing people and things. Tracking the transformation of an enclosure-logic into one of foreclosure, I show how current AI perpetuates and at the same time expends forms of extraction, exclusion, and dispossession toward a totalizing horizon. For, while the outside is essential and constitutive to the logic of enclosure, foreclosure, by contrast, is characterized by the “totalizing desire” to not leave anything out of it. The totalizing desire to move beyond the logic of the enclosure forecloses that the enclosure has just gotten bigger and that the operations of exclusion have been masked and displaced, making them harder to contest. (shrink)

El texto aborda cómo la interacción entre tecnología y sociedad, sobre todo desde el contexto del determinismo tecnológico, ha configurado el entorno humano desde la prehistoria hasta la contemporaneidad. La tecnología no es solo una herramienta, sino un agente activo que afecta y reconfigura las dinámicas sociales, además de estar influenciada por valores y decisiones humanas. En este sentido, se subraya la necesidad de una ética tecnológica que garantice que los avances sirvan al bienestar humano y promuevan la justicia social. (...) Esta ética aplicada, que emergió como respuesta a los impactos negativos de los avances tecnológicos, explora dimensiones complejas y multifacéticas de decisiones morales influenciadas por la racionalidad humana. Además, se enfatiza la responsabilidad compartida de ingenieros, sectores industriales y sociedad para guiar la tecnología hacia un futuro sostenible, promoviendo una relación armoniosa entre los valores humanos y el desarrollo tecnológico. (shrink)

Die gestalterischen Beiträge in diesem Band entwickeln verschiedene Perspektiven kritischen Informationsdesigns in unterschiedlichen Medien und für vielfältige Anwendungsbereiche: Videospiel, medizinische Diagnostik und ästhetische Erfahrung im online-Bereich. Ihr gemeinsames Ziel ist die Verbesserung sozialer Interaktion durch gestalterische Intervention. Der designwissenschaftliche Gastbeitrag diskutiert verschiedene Perspektiven, in denen sich Kunst auf Design bezieht und analysiert ihre wechselseitige Differenz als kommunikative Beziehungsstruktur.

Die Beiträge in diesem Band spiegeln den Stand der Reflexions- und Forschungsprozesse an der Fakultät Gestaltung der TH Würzburg-Schweinfurt, der HBKsaar und der New Design University in St. Pölten. Sie repräsentieren einen Prozess der Aufklärung, dessen Prüfstein Walter Benjamins Frage ist, wie sich ›die Art und Weise der Sinneswahrnehmung‹ geschichtlich gewachsener Kollektive durch neue Medientechnologien verändert.

Applications and devices of artificial intelligence are increasingly common in the healthcare field. Robots fulfilling some caregiving functions are not a distant future. In this scenario, we must ask ourselves if it is possible for machines to care to the extent of completely replacing human care and if such replacement, if possible, is desirable. In this paper, I argue that caregiving requires know-how permeated by affectivity that is far from being achieved by currently available machines. I also maintain that the (...) complete substitution of machine caregiving for human caregiving is not desirable because caregiving requires genuine human connection. (shrink)

Some important warnings about how we use technology in the philosophies of Plato, Martin Heidegger, Zhuangzi, and C. S. Lewis are relevant to the use of AI in education. Plato cautions us concerning what is lost when we let technology replace some of our own thinking processes. Far from making us more intelligent, the use of AI in writing falls into the mistakes Plato warns us against: We get lazy with learning and remembering, and we substitute a bundle of information (...) for the wisdom and comprehension that constitute genuine knowledge. Heidegger advises against using technology to create more of a product and reducing the role of humanity to merely a part of the system of production. When writing with AI, we abandon our responsibility to shepherd our own work, and we become tools in the machinery of creating a written product, even letting the software guide us rather than the other way around. Zhuangzi teaches us not to follow the patterns set by social convention. Material written by AI is a distillation of conventional word-patterns. Lewis warns us that we abolish part of humanity when we use technology to get what we want without first learning to love what is good. Using AI to get our writing done means sacrificing the essential human love for finding and understanding the truth, instead allowing our own words to be conditioned by unknown authors of algorithms. In this article I explain these matters and close with some helpful suggestions for how we might use AI more constructively—assuming we are going to use it at all. (shrink)

Losurdo analyzes the debate which took place in 1954 between Galvano Della Volpe and Palmiro Togliatti (the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party) over the relationship between Marxism and liberalism. Della Volpe championed the standard position that liberalism enshrined formal (negative) freedom which Marxism seeks to preserve while also extending social rights (or positive freedom). Togliatti recognized the main problem with this view: the majority of people who lived under the rule of states which purportedly adhered to Western liberalism (...) were colonized peoples who did not share in the experience of exasperation with the merely formal nature of bourgeois negative freedom, because it was never extended to them in the first place (pp. 94–95)! In a sense, we can say that the problem with Marxism in its Eurocentric form is that it is too charitable towards liberalism. It attributes to liberalism achievements that it is innocent of (p. 216). Losurdo remarks on the irony of the date of this debate, for 1954 was the year of the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ when the Việt Minh forces defeated the French in a war of independence which was fought, at least partly, in the name of the formal bourgeois freedom which Western liberal states had, according to Della Volpe and other Western Marxists, already actualized in the world. (shrink)

“Moral imagination” is the capacity to register that one’s perspective on a decision-making situation is limited, and to imagine alternative perspectives that reveal new considerations or approaches. We have developed a Moral Imagination approach that aims to drive a culture of responsible innovation, ethical awareness, deliberation, decision-making, and commitment in organizations developing new technologies. We here present a case study that illustrates one key aspect of our approach – the technomoral scenario – as we have applied it in our work (...) with product and engineering teams. Technomoral scenarios are fictional narratives that raise ethical issues surrounding the interaction between emerging technologies and society. Through facilitated role-playing and discussion, participants are prompted to examine their own intentions, articulate justifications for actions, and consider the impact of decisions on various stakeholders. This process helps developers to re-envision their choices and responsibilities, ultimately contributing to a culture of responsible innovation. (shrink)

Femtech refers to a growing range of technologies that aim to address health needs typically associated with women’s bodies, such as maternal health, fertility, menstruation, sexual wellness, or contraception. We examine a specific popular femtech product, cycle tracking apps, as an instrument of self-surveillance for greater productivity. Our analysis is grounded in the phenomenology of temporality—we understand workplace surveillance technologies as advancing an internalized sense of time discipline, generating a personal experience of time as a constant call to improve one’s (...) workplace productivity. We then examine how the same dynamic reveals itself in the vocabulary and functionality of popular cycle-tracking apps. Our paper contributes to the existing feminist critiques of femtech, namely, the examination of cycle-tracking apps as promoting a false sense of empowerment and separating users from self-knowledge of their bodies. We argue that cycle-tracking apps perpetuate the attitude that menstruators need to manage their cycle for the sake of reliable participation in productivity demands, creating a disconnect between their internal experience of the temporality of menstruation and external pressures. (shrink)

Algorithmic risk assessment tools, such as COMPAS, are increasingly used in criminal justice systems to predict the risk of defendants to reoffend in the future. This paper argues that these tools may not only predict recidivism, but may themselves causally induce recidivism through self-fulfilling predictions. We argue that such “performative” effects can yield severe harms both to individuals and to society at large, which raise epistemic-ethical responsibilities on the part of developers and users of risk assessment tools. To meet these (...) responsibilities, we present a novel desideratum on algorithmic tools, called explainability-in-context, which requires clarifying how these tools causally interact with the social, technological, and institutional environments they are embedded in. Risk assessment practices are thus subject to high epistemic standards, which haven't been sufficiently appreciated to date. Explainability-in-context, we contend, is a crucial goal to pursue in addressing the ethical challenges surrounding risk assessment tools. (shrink)

Lavinia Marin draws from phenomenology to lay bare another aspect of the ubiquitous presence of social media. By taking the phenomenology of attention as a starting-point, she show that attention is – rather than only a scare resource as analysts departing from the perspective of the attention economy would have it – foundational for our moral relations to other beings. She argues that there is a distinctive form of other-oriented attention that enables us to perceive other beings as living beings (...) that are worthy of care. This mode of attention presupposes a form of affectivity and involves the recognition of the other as a moral being capable of forming judgments, as well as someone having certain vulnerabilities. Her analysis shows that by prioritizing homogenous interactions and standardization, social media platforms hinder us from engaging in this mode of attention, thereby undermining our capacity of recognizing to others as surprising, changing, and fallible beings. (shrink)

In this chapter, we propose an ecological hermeneutic phenomenology to study both the ontic and ontological structures of new and emerging technologies. In section 2, we first consult the traditional concept of phenomenology to find an entry point for our methodological considerations. It will become clear that Heidegger provides a progressive concept of hermeneutic phenomenology, although we are critical of his essentialism and linguistic focus in which there seems to be no room for the phenomenological consideration of ontic phenomena. The (...) discussion of Heidegger results in a methodological concept of an empirically informed ecological hermeneutic phenomenology that enables us to research how new and emerging technologies impact the World in which we live and act. Subsequently, we critically reflect on the epoché of phenomenology and show that a methodological concept of ecological hermeneutic phenomenology engages in an ecological transduction from technology as thematic artefact to technology as co-thematic ontological structure in which each and every artefact is grounded. (shrink)

Our contemporary world is undeniably intertwined with technology, influencing every aspect of human life. This edited volume delves into why modern philosophical approaches to technology closely align with phenomenology and explores the implications of this relationship. Over the past two decades, scholars have emphasized users' lived experiences and their interactions with technological practices, arguing that technologies gain meaning and shape within specific contexts, actively shaping those contexts in return. This book investigates the phenomenological roots of contemporary philosophy of technology, examining (...) how phenomenology informs analyses of temporality, use, cognition, embodiment, and environmentality. Divided into three sections, the volume begins by exploring the role of phenomenological methods in the philosophy of technology, and further investigates the methodological implications of combining phenomenology with other philosophical schools. The second section examines technology as a phenomenon, debating whether it should be analysed as a whole or through individual artifacts. The final section addresses the practical applications of phenomenological insights in design practices and democratic engagement. By offering a systematic exploration of the connection between phenomenology and technology, this volume provides valuable insights for scholars, students, and researchers in related fields, highlighting the continued relevance of phenomenological perspectives in understanding our technologically mediated world. (shrink)