Abstract

We ordinarily think of the mind as private, “inside,” and accessible only to the person whose mind it is, and that the integrity of the mind is threatened by “outside” intervention. The prospect that neurotechnologies could be developed that are able to “read” our brains and directly manipulate our thoughts and feelings is, therefore, alarming to many. Implicit behind this sense of alarm is the view that, unlike other types of manipulation and persuasion that depend for their success on rational autonomy, direct interventions into the brain uniquely undermine this autonomy. According to the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), there is no necessary reason why mental states and processes must be realized by internal neural states. External artifacts can constitute part of a coupled cognitive system if these artifacts play the same functional role as internal states and processes. Interventions into these artifacts could, therefore, be considered direct interventions into the mind. If we alarmed by the threat to mental integrity posed by neurotechnology, then it is likely that we will be aghast at the idea that the mind can extend beyond the brain. For intuitively, extending the mind beyond the brain makes the mind more vulnerable to invasion. This paper argues that this fear may be misplaced. Specifically, the paper argues: (i) the most relevant processes to mental integrity are conscious, personal-level processes, (ii) the types of processes that can be extended according to the most influential account of EMT are unconscious, non-occurrent, and subpersonal processes, therefore (iii) the threat posed to mental integrity by neurotechnology if EMT is adopted may be quite modest.