Strict finitism posits a largest natural number. The view is usually thought to be objectionably arbitrary. After all, there seems to be no apparent reason as to why the natural numbers should ‘stop’ at a specific point and not a bit later on the natural line. Drawing on how arguments from arbitrariness are employed in mereology, I propose several ways of understanding this objection against strict finitism. No matter how it is understood, I argue that it is always found wanting.

Boffa non-well-founded set theory allows for several distinct sets equal to their respective singletons, the so-called ‘Quine atoms’. Rieger contends that this theory cannot be a faithful description of set-theoretic reality. He argues that, even after granting that there are non-well-founded sets, ‘the extensional nature of sets’ precludes numerically distinct Quine atoms. In this paper we uncover important similarities between Rieger’s argument and how non-rigid structures are conceived within mathematical structuralism. This opens the way for an objection against Rieger, whilst (...) affording the theoretical resources for a defence of Boffa set theory as a faithful description of set-theoretic reality. (shrink)

Theistic modal realism argues for an extension of Lewis's modal realism capable of accommodating a theistic God. By affording elegant solutions to many atheistic challenges, the view is of great theoretical utility for the theist. However, it has been objected that within a Lewisian framework God cannot be causally efficacious on pain of collapsing intuitively distinct modal notions. In this article I explain why these worries are ill-founded and show how God's existence and causal power over the pluriverse can be (...) consistently understood. If successful, the proposal offers a congenial theistic way to adopt modal realism and address the atheological problems. (shrink)

Circular sets are said to provide clear-cut cases of circular orders of ontological dependence. I argue that this claim is unwarranted given the epistemic parity of two principles of set-dependence.

System analyses deal with interrelationships between different variables that keep the system in balance. In many analysis of complex thinking, a system is viewed as a complex unit in which the ‘whole’ is not reduced to the ‘sum’ of its parts; the system becomes an ambiguous item because it consists of several entities that interact with unforeseen results or, in other words, it is situated at a transdisciplinary level, it is impossible for an area to have a complete reading of (...) its complexity. It was also mentioned that the concept of the open system best describes complexity by stating that ‘the laws of the organization are not equilibrium, but an imbalance that is restored or compensated for by stabilized dynamics’. This idea originated from the field of thermodynamics and the second law, in which the imbalance that it maintains allows the system for an apparent balance. This fragile steady state has something of a paradox, since the structures remain the same, but their constituents are changeable. The concept of open system undoes the door to a theory of evolution that can only derive from the interactions between a system and its ecosystem. Within this systemic approach, the focus of the analysis takes into account the ambiguity, multidisciplinary and complexity associated with system adjustment, i.e. it is intended to qualify an employee job based on their experience and knowledge as a measure of their impact on the organization performance. (shrink)