The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...) -/- The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: -/- the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. -/- Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

Ne serait-ce que par son titre, dont l’oxymore est d’emblée assumée (p.11) et dont les protagonistes sont associés d’une manière qui ne laisse de surprendre, l’ouvrage de Julien Boudon publié dans la collection « Les sens du droit » des éditions Dalloz, mériterait de retenir l’attention.Dans ce court opus, l’auteur entend, à travers un examen qui puise tout à la fois aux sources de l’histoire, de la philosophie, du droit, de la science politique, et qui emprunte à la fois (...) au style de la monog.. (shrink)

CorpusReader est un dispositif expérimental permettant d'articuler plusieurs instruments pour construire des corpus multi-annotés. L'objectif de ce dispositif est la description de corrélations entre niveaux de description pour caractériser des normes, comme par exemple des discours ou des genres. Dans ce cadre, toute annotation est une interprétation et le contexte est défini comme une pluralité d'interprétations réifiées dans un codage commun. CorpusReader permet à la fois de construire cette annotation contextualisante puis d'en extraire des sous-ensembles et des quantifications pour des (...) analyses quantitatives. (shrink)

It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard (...) rules of inference" themselves suffice to "determine the meanings of [the] logical constants" (p. 2). In a nutshell, Carnap showed that the rules allow for non-normal interpretations of negation and disjunction. Raatikainen concludes that "no ordinary formalization of logic ... is sufficient to `fully formalize' all the essential properties of the logical constants" (ibid.). We suggest that this is a mistake. Pace Raatikainen, intuitionists like Dummett and Prawitz need not worry about Carnap's problem. And although bilateral solutions for classical inferentialists - as proposed by Timothy Smiley and Ian Rumfitt - seem inadequate, it is not excluded that classical inferentialists may be in a position to address the problem too. (shrink)

Redoutant leur influence négative sur les maris grévistes, les syndicats ont parfois essayé de s'attirer les bonnes grâces des « ménagères ». A partir des années 1930, de nouvelles associations, issues des courants communiste et catholique-social, tentent de regrouper ces ménagères dans le cadre de ce qui peut s'apparenter à un syndicalisme de quartier (Comité mondial des femmes, Association populaire familiale, Union des femmes françaises). Organes d'assistance, de défense et de revendication, elles deviennent interlocutrices des syndicats professionnels en même temps (...) qu'outils de gestation et d'expression d'une solidarité. Par là même, elles favorisent également l'émergence de femmes-sujets. L'article étudie également les relations entre les non-salariées, isolées ou groupées dans leurs associations, et le syndicalisme professionnel, essentiellement masculin. (shrink)

Widespread preservation of fossilized biomolecules in many fossil animals has recently been reported in six studies, based on Raman microspectroscopy. Here, we show that the putative Raman signatures of organic compounds in these fossils are actually instrumental artefacts resulting from intense background luminescence. Raman spectroscopy is based on the detection of photons scattered inelastically by matter upon its interaction with a laser beam. For many natural materials, this interaction also generates a luminescence signal that is often orders of magnitude more (...) intense than the light produced by Raman scattering. Such luminescence, coupled with the transmission properties of the spectrometer, induced quasi‐periodic ripples in the measured spectra that have been incorrectly interpreted as Raman signatures of organic molecules. Although several analytical strategies have been developed to overcome this common issue, Raman microspectroscopy as used in the studies questioned here cannot be used to identify fossil biomolecules. (shrink)

Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account (...) of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance. -/- This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public polic. (shrink)

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...) roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements*Volume 51, Issue 1JULIEN A. DEONNA and FABRICE TERONI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000236Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements*Volume 51, Issue 1JULIEN A. DEONNA and FABRICE TERONI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000236Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements*Volume 51, Issue 1JULIEN A. DEONNA and FABRICE TERONI DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000236Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possibility provide the relevant dividing lines between how-possibly and how-actually explanations. Whereas how-possibly (...) explanations establish claims of possible explanations, how-actually explanations establish claims of actual ones. Models, in turn, simply provide evidence for these claims. (shrink)

Cet article présente quelques-unes des recherches de l’auteure, très succinctement exposées, sur les traducteurs anciens. Face à une divergence de la Septante et du Targum par rapport au texte massorétique, des indices sont d’abord rassemblés pour la situer, par exemple, au niveau du traducteur ou déjà de sa copie hébraïque, à moins qu’il n’ait conservé le texte primitif, et qu’il s’agisse d’une variante dans le texte massorétique. La recherche porte ensuite sur le motif et la méthode de la modification, s’il (...) s’agissait d’une modification volontaire. Dans plusieurs cas, cela permet de replacer la Septante dans le cadre d’interprétations de l’exégèse juive ancienne, puisque plusieurs procédés herméneutiques employés par les traducteurs grecs peuvent être retracés tant dans le texte massorétique lui-même que dans les traductions araméennes et les littératures intertestamentaire et rabbinique. (shrink)

We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...) language either. We then turn to an alternative proposal, recently defended by Beall (in Analysis 73(3):438–445, 2013; Rev Symb Log, 2014), for expressing truth and falsity only, and hence disagreement. According to this, the exclusive semantic status of A, that A is either true or false only, can be conveyed by adding to one’s theory a shrieking rule of the form A & ~A |- \bot, where \bot entails triviality. We argue, however, that the proposal doesn’t work either. The upshot is that glut theorists face a dilemma: they can either express denial, or disagreement, but not both. Along the way, we offer a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists—an extension of the logic commonly called LP. (shrink)

Phosphatidylinositol 5‐phosphate (PtdIns5P), the least characterized among the three phosphatidylinositol monophosphates, is emerging as a bioactive lipid involved in the control of several cellular functions. Similar to PtdIns3P, it is present in low amounts in mammalian cells, and can be detected at the plasma membrane and endomembranes as well as in the nucleus. Changes in PtdIns5P levels are observed in mammalian cells following specific stimuli or stresses, and in human diseases. Recently, the contribution of several enzymes such as PIKfyve, myotubularins, (...) and type II PtdInsP‐kinases to PtdIns5P metabolism has gained a strong experimental support. Here, we provide a picture emerging from recent studies showing how this lipid can be generated and act as a regulator of membrane and cytoskeleton dynamics, and as a modulator of gene expression. We briefly summarize the current methods and tools for studying PtdIns5P, and discuss how PtdIns5P can integrate and coordinate different functions in a spatiotemporal manner. (shrink)

RNA polymerase II (RNAP II) non‐coding transcription is now known to cover almost the entire eukaryotic genome, a phenomenon referred to as pervasive transcription. As a consequence, regions previously thought to be non‐transcribed are subject to the passage of RNAP II and its associated proteins for histone modification. This is the case for the nucleosome‐depleted regions (NDRs), which provide key sites of entry into the chromatin for proteins required for the initiation of coding gene transcription and DNA replication. In this (...) review, recent data on the effects of pervasive transcription through NDRs are summarized and a model is proposed to explain how RNAP II‐driven transcription is able to modify the nucleosomes flanking the NDRs, leading to nucleosome repositioning and NDR closure. Even though much of the mechanistic detail underlying these events remains to be elucidated, such a model provides a basis to explain how non‐coding transcription through NDRs can regulate the initiation of coding gene expression and DNA replication. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...) that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries. (shrink)

Il dinamismo.--L'esistenzialismo.--La dialettica materialista.

El propósito del presente texto es mostrar, a contrapelo de lo que suelen sostener tanto sus detractores como sus abogados, que el neoliberalismo, en su crítica al keynesianismo y al Estado de bienestar, no pretende en absoluto reconducir el laissez-faire promovido por los marginalistas, aunque públicamente no tiene inconveniente en acomodarse de la retórica neoclásica. Antes bien, es consciente de que el libre mercado –por el que aboga– es algo que debe ser instituido y protegido frente a la inercia social; (...) y que, para ello, se precisa de un intervencionismo estatal que ampare el orden de la competencia, así como de un tejido institucional (escuela, prensa, cultura, etc.) que contribuya a la conformación de una subjetividad adaptada al carácter altamente evolutivo e incierto de la sociedad capitalista. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

La mathématique est conditionnée par un objet formel constructif. De même, la logique. L’objet formel est identique pour les deux disciplines. Il est de nature rameuse. L’auteur donne quelques indications sur la théorie des ramifications qu’il a instituée. Il termine en signalant que la logique des prédicats et la distributivité du produit logique ont pour objet véritable la variété multidimensionnelle discrète des mathématiciens, un objet dont la genèse rameuse est une pièce importante de sa théorie.

Nous n'aimons guère le spirituel républicain. Un spectre, dira-t-on, vestige de gloires révolues, épouvantail obsolète d'un imaginaire laïque passablement décharné. Forgé dans l'atelier conceptuel de la Révolution française, irriguant le dialogue de la philosophie et des sciences sociales naissantes, le problème du gouvernement des esprits est le point névralgique du XIXe siècle. Et telle est la distance qui nous sépare d'auteurs apparemment aussi hétérogènes que Comte, Michelet, Tocqueville ou Pierre Leroux : rendre effective la liberté des modernes suppose d'abord d'affronter (...) l'énigme du pouvoir spirituel. Heureux émancipés ou mélancoliques vitupérants, nous sommes les héritiers d'une sacralité républicaine qui fut conjointement cernée de tragique et ourlée d'espoirs. Ce livre retrace l'histoire d'une contrariété. (shrink)

This book is a treatise on cultural globalization and the global political economy. By introducing the transnational public domain in the study of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the book goes beyond existing theoretical frameworks involving both the ‘clash between civilizations’ and the ‘time-worn division’ of the world into North and South. It advances a new focus on the theoretical and empirical elements that canvass global cultural behaviours and reactionary attitudes to the expanding Chinese economic norms, cultures and values in (...) different national contexts. Readers of political theory, global political economy, globalization, international relations, political sociology, cultural sociology, public policy and foreign policy analysis will find interest in the book. Whereas new nationalism couples with globalism, both concepts are rediscovered through various socio-economic contexts of BRI policy discourses, which produce conflicts, solidarities, new economic partnerships, and cooperation and resistance as types of contemporary nationalism. The new nationalism is approached as a dual-sided, relational, and dialectical phenomenon which readers will capture by paying particular attention to both the global and local scales of the social responses to the BRI. (shrink)

A key aspect of the educator's responsibility as understood by Hannah Arendt is its dual character. Educators are responsible for both the life and development of the child and the continuance of the world, as Arendt puts it in “The Crisis in Education.” Moreover, these aspects of responsibility are in tension with each other. Arendt's own accounts of responsibility in her political writings are, in a similar way, riddled with tension. What should we conclude from this about the nature of (...) educational responsibility? To address this question, Julien Kloeg and Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens first reconstruct the meaning of responsibility in Arendt's political writings. They find a broad distinction between political responsibility and personal responsibility: the former consists in contributing to a community (by extension, the world), and the latter in the “two-in-one” of silent self-dialogue. While political responsibility is close to Arendt's description of the responsibility of the educator (for the continuance of the world), personal responsibility does not find an obvious home in her educational thought. From this ambiguous situation of education and Arendt's own theme of the “in-between” arises the possibility of introducing a concept of educational responsibility that further develops Arendt's position. Kloeg and Noordegraaf-Eelens's concept of educational responsibility suggests a theory and practice of navigating tensions between conflicting commitments. In their view, this is both an appropriate extension and reform of Arendt's educational work and an insight that does justice to the practical situation of educators in the modern world. (shrink)

In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument (...) rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might access values prior to emotional experience, we conclude that the attitudinalist is still in the game. (shrink)