Background: Dementia is one the major problems of aging societies, and, novel and effective non-drug therapies are required as interventions in the oldest-old to prevent cognitive decline.Objective: This study aims to examine the efficacy and safety of reminiscence using immersive virtual reality focusing on anxiety that often appears with cognitive decline. The secondary objective is to reveal the preference for VR image types for reminiscence: live-action or computer graphics.Methods: This was a pilot, open-label, and randomized crossover study which was conducted (...) on January 2020 at a single nursing home. The subjects were randomly divided into two groups in equal numbers, and they alternately viewed two types of VR images themed on the mid- to late Showa era in Japan. In group A, the CG images were viewed first, and then the LA images were viewed. In group B, the images were viewed in the opposite order. Before VR viewing, subjects responded to Mini-Mental State Examination Japanese version and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Japanese version. After viewing the first and second VR, subjects responded to STAI and the numerical rating scale for satisfaction and side effects.Results: Ten subjects participated in this study. The values of analyses are presented in the mean. The age was 87.1 years, and the MMSE was 28.5. The total STAI score before VR viewing was 36.1, but it significantly decreased to 26.8 after the first VR viewing, and further decreased to 23.4 after the second VR viewing. The NRS score for satisfaction tended to be higher after viewing LA in group A vs. 8.6, P = 0.0993), while in group B, the score after CG was slightly lower than that after LA. There were no serious side effects.Conclusions: This study suggests that iVR reminiscence can reduce anxiety in the oldest-old without causing serious side effects. Furthermore, the impacts might be better with LA images. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between a firm’s strategy and consumers’ decisions in the presence of the paradox of choice and sharing personal information. The paradox of choice implies that having too many choices does not necessarily ensure happiness and sometimes having less is more. A new model is constructed introducing a factor of information sharing into the model of a previous study that embedded the paradox of choice only (Kinjo and Ebina in AI Soc (...) 30(2):291–297, 2015). A key feature of the model is its disutility function. It is demonstrated that if the sign of the cross derivative of the function is positive (negative) at the optimum, there is a positive (negative) correlation between the degree of sharing personal information chosen by the consumers and the number of products offered by the firm in its recommendation systems. It is also numerically indicated that the profit function of the firm becomes convex or concave depending on the shape of the disutility function. These results suggest that firms should carefully investigate the shape of the disutility function, under the paradox of choice and sharing personal information. (shrink)

The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of the number of products, product attributes, and prices on consumer confusion, conduct a numerical analysis to check the robustness of the results, and present an example of the cell phone market in Japan. Following an ideal point model and embedding the number of products and product attributes, we clarify how these factors affect consumer confusion and purchase probability. We show that as the number of product attributes increases, the choice (...) probability of each product becomes equal, implying that consumer confusion occurs. This result is robust to the introduction of prices as strategic variables. (shrink)

Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is (...) obviously false if read as saying that everything that has existed, exits or will exist is present. If eternalism is taken as the negation of presentism, it is also either trivially false or obviously true. In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In second section, I will examine how the argument proceeds. In third section, I will reflect on three possible ways to respond but will argue that none of them succeeds in giving a satisfactory solution. I will then try to clarify the core idea of presentism and to suggest that if we characterise presentism accurately, the problem will disappear. In fourth section, I will offer a plausible definition of presentism and will show how it can avoid the triviality objection and demonstrate why it is advantageous to accept the version of presentism I offer. (shrink)

This is a review essay on Daisuke Kachi’s recent book, Agents: Contemporary Substance Ontology (sic. Shunjusha, 2018). The book develops and partially defends an ontology that takes the category of substance as the most fundamental one. The author provides in it a new perspective on substance, which consists in characterizing substances as bearers of what he calls “substance modalities” (of which there are four kinds, that stem from the factors of essence, power, past persistence, and future persistence respectively). The first (...) part of this review essay gives an extended overview of Kachi’s book while the second discusses some problems it may face. (shrink)

本書は、2013年4月1日から2015年3月31日までの2年間、『みすず』誌に連載された「日記」を一書にしたものである。大学人としての仕事や作家として執筆に追われながら、政治学者として世の動向を分析し 、皇室の動きを観察し、鉄道旅行をする。日常から時代を解読する試み。.

In Ideas II and other works, Edmund Husserl gives a constitutional analysis of material reality. His basic thought on this matter is that a material thing is constituted when it is shown to causally depend on its surrounding circumstances. In this essay, I will first try to show that this appeal to causal dependence involves an important problem, namely, the circularity or regress problem. I then consider how this problem can be solved from both theoretical and exegetical standpoints. As a (...) key that could lead to a solution, I propose the hypothesis that Husserl’s notion of reality is holistic. By attributing this notion to Husserl, I argue that we can find a satisfactory answer to the aforementioned problem, as well as a perspicuous way of understanding some of his passages. (shrink)

This study compares Pairs of subjects with Single subjects in a task of discovering scientific laws with the aid of experiments. Subjects solved a molecular genetics task in a computer micro‐world (Dunbar, 1993). Pairs were more successful in discovery than Singles and participated more actively in explanatory activities (i.e., entertaining hypotheses and considering alternative ideas and justifications). Explanatory activities were effective for discovery only when the subjects also conducted crucial experiments. Explanatory activities were facilitated when paired subjects made requests of (...) each other for explanation and focused on them. The study extends from individual to collaborative discovery activities the importance to the discovery process of setting goals to find hypotheses and evidence (Dunbar, 1993) and to construct explanations of phenomena and processes encountered in examples (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, & Glaser, 1989). (shrink)

Shōwashi e no renketsu -- Higashi Ajia kara no me -- Tennō to iu jiba -- Watashi no kaikōki -- Jikokuhyō katate ni ekisoba o.

死後十余年を経ても、いまだに熱烈な支持層を誇る政治思想史の巨人・丸山眞男。半世紀にわたって師事した著者ならではの視点で、一代の碩学の真の姿や意外な側面を浮き彫りに。また折に触れ示された言葉の数々を初め て明らかにする。.

According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new (...) reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense. (shrink)

One short passage on what is called the Receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus has been the subject of much controversy since Cherniss presented an alternative reading of it in 1954. In this paper, I criticize an influential argument presented by Zeyl for a traditional reading, and propose a new interpretation which adopts the alternative reading on important sentences of the passage, but is not accompanied by the defects of Cherniss’ interpretation.

Is there anything that is given immediately? This question seems to be of crucial importance for Phenomenology, a field perhaps known most principally for its attempt to return directly to the “things themselves.” The seeming simplicity of the idea is appealing: after all, where better for us to start in any philosophical investigation than with things as they appear to us in their most pure or “immediate” state? When put in its historical context as well, Husserl’s phenomenological project could even (...) be interpreted as a breath of fresh air in the midst of the environment of early 20th century philosophy in comparison with the seemingly constructive philosophy of its Neo-Kantian contemporaries. Indeed, rather than starting with a merely systematic account of our cognition and reality, is it not better for us to first return to the world just as it is given to us in perception or intuition in order to have a more faithful account of these issues? (shrink)

This paper aims to improve on Michael Lynch’s functionalist account of truth-grounding. According to Lynch, truth is grounded in another (non-generic) alethic property when the latter has all the conceptually essential features of truth. However, this view faces a problem raised by Marian David (“Lynch’s Functionalist Theory of Truth”) and Crispin Wright (“A Plurality of Pluralisms”), which is that some conceptually essential features of truth are not possessed by the properties usually taken to ground it (such as correspondence and superwarrant), (...) so that Lynch’s account cannot allow truth to be grounded in these properties. In response to this objection, I propose to modify Lynch’s account by restricting the range of truth’s essential features that a truth-grounding property must have to the class of what I call the “bearer-centered” features of truth. They are those features whose possession by truth amounts to certain facts about how propositions bearing truth behave. The resultant account then is that truth is grounded in a property when the latter has all the essential and bearer-centered features of truth. This account is immune to the David–Wright objection because the features they mention do not belong to the class of bearer-centered features. Also, this account is well-motivated by some principled reasons. The account thus serves as a viable functionalist account of truth-grounding. (shrink)

A number of philosophers today endorse the view that material substances (e.g., cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed as bundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among several developments, the theory that Peter Simons proposed is seen as the most successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputation to mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: the capacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacy for the phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to (...) object to this high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantages in fact cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. To this aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory and explain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up Arda Denkel’s criticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unless Simons accepts a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that as a result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose the capacity for avoiding infinite regress in turn. (shrink)