Epicurus

In a chapter from his book, "Confrontation with the Reaper," Feldman critiques Epicurus' assertion that nothing inherently negative befalls us after death. However, it is essential to note that the Epicurean argument is more nuanced than Feldman suggests. In this chapter, Feldman undertakes a comprehensive revision of the Epicurean argument, incorporating numerous assumptions supported by evidence to comprehend it. This multiplicity of revisions makes it challenging to trace how Feldman distorts the original Epicurean argument. In this paper, I will endeavor (...) to reconstruct Feldman's line of reasoning, focusing on his conclusion, which posits that death, by depriving the deceased of the intrinsic value of life, introduces an extrinsic evil. According to this view, had death not occurred, the person would have continued to enjoy the intrinsic value of life. However, it is arguable that death does not deprive a person of the intrinsic good inherent in life because, without death, one would still have the opportunity to experience the intrinsic value of life. This perspective finds support in the examples I present to counter Feldman's conclusion: the cases of a cancer patient, a devout Christian, and a Buddhist philosopher who all met their demise. (shrink)

If death is a harm then it is a harm that cannot be experienced. The proponent of death's harm must therefore provide an answer to Epicurus, when he says that ‘death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not’. In this paper I respond to the two main ways philosophers have attempted to answer Epicurus, regarding the subject of death's harm: either directly or via analogy. The direct (...) way argues that there is a truth-maker (or difference-maker) for death's harm, namely in virtue of the intrinsic value the subject's life would have had if they had not died. The analogy argues that there are cases analogous to death, where the subject is harmed although they experience no pain as a result. I argue that both accounts beg the question against the Epicurean: the first by presupposing that one can be harmed while experiencing no displeasure as a result and the second by conflating a de re with a de dicto reading of death's harm. Thus, I argue, until better arguments are provided, one is best to agree with Epicurus and those who follow him that death is not a harm. (shrink)

La vida eterna y la resurrección de los muertos gracias a la clonación.

Epicurus asked: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” This Socratic dialogue explores a popular version of the Argument From Evil. Suitable as an introduction to the topic.

Within the Critique of practical reason, Epicurus plays an important, even if very often neglected, role. First at all in the Analytic, where the Epicurean ethics appears as the more serious opponent to the Kantian foundation of the morality. The discussion becomes more cogent on the topic of the motivation, question which is again debated in the Dialectic.

Epicurus holds, in Key Doctrine 31, that what is just according to nature is a súmbolon or sign of the interest there is in neither harming one another nor being harmed. Certain readings of this maxim equivocate this legal sign with other signs found in nature, thereby failing to give sufficient weight to the role of reciprocity in its production. Other readings simply import a legal sense from outside of Epicurean doctrine, thereby failing to explain what makes Epicurean súmbola legal. (...) A final set of readings attempt to find a legal rule as a kind of innate concept or Kantian ‘scheme’. This article identifies new sources for understanding súmbolon, drawn principally but not exclusively from Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. This article offers an original argument that Epicurus adopts Aristotle’s’ image of the tally stick (symbolon) as a meeting of often divergent interests which constitutes something new and particularly valuable to the Epicurean: friendship. A theoretical argument is also advanced to support this reading which claims that one person’s reflection on a ‘divine image’ of the end (telos) is insufficient to constitute a súmbolon; rather real (as opposed to abstract or ideal) individual interests are filtered via the mechanism of the tally, that is via the meeting of two given individuals who together generate a sign (symbolon) of reciprocal interest in neither harming nor being harmed. (shrink)

Epicurus famously argued that death cannot be bad for a person because only painful experiences or something that brings about them can be bad for people, but when a person dies, she cannot experience anything at all, let alone pain. If, as Epicurus argued, death is not something bad for us, then presumably, we have no reason to fear it. In contrast with Epicurus, however, contemporary philosophers of death generally subscribe to the deprivation account of the badness of death, which (...) allows that death can be comparatively bad for the one who dies. Still, many deprivation theorists believe that death, as merely comparatively bad, is not a fitting object of fear. Some of them argue that our attitudes would be unfitting if they respond to comparative value; while others contend that fear is not the kind of attitude that tracks comparative value. In this paper, I critically assess these arguments by deprivation theorists, and argue that, contrary to what these theorists claim, their arguments do not entail that death does not merit fear. (shrink)

Smith’s imagination of sociability and interpersonal relationships in commercial society carries a strong Epicurean tone. However, in terms of moral philosophy, Smith severely criticised Epicureanism and firmly defended the ‘natural beauty of virtue’ within the framework of sentimentalism (i.e. the existence of moral worth independent of pleasure and utility). He claimed that Epicureanism’s denial of the ‘natural beauty of virtue’ not only misunderstands the basis of moral judgement but also ignores people’s corresponding moral motives and the possibility of their self-formation (...) in character. He similarly criticised Hume. In Smith’s view, Hume also neglected the ‘natural beauty of virtue’. This negligence underestimated the dignity of human nature in terms of moral motives, moral perception and the self-cultivation of character, thus failing to explain the possibility of justice, self-command, generosity, and other virtues. In general, drawing on established intellectual resources, Smith offered a more active, energetic perspective on the moral agent than Epicurus and Hume. The active and noble moral agent, rather than rationally maximising individuals, was an enlightened participant in Smith’s commercial society. (shrink)

Encyclopedia entry on Epicurus' theology. It considers the negative side of Epicurean theology and its basis in their physics, the Epicureans’ positive view of the nature of the gods and how they use it to critique popular religion, and the psychological benefits that they claim result from having correct views about the gods.

abstract Ancient writers, including philosophers such as Aristotle, often depict friendship as a source of pleasure; by contrast, in his Laelius de amicitia, Cicero describes such relationships as sweet and delightful, but never connects them with uoluptas, which for him is a largely negative term reserved for Epicurean doctrine. This paper argues that there is more to this pointed use of language than Cicero’s well-known dislike of Epicureanism. Considering first the Latin philosophical vocabulary of pleasure and then the vexed question (...) of what exactly qualifies as pleasure according to the Epicurean system, the paper makes the case that Cicero believed (probably correctly) that the pleasures of friendship as conceived of by himself and many ordinary language-users would not in fact qualify as instances of Epicurean uoluptas. If, as Epicurus appears to have held, all pleasures are either bodily or mental, and all mental pleasures are derived from bodily ones, then many activities experienced as pleasurable in and of themselves—including many traditional elements of friendship—are not in fact Epicurean pleasures. (shrink)

The philosophies of Epicurus and the Buddha aim to free us from suffering by helping us to recognize how ignorance and delusion lead us to pursue harmful desires. Since the problem lies in our attitudes, the solution is to change our attitudes. Like doctors healing the sick, they offer therapeutic practical advice, to remove the groundless opinions and the unhealthy desires that cause suffering. Although various misconceptions may lead us to conceive of these two thinkers as quite different with respect (...) to values and ethics, there are remarkable similarities. Indeed, their practical advice for how to live has the same normative basis: they counsel us to avoid craving and clinging, so that we avoid the harmful ways of living that make most people unhappy. Epicurus and the Buddha advocate a selective elimination of desire, and on the same basis. As we choose how to live, we are like gardeners weeding out harmful desires and cultivating healthy desires that will make our lives flourish. This article clarifies the notions of craving and clinging, which are often conflated in Buddhist studies, and uses them to improve on our understanding of Epicurus’ categorization of desires. (shrink)

Explores the role of eliminating fear in Epicurean ethics and physics, focusing on techniques to eliminate the fear of death and the fear of the gods. Includes a taxonomy of types of fear and types of therapy for fear.

Tradução do artigo de Norman Wentworth DeWitt intitulado "Epicurus’ Three-Wheeled Chair", CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, com permissão da University of Chicago Press.

인간의 가장 확실한 가능성으로서 죽음이 인간에게 고통을 초래할 수 밖에 없다면, 심신의 고통의 제거를 통해 행복에 이르고자 했던 에피쿠로스의 기획은 무너진다. 따라서 에피쿠로스는 죽음이 인간에게 고통을 초래하지 않을 수 있다는 것을 보여야만 죽을 수밖에 없는 인간이 인생의 목적으로서 행복에 도달할 수 있다고 참되게 말할 수 있으며, 한 인간에게 그에 도달하도록 참되게 촉구할 수 있다. 본고의 목표는 에피쿠로스를 대신하여 그의 쾌락주의 체계 내에서 죽음이 인간에게 고통을 초래하지 않을 수 있다는 것을 보이는 것이다. 간단히 말해, 에피쿠로스의 쾌락주의에서 죽음이 악이 아닐 수 있다는 (...) 해석을 제시하는 것이다. 구체적으로, 필자는 다음과 같은 세 가지 명제들을 설득력 있게 이끌어 내는 논증을 에피쿠로스의 텍스트로부터 재구성할 것이다: (i) 살아 있지 않은 상태로서 죽음은 악이 아니다. (ii) 삶의 중단으로서 죽음은 그것이 삶의 박탈이라는 이유로 악인 것은 아니다. (iii) 삶의 중단으로서 죽음은 인간이 가진 어떤 욕망이 요구하는 미래의 삶을 결핍시킴으로써 악이 될 수 있지만, 필수적인 욕망만을 가지는 인간에게는 악이 아니다. 여기에 더하여, 인간이 죽음이 악이 아닌 삶에 실제로 도달할 수 있으며 그 삶이 실제로 즐겁고 행복한 삶이라는 점을 보임으로써 에피쿠로스의 쾌락주의에서 죽음의 문제가 이론적 차원뿐만 아니라 실제적 차원에서도 해소될 수 있음을 밝힐 것이다. 본고는 에피쿠로스의 쾌락주의를 내재적으로 보다 정합적으로 만듦과 동시에 이후 외재적 비판이 생산적으로 이루어질 수 있는 토대를 제공한다는 점에서도 그 의미가 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Epicurus held that justice came into being when individuals made compacts with one another to secure the benefit that comes from not harming one another. He also distinguished just laws from those that are not just; and he recognized a virtue of justice. This much is well supported by our evidence. There is also much that is controversial. At the very basis, there is disagreement on his conception of justice. There are also basic questions on how compacts are related to (...) the justice of laws, as well as to the virtue of justice. Plato and Aristotle severed compacts from virtue; and some modern thinkers consider the justice of institutions prior to that of individuals. What was Epicurus’ position? This paper will sketch an outline of Epicurus’ theory of justice as a path to the goal of a pleasant life. As Phillip Mitsis (1988) suggested, Epicurus sought to harmonize a contractual view of justice with the virtue of justice. My aim is to investigate further the coherence of this endeavor. As I will argue, Epicurus presents a unitary theory of justice, composed of a number of steps that develop out of each other in a consistent way. As a developmental path, it admits of much variation. By tracing its basic features, I seek to show how Epicurus puts individuals in charge of attaining their goal, pleasure. (shrink)

Four complete philosophical works have been transmitted by Diogenes Laertius under Epicurus’ name: three doctrinal letters, addressed to Herodotus, to Pythocles and to Menoeceus respectively, and a collection of maxims known as the Κύριαι δόξαι (variously translated as ‘Principal Doctrines’ or ‘Sovran Maxims’). While the Maxims and the Letters to Menoeceus and to Herodotus each enjoy a certain fame, the Letter to Pythocles has long suffered neglect. Symptomatic of this neglect is, for instanc...

Many commentators have understood Philippians 3:2 as a clear warning against Judaizers. This verse, however, admits of other interpretations. And indeed, some commentators have suggested new readings for this passage. For example, one author suggested that the apostle might have had the Cynic philosophers in mind. Others thought that Paul distinguished between three kinds of people. This article aims to contribute to this debate by presenting the viewpoint of Norman DeWitt, who provides (indirect) evidence that the Epicureans were among the (...) main opponents of Paul and Christianity. And he assumes that after the evidence of certain symbols and elements in the language of the author of the letter, it can be seen that the infamous epithet in 3.2: "τοὺς κύνας" refers to the followers of the Greek philosopher Epicurus. In addition to Norman DeWitt, we sought to dialogue with other authors who deal with the subject and contribute to the reflection of this investigation. As methodology, a bibliographical study was carried out. As a result, it is emphasized that Philippians verse 3:2 is open to many identity possibilities. (shrink)

In his later writings, Althusser brings to light a repressed materialistic current in Western philosophy, ranging from Epicurus to Heidegger and Derrida. In this article, I argue that the comparison between Epicurus's conception of Nature and Heidegger's concepts of _Geworfenheit_ and _Es gibt_ allows Althusser to lay the foundation for a new notion of event. Through the analysis of this philosophical connection, Althusser aims both to think of Time and History in a non-teleological way and to create the conditions for (...) a political praxis that does not apply any kind of metaphysical principles to a constantly changing reality. (shrink)

Epicurus’ original version of atomism takes atoms to be physically indivisible but not completely unanalysable: each atom contains a finite number of minima. This paper explores the nature of the minima by focusing on a specific question: in which sense are the minima minimal? I do so by investigating the notions of parthood and divisibility into parts that are at play in paragraphs 56–59 of the Letter to Herodotus, where the theory of minima is introduced. By focusing on the analogy (...) (noticed by Francesco Verde) between Epicurean minima and Aristotelian limits, I argue that the minima should be understood as the minimal realiser of the atom’s physical functions. This allows me to keep together two very plausible but apparently incompatible claims: (i) the minima are supposed to block the paradoxes of theoretical divisibility, but (ii) their existence and their indivisibility can only be justified in physical (rather than geometrical) terms. (shrink)

In 1976, Fred Miller published a brief, but highly original, paper entitled “Epicurus on the Art of Dying.” This was shortly after Thomas Nagel’s well-known 1970 paper which attempted to counter Epicurus’s claim that death does us no harm, and somewhat before ancient philosophers and their philosophical colleagues started turning Epicurus’s death arguments into a major growth industry. I argue that if Epicurean scholars had taken Miller’s arguments to heart it would have saved them going down a lot of blind (...) alleys in what is now the almost 50 years since the paper appeared. Using elements taken from his arguments, I elaborate them in the light of subsequent scholarship in order to show why a series of leading contemporary interpretations of Epicurean claims about death are deeply inadequate and why Epicurus’s view is not just a clever puzzle, but, as Miller argued, a position with considerable, even attractive, argumentative resources. (shrink)

Cicero often challenged Epicureanism on the grounds of inconsistency. Cicero personifies the charge through his character Torquatus, who defends Epicureanism in De finibus 1–2. Cicero highlights the discrepancies among Torquatus’ beliefs and between them and his behaviour. Torquatus holds that the senses incontestably verify the tenets of Epicureanism, and that logic is superfluous. Yet he is sensitive to the fact that Epicurus’ teachings are not intuitive and require a fair amount of logical argumentation in its defence. Therefore, he defends his (...) school against Cicero's criticisms. But by engaging in a defence of the system, Torquatus has already spoken against his commitment to the obviousness of Epicureanism and his disavowal of logic. (shrink)

Vain emotions are, according to Epicurus, the source of our mental disturbance. The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyze this connection by clarifying the structure of vain emotions in Epicurean philosophy. In order to achieve this, I present, first, the major lines of interpretation regarding the structure of epicurean emotions. Second, I highlight potential problems for each one of these interpretations. Third, I conclude that the existing interpretations cannot capture the whole picture regarding the epicurean structure of (...) emotions and thus I propose an alternative reading of the latter which surpasses the problems facing the existing interpretations. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Epicurean happiness can be achieved by everyone alike. This paper offers a corrective to this view. While it is true that the Epicureans abolish traditional differences among people like those between the sexes, social classes, and so on, they also maintain that there are people who are incapable of achieving happiness because they lack a certain bodily make-up or because they do not have the right ethnic or cultural origin.

In this book, the first English-language monograph on the topic, Jan Maximilian Robitzsch draws on a range of sources including papyrological evidence to give a comprehensive account of the theory of justice advanced by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus and his followers.

In this paper I aim to undermine Stoic and Neo-Stoic readings of Benedict de Spinoza by examining the latter’s strong agreements with Epicurus (a notable opponent of the Stoics) on the nature and ethical role of pleasure in living a happy life. Ultimately, I show that Spinoza and Epicurus are committed to three central claims which the Stoics reject: (1) pleasure holds a necessary connection to healthy natural being, (2) pleasure manifests healthy being through positive changes in state and states (...) of healthy being per se, and (3) pleasure is by nature good. The Stoics reject these three claims due to their views on pleasant sensations as preferred moral indifferents and passionate pleasures as diseases of the soul, views which Spinoza (due to the abovementioned commitments) is strongly opposed to, thereby placing him (at least on the subject of pleasure) outside the realm of merely following or improving on Stoic doctrines. From this comparative analysis we also gain deeper insight into both Spinoza’s engagement with ancient Greek philosophy and the value of Epicureanism and Spinozism in helping us achieve and maintain happiness in the present day, particularly with respect to the benefits and harms of bodily and mental pleasures. (shrink)

Las críticas proferidas en la antigüedad y en la contemporaneidad acerca de la realización del proyecto hedónico de Epicuro, aducen algunas deficiencias en los principios valorativos y epistémicos que trastocan el sentido originario de dicho autor. Frente a las críticas, la censura a los valores tradicionales y el análisis de los deseos como caracteres de la virtud sugieren una respuesta a la insuficiencia epistémica y de valoración con que se designa a la doctrina epicúrea. Por ello, en este artículo se (...) indaga el carácter mediador de la virtud en tanto es justificación del placer como contenido del bienestar tan recusado por tantos críticos del filósofo de Samos. (shrink)

A comparative investigation in the metaphysics of material objects and persons in ancient philosophy, this book provides radically new insights into key themes and areas of ancient thought by drawing on Greek and Buddhist philosophies. Ugo Zilioli explicates the neglected tradition of philosophers who in different ways made material objects either redundant or ontologically dispensable in the ancient world. At the same time, while eliminating objects from the material apparatus of the world, some of those philosophers conceived of selves and (...) persons as the only truly existing items. Chapters cover concepts such as nihilism, elusive objects and the emergence of the self, demonstrating how the philosophy of major thinkers Protogoras, Vasubandhu, Gorgias, Nagarjuna, Democritus, Pyrrho, Epicurus and the Cyrenaics advance our understanding of eliminativism. Zilioli's historical and philosophical reconstruction challenges traditional readings of key moments and figures in the history of thought, both Eastern and Western, as well as providing conceptual tools that are of interest not only to historians of philosophy but also to contemporary metaphysicians. (shrink)

The opponents of Epicureanism in antiquity, including Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius, succeeded in establishing a famous cliché: the theoretical and practical disinterest of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. However, this anti-Epicurean literature did not provide considerations of Epicurean political theory or the testimonies about Epicurean lifestyle. Therefore, the purpose of this book is to shed light on the contribution of Epicurean thought to political life in the ancient world. Incorporating the most up-to-date archaeological material, including papyri which have (...) been recovered from Herculaneum and the Greek epigraphy of the Roman Epicureans, this volume will bring to the foreground new testimonies surrounding the public activities of the Epicureans. In this way, the reader will learn that Epicurean political theory is, in fact, a crucial ingredient of its philosophy. As a result, this connection creates an ongoing dialogue with the Greek philosophical tradition, revealing the presence of Plato in the Epicurean political model. (shrink)

In this paper1, we explore some positive elements from the Epicurean position on mathematics. Is induction important in mathematical practice or useful in proof? Does atomism appear in mathematics and in what ways? Keywords: Epicurus, induction, Polya, proof, atomism.

By digging through the stratigraphy of the history of ideas we can find within and beyond Marxism an 'aleatory current' that values the role of chance in history. Using this perspective, the book builds a case for a historical materialism that is stripped of all teleology. Starting in the ancient Mediterranean with Epicurus, it traces the history of conceiving history as plural up to Marxism and modern science. It shows that concrete historical 'worlds' such as ancient Mesoamerica and Eurasia cannot (...) be reduced to a single template. Affirming the potentiality of a future non-capitalist 'world', it invalidates any 'end of history' thesis. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to present the fundamentals of Epicurus’ views on physics and ontology and to raise some questions that a competitor to Aristotelian hylomorphism ought to be able to handle. In section 1, I present the basic ontological framework; in section 2, I introduce atoms, which most closely correspond in Epicurus’ system to Aristotelian matter, and show how he attempted to account for some phenomenal and psychological properties of compound bodies by appealing just to the characteristics (...) and arrangement of their atomic parts. But it turns out that not all macroscopic properties are regarded as explicable in this way. In section 3, I introduce an alternative Epicurean analysis of bodies that treats them not as aggregates of material parts but rather as complexes of attributes that have so-called ‘permanent natures’ at their core. I argue that this analysis must play an ineliminable explanatory role in some contexts, in order to account for the unity of compound bodies, their persistence over time, and to ground modal claims about what belongs to them necessarily or non-necessarily. In section 4, I briefly discuss a semi-technical formulation that some Epicurean philosophers use when making such claims. (shrink)

There are two links that stand in the foreground of Deleuze’s treatment of Epicurus and Lucretius: the themes of immanent naturalism and of the externality of ontological relations. However, the links are problematised in Difference and Repetition, which presents an important critique of the concept of the atom. I will argue that this critique reveals the limits of the intellectual affinity between ancient atomism and Deleuzian metaphysics; in particular, that Deleuze’s notions of relationality and spatium respond to problems raised by (...) the relations between atoms and by the not-being of the atomists’ vacuum. In this sense, Deleuze’s treatment of atomism is significant because it makes clear Deleuze’s aim in shifting the mereological vocabulary from points to lines; it shows what, in Deleuze’s sense, it means to unfound and sets down the conditions for a successful Deleuzian critique of essentialist varieties of the metaphysics of structure. (shrink)

Epicurus holds, in Key Doctrine 31, that what is just according to nature is a súmbolon or sign of the interest there is in neither harming one another nor being harmed. Certain readings of this maxim equivocate this legal sign with other signs found in nature, thereby failing to give sufficient weight to the role of reciprocity in its production. Other readings simply import a legal sense from outside of Epicurean doctrine, thereby failing to explain what makes Epicurean súmbola legal. (...) A final set of readings attempt to find a legal rule as a kind of innate concept or Kantian ‘scheme’. This article identifies new sources for understanding súmbolon, drawn principally but not exclusively from Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. This article offers an original argument that Epicurus adopts Aristotle’s’ image of the tally stick (symbolon) as a meeting of often divergent interests which constitutes something new and particularly valuable to the Epicurean: friendship. A theoretical argument is also advanced to support this reading which claims that one person’s reflection on a ‘divine image’ of the end (telos) is insufficient to constitute a súmbolon; rather real (as opposed to abstract or ideal) individual interests are filtered via the mechanism of the tally, that is via the meeting of two given individuals who together generate a sign (symbolon) of reciprocal interest in neither harming nor being harmed. (shrink)

This article investigates why Lucretius does not dedicate any section of his poem to atomic size or provide a technical term to describe the concept. This absence is particularly significant because Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus both uses the term μέγεθος to indicate atomic size and contains a passage reporting specifically on this property. First, the article argues that atomic size and shape are causally redundant in Epicurus’ ontology. Second, it demonstrates that the origin of both shape and size is found (...) in the smallest magnitudes in Epicurean physics, the minima. Drawing on these findings, it concludes that, since atomic size violates the law of parsimony, it is a superfluous entity in the Epicurean system. After analysing passages from the De rerum natura, it suggests that the absence of atomic size in Lucretius may be deliberate. Lucretius’ microphysics works perfectly without introducing a philosophical notion of atomic size, and is more economical and efficient than that of Epicurus. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be (...) bad for everyone else but those who die, such as family, friends, and society (other-regarding effects). During the pandemic, the focus has been on the number of deaths more than on the suffering and reduced well-being of those infected and the rest of society. However, since the pandemic requires prioritization, it is, on a utilitarian account, important to consider priorities that do the most good overall. In this article, we approach the harm of death from an Epicurean point of view, seeking to flesh out potential implications for pandemic priority-setting, and healthcare in general, using a case study of COVID-19 priority-setting. We also explore whether this would conflict with utilitarianism. We conclude that an Epicurean pandemic priority-setting approach would be different but, surprisingly, not radically different from many of the actual priority-setting decisions we saw under the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that existing literature discounts the role of self-improvement in Astellian friendship. To make this element central, I show how an Epicurean analysis of Astellian friendship brings self-improvement clearly into focus. On the way to centering self-improvement, I show how extant accounts imply self-improvement without explicitly setting up the architecture to explain this element of Astellian friendship. Self-improvement is centralized by way of three shared themes between the Epicurean Garden and the Astellian religious retirement: the motivation (...) to enter, the project inside, and the manner of friendship. (shrink)

The purpose of our study is to demonstrate through an array of three themes that the role of the thought of Epicurus is central throughout the works of Friedrich Nietzsche. In doing so, we are going to study several themes among which the duality between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the Übermensch and finally décadence (as the word is used in French by Nietzsche) and which Nietzsche associates to Epicurus in his last period. Our theoretical proposal consists of saying that (...) there is a common thread of the Epicurean thought in the Nietzschean works that makes it an important source of inspiration throughout his works in order to build some of his main concepts. (shrink)

This chapter situates Karl Marx’s dissertation The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature (1841) within his intellectual biography. It explores the role of a German ideal known as Bildung, translated as “education”, “cultivation” or “culture”, within Marx’s classical education in the Gymnasium and the dissertation itself. Both Wilhelm von Humboldt, who reformed the Gymnasium curriculum prior to Marx’s attendance, and philosopher G.W.F. Hegel have classically inspired notions of Bildung. Each presents the white European man as the model (...) for this “education” or “cultivation”. This chapter argues that the dissertation assimilates Epicurus and his atom into this Eurocentric paradigm, with Marx taking for granted his predecessors’ racist teleology of history and applying their conception of the individual to the atom. Then, it addresses the dissertation’s influence in the development of historical materialism, a facet of Marxism already critiqued for its Eurocentrism. This chapter concludes by showing how non-White and non-Western Marxists have updated Marxist thought through constant critique of its Eurocentrism instead of abandoning its revolutionary vision. It suggests that Marxism is relevant to scholars of antiquity not because of the dissertation but the tradition’s self-interrogation of its foundational ideas and persistent focus on improving the conditions of the marginalised. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, [volume 1] includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

Epicureanism is not only a defence of pleasure: it is also a philosophy of science and knowledge. This edited collection explores new pathways for the study of Epicurean scientific thought, a hitherto still understudied domain, and engages systematically and critically with existing theories. It shows that the philosophy of Epicurus and his heirs, from antiquity to the classical age, founded a rigorous and coherent conception of knowledge. This first part of a two-volume set examines more specifically the contribution of Epicureanism (...) in the fields of language, medicine, and meteorology (i.e., celestial, geological and atmospheric phenomena). Offering a renewed image of Epicureanism, the book includes studies on the nature of human language and on the linguistic aspects of scientific discourse; on the relationship between Epicureanism and ancient medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen; on meteorological phenomena and the method of explaining them; and on the reception of Epicurus's legacy in Gassendi. (shrink)

The ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE), though often despised for his materialism, hedonism, and denial of the immortality of the soul during many periods of history, has at the same time been a source of inspiration to figures as diverse as Vergil, Hobbes, Thomas Jefferson, and Bentham. This volume offers authoritative discussions of all aspects of Epicurus's philosophy and then traces out some of its most important subsequent influences throughout the Western intellectual tradition. Such a detailed and comprehensive study (...) of Epicureanism is especially timely given the tremendous current revival of interest in Epicurus and his rivals, the Stoics. The thirty-one contributions in this volume offer an unmatched resource for all those wishing to deepen their knowledge of Epicurus' powerful arguments about happiness, death, and the nature of the material world and our place in it. At the same time, his arguments are carefully placed in the context of ancient and subsequent disputes, thus offering readers the opportunity of measuring Epicurean arguments against a wide range of opponents--from Platonists, Aristotelians and Stoics, to Hegel and Nietzsche, and finally on to such important contemporary philosophers as Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams. The volume offers separate and detailed discussions of two fascinating and ongoing sources of Epicurean arguments, the Herculaneum papyri and the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda. Our understanding of Epicureanism is continually being enriched by these new sources of evidence and the contributors to this volume have been able to make use of them in presenting the most current understanding of Epicurus's own views. By the same token, the second half of the volume is devoted to the extraordinary influence of Epicurean doctrines, often either neglected or misunderstood, in literature, political thinking, scientific innovation, personal conceptions of freedom and happiness, and in philosophy generally. Taken together, the contributions in this volume offer the most comprehensive and detailed account of Epicurus and Epicureanism available in English. (shrink)

Positive review of Sellars' short introduction to Epicureanism considered as a way of life.

This paper outlines the key points of the debate concerning theoretical perspectives on knowledge which had unfolded in the time of the most prominent epicurean and skeptical thinkers. The research begins with a few historical indications about Epicurusʼ contribution to the establishment of the aforementioned disputes and his motivation to assign crucial importance to the problem of the criteria of knowledge. At the same time, to some extent, it will become clear how a rival, skeptical school of thought developed under (...) the influence of that teaching. The intention is not to depict these two philosophical approaches in full, nor to capture their main features, but to offer some insight into specific areas of their mutual influence that have contributed to their unexpected convergence. As a result, we will see that, although quite diverse, these two Hellenistic positions reflect certain similarities, above all when it comes to the understanding of the nature and goal of philosophical research, the illustration of a happy life, as well as the answer to the question of what criteria we should follow in order to lead such a life. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical schools developed and discussed perspectives and practices on the emotion of anger useful in contemporary philosophical practice with clients, groups, and organizations. This paper argues the case for incorporating these insights from four main philosophical schools (Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic) sets out eight practices drawn from these schools, and discusses how these insights can be used by philosophical practitioners with clients.

"Un monde fait d'atomes et de vide, des phénomènes réductibles aux mouvements et aux formes des atomes : ce sont là deux aspects bien connus de la philosophie matérialiste et mécaniste d'Épicure. Une telle conception de l'univers peut-elle cependant rendre véritablement compte de l'être vivant et de sa physiologie? Comment un rassemblement de matière aléatoirement combinée produirait-il un organisme? Et si le vivant est une sorte de mécanisme, qu'est-ce qui différencie un mécanisme vital des autres? L'ouvrage examine de façon systématique (...) les réponses épicuriennes à ces questions en s'attachant notamment à les replacer dans un dialogue avec les philosophes antérieurs, principalement Démocrite et Aristote."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper shows the ways in which Kant’s notions of the feeling of life and the feeling of the promotion of life may be influenced by Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis, respectively. Accordingly, getting a clear picture of Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis will help us (i) understand why Kant introduces these notions in the third Critique and (ii) why he identifies aesthetic pleasure with the feeling of the promotion of (...) life. As I will demonstrate, the feeling of life allows us to be conscious of the harmonious interaction of our faculties with each other while the feeling of the promotion of life allows us to be aware of the harmonious relationship between our faculties and nature. Hence, the feeling of the promotion of life indicates the well-being of the subject in its relation to its environment. (shrink)

Distress and guilt are common aspects of grief. For many, especially those experiencing complicated grief, guilt can often feel overwhelming and be prolonged. Those grieving are often subject to thoughts of the form “If only X” or “I should have done Y.” Fueling these thoughts is the belief that, somehow, a loved one has been harmed by death. Some who are grieving, often experience the thought that they are disappointing those who have passed or, even, harming the memory of those (...) they love. These feelings have little logical support if, as Epicurus suggests, the dead can’t be harmed, and death is not a misfortune to the dead. In this article I will outline the Epicurean view on death with the expectation that it may be useful in philosophical counseling for those experiencing anguish as a part of the process. (shrink)