I consider statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness from the perspective of the _ideals_ of fairness to which these criteria are committed. I distinguish and describe three theoretical roles such ideals might play. The usefulness of this program is illustrated by taking Base Rate Tracking and its ratio variant as a case study. I identify and compare the ideals of these two criteria, then consider them in each of the aforementioned three roles for ideals. This ideals program (...) may present a way forward in the normative evaluation of candidate statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

We study the structure of analytic ideals of subsets of the natural numbers. For example, we prove that for an analytic ideal I, either the ideal {X (Ω × Ω: En X ({0, 1,…,n} × Ω } is Rudin-Keisler below I, or I is very simply induced by a lower semicontinuous submeasure. Also, we show that the class of ideals induced in this manner by lsc submeasures coincides with Polishable ideals as well as analytic P-ideals. We (...) study this class of ideals and characterize, for example, when the ideals in it are Fσ or when they carry a locally compact group topology. We apply these results to Borel partial orders to rederive a theorem of Todorcevic and to Borel equivalence relations to answer a question of Kechris and Louveau. As another application we give a characterization of σ-ideals of μ-zero sets for Maharam submeasures μ on the Cantor set which is to a large extent analogous to a characterization of the meager ideal due to Kechris and the author. (shrink)

In this work we introduce a class of commutative rings whose defining condition is that its lattice of ideals, augmented with the ideal product, the semi-ring of ideals, is isomorphic to an MV-algebra. This class of rings coincides with the class of commutative rings which are direct sums of local Artinian chain rings with unit.

Discussions about the permissibility of students using enhancements in education are often framed by the question, “Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?” While the question of cheating is interesting, it is but only one question concerning the permissibility of enhancement in education. Another interesting question is, “What kinds of students do we want in our academic institutions?” I suggest that one plausible answer to this question concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues. The students we want (...) in our academic institutions are virtuous or, at least minimally, possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement. That a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement illustrates that under certain conditions motivation can determine the permissibility of using enhancements. Building upon this I suggest a virtues-based institutional rule for governing and guiding student-use of cognitive enhancers in an academic institution to be for the right reasons. This ideals of human excellence or virtues approach offers interesting and unique insights for issues of enhancement in education, as it might turn out, that uneasiness many people have about students using cognitive-enhancing drugs has less to do with issues of enhancement and more to do with the motivations and character of students. (shrink)

"It has long been thought that science is our best hope for realizing objective knowledge, but that, to deliver on this promise, it must be free of the influence of any values that are not purely epistemic. As recent work in philosophy, history, and social studies of science shows, however, things are not so simple. The contributors to this volume ask where and how nonepistemic values are involved in science; they explore the roles these values play at the heart of (...) science, in the assessment of evidence and explanations, and they examine the implications this has for ideals of objectivity."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Introduction : changing forms of global order. Towards a multipolar world ; The paradox of our times ; Economic liberalism and international market integration ; Security ; The impact of the global financial crisis ; Shared problems and collective threats ; A cosmopolitan approach ; Democratic public law and sovereignty ; Summary of the book ahead -- Cosmopolitanism : ideas, realities and deficits. Globalization ; The global governance complex ; Globalization and democracy : five disjunctures ; Cosmopolitanism : ideas and (...) trajectories ; Cosmopolitan realities ; Addressing the institutional deficit : reframing the market -- Principles of cosmopolitan order. Cosmopolitan principles ; Thick or thin cosmopolitanism? ; Cosmopolitan justifications ; From cosmopolitan principles to cosmopolitan law -- Cosmopolitan law and institutional requirements. The idea of cosmopolitan law ; Institutional requirements ; In sum ; Political openings -- Violence, law and justice in a global age. Reframing human activity : international law, rights and responsibilities ; 9/11, war and justice ; Islam, the Kantian heritage and double standards ; Concluding reflections -- Reframing global governance : apocalypse soon or reform!. The paradox of our times ; Why be concerned with global challenges? ; Deep drivers and governance challenges ; Global governance : contemporary surface trends ; Problems and dilemmas of global problem-solving ; Strengthening global governance ; Global governance and the democratic question ; Multilevel citizenship, multilayered democracy -- Parallel worlds : the governance of global risks in finance, security and the environment. Global governance and the paradox of our times ; The global governance of finance ; The global governance of security ; The global governance of the environment ; Conclusion : crisis, politicization and reform -- Democracy, climate change and global governance. Democracy I : the democratic nation-state and climate change ; Democracy II : global governance and climate change ; The policy debate : squaring the circle? ; The political elements of a democratic global deal ; Democracy and the policy menu ahead. (shrink)

Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.

We study the Katětov order on Borel ideals. We prove two structural theorems, one for Borel ideals, the other for analytic P-ideals. We isolate nine important Borel ideals and study the Katětov order among them. We also present a list of fundamental open problems concerning the Katětov order on Borel ideals.

The book is an exploration of how we narrow the gap between our moral ideals and our actual selves. It develops an account of moral improvement as a practical project requiring what Karen Stohr calls a "moral neighborhood." Moral neighborhoods are constructed through social practices that instantiate shared moral ideals in a flawed world.

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies , by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to (...) do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends. (shrink)

The moral significance of preserving natural environments is not entirely an issue of rights and social utility, for a person’s attitude toward nature may be importantly connected with virtues or human excellences. The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural environment--or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?” The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and (...) appreciation of the good in others. (shrink)

We describe a new way to construct large subdirectly irreducibles within an equational class of algebras. We use this construction to show that there are forbidden geometries of multitraces for finite algebras in residually small equational classes. The construction is first applied to show that minimal equational classes generated by simple algebras of types 2, 3 or 4 are residually small if and only if they are congruence modular. As a second application of the construction we characterize residually small locally (...) finite abelian equational classes. (shrink)

We prove, assuming the existence of large cardinals, the relative consistency of the existence of strongly saturated ideals on small cardinals. We also give some information about the problem, how many σ-additive, 0-1-valued measures over a small cardinal are necessary, such that every subset of the cardinal is measurable in at least one of them.

We study the relationship between a computably enumerable real and its presentations. A set A presents a computably enumerable real α if A is a computably enumerable prefix-free set of strings such that equation image. Note that equation image is precisely the measure of the set of reals that have a string in A as an initial segment. So we will simply abbreviate equation image by μ. It is known that whenever A so presents α then A ≤wttα, where ≤wtt (...) denotes weak truth table reducibility, and that the wtt-degrees of presentations form an ideal ℐ in the computably enumerable wtt-degrees. We prove that any such ideal is equation image, and conversely that if ℐ is any nonempty equation image ideal in the computably enumerable wtt-degrees then there is a computable enumerable real α such that ℐ = ℐ. We also prove a kind of Rice Theorem for these ideals, namely that if the index set of such a equation image ideal is not empty or equal to ω then it is equation image-complete. (shrink)

It is well known that there are large differences in the per capita income levels of the world's states. While a few poor countries are catching up with the rich world, for some countries, the gaps are growing wider. Most of this global inequality isbetweencountries, notwithinthem. In other words, even if income were equalized within countries, a large part of the gap in average income levels between countries would remain.At the same time, the majority of movements in the wealthier countries (...) for greater distributive equality have tended to focus on inequalities within their own borders: on issues such as raising minimum wages, changing the domestic tax rate, and ending national health disparities. This state-centric focus is frequently justified in moral terms. It is a familiar claim, for example, that we have special obligations to our own citizens and that these obligations are both weightier and more extensive than our obligations to strangers outside our borders. (shrink)

Surveys the ideals of friendship in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy. The notion of the best friendship inevitably reflects the various conceptions of a good life.

The Eminent Monk: Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagi-ography. John Kieschnick., University of Hawai’i/Kuroda Institute, Honolulu 1997. vii, 218 pp. ISBN 0-8248-1841-5.

What makes a friendship a good friendship? One way of answering that question, taken by Aristotle and many philosophers since, is to describe an ideal friendship, and then say that a friendship is a good friendship insofar as it resembles the ideal. An ideal of friendship, so presented, is intended to capture the qualities that all good friendships share, regardless of who the friends are and regardless of their circumstances. This approach to good friendship, I argue, fails to capture the (...) variety of good kinds of friendship and the role of friendship in real human lives. I propose an alternative approach, on which a good friendship is one that improves the lives of the friends by bringing to those lives some of the many disparate values especially associated with friendship. On this view, there are many forms of good friendship, often mutually incompatible; no single kind of friendship is a model for all others; and the point of friendship is to improve the lives of humans as they are, with all their distinguishing weaknesses, limitations, and needs. (shrink)

This article illuminates the open ending of Christopher Nolan's film Inception (2010) in light of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. Drawing particularly on Nietzsche's notions of ascetic ideals and honest illusions, the article contends that Cobb's refusal to look at the spinning top can be seen not necessarily as his renunciation of autonomy but as his new attempt to affirm his existence and create meanings. Mal's tragic death has turned Cobb into an ascetic idealist who paradoxically resorts to self-torture to alleviate (...) his pain and suffering. Only when he sees the destructive power of his sense of guilt about Mal does he come to realize that what he really needs is not exactly the ability to distinguish the dream world from reality per se but the ability to make things seem and feel real – that is, in Nietzsche's words, honest illusions. Faced with the challenge to regain the capability to see and appreciate illusions as illusions without deceiving himself into believing that they are real, Cobb takes “a leap of faith” with Saito into the world to which he wishes to belong and finally embraces the moment of seeing his children's faces, which, fortunately for him, seem real – that is, “good” – enough. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly relied upon by clinicians for making diagnostic and treatment decisions, playing an important role in imaging, diagnosis, risk analysis, lifestyle monitoring, and health information management. While research has identified biases in healthcare AI systems and proposed technical solutions to address these, we argue that effective solutions require human engagement. Furthermore, there is a lack of research on how to motivate the adoption of these solutions and promote investment in designing AI systems that align with values (...) such as transparency and fairness from the outset. Drawing on insights from psychological theories, we assert the need to understand the values that underlie decisions made by individuals involved in creating and deploying AI systems. We describe how this understanding can be leveraged to increase engagement with de-biasing and fairness-enhancing practices within the AI healthcare industry, ultimately leading to sustained behavioral change via autonomy-supportive communication strategies rooted in motivational and social psychology theories. In developing these pathways to engagement, we consider the norms and needs that govern the AI healthcare domain, and we evaluate incentives for maintaining the status quo against economic, legal, and social incentives for behavior change in line with transparency and fairness values. (shrink)

Part of being a good professional is, so we contend, to have ideals. Ideals essentially complement the deontic considerations that are usually taken as the main components of professional moral deliberation. Yet the notion of professional ideals is problematic. As professional ideals they refer to a profession collectively, while as professional ideals they are first of all strong personal commitments of individual professionals. As collective aspirations, professional ideals have a kind of external normative thrust (...) on individual professionals, but people cannot be forced to identify with ideals on demand. Endorsing ideals can only come from within. On the basis of an analysis of ?professional ideals? and ?professional identity?, we conclude that professional ideals are necessary constituents of the personal identity of professionals. This explains the dual character of professional ideals: they are pursued by a collective and constitute the group professional identity but they also need to be endorsed by individual professionals in order to be able to say that the ideals are their own. We end with a short and tentative description of some practical implications for the fostering and education of professional ideals. (shrink)

Let $\mathfrak{M}$ be the Medvedev lattice: this paper investigates some filters and ideals (most of them already introduced by Dyment, [4]) of $\mathfrak{M}$ . If $\mathfrak{G}$ is any of the filters or ideals considered, the questions concerning $\mathfrak{G}$ which we try to answer are: (1) is $\mathfrak{G}$ prime? What is the cardinality of ${\mathfrak{M} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {\mathfrak{M} \mathfrak{G}}} \right. \kern-0em} \mathfrak{G}}$ ? Occasionally, we point out some general facts on theT-degrees or the partial degrees, by which these questions (...) can be answered. (shrink)