The following thesis is an attempt to establish the communicative dimensions of silence. In it I put forward a thesis in the spirit of Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue and Max Scheler's phenomenology of emotion, according to which true dialogue does not convey specific content, but modes of existence born of the experience of presence. This kind of normative transmission of existence makes communication a communion. Underlying tacit communication are various forms of affection, through which emotionality becomes one (...) of the main dimensions of communicating silence. (shrink)

The general topic of my philosophical dissertation is phenomenological ontology of breathing. I do not investigate the phenomenon of breathing as a natural scientific problem, but as a philosophical question. Within our tradition, breathing has been normally understood as a mechanistic-materialistic physiological life-sustaining process of gas exchange and cellular respiration which does not really seem to have any essential connection to human being’s spiritual, mental or philosophical capacities. On the contrary to this natural scientific view, I argue that breathing can (...) be understood as a philosophical question that has phenomenological, experiential, ontological, spiritual, bodily, mental, poetic, elemental, ethical, voluntary and mystical dimensions. My investigation conceptualizes breathing in the first place as a question of phenomenological ontology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologico-ontological method of interrogation of the lived body’s experiential openness to the world and Being provides the most fundamental point of departure in this dissertation. Merleau-Ponty emphasized in his investigations the lived body’s perceptual openness to the world and Being. He argued famously for the primacy of perception. His thesis of the primacy of perception means that perception as the perceptual openness to the world and Being is the foundation which is always presupposed by all the other levels of our existence and being-in-the-world. In this dissertation, I challenge this idea of the primacy of perception with Merleau-Ponty’s own remarks about breathing. I argue that in his own remarks about breathing, he implicitly points toward a level which is even more fundamental than the primacy of perception. In this dissertation, this level of our being-in-the-world I call the primacy of breathing. Breathing as the lived body’s respiratory openness to the world and Being is now understood as the foundation which is always presupposed by all the other dimensions of our being-in-the-world. These dimensions are, for example, our theoretical, practical, social and perceptual ways of relating with the world. If the idea of the primacy of breathing is taken seriously, it means that all the questions of philosophy could be rethought, reexamined and re-experienced within the fundamental atmosphere of respiratory openness to the world and Being. In this dissertation, I initially try to rethink philosophy as a new philosophy of breathing. This new philosophy of breathing would be phenomenological ontology of breathing. The bases of this new phenomenological ontology of breathing are Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about breathing. My task is to explicate and interpret them with the help of Merleau- Ponty’s own phenomenological ontology. In my task of beginning philosophy anew as philosophy of breathing or as respiratory philosophy, I will also use the ideas of Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, Paul Claudel, Luce Irigaray, Edmund Husserl and David Kleinberg-Levin. My dissertation is divided into two main sections. In Section One, I construct within the framework of phenomenological ontology a new notion of breathing as the primacy of breathing. In Section Two, I develop a phenomenological method that I call the method of ontologico-respiratory reduction. This method will lead us back to the primacy of breathing. (shrink)

This book studies the phenomenological ontology of breathing. It investigates breathing and air as a question of phenomenological philosophy and looks at phenomenological questions concerning respiratory methodology, ontological experience of respiration, respiratory spirituality and respiratory embodiment. Drawing on the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gaston Bachelard, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Luce Irigaray and David Kleinberg-Levin, the book argues for the ontological primacy of breathing and develops a new principle of philosophy that the author calls "Silence of Breath, Abyss/Yawn (...) of Air". It asserts that breathing is not a thing- or person-oriented relation, but perpetual communication with the immense elemental atmosphere of open and free air. This new phenomenological method of breathing offers readers a chance to begin to wonder, rethink, re-experience and reimagine all questions of life in an innovative and creative way as aerial and respiratory questions of life. Part of the Routledge Critical Perspectives on Breath and Breathing series, the book breaks new ground in phenomenology and phenomenological ontology by offering a decisive and insightful treatment of breath. It will be indispensable for students and researchers of philosophy, phenomenology, and ontology. It will also be of special interest to Merleau-Ponty scholars as it investigates uncharted dimensions of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. (shrink)

Starting with the point of freedom being one of unavoidable ideas of existential philosophy, as well as philosophy in general, we shall consider ethical and ontological aspects of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. We deem that existential philosophy, “contemplated” in all its variations, represents the very horizon or manner of philosophical comprehension of freedom phenomena, where freedom is integrally observed, thus allowing us to talk about unique bliss of ontological and ethical dimension, both of those appearing to (...) be equally important. Therefore, freedom dominates the Kierkegaard’s determination of individual, co-determines all its leap stages but also continually makes possible the sense of human existence. (shrink)

Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue ‘The Cognitive Ontological Dimensions of Naturalness’, including brief introductions of the individual contributions.

Petri Berndtson’s Phenomenological Ontology of Breathing points to the largely unexplored dimension of our being breathing beings. Berndtson draws upon the ontology of the flesh, as well as several comments of Merleau-Ponty about breathing and Being. The primordial perceptual faith in the being of the world as a field of all fields (the “barbaric conviction”) is seen as a primordial sense of breathing in the world (“respiratory faith”). Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s reference to Claudel’s call to listen to the ear of (...) Sigé, the Abyss, Berndtson relates silence in the encounter with Being to an encounter with silence of breath and its abyssal or chasmological (“yawning”) quality. He asserts that this level of breathing is a level of being-in-the-world deeper than the primacy of perception. At this point, the review questions the author’s assertion that this dimension is more primordial than perception, that Merleau-Ponty has a positivistic framing of perception, the author’s literal sense of silence and the lack of appreciation of the power of the poetic in flesh ontology, the role of reversibility and the import of the invisible of the visible. Rather than the ontological primacy of breath, the review suggests that breathing is a way of taking in the world and being open to an aerial dimension of inchoate sense that is equiprimordial with the other avenues of perceiving the world. (shrink)

This paper is one in a series of attempts on my part to think through one of the central challenges left to us by Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 1961: if we understand the turn, in his later writings, toward an ontology of the flesh as “a radical rethinking of the experience of belonging from within, [as] a phenomenology of being-of-the-world”, how are we to bear witness to such an experience? What modalities are called forth to do justice to this belonging? (...) The task accrues existential and ethical weight when, at stake in our analyses, are historical and social structures like coloniality that normalize experience, perception, and sense-making while marginalizing others. It is my contention, in this article, that when the phenomenological inquiry becomes critical the question of modality becomes ethically central; how we bear witness to experiences of marginalization and the operations of power that produce them matters in that it risks reifying the same normative structures that predicate the oppression of many. With these questions and considerations in mind, in this article, I return to silence and propose that the mobilization of what I call “deep silences” can be a powerful tool for a critical phenomenology that bears witness without capitulating to the imperative of transparency norming the modern/colonial world system. Deep silence, in fact, designates signifying practices that do not primarily operate within the bounds of logocentrism and speech as the foundational principles of meaning, or that rely upon conceptual, analytical, and instrumental thinking, mobilizing instead the somatic, affective, and sensual dimensions of existence. In this article, I am primary concerned with the sense-making effected by the aesthetic as an instance of deep silence. Specifically, I focus on the image- and ritual-centered photographic documentaries of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, which, I suggest, challenge the hegemonic normativity of modern/colonial aesthetics, introducing the reader to other sensibilities wherein the distinction between theory and practice has no purchase and the multiplicity of creative expressions is recognized. (shrink)

Heine provides new insight into Dogen's philosophy as seen in the "Uji" chapter of Dogen's Shorogenzo. The book features a new annotated translation of the "Uji" and a glossary of Japanese terms.

In Confucianism, ritual propriety 1 is commonly understood as an instrument for guiding people's actions. In this essay, however, I argue that taking ritual propriety merely as an instrument external to human beings fails to appreciate important aspects of Xunzi's conception of ritual propriety. Drawing on suggestions from Martin Heidegger's philosophy, I argue that ritual propriety in the Xunzi is analogous to language in Heidegger in important ways. For Heidegger, language is the "house of Being." For Xunzi, ritual propriety could (...) also be described as the house of the being of humanity. "House" refers to the medium in which human beings dwell. As the "house" of the morally refined person, ritual... (shrink)

Using the example of auditory hallucinations which especially occur in the psychopathology of schizophrenia this text tries to bridge the gap between empirical research in psychology or psychiatry and philosophical reflection on the mind–body problem. It is a fact that the neuronal manifestations of schizophrenia are significantly associated with psychic characteristics of this disorder. But nevertheless, it is questionable how these dimensions of schizophrenia are related to each other, exactly. The suggested intuitive plausible dualistic solutions of the mind–body problem (...) are problematic with regard to conceptual consistency as well as to the empirically founded theories about schizophrenia. A promising approach seems to be the monistic conception of the identity theory of mind . A psychic manifestation of schizophrenia and the corresponding neuronal process fuse into only one event, which can be called psychophysical units. The perceived qualitative difference between the phenomena which appear in the psychic and neuronal dimension cannot be ascribed to a difference between the phenomena themselves, but to the different representation of one and the same event in the mind of the observer. Furthermore, it can be demonstrated that the processes of interaction between psychic and physical entities, often being postulated within the pathogenesis of schizophrenia, can be integrated. Functionalism holds advantages, too. Functionalist explanations make it possible to understand many pathogenetic aspects of schizophrenia. In this way psychopathological phenomena can be accounted for failed attempts to induce certain functional states. A reasonable research paradigm should be raised from the connection between the principles of the identity theory of mind and functionalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIf we take Heidegger's ontology to be a philosophy of history, then, for Husserl, the problem of history is only one among the three major directions of his thoughts. After Husserl met Dilthey in 1905, he more and more attended to the problem of history and reflected upon the longitudinal intentionality of time-genesis-history. His basic idea is to grasp the condition of possibility of history by means of an eidetic intuition upon the longitudinal intentionality. However, because Husserl never explicates his (...) thoughts on history in his published works, he is often regarded as a “non-historical” philosopher. In fact, like Dilthey, Husserl purports to combine historical enlightenment with critique of knowledge. It is hence Dilthey-Yorck, Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer who established together the most important tradition of history of philosophy in the twentieth century, namely, phenomenological-ontological philosophy of history. (shrink)

There is a globalization trend in teacher education, emphasizing the role of teachers to make judgments based on human rights in their teaching profession. Rather than emphasizing the epistemological dimension of acquiring knowledge about human rights through teacher education, an ontological dimension is emphasized in this paper of what it means to become a professional teacher. An ontological dimension of ‘learning to become’ can be captured in critical examination of a cosmopolitan awareness of teachers in relation to judgment (...) and justice. I read the critique through studies on human rights in teacher education, which transforms notions of openness and respect in relations marked by difference. (shrink)

Nel 1956, in piena guerra fredda, una conferenza di scienziati al Dartmouth College negli Stati Uniti annunciò il lancio di un audace progetto scientifico, l’Intelligenza Artificiale (I.A.). Dopo l’iniziale fallimento degli sforzi della “Hard AI” di produrre un’intelligenza simile a quella umana, alla fine del XX secolo è emerso il movimento della “Soft AI”. Invece di essere orientato a imitare il comportamento umano in relazione a compiti specifici, ha preferito cercare modi alternativi di eseguire i compiti basati sulle particolari funzioni (...) e strutture della macchina. Il fattore decisivo è stata la combinazione della tecnologia di apprendimento automatico con le comunicazioni digitali online, l’incontro tra l’IA e Internet. Le applicazioni dell’IA “soft” sono quelle che vediamo nel mondo dei dispositivi automatici “intelligenti” che informano la nostra vita sociale digitale. Nel seguente articolo mi concentrerò su una particolare applicazione dell’IA per le discussioni online con utenti umani, ChatGPT, per mostrare le implicazioni della tecnologia digitale online nelle modalità storico-sociali dell’esistenza umana. ChatGPT è un’applicazione che combina l’IA con Internet, le possibilità della corrispondenza tra macchine e le potenzialità della tele-comunicazione umana. Il mio approccio si concentra sulle implicazioni fenomenologiche e storico-sociali della proliferazione della tecnologia AI per quanto riguarda la coscienza e la socialità umana. -/- Abstract (english) -/- In 1956, amidst the Cold War, a conference of scientists at Dartmouth College in the United States announced the launch of a bold, scientific project, Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). After the initial failure of “Hard AI” efforts to produce a human-like intelligence, the “Soft AI” movement emerged in the late 20th century. Instead of being oriented towards imitating human behaviour concerning specific tasks, it preferred to seek alternative ways of performing tasks based on the particular functions and structures of the machine. The decisive factor was the combination of Machine Learning technology with Digital Online Communications, the meeting between AI and the Internet. The applications of “Soft” AI are those we see in the world of “smart”, “intelligent” automatic devices that inform our digital social life. In the following article, I will focus on a particular application of AI for online discussions with human users, ChatGPT, in order to show the implications of online digital technology in the social-historical modalities of human existence. ChatGPT is an application that combines AI with the Internet, the possibilities of Machine correspondence with the potentialities of human telecommunications. My approach focuses on the phenomenological and social-historical implications of the proliferation of AI technology as regards human consciousness and sociality. (shrink)

Streng considers the question of the ontology of silence in the light of work he has done on mysticism. In an earlier essay, he concluded that mystical language has both a descriptive and an evocative function. The evocative function is to "evoke a change in the attitudes and mechanisms of apprehension within the mystic adept." In this paper, he turns his attention to St. John of the Cross' Ascent of Mount Carmel and the dialogue in the Mahayana Buddhist text (...) The Eight-Thousand Line Perfection of Wisdom Sutra. After showing both important similarities and important differences between these two religicus paths, Streng develops some consequences for an ontology of silence. What follows is the concluding portion of Streng's paper. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the search for the nature of the ontology of an art work on the example of a literary work. Tradition viewed a work of art as the discovery of a higher truth. Analytical philosophy deprived literature of the status of truth in general, and thereby deprived it of any ontological dimension. Heidegger’s attempt to return this dimension to literature through its relationship with being did not find continuation in philosophy. The author proposes to consider (...) a literary work as a model of the world, primarily the social world. This approach makes liken a literary work to a mathematical theory. A mathematical theory is built as a correlation of simple elements; in a literary work such elements are characters (sometimes things). A mathematical theory is built on clearly defined axioms, a literary work is also built on axioms, but they do not have an explicit expression within the work and cannot always be perceived intuitively. The author shows that the mathematical theory never fully meets the specified conditions, and the mathematicians themselves note that in the future they will largely lose their strength. Thus, a literary work is of the same nature as a mathematical theory, only it presents a more complex case. The problem of truth serves as the way to find the ontological dimension. Analysis shows that in mathematics it is solved not by reducing a hypothesis to axioms, but by recognizing a theory through its effectiveness or applicability. For a work of art, such a criterion is its perception by its readers. In both cases, the ontological dimension is in the mind of the reader. (shrink)

It seems that the distinction goes even further. The philosophical historians look at the sum total of occurrences in time as exemplifying an underlying absolute substance in the Hegelian sense, or a basic human activity like economic production as an autonomous creation of human life. Against this view of history, Weiss takes the position that history has to be understood first through universal ontological distinctions. Whatever is characteristic of being in general is characteristic of history. Thus history is not (...) looked at from the point of view of a basic content, or as carried by a basic act; history is integrated into the universal structure of the world, and whatever pertains to the universe at large pertains to history. (shrink)

In this article we will try to elaborate a reflection around aesthetic experience, more specifically a phenomenology of artwork (Soutine/de Kooning), in dialogue with Emmanuel Falque's thought. Even if the French philosopher has not yet dedicated an autonomous work to the aesthetic question, such reflection appears abundantly dispersed and sparse in his various writings. Among others, Francis Bacon and Lucian Freud were Falque's artists of choice, their work most closely reflected his underlying philosophical thesis. The preference for the figurative, that (...) which in us resists phenomenology, the incarnation as such, would thus bring the philosophical concept and the artistic intuition closer together. However, between figurative and non-figurative or abstract thought, is there not another possibility of thinking them together, without necessarily having to give primacy to one or the other or opposing them? The idea of an oblique incarnate thought (figuration-abstraction, resistance-deflagration, word-silence), or of the diagonal/oblique impastoed being (presence in absence, metamorphosed transcendental materiality, indirect ontology), might also be a third way of thinking about the great philosophical questions between realism and idealism, immanence and transcendence, visible and invisible, metaphysics and phenomenology. In this sense, the artistic work of Chaïm Soutine and de Kooning may be the aesthetic expression of incarnate thought, as a way of primordial access to being, to the world and to another, in the joining in act of the figurative and the abstract, as if multiple possibilities or dimensions of being inhabited in the same being (the articulation of the in-itself and the outside of the self, madness and normality, dream and reality...). Not by chance both were the subject of a recent joint exhibition, from which we propose this reflection, in dialogue with Emmanuel Falque's thought on finitude, which his most recent book radicalises. Our thesis, based on these two artists, aims to affirm that art, whether figurative or abstract, starts from an inalienable material dimension, that is to say, a sensitive dimension, the impasted (body) being, to the point that we may say that Hors phénomène maintains in itself this possibility of articulation between presence to the self and the outside of the self, distance and proximity, immanence and transcendence, even if here and there one can glimpse in its philosophical project an ontological preference for the figurative. However, in our view, what brings together Falque’s philosophy and the work of both artists is the fact that they are the expression of an embodied thought, whether through conceptual experience (philosophy) or through perceptual experience (aesthetics). (shrink)

"Dimensions of Shared Agency" investigates the way in which standard philosophical accounts have been dealing with the issue of collective actions. In particular, the book focuses on the 'Big Five' of analytical social ontology and their accounts of shared/collective intentions and actions. Through systematic readings of different positions in the debate, the author proposes original ways of analyzing and classifying current theories of shared agency according to whether they advance a member-level or a group-level account of shared agency. While (...) member-level accounts are theories of shared agency based on individuals' attitudes and actions, group-level accounts give attention to the group of individuals considered as a whole, i.e., as an agent itself. Criticism arises against the idea that the Big Five have proposed stable group-level accounts suitable for explaining the case of shared agency as a group-level phenomenon. The widespread tendency in the debate is to endorse a perspective called holistic individualism, which maintains that high-level explanations are objective even though social facts are ontologically reducible to facts about individuals. Lasagni argues that as long as holistic individualism is held, the GLA is reducible to the MLA because holistic individualism upholds ontological individualism based on a deep individualistic premise, fixing the special status of individual agents as natural persons. The premise makes the claim to treat groups as agents contradictory to the general framework of the theory. This book profiles an alternative interpretation according to which agency should be considered as a functional kind, which is equally instantiated by different systems, such as individual human beings and organized social groups. In this way, the author claims, the reduction of the social can be avoided. "Dimensions of Shared Agency" will be of interest to doctoral students, researchers, and scholars interested in social ontology and the philosophy of the social sciences. It can also be utilised as supplementary reading or an introduction to philosophy students and scholars who are first approaching the philosophy of collective intentionality and shared agency. (shrink)

My article examines the role played by the phenomenon of silence both in Merleau- Ponty’s thinking and in Lyotard’s. I show thereby the continuity between the two philosophers in spite of the distance taken by Lyotard towards the phenomenological tradition. The aim of phenomenology to express the pure sense of silent experience is in fact taken up in a peculiar way by Lyotard as the action of desire and can well be used as a key to understand the unity (...) of his thinking. The comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard also shows that silence is a central topic in order to understand the political dimension of works of art, not as participants in political struggles, but as tools made for the empowerment of our capacity to perceive. (shrink)

Arguing that today’s burgeoning globalization literature still neglects the investigation of powerful subjective dynamics of growing social interconnectivity, this article explores how various ideological articulations of globalization have shaped its material designs and in­stantiations. The thickening of global consciousness can be conceptualized along the three interrelated dimensions or layers of ideology, imaginary, and ontology. Each of these three layers of subjective globalization is constituted in practice at an ever-greater generality, durability, and depth. Normative contestations continue, but they tend to (...) have a common global point of reference—albeit not to the exclusion of the national. (shrink)

This in-depth study of the apophatic dimension crafted by Gregory of Nissa is the translation on the epistemological level of a new ontology, developed in debates with Arianism, and intended to expand classical metaphysics on the meaning of relationship. In Neoplatonic philosophy silence protects the absolute nature of the First Principle leaving expressive mediation to degrees of intermediate ontologies. Through trinitarian revelation God is manifested as a communion of love within which the external Logos is identified with the divine (...) essence itself, in a unity founded upon relationship and will. Beginning from this new trinitarian ontology, Gregory sees in contemplation and in adoration, made up of silence and word, the human response to a free creative act of divine love and thus cognitive instruments, paths of access to the personal relationship of union with the Beloved. (shrink)

This article challenges the consensus that silences about mental disorders are there to be broken. While silence in mental disorders can be painful, even deadly, the consensus rests on an oversimplified understanding of silence. Drawing upon accounts from depression and bipolar memoirs, this article names and analyses some salient experiences of silence in mood disorders. It does so with two goals in mind. The first is to show that mood disorders may involve several different kinds of lived (...) experiences of silence. This is important because even though silence is considered a promising objective symptom of depression, little has been written about lived experiences of silence in disorders that involve depression. The second is to argue against the fetishisation of breaking silence and the concomitant understandings of silence as an externally imposed and inherently negative phenomenon. This is important because some silences are not experienced as external and are even felt to be valuable, meaning that efforts to break them may be counterproductive. (shrink)

On se propose ici de tenter de rapprocher la critique wittgensteinienne des propositions métaphysiques du projet heideggérien de « destruction phénoménologique de l’histoire de l’ontologie ». Il s’agit donc d’abord de rappeler que dans le Tractatus Wittgenstein établit une différence « transcendantale » entre ce qui peut se dire et ce qui ne fait que « se montrer » et qu’il faut plutôt taire. Mais chez Wittgenstein la mise en évidence de cette différence conduit au refus du métalangage, et à (...) l’interdiction d’une interrogation sur sa propre démarche de philosophe, c’est-à-dire à ce que l’on pourrait nommer un « transcendantalisme paradoxal ». Chez Heidegger en revanche la mise en évidence de la différence ontologique, laquelle ne permet ni de faire de l’être un prédicat réel ni d’énoncer l’être sous la forme de propositions prédicatives conduit à interroger le fondement antéprédicatif du langage énonciatif, qui n’est autre que la transcendance du Dasein. Il répond ainsi à la paradoxie du Tractatus en montrant qu’il n’y a d’apophansis que sur la base d’une hermeneia plus originaire. Une mise en parallèle de l’« herméneutique de la facticité » heideggérienne et de l’analyse wittgensteinienne des jeux de langage en tant que formes de vie peut alors être tentée, dans la mesure où la dimension herméneutique du comprendre n’est pas entièrement absente chez le second Wittgenstein, en dépit de sa conception instrumentale du langage.The object of this paper is to try a comparison between Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysical statements and Heidegger’s project of a « phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology ». It is at first necessary to recall that in Tractatus Wittgenstein establishes a transcendental difference between what can be said and what can only show itself and has to be passed over in silence. But this leads Wittgenstein to refuse metalanguage and to prohibit all questioning of his own position as a philosopher, that is to say to what could be named a « paradoxical transcendentalism ». On the contrary, Heidegger, in bringing to light the ontological difference, which does not allow to define Being as a real predicate or to enunciate Being in the form of predicative statements, is led to question the antepredicative foundation of the propositional language or logos apophantikos, which is nothing else than the transcendence of Dasein. He thus gives an answer to Wittgenstein’s parodoxy by showing that there is apophansis only on the basis of a more originary hermeneia. A comparison between Heidegger’s « hermeneutics of facticity » and Wittgenstein’s analysis of language games as life forms can then be performed, in so far as the hermeneutic dimension of understanding is not completely absent in Wittgenstein’s Investigations, in spite of his instrumental conception of language. (shrink)

This article argues that a phenomenological notion of “lived body” emerges in the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 critique of the Confucian body of ritual and morality. It also argues that a philosophical account of body cannot be reduced to a Sinological account. This article draws on the phenomenological distinction between “object body” and “lived body,” especially the “three ontological dimensions” of Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that the Zhuangzi criticizes the Confucian body of ritual and morality as being a “body-for-others” and (...) that it maintains a concept of “lived body.” Finally, it argues that through such methods of cultivation as “sitting and forgetting” a liberation of the body is achieved where one is connected to dao 道 and achieves a state of heightened experience. (shrink)

This article elucidates and interpretively develops Raimon Panikkar's hermeneutics of intertraditional dialogue by way of setting it into sympathetic and critical dialogue with the predominantly intratraditional hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It argues that Panikkar's thought enables us not only to appreciate, but also to question the limits of the fundamental roles played by language and tradition in Gadamer's hermeneutics. Panikkar's own hermeneutical reflections arise directly out of intertraditional as well as interlinguistic experience; and they ultimately direct us toward the profoundest (...) dimension of dialogue, a dimension in which the words we share arise out of and gesture back into the depths of an originary silence. (shrink)

In book IX of the Republic, Socrates offers a strange mathematical calculation, which claims to prove that the tyrant lives exactly 729 times less pleasantly than the king. For the first time, a complete and detailed reconstruction of this difficult text and its underlying structure is offered in the present article. It thereby proves that the distinction between ‘pleasure’ and the ‘image of pleasure’ is one among the keys to understanding the passage. It is furthermore shown how the whole calculation (...) is based on Plato’s ontology of dimensions and therefore proves that this theorem can be taken into account at least already for the time of the Republic. (shrink)

Recent arguments for scientific realism have emphasized the importance of both methodological factors, such as theoretical unification , and experiments , as evidence for a realistic view of certain aspects of theoretical structure . Throughout this dissertation I argue that neither strategy is sufficient as a defense of realism. ;Chapter one consists of a discussion of Friedman's argument for realism as outlined in his Foundations of Space-Time Theories . I argue that his reliance on theoretical unification and conjunction as grounds (...) for a selective brand of realism is unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. Not only does his structure-substructure reductivist model of theories and the emphasis on conjunction fail to fit actual cases of theory evolution, but the historical relativity built into the approach is undesirable even from a realist perspective. The relationship between conjunctive inference and unification is discussed and it is suggested that although theoretical unification is desirable at some stages of theory development it contributes nothing to the justification or evidential warrant of theories. ;In chapter two my claims regarding unification are applied to the development of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. I discuss the difficulties in specifying a workable model of the aether as the unifying theoretical structure as well as the importance of models and analogies in Maxwell's work. It is argued that this obvious unification of electromagnetism and optics played virtually no evidential role in the final acceptance of the theory. It was not until the completion of Hertz's experiments that Maxwell's theory was actually vindicated. ;Chapter three focuses on the experimental difficulties associated with Maxwell's theory and the relationship between Hertz's experiments and his theoretical interpretation of electromagnetism. ;In chapter four I summarize some of the general difficulties associated with the notion of independent evidence as it pertains to experimental results. I conclude by arguing that although experiment provides a more persuasive case for realism than methodological factors, in many instances it fails to provide the kind of epistemological justification required for the realist assumptions about the ontology of scientific theories. (shrink)

Fātima is an important figure in Islamic society, both religiously and historically, and is regarded as a symbol of innocence and sanctity, especially in the Shīʿa faith. In this context, her marriage to ʿAlī is considered in Shīʿa theology not only as the union of two great personalities but also as a divine covenant representing the beginning of the chain of imāmate. According to Shīʿa sources, this marriage took place in accordance with God's will and gained a sacred dimension with (...) the Prophet's approval. The marriage also came to the fore as an important element that reinforced the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate. This article aims to analyze the marriage of Fātima, one of the most important figures in Islamic history, to ʿAlī within the framework of Shīʿa sources and to determine the impact of the religious-political events of later periods on the narratives related to this marriage. While Sunnī sources written in the second and third centuries of the Hijri era contain limited information about Fātima’s biography, Shīʿa sources, especially from the fourth century onwards, contain a large number of narrations about certain periods of her life. From this century onwards, the influence of Shīʿa beliefs on the biography of Fātima became evident in the works of Shīʿa authors. In this process, the roles attributed to Fātima began to diverge from Sunnī sources. These narratives focus on the events of Fātima’s birth, her marriage, and her short life after the death of her father. While Sunnī sources present only a few narratives about her marriage, in Shīʿa literature, this marriage took on an ontological meaning and began to carry a divine character. In the narrations, the choice between the marriage of the first caliphs, who had requested to marry Fātima but were rejected, and ʿAlī’s marriage was reflected in the caliphate debates in the following period and became the starting point of the belief in imāmate. The marriage is seen as a symbol of the religious and political conflicts between ʿAlī and the first caliphs in the early periods and with the Shiite groups in the later periods. The marriage is seen as a symbol of the religious and political conflicts between ʿAlī and the first caliphs in the early periods and with the Shiite groups in the later periods. This article analyzes the marriage of Fātima in historical and theological contexts and reveals the religious and political meanings of this marriage. It critically evaluates how these narratives developed in line with sectarian differences and how they transformed over time in the context of the impact of sociocultural and political elements on these narratives. The analysis reveals that the marriage of Fātima and ʿAlī had a significant impact on religious and political events in Islamic history. While Shīʿa sources consider this marriage as the manifestation of a divine command, they present the characteristics of Fātima and ʿAlī as elements that reinforce the legitimacy of the imāmate. It has been determined that marriage constitutes the ontological foundations of imāmah and has become one of the cornerstones of Shīʿa belief. In Sunnī sources, on the other hand, marriage is treated more as a familial event, which reveals the different perspectives between the two sects. This situation clearly reveals the differences in the historical narratives of marriage. In the narratives, the rejection of the first caliphs who proposed to Fātima led to the formation of a sub-message that they did not deserve the caliphate. Over time, this idea led to marriage acquiring a divine character in Shīʿa theology and becoming a symbolic representation of imāmah. Moreover, the Sunnī sources' treatment of marriage in a simpler context contrasts with the deep theological analysis in Shīʿa sources. In conclusion, the marriage of Fātima and ʿAlī is a critical event that affected the religious and political dynamics of Islamic society and deepened the divergent understandings between the two sects. The differences in narratives about the marriage provide a powerful example of how religious and historical narratives are shaped by social and political factors. (shrink)

Drawing on the work of Georg Misch, this work seeks to give back to the Word its original fullness of meaning. The question of life leads the inquiries undertaken in this study via Misch s anthropological conception on to the phenomenological ontology of Martin Heidegger and Josef Koenig s investigation of Being and Thought. ".

This is the introduction to the special issue on Responsible innovation (RI). The special issue presents five philosophical analyses into the foundational concepts and assumptions of RI. This paper explores the common themes that emerge across these five analyses by mapping them onto the ontological and axiological dimensions of the newly emerging RI paradigm. This way, we are able to articulate the (known) shortcomings of RI as well as the possible way forward suggested by the authors to remedy (...) them. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the various meanings of embodiment from a patient’s perspective. Resorting to phenomenology of health and medicine, I take the idea of ‘lived experience’ as starting point. On the basis of an analysis of phenomenology’s call for bracketing the natural attitude and its reduction to the transcendental, I will explain, however, that in medical phenomenological literature ‘lived experience’ is commonly one-sidedly interpreted. In my paper, I clarify in what way the idea of ‘lived experience’ should be (...) revisited and, subsequently, what this reconsideration means for phenomenological research on embodiment in health and medicine. The insight that the body is a condition of possibility for world-disclosing yet, at the same time, itself conditioned by this world forces us to not only zoom in on the body’s subject-side, but also on its object-side. I argue that in order to render account for this double body ontology, phenomenology should include empirical sociological analyses as well. I thus argue in favor of the idea of a socio-phenomenology. Drawing on material from my own research project on embodied self-experiences after breast surgery, I show how this approach can be fruitful in interpreting the impact of disfigurements on a person’s embodied agency, or a person’s ‘I can’. (shrink)

The metaphysics of presence has led not only to the closure of rationalized systems that define modernity, but also to what can appear as its opposite, the freely flowing movement of information (and of capital) characteristic of the post-modern “de-centered” world. Ideas, after all, require a depth dimension that ultimately proves irreconcilable with the one-dimensionality of the purely present. It is for this reason that the rejection of metaphysics (which is only the final consequence of the metaphysics of presence) fails (...) to solve our dilemma. An alternative strategy is to attempt the recovery of the living heart of metaphysics, its open and ecstatic gaze, rather than its final consequence, the constrictive will to closure, determination, and power. This is the genuinely Socratic possibility, a metaphysics not of presence but of radical transcendence. To clarify that possibility, it is necessary to show how Socrates himself was characterized less by practical and political concerns than by a metaphysical vision directed not to presence but to the unknowable region that opens with death. Socrates’ irony and courage have the same source, what I call a metaphysics of “silence.”. (shrink)

Ethical guidelines protecting medical research participants have been criticized for stripping the sociocultural contexts of research. This critique is urgent considering ongoing calls to account for participant diversity in recruitment and inclusion procedures. Our intersectional analysis of illness narratives explores how sociostructural factors might play a role in participants’ exposure to research-related harm in clinical trials. Although widening participation does respond to generalizability concerns, we argue that gendered, classed, and ableist processes of self-silencing could simultaneously enhance risk of harm for (...) participants with multiple oppressed identities. To prevent this, researchers might actively involve participants when designing trials. (shrink)

Silence has been a relatively neglected phenomenon despite its significance in psychiatric research. Acknowledging this oversight, there has been a recent move towards systematically describing the first-personal experience of silence in mental disorders within the field of philosophy of psychiatry. This paper contributes to this research effort by highlighting the underexplored interpersonal aspect of silence crucial for both psychopathological and therapeutic research. More specifically, I develop the interpersonal aspect of distressing silence associated with depression, recently coined (...) as ‘empty silence’. Complementing its original analysis, I argue that this distressing silence not only involves the loss of linguistic agency but also the loss of social agency. Having established this claim, I situate it within the wider research context and open an ethical dimension to the current analysis. I explore this by identifying a therapeutic silence others can establish for an individual undergoing a severe depressive episode. I provisionally term it ‘undemanding silence’ and argue that this form of silence can help restore the loss of social agency by providing a distinct form of social affordance that depressed individuals can easily realise at their own pace. (shrink)

This essay expands Johanna Hartelius? rhetorical understanding of expertise by probing the concept?s ontological and epistemological grounds. Viewed through the lens of a realist-based theory of rhetoric, we contend that notions of being, consciousness, meaning, and knowing are essential to understanding expertise. Applying our theory of rhetorical perspectivism to link these concepts to expertise permits coherent distinctions between genuine expertise and faux expertise. The theory also suggests a philosophy of education centered on the preparation of experts who are ?intellectual (...) entrepreneurs.? With a diversified yet integrated portfolio of theoretical and practical knowledge, these citizen-scholars discover solutions to challenges affecting communities and stakeholders, transcending traditional disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

The threads of linguistic philosophy in Being and Time oppose the prevailing tendency to understand language philosophically within the confines of representational epistemology. In elaborating on the ontological aspects of the view of human beings as inhabiting a linguistically articulated world, the paper stresses the peculiar status of the “fore-structure of understanding” in the discursive articulation as an existential phenomenon of being-in-the-world.

Analyzing the doctrine of methodological individualism and its opposition to methodological holism, I start by briefly reviewing three historical periods in which the discussion around it was very lively (i.e., the turn of the century around 1900, the 1950s, and the 1980s-90s) explicating the variety of characterizations of methodological individualism. To highlight the connection of these philosophical discussions to social scientific practice, intradisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary dynamics, I then look into the debates around microfoundations (in the 1980s) and so-called (...) economics imperialism in the social sciences (and its impact within political science in the 1990s). While both the microfoundations project and economics imperialism are driven by methodological individualists, here too it seems important to pay attention to the variety of understandings of methodological individualism as well as the exact ambition of their undertakings (evaluated along different dimensions, i.e., ontological, epistemological, axiological, and institutional). Overall, I conclude that when looking into the history of the social sciences, the best philosophers can do when discussing methodological individualism and holism is to carefully distinguish the broad variety of positions that can be evaluated along multiple dimensions, to demonstrate the benefits of methodological pluralism as well as expose the downsides of methodological monocultures. (shrink)