Hans-Martin Sass, Honorary Professor of Philosophy. Founder and board member of the Centre for Medical Ethics, Bochum, Germany. Honorary Senior Research Fellow at Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Honorary Professor of the Bioethics Research Centre, Beijing. He has written more than 60 books and pamphlets, more than 250 articles in professional journals. Editor of the Ethik in der Praxis/ Practical ethics, Muenster: Lit. Founder and co-editor of the brochures “Medizinethische Materialien”, Bochum: ZME. He has lectured (...) in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, the Chech Republic, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland and Taiwan. The interview devoted to exposition of the concept of bioethics in America and Germany, as well as the professor`s attitude to the idea of the integrative concept of bioethics. The concept of integrative bioethics has been developed in different countries, a component of this concept is the idea of the need for discussion on bioethics in various sectors of society. Equally important in this concept are the definitions of bioethics and the bioethical imperative proposed by Fritz Jahr in 1926. The scientist`s article, which was discovered in 1997, contains a new format of bioethical ideas, as well as a valuable opportunity to enhance understanding the term of bioethics as an integrative science. Interview has been conducted by Hanna Hubenko as a part of the joint international course «Integrative Bioethics». At the meeting it was discussed the experience of cooperation and plans for the future. Cooperation and feedback between scientists remains an unconditional prerogative, also in a pandemic situation. (shrink)

Biotopes and Bioethics are highly complex and adaptable systems of Bios. Individual bios is terminal, but the stream of Bios goes on. Basic properties of Bios such as communication and cooperation, competence and competition, contemplation and calculation, compassion and cultivation come in different shades of light and dark in individuals and species, in history and ecology. Hans-Martin Sass discusses the territories of Bios and Bioethics, based on his involvement in decades of consulting in academia, business and politics. Special attention (...) is given to the vision and role of Bioethics in research and training, in religious and cultural traditions, and in the survival, happiness, and health of corporate, social and political bodies. Hans-Martin Sass is Senior Research Scholar Emeritus at Georgetown University, Washington DC, and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Ruhr University, Bochum. (Series: Practical Ethics - Studies / Ethik in der Praxis - Studien, Vol. 40) [Subject: Bioethics]. (shrink)

Several philosophers have expressed concerns with some recent uses of the term ‘cognition’. Underlying a number of these concerns are claims that cognition is only located in the brain and that no compelling case has been made to use ‘cognition’ in any way other than as a cause of behavior that is representational in nature. These concerns center on two primary misapprehensions: First, that some adherents of dynamical cognitive science think DCS implies the thesis of extended cognition and the rejection (...) of representation, and second, that cognition is mistakenly equated with behavior. We make three points in response to these claims: First, there is no thoroughly entrenched conception of cognition as distinct from behavior that is being illegitimately disregarded. Second, we present Shapiro’s exposition of dynamical systems theory as revealing a misunderstanding of the way that dynamical models are used in explanations of cognition and related phenomena. Accordingly, a proper conception of DCS’s methods facilitates an appreciation of extended cognition as a legitimate phenomenon of scientific investigation. Finally, we demonstrate that practicing cognitive scientists and psychologists are far more pluralistic in the phenomena they apply ‘cognition’ to than is suggested by some. At the heart of our disagreement with these concerned folks is that although we think it likely that some cognitive phenomena are representational, non-extended, and only in-between the ears, we also think there are good conceptual and empirical reasons to believe that many cognitive phenomena are non-representational, extended, and not confined to the brain. (shrink)

Unlike earlier attempts to prove the completeness of the table of judgments, this book takes the fundamental position that an answer can only be found in the context of a basic interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason that encompasses the metaphysical and transcendental deduction of the categories and ideas, the role played by cognitive capacity, transcendental apperception, and the theory of affects.

In Spinoza’s metaphysics, we encounter many puzzling doctrines that appear to entangle metaphysical notions with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. According to him, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, are defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. He defines an attribute as that which an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance. Intellectual (...) perception, something cognitive, is used to define an attribute, something metaphysical. And he claims that if something exists there is a reason why it exists and if something doesn’t exist there is also a reason why it doesn’t. Thus, a reason, something cognitive or epistemic, is necessary for existence or nonexistence. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Between being and reason? In this book, I argue for what might be called a realist interpretation: although Spinoza is confident that the order of being mirrors the order of reason, he believes that they are two orders, not one. There is inherence over and above conceptual dependence; there is causation in addition to causal explanation; the world has a nature that we can grasp and that our way of grasping it does not interpose an impenetrable conceptual veil between it and us. (shrink)

Some philosophers hold that trust grows fragile when people become too rational. They advocate a retreat from reason and a return to local, traditional values. Others hold that truly rational people are both trusting and trustworthy. Everything hinges on what we mean by 'reason' and 'rational'. If these are understood in an egocentric, instrumental fashion, then they are indeed incompatible with trust. With the help of game theory, Martin Hollis argues against that narrow definition and in favour of a (...) richer, deeper notion of reason founded on reciprocity and the pursuit of the common good. Within that framework he reconstructs the Enlightenment idea of citizens of the world, rationally encountering, and at the same time finding their identity in, their multiple commitments to communities both local and universal. (shrink)

Sexual violence has become a topic of intense media scrutiny, thanks to the bravery of survivors coming forward to tell their stories. But, unfortunately, mainstream public spheres too often echo reports in a way that inhibits proper understanding of its causes, placing too much emphasis on individual responsibility or blaming minority cultures. -/- In this powerful and original book, Linda Martín Alcoff aims to correct the misleading language of public debate about rape and sexual violence by showing how complex our (...) experiences of sexual violation can be. Although it is survivors who have galvanized movements like #MeToo, when their words enter the public arena they can be manipulated or interpreted in a way that damages their effectiveness. Rather than assuming that all experiences of sexual violence are universal, we need to be more sensitive to the local and personal contexts – who is speaking and in what circumstances – that affect how activists’ and survivors’ protests will be received and understood. -/- Alcoff has written a book that will revolutionize the way we think about rape, finally putting the survivor center stage. (shrink)

Eric Martin and Daniel N. Osherson present a theory of inductive logic built on model theory. Their aim is to extend the mathematics of Formal Learning Theory to a more general setting and to provide a more accurate image of empirical inquiry. The formal results of their study illuminate aspects of scientific inquiry that are not covered by the commonly applied Bayesian approach.

In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to (...) the left of straight ahead. (shrink)

Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the (...) argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14.3 (2004) vii-viii [Access article in PDF] John C. Fletcher 1931-2004 John Fletcher was one of the pioneers in the still-young field of bioethics. In this short tribute, I can only hope to highlight a few of the many contributions he made to the field.For many of us, our first introduction to John occurred in October 1971. At an international symposium sponsored by the (...) Kennedy Foundation, the film "Who Should Survive?" depicted the dramatic case of an infant with Down syndrome and an intestinal blockage. The parents of the infant refused surgery to relieve the obstruction, and the healthcare providers for the infant decided not to pursue a court order permitting the surgery. During a period of approximately two weeks the infant was allowed to die.In the second part of "Who Should Survive?" John was one of several panelists invited to discuss the decisions made in this case. After acknowledging how troubling the infant's death was to him, John nonetheless sought to be empathic with the parents. He pointed out that in the re-enactment of the case the faces of the parents were never seen, and he worried that the film did not permit the parents to discuss the reasons for the choice they had made. John realized that his position would not be shared by most other panelists. Yet he had the courage to take an unpopular stand and to challenge other panelists—and the audience—not to reach premature closure on complex ethical dilemmas.Already in 1967, John had begun contributing to the literature of bioethics. His essay "Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation," appeared in Law and Contemporary Problems. At the time, John was deeply immersed in studying the ethical dimensions of research with human subjects at the NIH Clinical Center. Paul Ramsey cited John's work with appreciation in his 1970 book, The Patient as Person. By the time he completed his dissertation at Union Theological Seminary in 1969, John was arguably one of the best trained bioethicists in the world—before there was a field of bioethics.After serving as chaplain, teaching at Virginia Theological Seminary, and founding and leading a seminary without walls in Washington, DC, John became the chief of the ethics program at the NIH Clinical Center in 1977. There he had the unenviable task of providing a second review for all clinical protocols emerging from the intramural programs of the NIH institutes. John discovered that in some cases the institutional review boards of the institutes had overlooked important ethical questions. This role also [End Page vii] required courage. At times John found it necessary to challenge senior NIH researchers, even institute directors, and to request protocol revisions that in his view were required for the protection of human subjects.In 1980, after Martin Cline had performed an unauthorized gene transfer experiment involving thalassemia patients, John joined with physician W. French Anderson to write an essay entitled "Gene Therapy in Human Beings: When Is It Ethical to Begin?" [New England Journal of Medicine 303: 1293-97]. Not only did this essay help to defuse a potentially explosive problem for NIH, which had funded Cline's research. It also provided a set of guidelines for the conduct of human gene transfer research that is of continuing relevance today.At times John disagreed with federal policies on research, for example, conservative policies on human embryo research. He also chafed at the idea of subjecting his publications to prior NIH review, both for accuracy and for political correctness. Thus, he welcomed the opportunity to move to the University of Virginia in 1987. There his academic career flowered, and he enjoyed some of his most productive years of research and writing.Among his many contributions during these later years, John participated as Committee co-chair in an effort to "redress the wrongs of Tuskegee." The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee proposed in May 1996 that President Clinton apologize to the participants in the Tuskegee study on behalf of the federal government. In May 1997, the President did in... (shrink)

A collection of brand new and revised essays from eminent scholar of public law, Martin Loughlin, that systematizes his work on political jurisprudence - a school of thought that contends the key to understanding the nature of legal order lies in how political authority is constituted.

Philosophy underwent a corresponding theatrical shift in the modern era, most importantly through the work of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus.

Abstract The work of Martin Buber oscillates between talk in which transcendence is experienced and talk in which transcendence is merely postulated. In order to show and mend this incoherence in Buber's thought, this essay attends to the rhetoric of verification ( Bewährung ), primarily but not solely in I and Thou (1923), both in order to show how it is a symptom of this incoherence, and also to show a broad pragmatic strain in Buber's thought. Given this pragmatic (...) strain, the essay argues that a weak notion of Buberian verification, in which taking a dialogic stance with reference to others evinces the right to talk of the real possibility of transcendence (a You-world, or God as the “eternal You“), is all that is necessary to combat despair. Strong notions of encounter are unnecessary, and also sink Buber in a morass of theodicy, in which he interprets historical misfortune and destruction as evidence of history's meaning. (shrink)

This book is a philosophers' attempt to bring together ideas put forward by economists, sociologists and political theorists. The author begins by exploring the economist's assumption that action is rational if it helps to achieve the agent's goals as efficiently as possible. The assumption is explored with the aid of rational-choice theory and game-theory, but it is rejected in the end for failing to account for the elements of trust and morality which rational social life requires. A discussion of 'Rational (...) Expectations' and of 'maximising' and 'satisficing' leads to a portrait of social actors as rational role-players. Rationality is, finally, the expression of the self in a social world. The book intervenes in intense current debates within and among several disciplines. Its concern is with the true nature of social actors and the proper character of social science. Its arguments are the more challenging for being presented in a simple, incisive and lucid prose. It will be of particular interest to philosophers, social theorists and social scientists interested in the philosophical aspects of their discipline. (shrink)

«All’interno di un genere umano ancora proteiforme e in divenire, sempre più persone percepiscono che cosa si stia preparando; la loro percezione cresce di giorno in giorno, e la conoscenza della crisi richiama in loro la sola controforza che può riuscire a elevare essi stessi a “signori” attraverso nuove mete, mete grandi e chiare, imponendosi su tali sediziosi mezzi. Questa controforza è quella che io chiamo il nuovo Umanesimo della fede ».

The sacred tales and aphorisms collected here by Martin Buber have their origins in the traditional Hasidic metaphor of life as a ladder, reaching towards the divine by ascending rungs of perfection. Through Biblical riddles and interpretations, Jewish proverbs and spiritual meditations, they seek to awaken in the reader a full awareness of the urgency of the human condition, and of the great need for self-recognition and spiritual renewal.

This critical interpretation shows Derridian thought to be permeated by a semiology that reduces all meaning to the signification of signs thus challenging the philosophy of deconstruction at its roots.

Standard models of lexical production assume that speakers access representations of meaning, grammar, and different aspects of sound in a roughly sequential manner (whether or not they admit cascading or interactivity). In contrast, we review evidence for a parallel activation model in which these representations are accessed in parallel. According to this account, word learning involves the binding of the meaning, grammar, and sound of a word into a single representation. This representation is then activated as a whole during production, (...) and so all linguistic components are available simultaneously. We then note that language comprehension involves extensive use of prediction and argue that comprehenders use production mechanisms to determine (roughly) what they would say next if they were speaking. So far, theories of prediction-by-production have assumed sequential lexical production. We therefore reinterpret such evidence in terms of parallel lexical production. (shrink)

El nacionalismo es un fenómeno a la vez poliédrico y de contornos difusos. Hay, sin embargo, un conjunto de parecidos familiares que autorizan una aproximación desde el ángulo normativo. Estas páginas se centran en la vertiente oscura, arguyendo que las consecuencias de las políticas de corte nacionalista tienen que ver con un cierto número de factores que inciden en la acción colectiva que guardan relación con el tema de la identidad. Después de justificar el enfoque, se trata: 1. de ciertas (...) particularidades de la retórica nacionalista 2. del bajo coste relativo de la movilización desde el marco nacionalista y de la preponderancia de la variante étnica 3. del papel de las emociones negativas Unas consideraciones sobre las eventuales vías de salida cierran el artículo. (shrink)