Obra epistologràfica / introducció de J. Estellés -- Obra filològica / introducció de J. Pérez Durà -- Obra filosòfica / introducció de C. Mínguez -- Obra jurídica / introducció d'I. Roca -- Obra religiosa / introducció d'I. Roca -- Sobre ciència i medicina / introducció de J. Ll. Barona i V. Navarro -- Sobre la dona / introducció de N. Campillo -- Obra pedagògica / introducció d'A. Mayordomo -- Obra psicològica / introducció de F. Tortosa.

This article echoes those voices that demand new approaches and ‹senses’ for management education and business programs. Much of the article is focused on showing that the polemic about the educative model of business schools has moral and epistemological foundations and opens up the debate over the type of knowledge that practitioners need to possess in order to manage organizations, and how this knowledge can be taught in management programs. The article attempts to highlight the moral dimension of management through (...) a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom. I defend the ideas that management is never morally neutral and that Aristotelian practical wisdom allows the recovery of moral considerations in management practice. I analyze the impact and implications that the introduction of practical wisdom in business schools entails for the conception and objectives of management education. This view reconfigures management education in terms of attention to values, virtues and context. Therefore, management programmes should prepare students to critically evaluate what they hear and to make decisions coherent with their values and virtues. In the final section, I reflect on the pedagogical implications of this approach. I point out that an integrated model of ethics and practical wisdom promotes education of cognition and education of affect as well. I provide an example to illustrate my perspective and to support my conclusions. (shrink)

Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding (...) their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins. (shrink)

The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

According to Essentialism, an object’s properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. While being human is commonly thought to be essential to Socrates, being a philosopher plausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing—as we just did—to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion of essential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a given property. In this paper, I elaborate on these (...) issues and explore the way in which essential properties behave in relation to other related properties, like sufficient-for-existence properties and individual essences. (shrink)

The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily (...) elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W). (shrink)

The paper focuses on the Epistemic Challenge for mind-independent accounts of modality. The challenge can be formulated as an inconsistency problem among three premises and, therefore, any strategy to meet the challenge will require the negation of (at least) one of its premises. The aim of the paper is not to offer a positive solution to the challenge, but rather to argue for the claim that to follow a hybrid strategy is probably the best way to meet it. With some (...) qualifications, reasons are given as to why empiricism should be the way to meet the challenge as far as de re modality is concerned, whereas rationalism might be the correct way of addressing it for the case of de dicto modality. (shrink)

The paper argues that Lewis’ Genuine Modal Realism, in taking the plurality of worlds to be necessarily the way it is, implies the existence of necessary connections of the sort that contradicts the Humean thesis that Lewis endorses. By endorsing, pace Divers, a non-redundancy interpretation of advanced modalizing, we gain the means to exactly state what these connections amount to.

Abstract.The biological and cognitive approach to religion has matured somewhat and reveals interesting results. Nevertheless, some questions arise about its foundation and development. The essay offers a review of current research in the cognitive field, focusing on its conclusions, the internal discussions, and the problems that need more study or correction. Emphasis is placed on a more intricate account of the factors involved in religious experience, discussing the proper use of the discoveries of biocognitive research and the limits that should (...) be placed on said conclusions. (shrink)

Historical re-enactment is an emerging social practice in the knowledge society, and it helps us better understand aspects of the past and heritage. The knowledge gained through historical recreation contributes to the construction of quality citizenship. The deepening of democratic values requires that educational systems commit to the promotion of critical citizenship. Service-learning constructively develops experiences that connect science, education and society. Our research describes a systematized praxis of historical recreation. It has been developed by university students, and it has (...) been carried out from the perspective of service-learning, in a manner consistent with the concepts of public history and public archaeology, to contribute to the promotion and defense of heritage history and the preservation of historical memory. (shrink)

This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not only (...) accidental to the method but also virtuous. Additionally, the scrutiny suggests a recipe for increasingly pushing back, as modal enquirers, some of these limits. Limits will irremediably remain. But, as modal epistemologists, it is to explain what lies beyond these irremediable limits (not within) that we should look somewhere else. (shrink)

The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support (...) Peacocke's moderate rationalism. (shrink)

Evolutionary studies have provided several explanations about how pain and suffering can be fitted into that framework, which tries to make sense of every biological and human feature in terms of evolution, survival, and fitness. These explanations point usually to how such apparently negative aspects become useful and contribute to an evolution that after all has delivered good outcomes. Such an approach might eventually render the theodicy question less sharp and critical for believers who are trying to cope with the (...) scandal of so great suffering in our world and history. Theologically we can welcome such new insights, less noticed in former tradition, but at the same time we need to be cautious before a development which could render less clear the message of Christian salvation. In any case, the new data and knowledge clearly invite to revise and reformulate the Christian salvific message, to better answer before the mystery of evil and suffering. (shrink)

Es bien conocida la primera filosofía de Ortega y Gasset en torno al "raciovitalismo" y al liberalismo. En cambio, su segunda navegación, en expresión suya, no ha alcanzado aún perfiles precisos ante el público interesado. Nada mejor para ello que revisitar la obra póstuma que mejor representa tal vez la tarea filosófica del último Ortega: "La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva". En este libro, por un lado se examinan las raíces alemanas con especial (...) atención a Fichte y a Heidegger y la teoría del conocimiento que Ortega va diseñando. Por otro, se analiza la estructura textual del libro mientras se profundiza en algunos de los logros más generales de la "segunda navegación" de Ortega, como el tema de "ideas y creencias", el constructivismo cognitivo y la teoría de la historia. En una tercera parte, se incide en diversas consecuencias de la obra de Ortega, en la hermenéutica y en el pensamiento cívico sobre España, así como en la crítica filosófica. (shrink)

For the first time in over thirty years a revolution is happening in phonology, with the advent of constraint-based approaches which directly oppose the rule-and-derivation tradition of mainstream Generative Phonology. The success of Optimality Theory and the rapidity of its spread since its official launch in 1993 is remarkable even by the general standards of post-1950s linguistics. Many phonologists appear to have been caught up in the whirlwind, as witnessed by the substance of many current working papers and conferences the (...) world over, and the recent contents of well-established journals. Two questions naturally arise: What is Optimality Theory about? In what way is Optimality Theory superior to traditional theory, if indeed it is? In this book, leading specialists and active researchers address these issues directly, and focus deliberately on the evaluation of the two competing approaches rather than on simple displays of their applicability to limited bodies of data. (shrink)

2Un grup d'experts, majoritàriament membres de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans, coordinat per Pere Lluís Font, es proposa en aquest llibre fer un balanç del que ha estat la contribució catalana en el camp de la filosofia i de les divers.

L’objectif de cet article est double. Il défend d’abord, contre une menace potentielle, la thèse selon laquelle une capacité pour la connaissance essentialiste ne doit pas figurer parmi les capacités fondamentales pour la connaissance des contrefactuels. Il évalue ensuite une conséquence de cette thèse, ou du moins de la défense que j’en fais qui s’appuie sur une discussion des théories de Kment et de Williamson portant sur le lien entre la modalité et les contrefactuels.

This paper investigates two trends which propose an approach to organisations and ethics different from those advocated by the modern tradition. It firste analyses the re-surfacing of the moral and social thinking of Aristotle in the work of a growing number of organisational theorists. It argues that Aristotle’s contemporary resurgence has been partly within the framework of corporate culturism. With this in mind, we reinterpret some elements of the Aristotelian social-moral system in such a way that it can be applied (...) to contemporary organisations. Recognising that some Aristotelian concepts can limit its applicability, we then draw on Levinas’ insights. His approach sheds some post-modern light on the social-moral Aristotelian system, by allowing the emergence of a more human and up-to-date vision of organisations and employee management. We contend that the fusion of both discourses results in a more complete understanding of organisations and its articulation with ethics. (shrink)