This review seeks to present a comprehensive picture of recent discussions in the social sciences of the anticipated impact of AI on the world of work. Issues covered include: technological unemployment, algorithmic management, platform work and the politics of AI work. The review identifies the major disciplinary and methodological perspectives on AI’s impact on work, and the obstacles they face in making predictions. Two parameters influencing the development and deployment of AI in the economy are highlighted: the capitalist imperative and (...) nationalistic pressures. (shrink)

This essay discusses four books recently published by Christophe Dejours with the aim of extracting their most significant social-theoretical and philosophical implications. The first two books are two contributions by Dejours in current debates and public policy initiatives in France through the application of his psychodynamic approach to work related issues (work and violence; work and suicide). Even though these texts are shaped by the specific contexts in which they were written, they also contain broader social-theoretical insights that are quite (...) significant. In the other two books, the two volumes of his sum Travail vivant, Dejours makes explicit the fundamental theoretical foundation upon which his psychodynamic approach is based. I will attempt to demonstrate that these books have significant implications for contemporary social theory and philosophy, notably as they establish the indissoluble continuity between the corporeal and cognitive capacities of the human subject, and the importance of this insight for moral and political reflection. (shrink)

Jean-Philippe Perreault | : Au point de départ de cette réflexion sur l’innovation religieuse, deux considérations : d’une part, il existe nécessairement de la nouveauté et de la créativité religieuses dans la mesure où les religions évoluent, s’adaptent et demeurent vivantes ; d’autre part, la jeunesse est elle-même pensée et construite comme source de nouveauté et de progrès. L’innovation religieuse se trouve conséquemment au centre du thème de recherche « jeunes et religions ». Sous forme de « notes (...) de recherche », l’intention ici est d’identifier quelques repères permettant une problématisation de la question de l’innovation religieuse dans l’étude du rapport des jeunes aux religions. Pour ce faire, nous interrogerons les conditions d’une telle innovation, tant sur le plan empirique qu’épistémologique : de quelle innovation est-il question, qui innove et innove en regard de quoi? Quelle épreuve épistémologique devrions-nous faire subir aux principaux concepts pour nous assurer de leur opérationnalité, de leur fécondité et de leur scientificité pour nos travaux? | : At the starting point of this reflection on religious innovation, there are two considerations : on the one hand, there is necessarily novelty and religious creativity insofar as religions evolve, adapt and remain alive ; on the other hand, youth is itself thought and constructed as a source of novelty and progress. Therefore, religious innovation is at the center of the research theme “youth and religions”. In the form of “research notes”, the intention here is to identify a few benchmarks that allow a problematization of religious innovation question in the study of relationship between young people and religions. To do so, we will question the conditions for such an innovation, both empirically and epistemologically : what innovation is in question, who innovates and innovates compared to what? What epistemological test should the main concepts undergo to ensure their operationality, their fertility and their scientificity for our work? (shrink)

This paper investigates a particular philosophical puzzle via an examination of its status in the writings of Wittgenstein. The puzzle concerns negation and can take on three interrelated guises. The first puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all – for if p is not the case, then nothing corresponds to p. The second puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all when not-p rejects p not as false but as unintelligible – (...) for if p is unintelligible, then p is nothing but scratches and sounds and does not seem apt for negation. And the third puzzle is how “not” could be anything but hopelessly equivocal if it sometimes (per the first puzzle) requires, and sometimes (per the second puzzle) precludes the intelligibility of p. The paper investigates these three puzzles, their respective structures, and their relations to each other. The second puzzle is expounded as the centre of gravity, and in countering two objections to the threefold puzzle, a special predicament is expounded with regard to the second puzzle’s concern with unipolar propositions – propositions that do not admit of an intelligible negation. The text concludes by indicating the first steps that could potentially lead us out of the threefold puzzle. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s philosophical reflections always had significant historical dimensions, but it is only recently, in Recognition. A Chapter in the History of European Ideas, that he has attended to the history of recognition as a concept. This essay examines the cogency and the implications of this turn to intellectual history in the theory of recognition. The first section summarises the main historical claims put forward by Honneth. Section two raises critical doubts regarding three aspects of his narrative: the cultural contexts (...) that are said to have influenced particular conceptions of recognition; the conceptions of recognition that are supposed to be tied to national cultures; and the method of linking particular meanings of recognition to national cultures. The third section broadens the scope and attempts to show why this turn to intellectual history, despite some shortcomings, raises tantalising questions for recognition theory, and beyond it, for critical theory. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective (...) spirit’ sections of theEncyclopaediaare found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite. (shrink)

Axel Honneth was born on 18 July 1949 in Essen, Germany, in the coal-mining part of North Rhine Westphalia, the son of Horst Honneth, a medical doctor, and Annemarie Honneth. His adolescence and early adulthood coincided with the eruption of radical movements around the world, notably in his native country. The legacies of his early involvement in politics can be traced throughout his work. His postgraduate research focused on social and political issues, and embraced the “critical theory” tradition of the (...) Frankfurt School. This is a strand in the Western philosophical landscape whose defining characteristic is precisely that it seeks to establish strong connections between philosophical analysis and the reality of the social and political worlds. In particular, the philosophers of the Frankfurt School seek to align their theoretical work with the progressive movements within the social that aim to challenge and transform oppressive social structures. The political bent of Honneth’s philosophical work can be witnessed in the positive references to Marx in his early articles, his criticisms of Habermas’ theoretical models, and his attempt recently to recalibrate a socialist project for the new century. (shrink)

While examining the reception given by the media to the World Youth Day held in July 2002 in Toronto (Canada) as well as their promotion of the event, the author tries to draw the profile of the youth, and its links with catholic religion. The analysis of press articles published into two important Quebec daily newspapers allows the identification of different visions of the youth put forward by the media. It can be noticed that the emphasis put on youth heterogeneity (...) at the beginning quickly moves to the presentation of a homogeneous youth united around Pope John-Paul II. However, such a relation of youth toward Catholicism goes against research major conclusions on this topic. To this reception of the WYD by Quebec media, several explanations about, among others, mass media status, role, and functioning in our society are proposed. (shrink)

On se propose de montrer que l’écart entre les critiques heideggérienne et wittgensteinienne de l’adoption du point de vue logique sur le sens et l’écart entre leurs conceptions respectives de la sensibilité du sens au contexte deviennent visibles et intelligibles à partir du moment où ils sont rapportés l’un à l’autre. On cherchera la clé de ce double écart dans un désaccord fondamental des deux philosophes sur le sort qui peut et doit être fait à l’usage philosophique du petit mot (...) « qua », usage qui semble aussi ancien que la métaphysique elle-même.The paper aims at showing that both the gulf between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s respective ways of inveighing against the prevailing of a logical point of view upon sense, and the gulf between their respective accounts of the context-sensitivity of sense, can be at once brought to light and rendered intelligible by being aligned on each other. It is contended that both of these clashes hinge upon a fundamental disagreement as to what could and should be made of the traditional use in metaphysics of the little word « als », in a word, of its use as « qua ». (shrink)

In recent years, theorists have contended that we should move to a mode of social organisation where work and the values attached to it are no longer central, a ‘post-work society’. For these theorists, the modern ideology of work is intrinsically unjust, even irrational and no longer suited to the challenges of our time. The article presents an alternative response to the problems of work and employment. Rather than moving to a ‘post-work’ society, the article argues that we should transform (...) the world of work, precisely by keeping in view why working is important to individuals and the community. In fact, it is not realistic to believe that human societies could ever do without work. Because human societies are by necessity work societies, and work, if organised correctly, entails many goods, we cannot really, and we should not, wish work away. (shrink)

La bioéthique est animée par la volonté d’une reprise en main de la question des fins sur celle des moyens du soin. Ainsi, la bioéthique peut-elle se comprendre comme une tentative de juguler le discours de la rationalité instrumentale qui déferle dans le champ de la maîtrise du vivant et du monde vécu, en y altérant ou détruisant les fragiles liens de soins mutuels. À cet endroit arrivent les interrogations. La gravité de situations inouïes impose-t-elle une éthique inédite? N’encourage-t-elle pas (...) une idéologie bioéthique qui instrumentalise l’éthique, dérive allant d’une attention à l’action vers une science de l’action dans une approche procédurale de la décision? Si la bioéthique s’est bien souvent concentrée sur l’éthique médicale et ne l’a pas toujours articulée avec une réflexion plus générale sur la vie vulnérable considérant la vie en nous, entre et en dehors de nous, peut-elle nous dispenser d’une réflexion plus en amont sur la nature de la raison pratique déployée elle-même sur l’assise d’une anthropologie du soin et de la vulnérabilité? (shrink)

This article proposes to analyze the relations between ethics and the poetics of testimony. It does so by testing Paul Ricoeur’s analyses of testimony with the literary work of the Belarusian Nobel Prize winner Svletana Alexievitch. After having shown why witnessing occupies a type of expressivity that is singular in contemporary times, and then having been surprised by the strong links that unite witnessing and the experience of evil, Alexievitch’s work is chosen to explain what the resource of the poetic (...) could be, in the face of the question of evil. Ultimately, the consequences are drawn for the development of a practical wisdom in which testimony would be in a good place. (shrink)

Ricœur n’a cessé d’explorer les liens de la littérature et de la philosophie, du poétique entendu au sens large et de la philosophie pratique. Ces réflexions ont fécondé ses analyses de façon majeure, le concept d’identité narrative – l’adjectif s’entendant aussi dans sa dimension littéraire – en étant un des centres. Mais cette valorisation de la linéarité du récit a parfois donné l’impression d’avoir davantage mis en avant l’importance du roman, délaissant le rôle de la poésie et du théâtre. Cet (...) article se propose d’explorer les liens mutuels entre la sagesse poétique et la sagesse pratique en leur redonnant toute leur place. Il le fait en suivant la manière dont le philosophe a donné une place à la poésie, singulièrement celle de Rilke, et en mettant au jour les différentes stratégies argumentatives (l’exergue, la correspondance, le commentaire) par lesquelles la poésie, et surtout le psaume, éclaire et enrichit la compréhension de ce/celui qui s’engage dans l’action. (shrink)

As social and ecological transition and climate change raise issues that go far beyond individual responses, how can these challenges be balanced with ethical and political responses? This article intends to show that the strength of virtue ethics lies in the fact that it translates these abstract issues into concrete biographical events that shape lifestyles. The search for the good life in these matters then finds in temperance, humility and hospitality three virtues, private and social, to operate this translation. Humility (...) makes explicit the deep interdependencies between the living, while temperance calls for practices that are attentive to these relationships, in the knowledge that our ways of life here have far-reaching consequences on the other side of the globe. This in turn invites us to restore hospitality to its cosmopolitical dimension. (shrink)

The chapter begins by establishing the absence of organizations in the organization of philosophy as a specialist academic discipline. The second section highlights the reasons why this gap is detrimental to philosophical inquiries. The third section seeks to clarify how philosophy, as a type of theoretical inquiry, can contribute to the study of organizations. Three basic features are proposed as underpinning the philosophical method. Hegel’s social theory is then put forward as an exemplary model of what a philosophical account of (...) organizations might achieve. The fourth and final section shifts the perspective to focus on the life of individuals in organizations. Following a recent book combining post-Hegelian critical theory and Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamic approach, the paper highlights important aspects of individual and collective work that lead to a cooperative conception of management. (shrink)

La présente contribution analyse les deux risques auxquels sont confrontés l’administration pénitentiaire et son personnel, les surveillants notamment, dans leur lutte contre la radicalisation : le risque de la protection insuffisante de la société face à des conversions non repérées et susceptibles d’aboutir à des actes violents de type terroriste, d’une part, et, d’autre part, le risque du signalement systématique pouvant conduire au renforcement du sentiment de discrimination chez certains détenus et, paradoxalement, constituer un terrain favorable au développement de la (...) radicalisation violente. Pour dépasser ces deux risques, il est proposé, à partir de données de terrain, une application équilibrée du principe de précaution qui devrait reposer sur une meilleure formation des personnels par la pratique, entre autres, de l’interprétation croisée. (shrink)

In the following, I want to examine the structure and the significance of the notion of value in Hegel’s philosophy of right. In the first part, I use the 1817 version to define the category itself. Hegel sees the concept of value as a formal conceptual scheme, which can be applied with full justification to the most diverse contexts. It is striking that he should use the same word, in the same structural sense, in fields as diverse as economic exchange, (...) crime and its punishment, indi-vidual action, individual worth, the social recognition of the person, and general social–cultural beliefs. Hegel deliberately exploits the full extent of the homonymy of “value,” to suggest the synonymy of its logical meaning in all these different contexts. This, however, has profound implications for the concept of value. My claim is that the homonymy of value rests on Hegel’s understanding of value as grounded in sociality. Before substantiating this claim in the conclusion, I will attempt to show, in the second part, how the definition of value found in the 1817 lectures is the counterpart in the social–philosophical of the Measure category analyzed in the Logic. In the third part, I study the different occurrences of value in the 1820 "Philosophy of Right" in order to highlight the extent of the homonymy and synonymy of the concept in Hegel’s mature thinking. (shrink)

De l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, la notion d'harmonie a lié les mathématiques, l'astronomie et la musique. Renouant avec cette tradition millénaire, Jean-Philippe Uzan vous invite à écouter le chant des étoiles, les vibrations du cosmos et le cri du big bang. Une balade cosmique entre sciences et musique, vertigineuse et inspirante. Jean-Philippe Uzan est physicien théoricien, spécialiste de la théorie du big bang. Il est directeur de recherche au CNRS/Institut d'astrophysique de Paris et directeur adjoint de (...) l'Institut Henri Poincaré. (shrink)

Selon la philosophe américaine Lydia Goehr, l’idéal romantique de « l’œuvre d’art totale » ( Gesamtkunstwerk ) fraye la voie d’un « formalisme transcendentalement élargi » ( transcendentally enhanced formalism ) capable de procurer « un usage contemporain renouvelé et acceptable » aux termes des premières revendications formalistes d’autonomie. Nous soutenons que le type de formalisme défendu par Goehr est incapable de rendre compte du sens inédit dans lequel la musique moderniste atteint à l’autonomie. Elle n’y atteint, ni en demeurant (...) confinée à l’intérieur des limites de son médium (comme le voudrait un formalisme étriqué), ni en faisant signe vers l’extramusical gisant au-delà de ces limites (comme le voudrait le formalisme élargi), mais en dissolvant l’apparence même selon laquelle ses ressources expressives seraient limitées a priori. L’autonomie revendiquée par le modernisme passe par une émancipation de la composition à l’égard de toute norme préexistante. (shrink)

Jean-Philippe Pierron | : Dans leur réflexion sur le raisonnement moral, critique d’une approche rationaliste stricte, les théories du care et les philosophies travaillant à une compréhension enrichie de la raison pratique se sont attachées à mettre en valeur l’importance éthique qu’il y a à envisager la perspective de l’autre. Elles se sont concentrées à cette fin sur le travail de l’imagination. On montre ici que l’éthique du care de Gilligan, l’éthique de la narration de Nussbaum et l’éthique (...) de la sollicitude ricoeurienne, quoique différentes, se renforcent mutuellement à partir d’une compréhension renouvelée du rôle de l’imagination dans la morale. Si l’enquête psychologique de Gilligan, la philosophie de la littérature chez Nussbaum et l’herméneutique du texte chez Ricoeur diffèrent, ces trois auteur.es ont en commun de ne pas se satisfaire des méfaits d’une rationalité instrumentale qui bride la créativité pratique des actrices morales et acteurs moraux. Il appartiendrait à l’imagination éthique de prendre la mesure de la complexité des situations morales et d’en suivre les variations subtiles, afin de prendre soin de formes de vies rendues invisibles ou d’existences vulnérables. | : Critical of a strictly rationalist approach, theories of care and philosophies working toward a deeper understanding of practical reason have valorized the ethical importance of envisioning the perspective of the other in their reflection on moral reasoning. To this end, they have focussed on the task of the imagination. Here it is shown that, however different, Gilligan’s ethics of care, Nussbaum’s narrative ethics, and Ricoeur’s ethics of solicitude mutually reinforce each other through a renewed comprehension of the role of the imagination in the philosophy of action. Although Gilligan’s psychological investigation, Nussbaum’s philosophy of literature, and Ricoeur’s textual hermeneutics differ, these three authors have something in common: a discontent with the misdeeds of an instrumental rationality that shackles the practical creativity of moral actors. It is up to the ethical imagination to size up the complexity of moral situations and to appreciate their subtle variations, in order to take care of forms of life made invisible and vulnerable existences. (shrink)

L’usage de corpus n’est pas réservé aux linguistes. Néanmoins ceux-ci en sont des utilisateurs patentés, du fait, entre autres, que leurs analyses portent sur des productions linguistiques ou langagières non finies dont l’étude ne peut s’opérer que sur un échantillon. Mais pour que l’analyse prétende à quelque validité, cet échantillon doit être représentatif. Représentatif de quoi? D’une réalité qui à la fois préexiste à l’analyse et qu’il contribue à cerner et à établir. D’où toute une palette de corpus dont les (...) principaux types en usage dans la discipline, selon les matériaux utilisés, selon la clôture imaginée, selon la fonction assignée…, sont brièvement rappelés. La réflexion est ensuite centrée sur la délimitation de la place et de la fonction du corpus entre faits, analyses et théories ; il est montré, quelques exemples à l’appui, empruntés à la démarche du dialectologue et du lexicologue, que le corpus ne saurait être qu’un construit et que sa construction fait partie intégrante du prisme théorique à travers lequel le linguiste entend appréhender le réel. (shrink)

Neste artigo considerarei as principais objeções marxistas ao modelo de Honneth para uma Teoria Crítica da sociedade e também as objeções centrais de Honneth aos modelos inspirados em Marx. Depois tentarei esboçar uma reaproximação entre ambas posições ao mostrar como o conceito normativo de reconhecimento de Honneth não é oposto a argumentos funcionalistas, e sim que ele contém uma dimensão socioteórica: a ideia de que a reprodução social e a evolução social revolvem ao redor de lutas pela interpretação de normas (...) sociais centrais. Ao iluminar o lado socioteórico do reconhecimento, é possível esboçar um modelo de Teoria Crítica da sociedade que, de fato, corresponda às características descritivas e normativa delineadas pelo próprio Marx. No entanto, o preço desta reaproximação para a Teoria Crítica de Honneth é uma ênfase maior na divisão do trabalho como o mecanismo central da reprodução social. (shrink)

This paper argues that Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility” provides a rich analytic framework for understanding how the many dimensions of aesthe...

The book will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and the social sciences.

Of all the parts of the System, the Philosophy of Right has one unique feature. It is the only part for which, throughout his entire career, Hegel published one of his few books, while giving lectures on the very same topic. This peculiarity of the Philosophy of Right puts a special demand on those who try to interpret it. Although the version published by the author himself should constitute the ultimate reference of his social and political doctrine, because he has (...) worked on the topic all through his philosophical life, one must also read the lectures to gain a full knowledge of Hegel’s social philosophy. However, this demand itself places the reader in an awkward position, as there are some obvious discrepancies on some crucial points between the lectures themselves, as well as between the lectures and the book. These discrepancies are particularly obvious in the first two lectures, held in Heidelberg in the winter semester 1817/1818 and the first Berlin lectures 1818/1819. (shrink)

In this essay, I take up James Conant and Cora Diamond’s suggestion that “to take the difference between saying and showing deeply enough is not to give up on showing but to give up on picturing it as a ‘what’ ”. I try to establish that the Tractatus’s talk of “showing” is more coherent than is usually appreciated, that it is indeed a key to the internal unity of the book, and that it positively helps us to work our way (...) into the practice of philosophy, which its author understood as a practice of logical clarification. Thus, it is not a stretch of latent nonsense whose sole function is to conjure up an illusion of sense for the sake of displaying its disintegration. While Wittgenstein’s concept of showing is not meant to “make up for” the impossibility of saying certain things, neither does it stand in need of being “redeemed.” Whether or not it is to prove ultimately coherent, the Tractatus’s talk of “showing,” I shall argue, is certainly not to be “thrown away” in the name of the Tractarian conception of logic, for the simple reason that it essentially belongs with it. (shrink)

‘On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality’. B. R. Ambedkar’s famous last speech to the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949 still resonates within contemporary Indian constitutional law, and even more so his following interrogation: ‘how long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions?’ Prima facie societal, the contradiction is however also a temporal (...) one, Indian constitutional law being founded on both the British traditional idea of ‘continuum’ and the American inspired revolutionary principles of ‘pursuance’ of a novel legal and social order. Two recent Indian Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the de-criminalisation of same sex relations ( Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India) and for the right of menstruating women to enter the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala ( Indian Young Lawyers Association v. Union of India) offer through their differing and sometimes dissenting opinions a glimpse at those temporal contradictions. Through an analysis of both decisions and in particular that of Chandrachud J. and Malhotra J.’s judgements, this article seeks to highlight two radically differing conceptions of temporality applied to constitutional issues, which can themselves be linked back to the transposition of the legal positivist discourse in India within the colonial era: on the one hand, an attempt to continue Common law’s empirical-based tradition and on the other hand, an (apparently) a-historical perception of Law drawn from neo-Roman civilian legal discourse and later normative positivism. If both branches of legal reasoning aim at protecting minorities’ rights, the value they inscribe to History within the realm of Law cannot be further apart. (shrink)

Axel Honneth, célèbre théoricien allemand de la reconnaissance qui s’inscrit dans la filiation de l’École de Francfort et notamment de Jürgen Habermas, et Jacques Rancière, éminent penseur français de la mésentente qui a rompu avec la tradition althussérienne, sont deux figures centrales du paysage intellectuel contemporain. Leurs pensées se situent dans deux traditions distinctes, mais elles ont toutes deux à voir avec le marxisme pris au sens large, qu’elles considèrent sous un angle critique. Les deux penseurs portent intérêt à des (...) domaines spécifiques au sein de la philosophie et hors d’elle. S’ils partagent tous deux un souci du domaine politique, Axel Honneth se meut dans la philosophie sociale, la philosophie morale et la philosophie du droit ; il fait un usage important et réfléchi des sciences sociales. Jacques Rancière se tourne, pour sa part, vers l’histoire, l’esthétique et la littérature. Mais une confrontation entre leurs deux pensées paraît s’imposer, tant leurs modèles sont influents dans le champ des sciences sociales, de la théorie politique et de la philosophie critique aujourd’hui. Il s’agit de savoir si les paradigmes qu’ils mettent en avant pour critiquer la société, pour rendre raison de son évolution et des transformations qui doivent la rendre plus juste ou plus libre, le paradigme de la reconnaissance et celui de la mésentente, sont concurrents, s’ils sont exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ou s’ils sont compatibles. (shrink)

The genesis of Axel Honneth's ethics of recognition shows that it represents the attempt to critically rejuvenate historical materialism through an emphasis on the normative dimensions and the anthropological preconditions of social interaction. By making explicit this project to redefine a theory of praxis, the exact theoretical stance and the full practical potential of Honneth's social theory can be stressed. However, by contrast to its initial formulation, the mature theory of recognition appears to have interpreted praxis in a narrow interpersonalist (...) sense. This is especially evident for the spheres of socialisation and labour. The last part of the article argues that the initial definition of the project could have been taken in a more materialist direction. This would define the second marxist horizon of the ethics of recognition, one of fruitful future developments. (shrink)

Critique as Social Practice first appeared in German in 2009, in the series of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Its English translation comes out in the recently launched collection...

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) was born in Landshut, Bavaria, the son of Paul Johann Anselm, a renowned legal theorist who had been called from Jena by the king of Bavaria to modernize the kingdom’s penal code. Feuerbach’s brothers all became distinguished scholars in their fields and his nephew Anselm a renowned classicist painter. After enrolling in theological studies in Heidelberg, Feuerbach became enthralled in Hegel’s philosophy and moved to Berlin to study with him. He presented his dissertation in 1828 at the (...) university of Erlangen and began his career there as a young Privat Dozent. Posterity has associated Feuerbach’s name to his anthropological critique of religion, presented in the 1841 The Essence of Christianity. Yet his writings touched on many other areas of philosophy. His life-long interest in religion arose from his attempt to solve the classical, fundamental questions of philosophy, of the human being’s place in the world, the relationships between thinking and being, reason and nature, mind and body, and the epistemological implications entailed in answering these questions. (shrink)