- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Testimony
Edited by Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside)
About this topic
| Summary | Beliefs are often based on assertions by others: that is, on testimony. This phenomenon raises many questions. How wide is the range of testimony-based beliefs? Do all assertions play the same epistemic role, or do some assertive speech acts play special roles? Can mathematical, moral, religious, or aesthetic knowledge be transferred? A major issue in the epistemology of testimony concerns the rational role of testimony. How does comprehending an assertion rationally support a belief? According to reductionism, it provides no support; comprehension is rationally inert. The recipient must have independent rational grounds to believe the assertion. Anti-reductionism disagrees: comprehension provides prima facie, defeasible rational support. Reductionism is accused of being too demanding, anti-reductionism of being too permissive. Another issue concerns the transmission of knowledge. Is knowledge transferred from sender to receiver? Is knowledge in the chain of sources essential for the uptake of knowledge, or can assertive communication sometimes generate knowledge? |
| Key works | Coady 1992 is a classic book-length treatment of nearly all the major issues. Burge 1993 is a rewarding and influential anti-reductionist account. Graham 2008 is an empirically informed, proper functioning anti-reductionist account. Fricker 1994 levels the charge of excessive permissiveness against anti-reductionism. Goldberg & Henderson 2006 articulates the standard, anti-reductionist response. Moran 2005 emphasizes the interpersonal role of telling in favor of anti-reductionism. Lackey 1999 and Graham 2006 argue that testimony sometimes generates knowledge. In recent books, Lackey 2008 and Faulkner 2011 both argue, in very different ways, for a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism. |
| Introductions | Adler 2006 is Jonathan Adler's revised and comprehensive Stanford Encyclopedia entry. Lackey 2011 is a concise and informative survey. |
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
The Nature of Testimony (106)
Epistemic Deference (13)
Testimonial Injustice* (15)
Testimony, Misc (257)
History/traditions: Testimony
- Hume: Testimony (28)
Contents
1337 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 1337 |
Material to categorize
- The Testimony Gap: Machines and Reasons.Robert Sparrow & Gene Flenady - 2025 - Minds and Machines 35 (1):1-16.Most people who have considered the matter have concluded that machines cannot be moral agents. Responsibility for acting on the outputs of machines must always rest with a human being. A key problem for the ethical use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of responsibility to humans or lead to individuals being unfairly held responsible for things over which they had no control. This is the “responsibility gap”. In this paper, we argue that (...)
- Controlling the Narrative: The Epistemology of Himpathy in Sexual Assault Trials.Eleonora Volta & Margherita Grassi - 2024 - Phenomenology and Mind 27:110-123.This paper develops an original approach for theorising about himpathy by examining the courtrooms’ environment. Kate Manne (2018) defines himpathy as the excessive sympathy sometimes shown towards male perpetrators of sexual violence. While Manne discusses himpathy in connection with the moral and political problem of exonerating narratives and through the lens of testimonial injustice, we want to explore cases in which the testimony of the rape survivor is believed, but nevertheless misinterpreted due to conceptual resources that obscure women’s experience of (...)
- Testimonial authority and knowledge transmission.Christoph Jäger & Nicholas Shackel - 2025 - Social Epistemology 2025.Is speaker knowledge necessary or sufficient for enabling hearers to know from testimony? Here, we offer a novel argument for the answer no, based on the systematic effects of partial belief and the hearer’s view prior to hearing testimony. Modelling partial belief by credence, we show that a requirement entailed by the principles of necessity and sufficiency apparent in the literature is inconsistent with Bayesian updating. Consequently, even when the other grounds of knowledge are in place, the audience correctly updating (...)
- Moral understanding: From virtue to knowledge.Miloud Https://Orcidorg Belkoniene - 2025 - Noûs 59 (1):219-233.This paper examines the nature of the specific grasp involved in moral understanding. After discussing Hills's ability account of that central component of moral understanding in light of problematic cases, I argue that moral grasp is best conceived of as a type of knowledge that is grounded in a subject's moral appreciation. I then show how and why the relevant notion of moral appreciation is connected to moral virtues and to one's affective and motivational engagement with moral reasons. Finally, I (...)
- ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding.Federica Isabella Malfatti - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.Is ChatGPT a good teacher? Or could it be? As understanding is widely acknowledged as one of the fundamental aims of education, the answer to these questions depends on whether ChatGPT fosters or could foster the acquisition of understanding in its users. In this paper, I tackle this issue in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I explore and analyze the set of skills and social-epistemic virtues that a teacher must exemplify to perform her job well – (...)
- Conceptually Engineering the Post-Truth Crisis.Tom Kaspers - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.This article uses the current post-truth crisis to level a charge against deflationism. It argues that a post-truth society rejects the normativity of truth, thereby deflating truth, by treating disagreements about, say, scientific facts, as mere disagreements of taste. To have substantive disagreements, the notion of truth at stake must be substantive as well. To ward off the perils of post-truth politics, truth must be taken to be more than what deflationists can account for. If we want our disagreements to (...)
- Desacordo e Deferência a Especialistas: Independência ou Números Qualificados?Eduardo Alves & Vinicius Felipe Posselt - 2024 - Peri 16 (2):21-47.O objetivo deste artigo é oferecer um panorama da discussão sobre se o princípio Independência de Crença é verdadeiro e investigar se a deferência do novato a um especialista defensor da posição majoritária é racional. Para isso, apresentaremos, na primeira seção, o princípio Independência de Crença e algumas noções de epistemologia da expertise. Na segunda seção, explicaremos o argumento de Alvin Goldman (2001) a favor de uma versão do princípio Independência de Crença. Na terceira seção, explicaremos as críticas de David (...)
- Communicating Understanding.Adham El Shazly - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.Knowledge can be transmitted through testimony. What about understanding? In this paper I argue against the possibility of testimonial understanding by giving an account of understanding in terms of ‘mental structures’. Then I argue while we cannot integrate communicating understanding into a propositional model of epistemic communication, we can do so on a perspectival model. I highlight the importance of this to the epistemology of education throughout.
- The value of testimonial-based beliefs in the face of AI-generated quasi-testimony.Felipe Alejandro Álvarez Osorio & Ruth Marcela Espinosa Sarmiento - 2024 - Aufklärung 11 (Especial):25-38.The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...)
- Ability, Knowledge, and Non-paradigmatic Testimony.Keith Raymond Harris - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):983-1001.Critics of virtue reliabilism allege that the view cannot account for testimonial knowledge, as the acquisition of such knowledge is creditable to the testifier, not the recipient's cognitive abilities. I defend virtue reliabilism by attending to empirical work concerning human abilities to detect sincerity, certainty, and seriousness through bodily cues and properties of utterances. Then, I consider forms of testimony involving books, newspapers, and online social networks. I argue that, while discriminatory abilities directed at bodily cues and properties of utterances (...)
- Epistemology of Conversation: First essays.Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho (ed.) - 2024 - Cham: Springer.Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical, psycho-linguistic, logical-linguistic, and pragmatic aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly (...)
- Correction to: The Epistemic Value of Testimony.Matthew Chick - 2024 - Contemporary Political Theory 23 (4):704-704.
- Being understood.Samuel Dishaw - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):184-195.Philosophical work in the ethics of thought focuses heavily on the ethics of belief, with, in recent years, a particular emphasis on the ways in which we might wrong other people either through our beliefs about them, or our failure to believe what they tell us. Yet in our own lives we often want not merely to be believed, but rather to be understood by others. What does it take to understand another person? In this paper, I provide an account (...)
- Book Review: Jennifer Lackey, Criminal Testimonial Injustice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, 224pp. [REVIEW]Robert Vinten - 2024 - Manuscrito 47 (4):1-13.At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in that book was on cases where (...)
- Determining Personal Falsity: A Gadamerian Critique of The Enlightenment.K. Varallo - manuscriptThis paper attempts to develop a criterion for determining when one’s own opinion is incorrect. I first establish a Gadamerian critique of Enlightenment objectivism and continue by stating that neither radical objectivism nor radical relativism are applicable standards within epistemology. There must be both some valid and some invalid opinions. In dialogue with Georgia Warnke, the discussion of right and wrong perception is based on the minimums of immediate illegitimizing of certain prejudices: part-whole incongruity and dogmatic opinions. Further, in conjunction (...)
- Verstehen statt Fakten vermitteln: Ein Erkenntnistheoretisches Argument für Dialogbasierte Wissenschaftskommunikation.Tanja Rechnitzer - 2024 - In Alexander Christian & Ina Gawel, Wissenschaftsleugnung. Fallstudien, philosophische Analysen und Vorschläge zur Wissenschaftskommunikation. De Gruyter. pp. 257-276.This article investigates Public Understanding of Science (PUS) as an epistemic goal of science communication. It proposes to conceptualize PUS as a form of understanding and discusses what implications this has for science communication from a social epistemological perspective. Specifically, it is argued that 1) PUS can be conceptualized as an epistemic goal of science communication in a way that does not already imply the so-called deficit model, and 2) that interactive and dialogue- based forms of communication are also justified (...)$56.77 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation
Bookmark - Explaining Phenomenal Explanationism: A Précis of Appearance & Explanation.McCain Kevin & Luca Moretti - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3:article number 85.
- Epistemic Autonomy, Trust, and Conflicts of Interest: A Reply to McBrayer.Joshua Brecka - 2024 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 13 (6):31-39.Whether we ought to trust the testimony of another person is often thought to primarily depend on features like their evidence, knowledge, or level of expertise. No doubt these are epistemically relevant features. However, a recent paper by Justin P. McBrayer (2024) convincingly argues that a testifier's interests may be more important than their expertise when it comes to how we should allocate our epistemic trust in them. Just think of the proverbial used car salesman. You should not trust what (...)
- Deference or critical engagement: how should healthcare practitioners use clinical ethics guidance?Ben Davies & Joshua Parker - 2024 - Monash Bioethics Review 42 (1):1-15.Healthcare practitioners have access to a range of ethical guidance. However, the normative role of this guidance in ethical decision-making is underexplored. This paper considers two ways that healthcare practitioners could approach ethics guidance. We first outline the idea of deference to ethics guidance, showing how an attitude of deference raises three key problems: moral value; moral understanding; and moral error. Drawing on philosophical literature, we then advocate an alternative framing of ethics guidance as a form of moral testimony by (...)
- Thinking Together: Advising as Collaborative Deliberation.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).We spend a good deal of time thinking about how and when to advise others, and how to respond to other people advising us. However, philosophical discussions of the nature and norms advising have been scattered and somewhat disconnected. The most focused discussion has come from philosophers of language interested in whether advising is a kind of assertive or directive kind of speech act. This paper argues that the ordinary category of advising is much more heterogenous than has been appreciated: (...)
- Biblical Narratives and Human Flourishing: Knowledge Through Narrative.Eleonore Stump & Judith Wolfe (eds.) - 2024 - Routledge.Biblical narratives include some of the most important and influential narratives in human history, shaping human understanding of the most basic questions of human life as lived individually or in social association with others. These narratives have lasted for so many centuries because they offer deep insights into the nature of the human condition and human flourishing. This volume includes chapters by accomplished philosophers and theologians who bring their expertise to bear on biblical narratives to show the way in which (...)
- Moral Testimony: Another Defense.Xuanpu Zhuang - 2024 - Filosofia Unisinos 25 (2):1-12.According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an (...)
- Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2).That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...)
- Aesthetic Communication.Jeremy Page - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.Can testimony provide reasons to believe some proposition about an artwork’s aesthetic character? Can testimony bring an agent into a position where they can issue an aesthetic judgement about that artwork? What is the epistemic value of aesthetic communication? These questions have received sustained philosophical attention. More fundamental questions about aesthetic communication have meanwhile been neglected. These latter questions concern the nature of aesthetic communication, the criteria that determine when aesthetic communication is successful, and the frequency of communicative success in (...)
- Testimony by Presupposition.Paula Keller - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2149-2167.Testimony is a source of knowledge. A speaker asserts what a hearer may therefore come to know. Assertion has widely been treated as the exclusive or at least the paradigmatic vehicle for testimony. I argue that we testify not only by asserting something, but also by taking something for granted within some other utterance. In philosophy of language, this is called semantic presupposition. The very reasons leading theorists of testimony have for thinking that assertion can be testimony are equally reasons (...)
- Deepfakes: a survey and introduction to the topical collection.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2024 - Synthese 204 (1):1-19.Deepfakes are extremely realistic audio/video media. They are produced via a complex machine-learning process, one that centrally involves training an algorithm on hundreds or thousands of audio/video recordings of an object or person, S, with the aim of either creating entirely new audio/video media of S or else altering existing audio/video media of S. Deepfakes are widely predicted to have deleterious consequences (principally, moral and epistemic ones) for both individuals and various of our social practices and institutions. In this introduction (...)
- Content internalism and testimonial knowledge.Joey Pollock - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1947-1968.It is commonly assumed that content preservation is required for success in testimonial exchanges. Many content internalists, however, cannot endorse this assumption. They must claim instead that testimonial exchanges can often succeed when the content grasped by the hearer is not the content of the speaker’s testimony, p, but some merely similar content, p*. Goldberg (2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) argues that this internalist approach is epistemically problematic: it cannot maintain certain features thought (...)
- Living with Uncertainty: Full Transparency of AI isn’t Needed for Epistemic Trust in AI-based Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.Can AI developers be held epistemically responsible for the processing of their AI systems when these systems are epistemically opaque? And can explainable AI (XAI) provide public justificatory reasons for opaque AI systems’ outputs? Koskinen (2024) gives negative answers to both questions. Here, I respond to her and argue for affirmative answers. More generally, I suggest that when considering people’s uncertainty about the factors causally determining an opaque AI’s output, it might be worth keeping in mind that a degree of (...)
- The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories: Concepts, Methods and Theory.M. R. X. Dentith (ed.) - 2024 - Routledge.This book presents state of the art philosophical work on conspiracy theory research that brings in sharp focus on central and important insights concerning the supposed irrationality of conspiracy theory and conspiracy theory belief, while also proposing several novel solutions to long standing issues in the broader academic debate on these things called ‘conspiracy theories’. -/- It features a critical history of conspiracy theory theory, emphasising the role of the ‘first generation’ of philosophers in conspiracy theory research. This book also (...)
- Do We Deserve Credit for Everything We Understand?Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2021 - Episteme 21 (1):187-206.It is widely acknowledged in the literature in social epistemology that knowledge has a social dimension: we are epistemically dependent upon one another for most of what we know. Our knowledge can be, and very often is, grounded on the epistemic achievement of somebody else. But what about epistemic aims other than knowledge? What about understanding? Prominent authors argue that understanding is not social in the same way in which knowledge is. Others can put us in the position to understand, (...)
- Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal.Katherine Dormandy - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):34-49.What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is (...)
- Do Your Own Research.Nathan Ballantyne, Jared B. Celniker & David Dunning - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):302-317.This article evaluates an emerging element in popular debate and inquiry: DYOR. (Haven’t heard of the acronym? Then Do Your Own Research.) The slogan is flexible and versatile. It is used frequently on social media platforms about topics from medical science to financial investing to conspiracy theories. Using conceptual and empirical resources drawn from philosophy and psychology, we examine key questions about the slogan’s operation in human cognition and epistemic culture.
- Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest.Justin P. McBrayer - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):290-301.To place epistemic trust in someone is to take their word for something. Much of the existing literature on epistemic trust concerns epistemic authorities. But as important as authority is to epistemic trust, it pales in comparison to the epistemic importance of conflicts of interests. In economics, we say that buyers shouldn’t take the word of sellers. Caveat emptor: let the buyer beware. I argue for a similar principle in epistemology. Caveat auditor: let the hearer beware. Others often have incentives (...)
- Intellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility.Keith Raymond Harris - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.In light of the complexity of some important matters, the best epistemic strategy for laypersons is often to rely heavily on the judgments of subject matter experts. However, given the contentiousness of some issues and the existence of fake experts, determining who to trust from the lay perspective is no simple matter. One proposed approach is for laypersons to attend to displays of intellectual virtue as indicators of expertise. I argue that this strategy is likely to fail, as non-experts often (...)
- Epistemological Problems of Testimony.Nick Leonard - 2023 - In [no title].
- The puzzle of plausible deniability.Andrew Peet - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-20.How is it that a speaker _S_ can at once make it obvious to an audience _A_ that she intends to communicate some proposition _p_, and yet at the same time retain plausible deniability with respect to this intention? The answer is that _S_ can bring it about that _A_ has a high justified credence that ‘_S_ intended _p_’ without putting _A_ in a position to know that ‘_S_ intended _p_’. In order to achieve this _S_ has to exploit a (...)
- Testimony of Oppression and the Limits of Empathy.Katharina Anna Sodoma - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (2):185-202.Testimony of oppression is testimony that something constitutes or contributes to a form of oppression, such as, for example, “The stranger’s comment was sexist.” Testimony of oppression that is given by members of the relevant oppressed group has the potential to play an important role in fostering a shared understanding of oppression. Yet, it is frequently dismissed out of hand. Against the background of a recent debate on moral testimony, this paper discusses the following question: How should privileged hearers approach (...)
- Disappearing Traces: Emmanuel Levinas, Ida Fink’s Literary Testimony, and Holocaust Art.Dorota Glowacka - 2002 - In Dorota Glowacka & Stephen Boos, Between Ethics and Aesthetics: Crossing the Boundaries. State University of New York Press. pp. 97-115.
- (1 other version)Co-deliberation, Joint Decision, and Testimony about Reasons: Reply to Tobias Steinig. Experts, Teachers and Their Epistemic Roles in Normative and Non-normative Domains, in: Analyse & Kritik 34, 251 – 274. [REVIEW]François Schroeter & Karen Jones - 2014 - Analyse & Kritik 36 (1):209-216.We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig’s recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical (working out what things are of genuine value and how to rank goods and ends) and one practical (engaging in joint action and social coordination). In between, simultaneously (...)
- The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism.Altanian Melanie - 2024 - London and New York: Taylor & Francis.THIS BOOK IS AVAILABLE OPEN ACCESS. The injustice of genocide denial is commonly understood as a violation of the dignity of victims, survivors, and their descendants, and further described as an assault on truth and memory. This book rethinks the normative relationship between dignity, truth, and memory in relation to genocide denial by adopting the framework of epistemic injustice. This framework performs two functions. First, it introduces constructive normative vocabulary into genocide scholarship through which we can gain a better understanding (...)
- Testimony on Gaston Bachelard.Georges Gusdorf & Eileen Rizo-Patron - 2017 - In Eileen Rizo-Patron, Edward S. Casey & Jason M. Wirth, Adventures in phenomenology: Gaston Bachelard. Albany, NY: Suny Press. pp. 277-279.
- Anscombe, Anarchism, and Authority.Anne Jeffrey - forthcoming - Ergo.Philosophical anarchism, in its strongest form, says that a right to be obeyed would run up against the duty to act autonomously, so there must be no one with a right to be obeyed. More recently, a parallel criticism of moral testimony has been advanced according to which there can be no right to be believed about moral matters because it would lead us to fail in our duty to form our moral beliefs for ourselves, and thus to bear responsibility (...)
- The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim Milnes (review).Margaret Watkins - 2024 - Hume Studies 49 (1):175-180.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim MilnesMargaret WatkinsTim Milnes. The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. viii + 278. Hardback. ISBN: 9780198812739. $91.00.In his brief autobiography, “My Own Life,” Hume reports that “almost all [his] life has been spent in literary pursuits and occupations” (E-MOL: xxxi). This is one (...)
- A view into the fray : lived testimony of minorities in the UK peace, security and foreign policymaking fields.Aditi Gupta & Mélina Villeneuve - 2024 - In Hannah Partis-Jennings & Clara Eroukhmanoff, Feminist policymaking in turbulent times: critical perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Testimony and evidence.Nick Leonard - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Rethinking Amidah and partisan testimony from the non-Jewish resistance member’s writings of Anna Pawełczyńska.Adele Valeria Messina - 2024 - History of European Ideas 50 (2):266-286.This article juxtaposes Anna Pawełczyńska’s writings with the works of Meir Dworzecki and Dov Levin. It will adopt a threefold analytical lens: first, using Pawełczyńska’s writings to reassess the conception of the early resistance that Dworzecki elaborated, second utilising Dworzecki’s viewpoint as a means to articulate Pawełczyńska’s perspective of Amidah, and then looking at Levin’s perspective on Pawełczyńska’s use of partisan testimony as a historical source. The main aims are to contribute to today’s debates on the Jewish resistance and the (...)
- The gatekeeper's dilemma: expert testimony, scientific knowledge and judicial reasoning.Edoardo Peruzzi & Gustavo Cevolani - manuscriptWe examine the relationship between scientific knowledge and the legal system with a focus on the exclusion of expert testimony from trial as ruled by the Daubert standard in the US.We introduce a simple framework to understand and assess the role of judges as “gatekeepers”, monitoring the admission of science in the courtroom. We show how judges face a crucial choice, namely, whether to limit Daubert assessment to the abstract reliability of the methods used by the expert witness or also (...)
- Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach by Jon Robson.Matilde Carrasco Barranco - forthcoming - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 61 (1):90-94.A book review of Jon Robson, Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, x+166 pp. ISBN 9780192862952.
- Simulación y testimonio: a propósito de la posibilidad de conocer a través de otros en el metaverso.Felipe Álvarez - 2023 - Cuadernos de Beauchef 7 (2):161-178.
- Updating on Biased Probabilistic Testimony.Leander Vignero - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):567-590.In this paper, I use a framework from computational linguistics, the Rational Speech Act framework, to model deceptive probabilistic communication. This account allows agents to discount for the biases they perceive their interlocutors to have. This way, agents can update their credences with the perceived interests of others in mind.
| 1 — 50 / 1337 |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-99fc7d78b-6fxz5 uwo