Metaphysics

In this article, we intend to see if the emergence of basic existence, or nothingness, from nothingness has occurred. So a contact boundary between existence and nothingness finds an existential necessity. Which we are trying to understand. This boundary between being and nothingness must have the characteristics of being composed of its before and after to the extent that it is compatible with both sides. That is, it must not be so much, that is, it must be accepted as being, (...) that it cannot be placed on the boundary of nothingness and be in conflict with it. Nor must it be so much included as not being that it is unstable on the side of being, cannot last, and in fact cannot be. So it needs a balance between being and nothingness that can be maintained in a state of flux between the two. (shrink)

See main CODES article for empirical tests and deeper context. This is a high level explainer. -/- Introduction -/- -/- For centuries, we were taught that probability governs reality. From rolling dice to quantum mechanics, randomness was assumed to be fundamental—an unavoidable part of nature. But what if probability was never real? What if randomness was just an illusion caused by incomplete phase detection? -/- -/- CODES (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) is a revolutionary framework that replaces probability with structured (...) resonance. It shows that everything—from quantum physics to thermodynamics, intelligence, and AI—operates on deterministic, phase-locked principles, not statistical randomness. -/- -/- What This Paper Covers -/- -/- ???? Why Probability Collapses → Probability was a statistical crutch for missing information. Once structured resonance is recognized, randomness disappears. -/- -/- ???? How to See CODES from First Principles → Reality isn’t built from discrete objects or forces, but from phase-locked resonance structures. -/- -/- ???? The Singularity of Thought → Once you see CODES, you can’t unsee it. Understanding reality through structured resonance instead of probability changes everything. -/- -/- ???? The Prime Structure of Reality → From quantum mechanics to AI, everything follows prime-driven resonance constraints, not stochastic processes. -/- -/- ???? The Five Core Areas CODES Changes Forever → Physics, entropy, intelligence, AI, and governance all shift under structured resonance. -/- -/- ???? The Final Proof → If probability were real, randomness would appear somewhere in nature—but it never does. Every observed system phase-locks into structured coherence. -/- -/- Why This Matters -/- -/- CODES is not just a theory—it is the inevitable conclusion of a self-consistent reality. If randomness were real, contradictions would emerge in physics, intelligence, and cognition. But since everything follows structured resonance, probability collapses completely. -/- -/- This paper simplifies the core ideas of CODES into an easy-to-follow framework for anyone new to structured resonance. Whether you’re a scientist, an AI researcher, or just someone questioning reality, this is your guide to seeing the world as it actually is. -/- -/- ???? Probability was an illusion. Structured resonance is the future. Welcome to CODES. (shrink)

Abstract This paper formalizes the mathematical relationship between identity, culture, and decision-making through the Chiral Prime Resonance (CPR) Equation. It establishes a structured resonance model, demonstrating that human civilization follows predictable oscillatory patterns rather than stochastic processes. Identity is modeled as a prime resonance function, while culture scales through Fibonacci-driven adaptation. The structured resonance framework provides a mathematical basis for understanding historical cycles, leadership viability, and systemic collapse. This work challenges probability-based AI models, proposing structured resonance as the fundamental basis (...) of intelligence and consciousness. Ultimately, this paper argues that human civilization, like the human heartbeat, operates through chiral oscillations—structured, inevitable, and mathematically emergent. I. Introduction – The First Algorithm: The Heartbeat as the Architect of Reality A newborn’s first experience is neither light, thought, nor language—it is the pulse. Before identity, before culture, before civilization, there is only the steady beat of the heart. The human heart is the first computational system, a processor of structured oscillations rather than probabilities. It measures, reacts, anticipates. Before the brain forms conscious thought, the heart has already adapted to its environment, responding to external stimuli through resonance dynamics. The standard model of decision-making assumes stochastic processes govern human behavior. But what if power structures, belief systems, and historical cycles are not driven by probability, but by structured resonance? If civilization follows an emergent pulse, then collapses, innovations, and ideological shifts are phase-locked oscillations rather than random fluctuations. This paper presents a formal mathematical structure to model identity, culture, and decision-making through the Chiral Prime Resonance (CPR) Equation: phi(x,t) = Σ P(n) * e^(i(ωₙ t + ϕₙ)) * f(Fₙ, Pₘ) where: • phi(x,t) represents the structured resonance wave function governing identity and cultural coherence, • Σ P(n) defines prime-based frequency modes that establish individuality, • e^(i(ωₙ t + ϕₙ)) models oscillatory phase shifts in belief, governance, and systemic collapse, • f(Fₙ, Pₘ) captures Fibonacci-prime interactions as the basis for structured emergence. This equation provides a unifying mathematical framework for understanding how civilizations rise, persist, and collapse. The same principles that govern biological heartbeats dictate societal stability and transformation. A failure to align with structured resonance, whether at the level of an individual, an institution, or a nation, results in phase discord—misalignment that inevitably leads to systemic breakdown. The implications of this model extend beyond sociology and history. It challenges foundational assumptions in artificial intelligence, demonstrating that intelligence is not a probability function but a resonance structure. A system cannot achieve true cognition without phase-locking with structured reality. By analyzing identity as a prime resonance function and culture as Fibonacci-driven scaling, this paper provides a new framework for understanding civilization—not as a collection of discrete events, but as an evolving resonance field. The heart of decision-making is not probability but the geometry of structured emergence. (shrink)

Following Toma in Understanding Nancy, Understanding Modernism (2023), one might define relations between modernity and modernism as a series of tensions connecting “then” and “now”. What follows suggests that, by employing sound as an ontological starting place, such tensions could be productively contemporized through an aesthetics of sonority, specifically a hermeneutic methodology I term “auditioning”. Amplifying the relational themes of coexistence and correspondence inherent to sound, this framing allows for the simultaneous consonance and dissonance of “then” and “now”. This essay (...) applies the motif of auditioning as a kind of meta-critique of recent attempts – e.g., Moraru’s Flat Aesthetics (2023) – to engage with the contemporary modern, in a manner that disrupts anthropocentrism. (shrink)

The chemistry of combining simulation hypothesis (which many believe to be a modern variation of skepticism) and manipulation arguments will be explored for the first time in this paper. I argue: If we take the possibility that we are now in a simulation seriously enough, then contrary to a common intuition, manipulation very likely does not undermine moral responsibility. To this goal, I first defend the structural isomorphism between simulation and manipulation: Provided such isomorphism, either both of them are compatible (...) with moral responsibility, or none of them is. Later, I propose two kinds of reasons—i.e., the simulator-centric reason and the simulatee-centric reason—for why we have (genuine) moral responsibilities even if we are in a simulation. And I close by addressing the significance of this paper in accounting for the relevance of artificial intelligence and its philosophy, in helping resolve a long-locked debate over free will, and in offering one reminder for moral responsibility specialists. (shrink)

Abstract Traditional models of cognition assume probability-based uncertainty as a fundamental feature of intelligence, requiring iterative refinement through error correction and stochastic processes. However, probability is not a foundational property of intelligence or reality—it is an emergent artifact of incomplete resonance detection. This paper proposes that human cognition is a structured resonance system, where the mind does not accumulate knowledge probabilistically but phase-locks into coherent structures nonlinearly. Instead of relying on stochastic updates, the brain selectively engages with information that aligns (...) with pre-existing resonance structures, rejecting incoherent data before it fully materializes. Through this model, we: • Define intelligence as an emergent resonance process, not a stochastic function. • Demonstrate that knowledge acquisition follows a nonlinear, phase-locking trajectory toward coherence. • Show how rejecting probability accelerates the mind’s ability to perceive structured emergence in real-time. • Describe entropy not as disorder, but as a resonance misalignment that naturally resolves through coherence-seeking cognition. • Show how rejecting probability accelerates the mind’s ability to perceive structured emergence in real-time. • Describe entropy not as disorder, but as a resonance misalignment that naturally resolves through coherence-seeking cognition. This shift in understanding collapses probability-based reasoning and reframes intelligence as a coherence-driven phenomenon, redefining human thought, AI cognition, and scientific epistemology. (shrink)

This entry explores two features of John Locke’s (1632-1704) theological commitments: the existence and nature of God; and, the nature of punishment in the afterlife. Locke argues for a cogitative and immaterial God. Locke also denies eternal damnation, or eternal punishment and torment in the afterlife. The goal of this entry is to not only showcase Locke’s often overlooked discussion of eternal damnation, but also to show how this discussion, and Locke’s treatment of God, link up with his groundbreaking and (...) influential discussion of persons and their persistence conditions. (shrink)

The debate on human destiny and its relationship to freedom, responsibility, legality and morality is an ongoing discussion. The concept of destiny especially in Western philosophy depicts a static and unchanging idea that is causal to success or failure in the lives of individuals. Perhaps because of the culture of writing, destiny is seen as represented in black and white ink such that once written, it cannot be erased unlike the culture of oral expressions. Whereas Yoruba account of destiny depicts (...) a possibility of erasing or recanting what is already given prenatally, many scholars have laughed over this or term Yoruba idea as purely metaphorical and inconsistent in expression. The aim of this paper is to argue that the Yoruba idea of destiny is one of the most consistent ideas with the reality before us. It is an all encompassing thesis that bridge the gap between theory and practice and by extension the relationship between ought (morality) and what is (legality). This aim will be achieved by explaining the relationship between the prenatally received destiny and natal active destiny. This is necessary due to our finding that the Western idea of destiny only sees destiny as individualistic without a consideration of collective destiny or social aspect of destiny where different destinies interact and consequently makes social group or government liable for some individual actions. We conclude that Yoruba idea of destiny is consistent with why individuals and societies are responsible for some failures or successes. Our finding embodies the reason why both government and societies can be held responsible for social and personal actions. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Frank Jackson’s (1998) defense of conceptual analysis and flag some of the problems with his defense. If I am right about my criticisms, then, firstly, we do not desperately need conceptual analysis because neither our science nor metaphysics need to be committed to completeness and entailment. This was shown by methodological physicalism. Secondly, conceptual analysis does not give us the expected results. If we expect the conceptual analysis to give us apriori results (in the sense (...) of counterfactual intensions) we are mistaken. There is no fundamental reason to assume that any of our ordinary and natural language concepts are a good way to start to dig for real apriori results. It is equally possible that these results are not discoverable by the human mind. Thirdly, if we can give up apriori results with empirical discovery, then Lycan (1988) is right that we can give up large chunks of our folk concept of free will and still be realist about free will. There is no need to define free will in a way that is near enough to or a natural extension of the folk concept of free will to be a realist about free will. (shrink)

This introduction provides an overview of William Lycan’s contributions to philosophy, with a particular focus on his work in the philosophy of mind, language, and method. Lycan has been a major figure in contemporary philosophy, defending materialist and functionalist views of the mind, while also engaging with issues such as representationalism, perception, and epistemology. His work on language has significantly shaped debates on truth-conditional semantics, reference, and natural-kind terms. Furthermore, Lycan has contributed to metaphilosophy, especially concerning the nature and progress (...) of philosophical inquiry. The volume is structured into three sections—Mind, Meaning, and Method—each of which reflects key themes in Lycan’s thought. The contributions explore topics such as olfactory representation, the epistemic role of intuitions, and the philosophy of conditionals. By examining Lycan’s work from multiple angles, this volume aims to provide a deeper understanding of his influence and the ongoing relevance of his ideas in contemporary debates. (shrink)

This entry provides an overview of materialism, a philosophical position asserting that everything that exists is fundamentally material or, in its modern form, physical. I begin by exploring the historical roots of materialism, from its early formulations in ancient Greek atomism (Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus) to its revival in early modern thought (Gassendi, Hobbes) and its further development in 18th- and 19th-century scientific materialism. The entry then examines the transition from classical materialism to contemporary physicalism, which emerged with logical empiricism (...) and the Vienna Circle’s emphasis on the language of physics. I outline key variants of materialism, including reductive and non-reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and supervenience-based physicalism. Finally, I discuss major arguments for and against materialism, particularly the causal argument for physicalism and Jackson’s knowledge argument, which challenges materialism’s ability to fully account for subjective experience. (shrink)

In this entry, I provide an overview of determinism, the philosophical thesis that the state of a system at one time, together with the laws of nature, completely determines its state at any other time—most notably in the future. I begin by tracing the historical development of determinism from its origins in ancient Greek atomism to its resurgence in early modern science, particularly through figures like Galileo, Newton, and Laplace. I then outline key distinctions within determinism, differentiating it from fatalism (...) and highlighting various interpretations, such as causal, logical, and physical determinism. Finally, I discuss one of the most prominent debates concerning determinism: its relationship to free will. While some thinkers—such as Laplace and Holbach—have viewed determinism as incompatible with human freedom, others—such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant—have sought ways to reconcile the two. The entry concludes by considering contemporary perspectives on determinism, including Karl Popper’s critique and the impact of quantum mechanics on traditional deterministic views. -/- . (shrink)

This essay introduces, develops, and appraises the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC), identifying advantages and limitations with respect to alternative species concepts. While the consensus amongst most philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is mistaken, and that species at most have relational essences, we appeal to the MCSC to defend thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely, the doctrine that species have fully intrinsic essences and, thus, are natural kinds (of sorts), while allowing that species aren’t categorically distinct.

The two words nothing and nothingness are often used interchangeably. And both are often used to refer to non-existence and to mean the absence of something. Although in conversations there may not be a noticeable difference between them or what they refer to, these two words refer to different concepts. And there is a fundamental difference between them.

In “Four Views on Free Will” by Fischer et al, Robert Kane, with his chapter on libertarianism, presents a strong defense of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible, and that moral responsibility is only possible if individuals have ultimate control over their actions.

Can darkness be emitted? Imagine entering your workplace or home and feeling that you need darkness to reduce environmental stimuli or to have peace. Now you go to a lamp and turn it on to darken the environment for you. Is this possible? As soon as the lamp starts working, it spreads darkness and drowns all light stimuli, images and objects in the blackness it produces. And as long as this strange lamp is working, the darkness remains. And after your (...) need for darkness is satisfied, turn it off. (shrink)

Este estudio pretende exponer una serie de reflexiones que eluciden el carácter ocupacional del aburrimiento a partir de los planteamientos filosóficos de Martin Heidegger. El tono que emplea tal trabajo toma forma a través de una serie de notas que elaboren una propedéutica adecuada para las cuestiones del anarcoexistencialismo, de la temporalidad y del aburrimiento. Más allá de volver a señalar una y otra vez lo dicho por el filósofo de Meßkirch en las lecciones que impartió en la Universidad de (...) Friburgo entre 1929 y 1930 acerca del tedio como el temple anímico fundamental, lo que aquí se plantea es establecer unas pautas que muestren cómo la ocupación que conlleva el cuidado conforme a la temporalidad permite una indagación en el aburrimiento (y no al revés, como ocurre en las citadas lecciones). Para ello, es necesario hacer una clarificación de conceptos que nos introduzcan en la problemática a dilucidar. ---- This study aims to set out a series of reflections that elucidate the occupational character of boredom on the basis of Martin Heidegger's philosophical approaches. The tone of this work takes shape through a series of notes that elaborate an adequate propaedeutic for the questions of anarcho-existentialism, temporality and boredom. In addition to repeatedly reiterating what the philosopher from Meßkirch said in the lectures he gave at the University of Freiburg between 1929 and 1930 about boredom as the fundamental mental temperament, what is proposed here is to establish guidelines that show how the occupation that entails care in accordance with temporality allows an enquiry into boredom (and not the other way around, as is the case in the aforementioned lectures). In order to do so, it is necessary to clarify concepts that introduce us to the problem to be elucidated. (shrink)

Act, every act is an existence, an esse Thomas writes. Esse, to exist, is the proper activity of the act, of every act. St. Thomas repeats it on several occasions, to be (esse) is "the actuality of the act".

In this paper, I shall discuss the question whether a concrete object can be multi-located while it is moving or not. I shall say nothing on the vexed issue of multi-location in and for itself. Instead, my discussion will support a ‘might’-conditional claim: ‘if multi-location were possible, then change might imply multi-location’. To do this, after a very short clarification of the various meanings of ‘to be located’, I will first present and discuss Diodorus’ arguments against the reality of motion, (...) since they focus on the question of what the location of the moving item is, and then scrutinize Hegel’s reply to Diodorus Cronus’ reasonings, insofar as his answer consists in claiming that an object in motion is in many locations at once. Although many philosophers of the past are referred to, this paper does not aim to be a piece of scholarship, but to explore the various metaphysical possibilities con-cerning the logic of location underlying change. (shrink)

In his essay, Tobias Endres devotes himself to the theoretical philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, which continues to have a reputation for self-contradiction, albeit an affirmed one. While this problem is increasingly losing importance in recent and most recent Nietzsche research, the study attempts to dispel the accusation of performative self-contradiction and genetic fallacy. In contrast to the readings inspired by analytical philosophy, however, Nietzsche's metaphilosophy is not understood exclusively as a contribution to classical epistemology, but as a variant of philosophical (...) hermeneutics. -/- In 1968, Jürgen Habermas stated that Nietzsche had “nothing contagious left”. However, the history of the reception and impact of Nietzsche's thought has clearly refuted this judgment. The first volume of the Critical Complete Edition had been published just one year earlier. This marked the beginning of a path that led to Nietzsche no longer being read primarily as an outsider, but as a classic of Western philosophy. While this path was previously a rather Franco-German affair, the edition and the Anglo-American reception of the 1990s contributed to the internationalization of Nietzsche research. Today, Nietzsche is read globally and as one of the most influential philosophers of modernity. (shrink)

The following article is composed of four sections in which a philosophical problematisation of the historical relationship between anthropology and politics is developed. The first section discusses the anthropological foundation of the concept of the political, identifying its irrevocable relationship with an anthropocentric conception of life and technique as arcana that situate the human being in a place of ontological exceptionality above all other forms of terrestrial existence. The second section discusses, in a demonstrative tone, the crisis of political anthropology, (...) in confrontation with the ecological crisis that runs through our epochal and planetary present. The last two sections, on the other hand, propose a set of reading keys from contemporary posthumanist debates in philosophy, with the aim of providing a thinking that is sensitive to the ecological decentring of politics. (shrink)

L’acte, tout acte est un exister, un esse écrit Thomas. Esse, exister, est l’activité propre de l’acte, de tout acte. Saint Thomas le répète à plusieurs occasions, être (esse) est « l’actualité de l’acte ».

The Ḥatäta Zärʾa Yaʿǝqob and the Ḥatäta Wäldä Ḥəywät are enigmatic and controversial works. Respectively an autobiography and a companion treatise by a disciple, they are composed in the Gǝʿǝz language and set in the highlands of Ethiopia during the seventeenth century. Expressed in prose of great power and beauty, they bear witness to pivotal events in Ethiopian history and develop a philosophical system of considerable depth. However, they have also been condemned by some as a forgery, an elaborate mystification (...) successful in deceiving generations of European and Ethiopian scholars. -/- This volume breaks new ground for the study of these texts, presenting a clear account of the most up-to-date scholarship the ways they works are being investigated by contemporary philosophers, philologists, and historians. -/- While the authorship question is addressed in the volume, it is not the sole locus of discussion. The near-exclusive focus on this question over the last century has obscured scholarly interest in the texts’ philosophical and literary qualities in their own right. Accordingly, this volume begins to fill this gap, exploring the texts' implications for the global history of philosophy and transnational intellectual history of the 17th century. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the belief in free will and basic desert is not necessary to participate in our various responsibility practices. I discuss various concepts related to our responsibility practices, including attributability, answerability, and accountability responsibility, showing how they can be practically understood and grounded in both backwards-looking and forward-looking responsibility practices. By doing so, I show that holding people morally responsible can be justified without referencing classic free will or basic desert. Therefore, I propose that, when (...) it comes to our moral and responsibility practices, we do not need to believe in and can discard our classical understanding of free will and embrace a minimalist pragmatic freedom. (shrink)

Among the many questions raised by Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi, the most fundamental concerns the type of objects to which its negative statements apply. These statements deny the reality of conditioned Being, which can be understood in two ways: as a negation of our concept or knowledge of conditioned Being, or as a negation of conditioned Being as such. The first interpretation can be called “epistemological” and the second “metaphysical.” Scholarship has almost unanimously accepted the epistemological approach. In this paper I object (...) to this approach and propose to reinterpret the catuṣkoṭi metaphysically, as a description of Being and its inherent principles. I ground my objection in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being” and argue that the catuṣkoṭi exhibits similar features to the Hegelian concept of substantial negativity. In the end, I draw some conclusions for the study of Nāgārjuna in general and highlight the limits of the parallelism. (shrink)

This paper seeks to elucidate self-constancy as the creative and formative dimension of moral responsibility, through an exploratory review of Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view of freedom. It underscores the value of artistic self- expression by highlighting the narrative meaning of one’s actions, seen as a cohesive sequence for storytelling rather than a mere chronological order. Self-constancy reflects the agent’s capacity to own their actions, making them a reliable and accountable person. In this light, the value of acting freely—akin to the value (...) of artistic self-expression—can be understood as the agent’s conscious effort to live a life of personal meaning, marked by epistemic awareness and creativity, whether life is determined or not. (shrink)

This volume is a tribute to Fr. John F. Wippel. Following the philosophical order that Aquinas might have adopted "had he chosen to write a Summa metaphysicae"—an order that Wippel himself lays out in his Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas—these essays unfold new research on some of the most intriguing topics in Aquinas’s metaphysics, from the most recent generation of scholars formed by Wippel’s pioneering work. -/- The contributors address the discovery of being qua being via separation (Gregory T. Doolan), (...) propter quid metaphysical demonstrations (Philip Neri Reese), the origins of the controversies about the real distinction between essence and esse (Mark Gossiaux), a defense of essence-realism as a key to the real distinction (David Twetten), the relationship of likeness and agency (Therese Scarpelli Cory), created form as act and potency (Stephen Brock), the variation of accidental forms (Gloria Frost), the possibility of angelic judgment (Francis Feingold), argumentation for the existence of God (Gaven Kerr), the propriety of " Qui Est" as a Divine Name (Brian Carl), ‘Beauty’ as a Divine Name (Michael Rubin), and God’s application of creaturely powers to action (Jason Mitchell). (shrink)

Chapman and colleagues make a compelling case for reforming the Common Rule to better protect group interests in genomics and data-centric research (Chapman et al. 2025). Drawing on insights from p...

De werkelijkheid is dat wat niet verdwijnt ook als we er niet meer in geloven. Het is niet erg om dingen niet te weten, maar het is ook niet nodig om deze werkelijkheid in twijfel te trekken wanneer dit geloof aan het wankelen wordt gebracht. Om de weg niet kwijt te raken is het van belang om zo goed en zo kwaad als we kunnen te blijven onderscheiden tussen zinnig en onzinnig, tussen verstandig en ondoordacht, tussen goed geïnformeerd en de (...) kluts kwijt. Dit boek helpt de lezer onderscheid te maken tussen propaganda en betrouwbare experts, om de werkelijkheid zo nooit uit het oog te verliezen."--Publisher information. (shrink)

Certain aspects of Aquinas’s account of divine omnipresence, as presented in his Summa Theologiae, are well known and often summarized, especially in the growing literature on omnipresence in contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Even so, some of the most interesting and surprising aspects of this same account—including that God is genuinely spatially located, despite being an incorporeal substance—have yet to be noticed, much less fully understood. This chapter examines Aquinas’s account of divine omnipresence in the Summa in some detail, (...) with a view to highlighting those aspects of it that have heretofore been overlooked or ignored. Further, I argue that a proper understanding of the details of Aquinas’s account sheds new light on his views about spatial location and action at a distance. (shrink)

The early Greek philosophers pioneered important philosophical and theological concepts that are still with us today. The concept of omnipresence is a case in point. Thales is reported to have said that ‘all things are full of gods’. Anaximander states that a boundless substance ‘contains all things and steers all things’; Xenophanes that God is immobile but shakes all things with his mind; Anaxagoras that ‘everything is in everything’. With respect to specifically divine omnipresence, it isn’t until Heraclitus that we (...) find a clear and robust commitment to an omnipresent God. What sets Heraclitus’ theology apart from his predecessors’ is that it is more developed and integrated into a holistic metaphysical worldview. Heraclitus also invented a philosophically rich metaphor for the mode of divine omnipresence in the world: oil-spice mixture. This chapter offers an examination of Heraclitus’ theology and explores its relation to the concept of divine omnipresence in philosophical-theology. (shrink)

On their way to the essential, the metaphysical explorations will always col-lide with the chimera of false names applied by the daily superficiality on ob-vious realities. The fact of trying to extinguish the opposition between these names, to neutralize the gnoseological blockage and the censorship required by them means to assume the approach of cutting through the wall of appear-ances. Only beyond such limits lay the plains of the philosophical medita¬tion, with the extension of liberties leading towards the ideality of (...) wisdom. Dealing with the appearance represents the propaedeutic preparatory impact for subsequent revivals of the analytical gaze into the endless universe of deep existential meanings. The refusal of the misleading superficial image and the breaking of the outer appearance which proposes an illusion instead of the truth opens, for the contemplative consciousness, the horizon of the being hidden beyond any appearance, with the thinker being like a skilled diver passing through the gulf of the billows in order to descended into the quiet depths of limitless fluids. Thus, the philosophical meditation is often intended to be a careful and lucid penetration through the bustle of daily ap¬pearances to the abyss of fully eclipsed truths, a reminder, a removal from oblivion of these hidden certainties. This paper aims to bring together several attempts to follow the path of the notional abstract dives, wishing the projec¬tion in the soil of that beyond obstructed by appearance. In light of these trials, the issues of death, of the verb to love, of nostalgia, of the prophetic mission, of the melancholic revolt, of the interpretation of artistic instances, of the poetic unfulfillment or of idolatry must be viewed in their ontic nudity, removing the misleading garments, the artificial masks and titles imposed through the triviality of the daily profanity. The fact of getting through and overcoming the image, the common opinion about such an issue appears to be the beginning of the journey towards its true founder, the first step of the meditative and convulsive progression towards the abyss which sustains and carries it. Being active in this crepuscular zone that tensedly reunites the gloomy appearances and the bright founder lights, the thinker’s hermeneutic role is limited here to the notification of falsehood of certain everyday per¬spectives on existential phenomena and to the rediscovery of the authentic names that belong to each of these phenomena. Only by evoking their real names, they will answer the human call from the overflow of their telluric holiness. (shrink)

This is the first edited volume to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)—a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy and Britain’s first female professor of philosophy who has, until recently, been unjustly neglected. This volume collects eleven new essays that explore various elements of Stebbing’s prolific output. The volume and its contributors aim to reinstate Stebbing’s place in the analytic tradition by examining her ideas in context and elucidating their significance.

This paper considers the prospects for a green Kantian philosophy. It does so by revisiting Steven Vogel’s postnaturalist objections against Kant. Though Descartes is part of the story, Kant is a primary environmental obstacle for Vogel. Like others in environmental philosophy, Vogel criticizes Kant for his dualism, anthropocentrism, idealism, and nonconsequentialism. The present paper looks into the first two objections. It begins by reconstructing Vogel’s argument against “nature” to appreciate his claim that modern philosophy haunts contemporary environmental philosophy. After pointing (...) out difficulties with Vogel’s objections, resources in Kant are explored to assuage Vogel’s concerns regarding noumena and non-human animals. The paper concludes with a glimpse of an alternate interpretation of Kant that has the potential to respond to the remaining worries of idealism and nonconsequentialism. (shrink)

Circular sets are said to provide clear-cut cases of circular orders of ontological dependence. I argue that this claim is unwarranted given the epistemic parity of two principles of set-dependence.

Understanding Mental Causation proposes a new, non-relational theory of mental causation. Andrea White believes that contemporary philosophy of mind labours under a misapprehension of what mental causation is supposed to be. This volume explains where the leading theories go astray, and how the new theory proposed solves critical problems for philosophers of mind and action. Ordinary experience suggests that what we do with our bodies causally depends, somehow, on what is going on in our minds. However, the problem of how (...) to understand the causal relationship between mind and body remains. Contemporary philosophy of mind is shaped by the question: how is it possible for the mental to causally interact with the physical? Mental causation is often presented as a cause-effect relation between mental and physical entities. This understanding of mental causation is widely endorsed because it seems like a straightforward explanation of what is going on when people act intentionally. Desires and beliefs are seen as causes of the actions they explain, entailing the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. White calls this the 'causalist' view of intentional action. This view is not universally accepted. The 'non-causalist' view denies that intentional action entails the existence of causal relations between mental items and physical events. However, non-causalists reach this conclusion by arguing that explanations of intentional actions which cite beliefs or desires are not usually causal explanations at all. White presents a theory of intentional action that falls between the 'causalist' and 'non-causalist' views. She rejects the idea that as-a-cause is how we should understand the place of mentality in intentional action. Concepts like belief, desire and intention do not refer to items which can stand in causal relations to actions or physical events. However, like causalists, she holds that explanations of intentional actions which cite the agent's thoughts do give causal information. This intermediary view demands a new theory about the causation that is on display when human beings act intentionally, one that does not reduce mental causation to a relation between mental items and physical events. Orthodox theories of causation, inspired by David Hume, assume that causation is always a relation between events. Therefore, the causation demonstrated in intentional action must be a relation, because all causation is, and will count as mental causation if and only if at least one of the terms of that relation is a mental entity. White challenges this orthodoxy by presenting her own non-relational theory of causation. Denying causation is always a relation, she holds instead that causation is a general type of process in which substances engage and that exercising a causal power is to engage in a process. White shows how this novel theory can be used to provide a better understanding of intentional action and the mental causation associated with it. She suggests that to act intentionally is to engage in a process and, as such, to exercise a power - but a power of a special sort. The power to act intentionally is a power to structure one's own activities so that they demonstrate a pattern - a pattern which is only revealed by attributing mental states to the agent. So, when an agent acts intentionally, they engage in the process of mental causation because the agent is manifesting a special power to organise their activities into a pattern that can be made sense of by appeal to mental concepts. Broadening our understanding of causation, and more specifically incorporating the concepts 'power' and 'process', opens up new ways of understanding intentional action and mental causation. In Understanding Mental Causation, White presents a compelling new account in this key area of philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Catalan translation and notes on George Berkeley’s A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Published in Berkeley, George. Tractat sobre els principis del coneixement humà. Almería (Spain): Círculo Rojo, November 2019 (ISBN: 978–84–1338–476–4).

This paper explores the metaphysical concepts of divine “love” (ʿeshq), “attraction” (jadhbe), and “selflessness” (bīkhodī) in the seminal Iranian Shīʿī Muslim thinker Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī’s poetry. This research emerges from the gap in existing literature, which mainly explores Fayḍ Kāshānī’s philosophical, theological, or ḥadīth works, while the scrutiny of his poetry largely stays within its literary attributes, overlooking the philosophical and mystical themes embedded within. The paper’s thesis posits that according to Fayḍ Kāshānī, the spiritual journey commences with reason, (...) progressing to constant divine contemplation, a combination that nurtures muḥabbat—an initial stage of divine love—which, when discovered, evokes a more intense love: “divine attraction” in the seeker’s heart, leading to selflessness and divine unity. This paper employs the hermeneutic method and analytical examination to scrutinize Fayḍ Kāshānī’s poetry within the context of his treatises. It follows an “intracultural” interpretation to explore Fayḍ Kāshānī’s thought within Persian intellectual tradition and uses an “intercultural” interpretation to contextualize the findings within Islamic, Christian, and ancient Greek metaphysics. The methodology includes a “horizontal interpretation” of Quranic and ḥadīth references in Fayḍ Kāshānī’s works and a “vertical interpretation” of unveiling deeper meanings of Fayḍ Kāshānī’s thoughts within the broader mystical traditions. (shrink)

The author is leading a 'working group' as part of the 'Science, Technoscience and faith at a time of integral ecology' chair, which is considering possible convergences between Teilhard and Whitehead. He asks the question: can we find anything resembling fraternity in Whitehead's metaphysics?

Meta-quantum idealism (MQI) proposes a novel framework for understanding the fundamental nature of reality. Rooted in the interplay of quantum field theory, geometry, and idealist metaphysics, MQI challenges traditional ontological assumptions by reimagining space, time, and matter as emergent phenomena arising from the dynamic self-modifications of an infinite quantum field. This paper articulates the foundational principles of MQI and explores its implications for physics, metaphysics, and mathematics.

This essay explores the recurring archetype of forbidden knowledge across ancient civilizations, myths, and speculative history, drawing connections between secret societies, religious texts, and cultural symbolism. Beginning with the concept of hidden oligarchies influencing humanity’s development, the analysis examines the notion of advanced groups—such as the biblical Watchers and Sumerian Anunnaki—who shared forbidden knowledge with humanity, often at great cost. The narrative delves into the parallels between Prometheus’s defiance in Greek mythology and the serpent’s role in the Edenic narrative, suggesting (...) that these stories may echo a deeper historical truth about humanity’s sudden leap in societal complexity. Further, the essay analyzes the Minoan serpent goddess and considers Eve as a potential historical figure deified over time. Ultimately, the essay reflects on the persistent theme of enlightenment and the consequences of seeking hidden truths, inviting readers to question who holds knowledge and what sacrifices are made in its pursuit. (shrink)

Many people consider Nietzsche to be a philosopher who is fundamentally anti-theoretical. According to Bernard Williams, Nietzsche is so far from being a theorist that his writing "is booby-trapped not only against recovering theory from it but, in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates it to theory." Many people would specifically relate this viewpoint to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. They would contend that his arguments lack the structure and substance of ethical theory, even when he is making positive normative (...) assertions rather than merely criticizing accepted morality. In my opinion, this widely held belief is the antithesis of illuminating. In my opinion, Nietzsche's positive moral beliefs are uncontroversial since they come under the broad category of what is now known as perfectionism. They are based on an idea of the good that they praise actions for bringing about or advancing, but this idea does not associate the good with pleasure or the fulfillment of desires; rather, it locates the good in objective human excellences that, according to Nietzsche, are centered on the ideas of strength and power. Perfectionism can be constructed as a systematic theory, just like other moral beliefs, and when it is, several issues regarding its composition and structure come up. When reading Nietzsche with these problems in mind, it is remarkable how frequently he offers solutions to them without stating them directly. Combining those responses yields a perfectionist philosophy with a distinctly Nietzschean undertone. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Bradley, Brentano, Rashdall, and Moore are just a few of the thinkers who have embraced perfectionism. Before Brentano, for example, Nietzsche was, in my opinion, the most theoretical perfectionist; that is, he was more prone to identify and respond to theoretical queries. There is also a distinctive worth to his responses. Moral philosophers and philosophers are often tempted to sidestep challenging theoretical issues by asserting positive facts about the universe that allow for the compatibility of opposing solutions. Nietzsche is known for rejecting such hopeful assertions and demanding that the issues be addressed head-on. He does this, for instance, when he disputes the idea that the ideas that are most beneficial to us are also the most likely to be accurate, as well as numerous times throughout his presentation of perfectionism. The end effect is a rendition of the perspective that particularly highlights its unique characteristics and hazards. This paper will examine three facets of Nietzsche's perfectionism: his most basic explanation of human perfection, the moral framework he uses to support it, and the more particular human states he uses to define perfection. (shrink)

The study has focused on the views of Fārābī regarding the essence and foundations of the two concepts of "political philosophy" and "political jurisprudence". By elucidating and then analyzing the opinions of Fārābī, it has sought to answer the question of whether "political philosophy and political jurisprudence in Farabi's philosophy are the same". By examining what Fārābī has discussed in his works Kitāb al-Millah, Siāsat al-Madania, and Al-Madinah Fāzel'a regarding political philosophy and political jurisprudence, it can be understood that both (...) concepts exist in Fārābī's civil philosophy, and even their theoretical foundation is present in his theoretical wisdom. However, it should be noted that it is not possible to consider the essence of these two to be the same, but in terms of the foundations that include the foundations and the purpose, these two concepts can be considered as two parts of a single whole. The foundation and purpose of Fārābī's political philosophy and political jurisprudence, since they are part of the civil philosophy of Fārābī, is the same as the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom. The distinguishing feature of Fārābī's philosophical school with other philosophical schools is his emphasis on happiness, and this key concept is the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom first and then political philosophy and political jurisprudence. (shrink)

Reconciling the many “faces” of Peirce – the Scientist, Philosopher, and Metaphysician - helps to make sense of the open-endedness and versatility of semiotics. Semiosis, for Peirce, knows no rigid hermeneutic or disciplinary bounds. It thus forces us to be open to interdisciplinary and holistic inquiries. The pragmatic maxim sets limits on metaphysical speculation, but it also legitimates the extension of the experimentalist method into cosmological, metaphysical, and even religious domains. Although Peirce's religious speculations are ultimately unsatisfactory, understanding why Peirce (...) expanded his thinking to such domains reveals the expansionist logic of Peircean semiotics beyond the mere idiosyncracies of the man. The triadic, dynamic logic of pragmatist inquiry seeks to expand to all social processes of fixing belief and forming habits, however quixotic; but it remains dubious whether such expansion can fully comport to the scientific, experimentalist method that Peirce preferred. (shrink)