Canadian ethicists Jocelyn Downie and Udo Schuklenk seek to assess the effect of Canada’s decriminalisation of ‘medical assistance in dying’ ‘to inform Canada’s ongoing discussions and because other countries will confront the same questions if they contemplate changing their assisted dying law.’1 Their assessment focuses on two arguments earlier levied against expansion of these procedures. The first is that of a ‘slippery slope’ and the second is what they disingenuously call, ‘social determinants of health’. They conclude that, in both cases, (...) the effect of legislation permitting first limited and then expanded options for medical termination has been benign. The argument in this brief commentary is that the ‘slippery slope’ is clearly evident and support for those with chronic, progressive diagnoses a clear contributor to the ever increasing number of persons seeking MAID. Downie and Schuklenk first review the legal and legislative history of MAID. In Carter v Canada, the courts found …. (shrink)

Recently, interest has surged in similarity-based epistemologies of possibility. However, it has been pointed out that the notion of ‘relevant similarity’ is not properly developed in this literature. In this paper, I look at the research done in the field of analogical reasoning, where we find that one of the most promising ways of capturing relevance in similarity reasoning is by relying on the predictive analogy similarity relation. This takes relevant similarity to be based on shared properties that have structural (...) relations to the property of interest. I argue that if we base our epistemology of possibility on similarity reasoning on the predictive analogy similarity relation, we require prior knowledge of the specifics of these structural relations. I discuss a number of possible responses to this on behalf of the similarity theorists given their methodological approach to the epistemology of modality more generally. They could either opt for making explicit the metaphysics underlying these structural relations, in which case they need to spell out how we can come to know these relations. Or they could opt for developing a theory that explains why we do not need to have explicit knowledge of these structural relations; for example by suggesting that we make use of epistemic shortcuts. (shrink)

Individuals with trypophobia have an aversion towards clusters of roughly circular shapes, such as those on a sponge or the bubbles on a cup of coffee. It is unclear why the condition exists, given the harmless nature of typical eliciting stimuli. We suggest that aversion to clusters is an evolutionarily prepared response towards a class of stimuli that resemble cues to the presence of parasites and infectious disease. Trypophobia may be an exaggerated and overgeneralised version of this normally adaptive response. (...) Consistent with this explanation, individuals with trypophobia, as well as comparison individuals, reported aversion towards disease-relevant cluster stimuli, but only the trypophobic group reported aversion towards objectively harmless cluster stimuli that had no relevance to disease. For both groups the level of aversion reported was predicted uniquely by a measure of disgust sensitivity. Scaled emotion ratings and open-ended responses revealed that the aversive response was predominantly based on the disease avoidance emotion, disgust. Many open-ended responses also described skin sensations. These findings support the proposal that individuals with trypophobia primarily perceive cluster stimuli as cues to ectoparasites and skin-transmitted pathogens. (shrink)

I evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice. My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge. The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need (...) to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality. (shrink)

Museum practice remains rooted in its historical ontology of nature-culture dualism. This article moves beyond this dualism by combining Bhaskar’s dialectical MELD schema with cultural historical a...

an article written with Tom Imbo for the forthcoming Compendium of Quantum Mechanics.

This book offers a systematic analysis of the moral principles that should apply to biomedicine. We understand "biomedical ethics" as one type of applied ethics. In our discussions of ethical theory per se, we offer anaylses of levels of moral deliberation and justification and of the ways two major approaches interpret principles, rules, and judgments. The systematic core of the book presents four fundamental moral principles--autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.

Is inner speech an intentional action, something we do, or a reaction, something that happens to us? This paper will argue that it can be both, (although not at the same time). Some inner speech utterances are reactive: they are spontaneous, they require no effort, and we are not in control of their occurring. These inner speech utterances fail to meet the traditional criteria for qualifying as intentional actions. But some inner speech ut- terances are intentional actions, performed deliberately, effortfully (...) and with as much control as any other intentional action. When we deliberate, for example, inner speech utterances are the basic actions by which we bring about the non-basic action of deliberating. (shrink)

The construct of flexibility has been a focus for research and theory for over 100 years. However, flexibility has not been consistently or adequately defined, leading to obstacles in the interpretation of past research and progress toward enhanced theory. We present a model of socioemotional flexibility—and its counterpart rigidity—at three time scales using dynamic systems modeling. At the real-time scale (micro), moment-to-moment fluctuations in affect are identified as dynamic flexibility. At the next higher meso-time scale, adaptive adjustments to changes in (...) context are characterized as reactive flexibility. At the macro scale is flexibility that occurs across months or years, reflecting flexibility due to developmental or life transitions. Implications of the model and suggestions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

A discussion of the connection between activism and academia in bioethics, highlighting the author’s own trajectory, exploring the extent to which academics have an obliation to be ‘judges’ rather than ‘barristers’ (as explored by Jonathan Haidt) and asking questions about the relationship of disability to positions in bioethics.

Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a (...) sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems. (shrink)

The frame or relevance problem is a classic problem in cognitive science and philosophy. We attempt to resolve this problem by appealing to predictive processing, a growing theory of cognition. As such, it ought to explain one of the central processes of cognition, that is, how an agent context-sensitively determines relevance. Our solution begins by appealing to Bayesian prior probabilities, which intuitively reflect relevance for a predictive agent. However, prior probabilities are necessary but insufficient for solving the problem with predictive (...) processing. We then turn to the broader predictive processing toolbox, leveraging the concepts of prediction, prediction error, and precision in order to explain relevance. This move reveals that the processes that optimize for prediction error minimization are crucial for realizing relevance. Although, they do not yet solve the entire problem, which also demands an agent select relevant actions, based on considerations about their consequences. By appealing to active inference, decision-making, and planning can be brought to bear on relevance, in addition to perceptual inference. With this final inclusion of action (as inference), we suggest predictive processing has the tools to comprehensively solve the problem of relevance. (shrink)

Background: Ethical leadership is important for developing ethical healthcare practice. However, there is little research-based knowledge on how to stimulate and educate for ethical leadership. Objectives: The aim was to develop and investigate the feasibility of a 6-week web-based, ethical leadership educational programme and learn from participants’ experience. Training programme and research design: A training programme was developed consisting of (1) a practice part, where the participating middle managers developed and ran an ethics project in their own departments aiming at (...) enhancing the ethical mindfulness of the organizational culture, and (2) a web-based reflection part, including online reflections and coaching while executing the ethics project. Focus group interviews were used to explore the participants’ experiences with and the feasibility of the training. Participants and research context: Nine middle managers were recruited from a part-time master’s programme in leadership in Oslo, Norway. The research context was the participating leaders’ work situation during the 6 weeks of training. Ethical considerations: Participation was voluntary, data anonymized and the confidentiality of the participating leaders/students and their institutions maintained. No patient or medical information was involved. Findings: Eight of the nine recruited leaders completed the programme. They evaluated the training programme as efficient and supportive, with the written, situational feedback/coaching as the most important element, enhancing reflection and motivation, counteracting a feeling of loneliness and promoting the execution of change. Discussion: The findings seem consistent with the basic assumptions behind the educational design, based partly on e-health research, feedback studies and organizational ethics methodology, partly on theories on workplace learning, reflection, recognition and motivation. Conclusion: The training programme seems feasible. It should be adjusted according to participants’ proposals and tested further in a large-scale study. (shrink)

This article examines the death of God theme in the work of Jacques Lacan and indicates some convergences with Christian theology. It distinguishes the ‘atheism’ of Lacan from the atheism of Freud. And it demonstrates that if Lacan does not believe in the God equated with Being, the God of the philosophers, the later Lacan’s argument for what he calls the ‘eksistence’ of God beyond language, the God of the mystics, makes for a highly nuanced atheism.

We ignore the history of philosophy at our peril. Engels, who typically conflates Marx and Marxism, points to the relation of Marxism to the tradition while also denying it. In his little book on Feuerbach, Engels depicts Feuerbach as leading Marx away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy and towards materialism and science. This view suggests that Marx is at best negatively related to Classical German philosophy, including Hegel. Yet Engels elsewhere suggests that Marx belongs to (...) the classical German philosophical tradition. In the preface to Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels wrote: “We German socialists are proud that we trace our descent not only from Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel”. In this paper I will focus on Marx’s relation to Fichte. This relation is rarely mentioned in the Marxist debate, but I will argue, it is crucial for the formulation of Marx’s position, and hence for assessing his contribution accurately. One of the results of this study will be to indicate that Marx, in reacting against Hegel, did not, as is often suggested, ‘leave’ philosophy, but in fact made a crucial philosophical contribution. (shrink)

Ryan, Tom The year 2012 was characterized by extensive re-appraisal, nationally and internationally, of the Second Vatican Council occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of its opening in 1962. One aspect discussed by Ann N.C. Nolan is the language of the Council documents. In her investigation of John O'Malley SJ's work, she points out how he detects in them a clear shift from the scholastic and logical style to a literary and rhetorical mode aimed at persuasion and a deepening of conviction. (...) O'Malley claims the Vatican II documents' mode of discourse is 'epideictic' in character and it follows 'one of the literary forms of antiquity, the panegyric.'. (shrink)

Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London * Corresponding author: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 28 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3JS, UK. Email: hschmidt{at}nuffieldbioethics.org ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract In November 2007, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics published the report Public Health: Ethical Issues . While the report has been welcomed by a wide range of stakeholders, there has also been some criticism. First, it has been suggested that it is not clear why, in developing its ‘stewardship (...) model’, the Council felt the need to go beyond the liberal position developed by John Stuart Mill—what is it that the stewardship model adds? Second, it is suggested that the Report is confused about the concept of paternalism. Third, it is argued that the discussion of the concept of stewardship is lacking in detail and substance. We clarify the Working Party's thinking regarding these three areas, which demonstrates the robustness of the framework set out in the report. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that Plato and Aristotle provide analyses of virtue and practical reason that are strongly shaped by the structure of the technai. Socrates assimilates virtue to skill, while Aristotle assimilates practical reason to a means-end technique. While both philosophers are sensitive to the problems these technē models generate, and try either to escape or to remedy them, they nonetheless remain under the impress of those models. I end by drawing a general lesson from this fascinating episode (...) in intellectual history. (shrink)

Medical practice has always involved at least three roles, three complimentary identities. Practitioners have been at once clinicians dedicated to a patient’s care, members of a professional organization promoting medicine, and informed citizens engaged in public debates on health issues. Beginning in the 1970s, a series of social and technological changes affected, and in many cases restricted, the practitioner’s ability to function equally in these three identities. While others have discussed the changing realities of medical practice in recent decades, none (...) have commented on their effect on their effect on rights of practitioners as citizens. Here several cases begin an analysis of the manner in which those changes have limited the physician’s right to act conscientiously and speak publicly in the face of organizational agendas and political priorities. (shrink)

In sensory neuroscience, the neural and perceptual levels of investigation are commonly related through a reductive research strategy based in psycho-neural isomorphisms. Davida Teller’s “linking propositions” are a particularly vivid illustration of this epistemology in the context of vision science. For Teller, linking propositions guide the core epistemological practices of vision science by expressing the criteria for acceptable explanations of perceptual phenomena by neural processes and by articulating heuristics for discovering neural properties on grounds of perceptual ones, and vice versa. (...) Furthermore, linking propositions create a uniform discourse in which ontological identity statements can be formulated on the basis of structural terms applicable to both the neurophysiological and perceptual domains.I argue that the epistemic practices of current color vision science are better understood through Machamer-style mechanisms than isomorphism-based linking propositions. For Machamer, activity types of mechanisms are central for both explanation and the discovery of entities and their properties. The activity type of color cancellation is fundamental to the opponent process paradigm of color vision precisely in this manner. The descriptive inadequacy of linking propositions for clarifying vision scientific research is particularly damaging because activity types have a unifying role for the structural facts of color perception. As a form of local reductionism, Teller’s proffered epistemology aims to create a uniform domain for neuroscience and perceptual psychology but on the basis of a non-unified, disparate set of structural identity statements. By bringing attention to the unifying role of activity types, Machamer mechanisms allow also for critical epistemological explorations of ontological reductions on grounds of the fit between activity types of higher-level and lower-level sciences. They offer a Machamer-ontological-critical or MOCing framework, for short, against local reductionism. (shrink)

Early voting behavior research confronted liberal democratic theory with the average American citizen's meager ability to think politically. Since then, several lines of analysis have tried to vindicate the mass electorate. Most recently, some researchers have attempted to reconceptualize the political reasoning process by viewing it in the aggregate, while others describe individuals as effective—albeit inarticulate—employers of cognitive shortcuts. While mass publics may, in these ways, be described as “rational,” they still fail to meet the basic requirements of democratic theory.

Some lines of poetry rhyme to certain readers and not to others because of how their words are pronounced in different accents. And because the accent in which a person speaks is tied in significant ways to aspects of their social identity (such as their age, race, gender, and class), some poems rhyme in the voices of the privileged and not in the voices of the disadvantaged. This paper argues that appreciators can incur aesthetic harms when they are excluded from (...) participating in aesthetic goods that are more fully available to others, and that these harms can constitute aesthetic injustices when they are part of a wider pattern of socio-economic hardship. Poems that embody objectionable gatekeeping practices can thus perpetuate aesthetic injustice. (shrink)

Statistical learning theory is often associated with the principle of Occam’s razor, which recommends a simplicity preference in inductive inference. This paper distills the core argument for simplicity obtainable from statistical learning theory, built on the theory’s central learning guarantee for the method of empirical risk minimization. This core “means-ends” argument is that a simpler hypothesis class or inductive model is better because it has better learning guarantees; however, these guarantees are model-relative and so the theoretical push towards simplicity is (...) checked by our prior knowledge. (shrink)

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of (...) the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception. (shrink)

(Deutsch:) Es werden zunächst drei Hinsichten unterschieden, nach denen die in einer Situation offenstehenden Möglichkeiten vorstrukturiert erscheinen: materiell, sozial und subjektiv. Während in materieller Hinsicht Möglichkeiten schlicht vorgegeben sind, werden Möglichkeiten gesellschaftlich als zulässig oder unzulässig skandiert, d.i. hervorgehoben, oder bleiben unskandiert. In subjektiver Hinsicht sind es vor allem die Fähigkeiten des Einzelnen, die diese Möglichkeiten er- oder verschließen. Technisierung erscheint in dieser Perspektive als sichernde Vorstrukturierung von Möglichkeitsräumen, die subjektiv stets mit der Abblendung oder Abschattung bestimmter Sachverhalte und Möglichkeiten, (...) der Erzeugung einer Zone der Latenz, einhergeht. Wie aus emanzipatorischer Perspektive mit dieser Dynamik umzugehen ist, ist Thema des letzten Abschnitts. -/- (English:) At the beginning of the text, I distinguish between three respects in which the options and possibilities within a given situation are prestructured: materially, socially, and subjectively. While certain options and possibilities are simply predetermined by the physical structure of a situation, many options are socially accentuated (skandiert) as admissible or inadmissible, while other options remain unaccented. With respect to the subject, options are primarily made accessible and disclosed through the particular capabilities of the agent. From such a point of view, mechanization (Technisierung) can be described as the safe-guarding prestructuring of spaces of possibility, which is always linked with the fading of certain circumstances and possibilities, the establishment of a domain of latency. How to cope with this dynamic from an emancipatory perspective is the subject of the last section of the paper. (shrink)

Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and then say it. One way to argue for the thesis is to show that the content of a token thought cannot be fully represented by a token mental state before the production of the utterance which expresses it. I make an argument for that claim based on speech act theory. (...) Many inner speech utterances are inner speech acts; as such they are individuated by an amalgam of semantic content and illocutionary force, which only come together with the performance of the speech act. Call the performance of a speech act its meaning and call its meaning its content. Since a token thought is individuated by its content it follows that the content of the speech act is not represented by any token mental state before the speech act is performed. Metaphysically, a thought, when it is an inner speech act, is not an object of any kind, but an action – the action of performing the speech act. I illustrate my argument with the action of deciding something. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:36. A DISCUSSION ON PERSONAL IDENTITY Jane L. Mclntyre's original paper "Is Hume's Self Consistent?" was presented at the MoGiIl Hume Conference; it will be published in the forthcoming volume devoted to those preceedings. Tom Beauchamp" s paper is presented here as delivered. John Biro's paper has been revised since its original presentation. 37. SELF INCONSISTENCY OR MERE SELF PERPLEXITY? Professor Mclntyre's imaginative and constructive paper has three primary (...) parts (despite its division into six sections). First, she offers an interpretation of Hume's view of the self in Book I of the Treatise. Second, she explains why his own reservations in the Appendix create problems not only for this theory of self identity but for other parts of his philosophy as well. Finally, she tries to ease him out of these difficulties with her overlap interpretation of the bundle theory. My comments follow exactly this outline, though my conclusions, for the most part, do not coincide with hers. My reservations do not derive from her attempt to render Hume consistent. Rather, I question the foundations of the entire enterprise in which she, Robison, Nathanson, et. al. are engaged. That is, I remain unconvinced that the alleged problem, as presently framed, is more than a pseudo-problem. I. Hume's Theory in Book I In Book I Hume offers a variety of arguments about the nature of the self, most of which rely on other theories, such as those of causation, the association of ideas, and substance. Whatever the exact arguments and positions he may be advancing, at least the following six propositions are integral to his theory of personal identity: 1)The self is entirely reducible to a collection of perceptions. 2)The self is not characterized by strict identity. 3)There is nothing simple in which the collection of perceptions inheres. 4)Both identity and simplicity are attributed to the self because of relations between perceptions--the relations of causation and resemblance. 5)The relations of resemblance and causation unite these perceptions. 38. 6) There are no real (non-associational) connections or relations among these perceptions which unite them. Half of these six claims are critical denials of other philosophical claims; the other half are constructive philosophical theories. Hume's entire philosophical program in Book I is tied up with these claims. The criticisms are directed at numerous metaphysical theories of mind, substance and causation; and the constructive account of personai identity requires his theories of perception and association of ideas. I mention these obvious points only because it is so important to note that if_ the interpretation is correct which Professor Mclntyre and others give to (roughly) five sentences in the Appendix, where Hume mentions a possible inconsistency, then Hume is not only questioning his theory of personal identity in Book I, he is calling Book I itself into question. To be convinced that this strikingly implausible turnabout occurs in five sentences of the Appendix, we must be given a most compelling argument—one which I doubt is forthcoming. II. Hume's Alleged Inconsistency The alleged problem of inconsistency arises because Hume says in the Appendix that he does not know how to render his own former opinions consistent (T633, 636). However, when he comes to a formal statement of the inconsistency, as everyone is agreed, the propositions said to be inconsistent are not inconsistent. In the attempt to grasp Hume's meaning, a general consensus has emerged in recent Hume scholarship, including Professor Mclntyre in its company, that we ought both to move backward and forward a sentence or two in Hume's text. Hume says in those passages that his hopes for his theory are diminished because he is unable to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness (T636) ; and he then indicates that i_f perceptions could be shown to inhere in something simple or to be really connected, these prob- 39. lems would vanish. It is this textual setting which Robison, Nathanson, and Professor Mclntyre turn into the claim that "the concept of a self which is affected by experience, and therefore must persist through experience— is precisely the concept of the self that... (shrink)

In this article, I identify – and clear up – two problems for contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. The first I call the problem of alienation; the second the problem of conservatism. I argue that these problems will persist, both for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of ethical naturalism, unless ethical naturalists adopt what I call ‘Practical Realism’ about essential human form. Such a Practical Realism leaves open the possibility of radical social and political criticism – I therefore suggest that contemporary ethical (...) naturalists ought to be more interested in exploring the affinities their view shares with Marxist political thought. (shrink)

Develops a framework using resources from Rawls and Nagel for understanding injustices due to the sale of defective real estate instruments by banks whose solvency was globally important in 2007-2008. The leaderships of some of these banks were partly responsible for the world financial crisis that started in 2008.

Java offers exciting opportunities to trace human–cattle relations in a Southeast Asian context. By foregrounding inscriptions, court poems (kakavin), and other textual and iconographic sources, we aim to unearth some historical and cultural aspects of pre-Islamic cattle management and milk consumption, paying special attention to the words used for different breeds, dairy products, and other bovine terminology. Contacts with the Indian subcontinent heralded the introduction of larger cows and eventually milk-based economies, despite the conventional wisdom that the early Javanese avoided (...) dairy products. When read critically and comparatively, Old Javanese texts reveal that locally domesticated cattle (sapi) had a relatively low status and were often used for heavy work. South Asian zebus (lǝmbu), by contrast, enjoyed more prestige and were valued for their holy profile and superior lactation. The consumption and ritual use of dairy products was especially prevalent in Hindu circles, but appears to have had an impact on rural village life more broadly. When the religious hegemony of Brahmins decreased, the production of milk and butter generally ceased to be seen as a worthwhile investment. As a result, the bovine landscapes reconstructed in this article gradually changed beyond recognition in Islamic, colonial, and postcolonial times. (shrink)

X chromosome centromeric drive may explain the prevalence of polycystic ovary syndrome and contribute to oocyte aneuploidy, menopause, and other conditions. The mammalian X chromosome may be vulnerable to meiotic drive because of X inactivation in the female germline. The human X pericentromeric region contains genes potentially involved in meiotic mechanisms, including multiple SPIN1 and ZXDC paralogs. This is consistent with a multigenic drive system comprising differential modification of the active and inactive X chromosome centromeres in female primordial germ cells (...) and preferential segregation of the previously inactivated X chromosome centromere to the polar body at meiosis I. The drive mechanism may explain differences in X chromosome regulation in the female germlines of the human and mouse and, based on the functions encoded by the genes in the region, the transmission of X pericentromeric genetic or epigenetic variants to progeny could contribute to preeclampsia, autism, and differences in sexual differentiation. (shrink)

Despite the growing influence of constitutional rights over the regulation of horizontal (private) relations, many aspects of this trend remain under-theorized. This article criticizes four ideal-typical constitutional horizontality models for failing to accommodate moral reasons that must shape this regulatory practice: the state action model ignores basic consequentialist aspects of political morality; the direct application model ignores basic relational aspects of interpersonal morality; the strong indirect model recognizes both but subordinates the latter to the former; and the partitioned indirect model (...) recognizes both but separates them too strongly. This article claims that a composite indirect model, which reflects basic features of the common law, can better realize constitutional rights through private law in conditions of moral pluralism: it can expose private law to constitutional rights-based and reform-oriented scrutiny without ignoring, eroding, or distorting the unique normativity of private relations and practices or their underlying values. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's Democracy and Political Ignorance uses a by-now familiar rational-choice lens with which to explain and analyze Americans’ widespread political ignorance. Unlike some scholars who tout rational choice on purely predictive or heuristic grounds, Somin claims that it also offers a more accurate description of reality, in this case better explaining the findings of empirical public-opinion research. In this essay, I compare Somin's central concept of rational ignorance and the related concept of “rational irrationality” with the earlier explanatory approach (...) taken by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in his classic study, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. While Schumpeter developed his description of the mass democratic citizenry over 70 years ago—prior to any of the significant empirical studies of American public opinion—its broad approach remains at least as persuasive as Somin's. (shrink)

This editor's preface introduces a special issue of Critical Horizons on the theme of “contestatory cosmopolitanism.” After identifying the broad failings of the standard cosmopolitan appeal to global community, it presents the defining features of the “contestatory” alternative and introduces the papers in light of them.

We ordinarily think of the mind as private, “inside,” and accessible only to the person whose mind it is, and that the integrity of the mind is threatened by “outside” intervention. The prospect that neurotechnologies could be developed that are able to “read” our brains and directly manipulate our thoughts and feelings is, therefore, alarming to many. Implicit behind this sense of alarm is the view that, unlike other types of manipulation and persuasion that depend for their success on rational (...) autonomy, direct interventions into the brain uniquely undermine this autonomy. According to the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), there is no necessary reason why mental states and processes must be realized by internal neural states. External artifacts can constitute part of a coupled cognitive system if these artifacts play the same functional role as internal states and processes. Interventions into these artifacts could, therefore, be considered direct interventions into the mind. If we alarmed by the threat to mental integrity posed by neurotechnology, then it is likely that we will be aghast at the idea that the mind can extend beyond the brain. For intuitively, extending the mind beyond the brain makes the mind more vulnerable to invasion. This paper argues that this fear may be misplaced. Specifically, the paper argues: (i) the most relevant processes to mental integrity are conscious, personal-level processes, (ii) the types of processes that can be extended according to the most influential account of EMT are unconscious, non-occurrent, and subpersonal processes, therefore (iii) the threat posed to mental integrity by neurotechnology if EMT is adopted may be quite modest. (shrink)

This article uses the current post-truth crisis to level a charge against deflationism. It argues that a post-truth society rejects the normativity of truth, thereby deflating truth, by treating disagreements about, say, scientific facts, as mere disagreements of taste. To have substantive disagreements, the notion of truth at stake must be substantive as well. To ward off the perils of post-truth politics, truth must be taken to be more than what deflationists can account for. If we want our disagreements to (...) amount to more than mere differences of opinion, we should have an inflated notion of truth. The article concludes with putting this claim within the context of conceptual engineering. (shrink)