We argue that ritual is not a by-product as Boyer & Lienard (B&L) claim, but rather an evolved adaptation for social communication that facilitates non-agonistic social interactions among non-kin. We review the neurophysiological effects of ritual and propose neural structures and networks beyond the cortical-striato-pallidal-thalamic circuit (CSPT) likely to be implicated in ritual. The adaptationist approach to ritual offers a more parsimonious model for understanding these effects as well as the findings B&L present. (Published Online February 8 2007).

This paper defends a reading of eikasia—the lowest kind of cognition in the Divided Line—as a kind of empirical cognition that Plato appeals to when explaining, among other things, the origin of ethical error. The paper has two central claims. First, eikasia with respect to, for example, goodness or justice is not different in kind to eikasia with respect to purely sensory images like shadows and reflections: the only difference is that in the first case the sensory images include representations (...) of value properties. Second, eikasia is not the bare awareness of images or simply a label for an error (mistaking image for original) but a kind of empirical, image-confined cognition, and one that has an important part to play in characterising the cognitive abilities of the non-rational parts of the soul. (shrink)

Greater and greater attention is being paid to Hannah Arendt’s iconic The Origins of Totalitarianism as a way to understand contemporary politics and particularly the global rise of the Far Right. With this promising resurgence, though, comes a distinct danger that was a central concern of Arendt herself in her post-war writings and the development of the book. Arendt was sharply critical of her contemporaries, particularly the social sciences, for their loose historical methods. An unthinking historical sensibility led, in her (...) view, to the too-easy drawing of analogies between past dominations and totalitarianism. In her pre-Origins talks and writings, Arendt slowly built an entire historiographic methodology around her concern with political judgment, a radical historicism that argued for the preeminence of progenesis and novelty in the politics of history. This paper looks to excavate that historicism and draw out its full implications not only for Arendt’s theoretical orientation, but for the broader praxis she demanded of all those who would be politically minded. Arendt’s radical historicism, which can rightly be called the groundwork for writing Origins and her turn to judgment, represents the beginning of what became her thorough-going practice: an ethics of responsibility, to the past and present. (shrink)

In this 4th edition of his successful Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction, John Storey has extensively revised the text throughout.

_Explores the evolution of Heidegger’s thinking about nature and its relevance for environmental ethics._.

This paper examines the soul-turning metaphor in Book 7 of Plato’s Republic. It argues that the failure to find a consistent reading of how the metaphor is used has contributed to a number of long-standing disagreements, especially concerning the more famous metaphor with which it is intertwined, the Cave allegory. A full reading of the metaphor, as it occurs throughout Book 7, is offered, with particularly close attention to what is one of the most difficult and stubbornly divisive passages in (...) Book 7, 532b6–d1. (shrink)

This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.

Storey, Lyndon Positive humanism is based on the idea that there is a positive potential in human beings. This includes the potential to help others, to find joy and meaning in life, and to use reason and creativity. It is not a guarantee of future perfection, but a positive potential. Acknowledging and nurturing this potential can improve an individual's chances of finding happiness and fulfilment in life, and a society's chances of becoming more harmonious and fulfilling for its members. (...) Positive humanism focusses on exploring and supporting a human-based path to happiness and fulfilment. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the translation of a line in Plato's description of the ‘greatest accusation’ against imitative poetry, Republic 606a3–b5. This line is pivotal in Plato's account of how poetry corrupts its audience and is one of the Republic's most complex and interesting applications of his partite psychology, but it is misconstrued in most recent translations, including the most widely used. I argue that an examination of the text and reflections on Platonic psychology settle the translation decisively.

New to this edition: 4 new readings Stuart Hall The rediscovery of 'ideology': return of the repressed in media studies Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe Post ...

Storey, Lyndon Humanism is often presented as a reaction against religion. But it is best understood as an answer to a question, the question being: what is the meaning of life?

In book 10 of the Republic we find a new argument for the division of the soul. The argument’s structure is similar to the arguments in book 4 but, unlike those arguments, it centres on a purely cognitive conflict: believing and disbelieving the same thing, at the same time. The argument presents two interpretive difficulties. First, it assumes that a conflict between a belief and an appearance—e.g. disbelieving that a stick partially immersed in water is, as it appears, bent—entails a (...) conflict between beliefs. Prima facie, there is only one belief, the belief that contradicts the appearance. Second, it is unclear what parts of the soul Plato intends to divide between: some argue that it is, as in book 4, a partition between a rational and a non-rational part; others argue that it is a new partition between a higher and a lower subdivision of the rational part. This paper offers solutions to both difficulties through an analysis of what Plato means by φαινόμενα, ‘appearances’, and δόξαι, ‘beliefs’. It is argued, first, that the relevant appearances are entirely sensory but nonetheless sufficiently belief-like to (a) warrant being called δόξαι and (b) oppose, by themselves, our beliefs; there is no need for a third mental state, a belief that assents to the appearance. A second claim concerns a central line in the argument, 602e4–6, that has served as the primary evidence that the partition is within the rational part of the soul. Those who wish to avoid this conclusion generally resort to alternative, and less natural, translations of 602e4–6. It is argued that this is unnecessary: once we have correctly understood sensory appearances, we see that the standard translation of 602e4–6 in fact entails a division between a rational and a non-rational part of the soul. (shrink)

Storey, Lyndon Humanism is an approach to life in its own right: it is not simply the rejection of religion. Nor is it just the continuing on of religiously inspired values without an accompanying belief in God. Humanism relies on exploring human potential, including our potential for such things as compassion, love, and to find a path to a fulfilling and meaningful life. Humanism is an essentially social set of beliefs with its emphasis on common humanity and it can (...) inspire people to positive social action and compassion for others. (shrink)

We live in an age of unprecedented prosperity, yet everywhere we see signs that our pursuit of happiness has proven fruitless. Dissatisfied, we seek change for the sake of change - even if it means undermining the foundations of our common life. In Why We Are Restless, Benjamin and Jenna Storey offer a profound and beautiful reflection on the roots of this malaise and examine how we might begin to cure ourselves. Drawing on the insights of Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, (...) and Tocqueville, Why We Are Restless explores the modern vision of happiness that leads us on, and the disquiet that follows it like a lengthening shadow. In the sixteenth century, Montaigne articulated an original vision of human life that inspired people to see themselves as individuals dedicated to seeking contentment in the here and now, but Pascal argued that we cannot find happiness through pleasant self-seeking, only anguished God-seeking. Rousseau later tried and failed to rescue Montaigne's worldliness from Pascal's attack. Steeped in these debates, Tocqueville visited the United States in 1831 and, observing a people "restless in the midst of their well-being," discovered what happens when an entire nation seeks worldly contentment - and finds mostly discontent. Arguing that the philosophy we have inherited, despite pretending to let us live as we please, produces remarkably homogenous and unhappy lives, Why We Are Restless makes the case that finding true contentment requires rethinking our most basic assumptions about happiness. (shrink)

I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...) very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex. (shrink)

Recently Geoffrey Miller has suggested that humor evolved through sexual selection as a signal of "creativity," which in turn implies youthfulness, intelligence, and adaptive unpredictability. Drawing upon available empirical studies, I argue that the evidence for a link between humor and creativity is weak and ambiguous. I also find only tenuous support for Miller’s assumption that the attractiveness of the "sense of humor" is to be found in the wittiness of its possessor, since those who use the phrase often seem (...) to associate it with the affects of relatively mirthless "bonding" laughter. Humor, I conclude, may have evolved as an instrument for achieving broad social adhesiveness and for facilitating the individual’s maneuverability within the group, but that it evolved through sexual selection has yet to be convincingly demonstrated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristophanes BirdsIan C. StoreyNan Dunbar, ed. Aristophanes Birds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. xviii + 792 pp. $105.00.Douglas Young's wonderful translation (The Burdies) is dedicated "to Miss Nan Dunbar with all good wishes for her learned edition of the original Greek." That was in 1959, and while Catullus waited nine years for Cinna's Zmyrna, we Aristophanic ornithophiles have had to wait four times that for this wonderfully thorough commentary (...) on Aristophanes' masterpiece. Birds has not fared as well as either Clouds or Frogs which have long dominated the field (and more recently Acharnians and Lysistrata). D. has now given us the "standard commentary."Although she has provided students with "more help with understanding Greek idiom" (v), it is clearly the professional scholar who will be the principal user of this commentary, especially those who are brought here by a reference to Birds and who will find D.'s notes of immense value. I noted excellent studies of peacocks (165), the agon and its roles (315-18), roosters and the early morning (338f.), the influence of Herodotos (374 et al.), the Orestes-problem (451f.), the meaning of in line 789 where D. lands a telling blow against comedy following tragedy (481), levels of meaning in (535f.), the episkopos as comic figure (562f.), dochmiacs in comedy (611), the figure of Iris (616), the sykophantes (674), the role of Prometheus (693f.), and necromancy in drama (710-12). Such notes are the very real strength of D.'s work.Three areas get special attention. First this is a new text, badly needed since neither the OCT nor the Budé is at all secure in text or critical apparatus. The introduction is dominated (thirty-two of fifty-one pages) by a discussion of the history of the text to the end of the eighteenth century, which she had considered issuing separately, but in the end kept with the rest. It does tend to overbalance the introduction, but is immensely informative and useful reading; I would have liked a list of modern editions of the sort that Rogers provided in his various commentaries. Textual evaluation I leave to the experts, but I observe that D. provides well over a dozen of her own readings ( [1064] and [1229] are attractive) and that many changes concern the attribution of lines to Peisetairos (her spelling, based on seeing the Triballian's [1615] as an attempt to say "yes, Peisetairos") and Euelpides, on the assumption that the clever leading lines belong to P. and the following lines to Eu. I am not sure this works in v. 11 where this clever capping fits P. better than Eu.Places where D.'s text makes a difference in sense include: the archon's name (Charias, not Chabrias); 16, deleting the line and its textual problem; 167, where even D.'s text may not solve the problem; 202, Tereus perches on the roof of the skene; 240, deleting both τε; 484, where is wrong; 533-38, rewriting a corrupt paradosis; 698, where μύχιος adds an edge lacking in νύχιος; 994, keeping the paradosis ("a monstrosity"-Sommerstein); 1212, reading and giving it to Iris; 1441, for the 'impossible' [End Page 336] while including some attractive alternatives in the notes; 1681, βα βάζει γ' where others either obelize or defend βαδίζει; 1757, δαπεδον with an allusion to the uncompleted temple of Zeus.Second D. gives very full accounts of the extraordinary variety of metres used in this play. Each lyric section is prefaced by a metrical analysis and consideration of the overall effect. In 227-62 it is that "of a bird repeating the same unit of rhythm over and over" (210), while the various patterns reflect bird movements. The "astrophic monody" reflects but does not parody the "new music" with which Ar. is clearly familiar (212). In 327-35/343-51-a passage seared into this reviewer's memory from the MPhil examinations of 1971-D. now prefers a change of metre rather than a highly irregular responsion, each metre reflecting the mental attitude of the birds. In 737-52/769-84 there is "no simple metrical description" (462), and D. wonders if Phrynichean tragic lyrics have been adapted "to produce a lighter bird-rhythm." There... (shrink)

Construction of the trunk/caudal region of the vertebrate embryo involves a set of distinct molecules and processes whose relationships are just coming into focus. In addition to the subdivision of the embryo into head and trunk domains, this “caudalisation” process requires the establishment and maintenance of a stem zone. This sequentially generates caudal tissues over a long period which then undergo differentiation and patterning in the extending body axis. Here we review recent studies that show that changes in the signalling (...) properties of the paraxial mesoderm act as a switch that controls onset of differentiation and pattern in the spinal cord. These findings identify distinct roles for different caudalising factors; in particular, Fibroblast Growth Factor (FGF) inhibits differentiation in the caudal stem zone, while Retinoic acid (RA) provided rostrally by somitic mesoderm is required for neuronal differentiation and establishment of ventral neural pattern. Furthermore, the mutual opposition of FGF and RA pathways controls not only neural differentiation but also mesoderm segmentation and might also underlie the progressive assignment of rostrocaudal identity by regulating Hox gene availability and activation. BioEssays 26:857–869, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Kate Storey is experienced in direct service, education and administration in both hospital and community settings. She is a family member; she was diagnosed with depression in 1980 and is “in recovery”. She is a doctoral student in the Faculty of Education at the University of Western Ontario with research interests in recovery education and empowerment. Tanya Shute is Executive Director of the Krasman Centre: a Consumer Survivor Initiative, which embraces a wellness and recovery focus. She is a social (...) activist who identii es as having personal experience with mental health challenges and substance abuse. Her undergraduate degree from York University is in Public Policy and Administration; she is completing her MSW in social policy at Laurentian University. Ann h ompson is a “survivor/ provider” trained in critical social work at York University, who is exploring the application of recovery principles in programs/organizations supporting consumer/survivors and family members. Ann is a certii ed Wellness Recovery Action Plan Facilitator and has adapted the WRAP framework to a family setting. She developed the Critical Perspectives in Mental Health curriculum in the Masters Social Work program at York University. (shrink)

There has been relatively little debate about Nietzsche’s place in environmental ethics, but the lines of the debate are well marked. He has been viewed as an anthropocentrist by Michael E. Zimmerman, a humanist by Ralph Acampora, a biocentrist and deep ecolo­gist by Max Hallman, a constructivist by Martin Drenthen, and an ecocentrist by Graham Parkes. Nietzsche does provide a theory of intrinsic value and his philosophy of nature is germane to an environmerntal ethic. His philosophical biology grounds his value (...) theory. The secondary literature contains three main claims plaguing the debate about his views. First, commentators tend to ignore or downplay Nietzsche’s biology. Second, his value theory is not adequatey addressed. Third, does Nietzsche’s emphasis on hierarchy enable him to maintain that human life is more valuable than that of other life forms, but that the lower life forms have a different kind of value insofar as they enable and support higher life forms? This view is roughly parallel in many respects to the views of Paul Taylor, David Ray Griffin, and Michael E. Zimmerman. (shrink)

This paper has four parts. First, I attempt to pinpoint how and why Merleau-Ponty was driven to go beyond Husserlian phenomenology, and did so for what are, largely, Hegelian reasons. Second, I trace the parallels between Hegel’s “metaphysics of Spirit” and Merleau-Ponty’s “ontology of the Flesh,” stressing the thinkers’ consensus about the nature of philosophical method. Third, I identify Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of Hegel’s approach, and assay his claim that Hegel’s system actually constitutes a lapse into a pre-critical, pre-Kantian, naïve metaphysics. (...) Fourth and finally, I examine how Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Hegel is tied to his investigation into the evolution of the concept of nature through the history of Western philosophy. My basic intention is to determine whether and to what extent Merleau-Ponty evades the very charges he levies against Hegel, and my basic claim is that he does. I conclude by suggesting some parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s later thought and the account of nature in Whitehead’s process philosophy that might tell us where to seek help for developing his later, enigmatic ideas once precedents in Continental thought have been exhausted. (shrink)

Relationships are an integral part of the design of a database. Comparing and integrating relationships from heterogeneous databases requires that the relationships be mapped to each other or to a common classification. Identifying similarities and resolving differences in relationships across large data sources is a resource-intensive task that could benefit greatly from semi-automated approaches. A prerequisite to developing such approaches is a clear understanding of the semantics of relationships used in database design. This research presents a layered ontology for classifying (...) the semantics of relationships. It consists of a core layer that captures the fundamental types of relationships between entities. A middle layer provides the internal context, obtained from entities surrounding the relationship, to interpret the fundamental types. The outer layer allows further interpretation using the external context, that is, the domain in which a relationship is being used. An initial assessment on relationships from a variety of application domains demonstrates that the ontology can be adequate and useful for comparing relationships across databases. (shrink)

In his article on the early career of Aristophanes, in particular on the relevance of the thiasotai on IG ii2.2343 and the importance of Herakles in the plays of Aristophanes, David Welsh has supported the thesis of Dow, that several of the thiasotai are mentioned by Aristophanes in his plays . He suggests that another of these thiasotai, Lysanias, may be alluded to at Clouds 1162. Here the unusual word λυσανας in the text means ostensibly ‘deliverer’, but Welsh argues that (...) in view of the rarity of the word ‘the spectators would have been put in mind of a contemporary individual…a Lysanias who was known for his filial piety or forensic ability .’. (shrink)

Energy scientist Amory Lovins is fond of pointing out that in the late 19th century, it was not picketing environmentalists that saved the whales being slaughtered en masse for oil used for lightin...

While Heidegger has long been cast as hostile to or neglectful of life-philosophy, his work on Aristotle in the 1920s demonstrates a struggle to articulate an ontology of life. I argue that this is no peripheral concern in his work and should be seen in the broader context of the development of his philosophy of nature. I submit that we can triangulate Heidegger’s position on the ontological status of life by tracing the tension between the Kantian and Aristotelian strains in (...) his work. His early forays into life-philosophy and philosophical biology, while incomplete and inconclusive, challenge our picture of him as espousing a view of human existence dissociated from living and natural being. (shrink)