Environmental Philosophy

This paper reevaluates wolf management through a relational ethics lens, highlighting the inadequacy of traditional wild versus domesticated categorizations. Recognizing the complexity of historical and ongoing human-wolf interactions, it proposes a nuanced, context-sensitive approach to ethical responsibilities toward wolves. By introducing an assessment process based on the examination of mutual impacts in human-wolf relations, this study advocates for a more informed and morally conscious management strategy that acknowledges wolves’ complex existence within human-affected landscapes.

In this paper, I defend a position contrary to a popular view of distributive justice. Residents of flood-prone or otherwise hazardous areas, like the Gulf South of the United States, receive substantial amounts of aid, paid through taxes on people living elsewhere in the US, after natural disasters that frequent the region. In popular discourse, some argue that we have reason not to (re)build in high-risk or hazardous areas, like the Gulf South. Instead, these residents, and others in similarly situated (...) regions, should “relocate.” If residents choose to stay, then the government and taxpayers do not owe them financial compensation to rebuild. Against that view, I argue that egalitarians commit to compensating many such people. However, I propose broadening our understanding of ‘compensation’ and going forward, focus on agency-enhancing efforts as compensation instead of solely relying on standard post-disaster financial compensation, as current policies generally do. Later in the paper, I offer a metric and tiered system that proposes alternatives to the standard compensation and claim that agency-enhancing compensation aligns with the egalitarian’s commitment to compensate individuals following a natural disaster. I conclude that a tiered system and a broader compensation approach provides egalitarians with more options than the current standard compensation allows. (shrink)

Indigenous knowledge and work in social science demonstrates the importance for well-being of people’s relationships with places, but western moral theorists have said little on this topic. This paper argues that there is a neo-Aristotelian virtue associated with forming a relationship with a place or places; that is, human beings can form relationships with places that affect their perceptions, emotions, desires and actions, and such dispositions, when properly developed, increase the chance that people will flourish. As well as discussing the (...) virtue, the paper considers related vices and briefly outlines implications of this virtue for dispossession, pro-environmental action, and education. (shrink)

This work employs Elizabeth Cripps’ collectivist account of responsibility for climate change in order to ground an individual duty to reduce one’s GHG emissions. This is significant not only as a critique of Cripps, but also as an indication that even on some collectivist footings, individuals can be assigned primary duties to reduce their emissions. Following Cripps, this work holds the unstructured group of GHG emitters weakly collectively responsible for climate change harms. However, it argues against Cripps that what follows (...) from this is a corresponding collective duty to act qua group to bring about an end to the harm and a derivative duty for each emitter to promote the required organization of a group capable of this. Instead, this work argues that acts of GHG emission, to the extent that they are avoidable and performed with requisite knowledge, make one into a member of a group that is morally responsible for climate-related harms. Thus, individual emitters who can do otherwise should recognize themselves as members of a group that collectively harms. Subsequently, they should take all possible steps in order to renounce their membership (e.g. by reducing their GHG emissions). (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have (...) to environmental areas and places. (shrink)

There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be (...) drawn to determine the identity of the person who will suffer a harm. Here, we reply to Stefansson and Willners’ criticism of that example, explaining how their reply makes a mistake about the point of the example. (shrink)

I contend that to be politically feasible a global climate treaty must satisfy the International Paretian principle (IP). I begin by defending IP as a principle of instrumental rationality that reflects the fact of extremely limited altruism vis-à-vis foreigners. I then address two objections to my thesis. One holds that an IP treaty is either economically infeasible or, contrary to its proponents’ claim, does not require side payments from poor states to rich ones. The other holds poor states will reject (...) any climate treaty that requires such side payments because it ignores or exacerbates their unjust treatment by rich states. (shrink)

EU co-legislators recently approved the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which establishes a uniform carbon price on both EU and imported products, in ETS covered sectors. This violates the CBDR-RC principle. Yet, CBAM advocates claim that the resulting unfair mitigation can be offset by scaling up climate finance, to the benefit of poorer countries. I argue that the CBAM’s unfairness is compounded by previous climate injustice, as avoidable emissions by developed countries pushed the climate crisis to the point where (...) fair mitigation is no longer viable. This implies that a disadvantage within the distributive sphere of emissions abatement cannot be counterbalanced by additional advantages within the distributive sphere of climate finance. (shrink)

This article explores the consequences of falling costs of solar and wind power for the ethics of climate change mitigation. We suggest that price competitiveness of renewables reveals a divergence of interest between fossil fuel consumers and producers: cheap renewables strengthen precautionary arguments for aggressive mitigation for consumers but threaten the economic base of producers. As existing applications of the precautionary principle to climate change do not address this issue, we develop a novel approach based on lexical utilities. Given the (...) premise that climate catastrophe entails economic catastrophe but not vice versa, we argue that both producers and consumers should favor mitigation. (shrink)

This chapter examines three characteristics of environmental sciences—prediction, replication and the use of models—to explore their dissonance with the traditional representation of science. While ‘Science’ is often idealised as objective, universal, and context-independent, environmental sciences operate in ways that do not fit into these assumptions. The chapter draws on Bruno Latour’s distinction between ‘Science’ and ‘sciences’ to argue that environmental sciences, with their inherent uncertainties, local contexts, and interdisciplinary methods, conflict with the image of science as a monolithic and universally (...) reliable source of knowledge. Referring to case studies, the text explores how environmental sciences craft complex, interconnected systems that defy the reproducibility and predictability often associated with ‘Science’. This dissonance, maintains, has led to issues such as climate denialism and the politicisation of scientific knowledge. From this perspective, a call is made for a revaluation of how environmental sciences are represented in both public and policy arenas, calling for a more nuanced understanding of their provisional, context-specific nature and for educational reforms that help the public better grasp the complexities of scientific knowledge production. (shrink)

This article brings recent insights from political animal philosophy and critical animal studies concerning animal subjectivity and multispecies communities into conversation with Daoist philosophy. Daoism is currently underexplored in animal philosophy and multispecies justice theory. This is unfortunate since Daoist ontology and Daoist concepts such as wanwu (萬物) and wuwei (無為) include recognition of nonhuman agency and multispecies entanglements. They offer a fruitful starting point for rethinking the position of the human in the whole of things as well as relations (...) between human and nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Can we empathize with plants? Critics object that supposed empathy with plants entails anthropomorphic or zoomorphic projection. In reply, a phenomenological account of empathy claims to avoid this objection. However, phenomenological accounts of empathy center on one sentient (phenomenally conscious) mind accessing another. If plants are not sentient, then they appear to be inappropriate targets for empathy. I reply by exploring how the organic body is implicated in sentience, even if it is not usually focal. Interoceptive experience gives us indirect (...) access to our own organic body, and thus provides a basis for a problematic, paradoxical empathy with plants. (shrink)

Based on a careful reading of Michael Marder’s book Plant-Thinking and a recent 2020 article by Michael Marder, this essay argues it is necessary to establish a differentiation between what is called plant and vegetal. Through and beyond the form of the plant there would be a time and a vegetal metabolism whose proper name is “we.” “We” as a denomination of the vegetal implies a conceptual transformation, but also an answer to the question of who “we” are. Who are (...) we now when, as Dipesh Chakrabarty asserts, our “we” no longer has any “ontological dimension”? While Chakrabarty answers the question of the “we” by answering that “we” are “a geophysical force,” I propose, following Marder, that the answer is: we are vegetality. (shrink)

Seeking to elucidate the ethical implications of scientific ecology while also avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, environmental philosophers have argued that the ethical ends we already pursue can be transmuted by ecological insights. This article suggests understanding this process as one of “ecological subjectivation” whereby the self is constituted ethically in relation to scientific discourses of ecology. I argue that a specific mode of ecological subjectivation exemplified by Aldo Leopold’s conversion narrative in “Thinking Like a Mountain” was predominant in twentieth century (...) environmentalism, while contemporary ecology requires us to look beyond conversion for different ways of cultivating an ecological ethic. (shrink)

The concept of human identity has often been framed through economic and materialist paradigms, particularly in Marxist and industrial thought, which have emphasized the proletarian and agricola—the laborer and the productive farmer—as the primary agents of historical development. However, this economic reductionism has marginalized an alternative and equally fundamental mode of existence: the paganus—the rural dweller whose relationship to the world is defined not by labor, but by dwelling, continuity, and embeddedness in place. This paper critically re-examines the paganus as (...) an ontological category distinct from economic determinism, drawing upon phenomenology, ecological philosophy, and political thought to argue for a renewed understanding of human identity beyond its productive function. -/- By engaging with thinkers such as Edward Casey on the topology of place, Martin Heidegger on dwelling, and Henry David Thoreau on experiential solitude in nature, this paper explores the existential depth of inhabiting a place rather than merely exploiting it. The marginalization of the paganus reflects broader cultural and political shifts that have privileged mobility, urbanization, and deterritorialization over rootedness, continuity, and place attachment. This paper contends that the restoration of paganus as a meaningful philosophical category is crucial in addressing contemporary issues such as ecological alienation, the erosion of cultural memory, and the search for belonging in a rapidly urbanizing world. -/- Rather than advocating for a retreat into traditionalism, this study calls for an expansion of human identity beyond economic constraints, reclaiming dwelling as a fundamental human experience. The paganus, far from being an obsolete relic of the past, emerges as a necessary counterpoint to modernity’s abstraction and displacement, offering a vision of human existence that is rooted in place, history, and the enduring rhythms of the natural world. (shrink)

The recent ethical debate concerning the implementation of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) has expanded the traditional scope of ethical analysis to investigate the appropriate role of CDR within the larger climate change mitigation discussion. Specifically, the recent scholarship is embedded in the disputed sustainable development landscape that presents various and competing visions of desirable futures. This article unpacks and clarifies the discussion between Darrel Moellendorf and Henry Shue as representatives of two camps in the recent debate, the former supporting carbon (...) removal to achieve poverty-targeting sustainable development and the latter rejecting overreliance on CDR’s potential. Finally, moving beyond this discussion, the article proposes that a capabilities approach to CDR can adequately inform the debate, tackling some important limitations in the recent literature by offering a broader account of human well-being relevant to CDR implementation. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology can be employed as a framework for conceptualizing an ecocentric environmental philosophy that grounds moral consideration in the intrinsic value of the ecosystem itself. The theory we will develop will not treat the ecosystem as a unique entity different or that subsumes other entities in it. It will be one that regards the ecosystem as a network composed of biotic and abiotic entities. To reach this objective, we will identify and (...) highlight the anthropocentric and bio-centric frameworks as contrasting but limited approaches, which seek to protect the environment for the sake of humanity’s well-being and the wellbeing of living things, respectively; unlike the ecocentric vision that covers the welfare of the ecosystem as a whole. For their limitations, we will argue that the anthropocentric and bio-centric orientations have not helped to improve and sustain the ecosystem, hence the gap that our research will attempt to fill. As a remedy, we here deploy Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology, which holds that being is belonging, to tap into the underexplored African notion of relationship to construct an ecocentric philosophy that conceives the ecosystem as a globe of interconnected and interdependent realities without any prejudice. (shrink)

Dans un texte court, dense, poétique et technique à la fois, Martin Buber nous invite à considérer autrement nos compagnes végétales. Cette forme de considération nouvelle peut s’étendre aux autres humains, aux autres vivants. Les êtres humains constituent une espèce vivante qui entretient des relations, de toutes natures, avec quantité d’espèces vivantes, très diverses, plus ou moins visibles ou perceptibles, selon des modalités conscientes ou pas. Les humains se sont entourés d’espèces domestiquées, végétales et animales, avec lesquelles les relations sont (...) anciennes, conscientes et proches. Partis d’un arbre et de sa contemplation, nous sommes invités à une prise de conscience de son existence d’être vivant face à la nôtre, de notre puissance, éventuellement destructive, jusqu’à notre capacité à lui reconnaître sa dignité et à la possibilité d’entrer en relation réciproque avec lui. Dans la continuité de cette démarche, nous nous tournons vers les autres vivants, jusqu’à atteindre une forme d’invisibilité qui n’est ni la réciprocité de la relation ni la conscience de l’arbre mais l’existence des micro-organismes, qui ne nous sont pas accessibles directement, mais qui se révèlent être, également, dans des relations fortes avec les autres vivants. (shrink)

In some cases, the term ‘Responsible Innovation’ has been considered a type of ethical solution to the Collingridge predicament in control of technology development. In this article, I claimed that two different approaches for responsible innovation (i.e. Van den Hoven’s innovation-based approach and Owen’s social-based approach) can be considered as two different dimensions that, while being conflicting, dialectically interact and thus can be useful for solving the problem of Collingridge. For this purpose, I argue that the first approach that resorts (...) to innovations for solving moral dilemmas is successful in rearranging and removing unhelpful (i.e. amoral) obligations, but it is unable to determine useful (i.e. moral) obligations. On the other hand, the second approach believes that Responsible Innovation occurs through social processes and by virtue of concepts such as reflection, deliberation, anticipation, and responsiveness, although is effective in determining useful (i.e. moral) obligations, it cannot remove or rearrange all useless (i.e. amoral) obligations. Although these two approaches are conflicting, the result of each approach is a necessary condition for the other approach, so the problem can only be solved by a dialectical interaction. (shrink)

Ecofeminism is theoretically diverse, as drawn from various ecofeminists who understand women-nature relationships differently. The common ground, however, is that they all draw on the concept of gender to understand this close relationship. This paper explores the ecofeminist view behind the mobilization of women for conservation, a subsequent reimagining of age-old stork-related myths and a reinterpretation of symbols of intangible culture, and an attempt at confronting the erstwhile anthropocentric nature of conservation. The qualitative case study focuses on the Hargila Army, (...) a community-based conservation initiative in Dadara, Assam, primarily led by women, aiming to conserve the greater adjutant stork, locally known as Hargila. The rural women’s lived experiences with the stork and its habitat – trees and wetlands – transform the ecological and wildlife issue into a feminist one. There are varied ways embedded in tradition and culture through which they have been carrying out stork conservation. The research is significant for it addresses a research gap on women’s environmentalism in the context of Assam, which has been neglected in literature reviewed for the purpose. It also empirically contributes to the ongoing dialogue on ecofeminism in action. (shrink)

In our contemporary world, the rights of nature have become an important legal device for environmental protection. Some of the most influential rights of nature frameworks can be found in non-Western contexts and have been strongly influenced by ecocentric accounts of nature. This article addresses the question of whether rights of nature can be implemented in Western contexts as well, focusing in particular on Europe. It first examines ecocentric justifications of the rights of nature and discusses two possible non-ecocentric alternatives. (...) Second, two models for implementing rights of nature—the nature’s rights model and the legal personhood model—are compared to demonstrate how different combinations of elements from both models can fit different socio-cultural contexts, including Western ones. (shrink)

Energy justice is often conceived of as consisting of distributive, procedural, and recognitional justice. This article adds epistemic justice, which engages with the question of how the exchange of knowledge can be shaped fairly. Energy issues ramify across social worlds, connecting to multiple knowledge systems. The conventional elements of energy justice place specific demands on how different knowledge systems must be accommodated. Epistemic work must be done to bridge epistemological differences and pay due respect to different forms of knowledge. Energy (...) justice should not neglect this epistemic work, and it cannot be assumed that it is sufficient to invite stakeholders to the discussion arena. I argue that fair ways of dealing with knowledge and fair opportunities for citizens to contribute knowledge to energy affairs are crucial to achieving energy justice of any general form. Also, this epistemic justice is not to be seen as yet another pillar of energy justice but a concern that runs through all pillars of energy justice. (shrink)

As persons we are irreducibly unique and essentially relational. In many contexts individual uniqueness has been accentuated at the expense of communal relationality. Our age has been marked by the loss of deep and meaningful relations to one another, and still more dramatically to the earth and its living creatures. The cosmological dimension of human personhood, that is, has been largely obscured. This chapter argues that our age has been marked increasingly by anesthetizing, alienating, and anonymizing tendencies. It proposes three (...) commensurate responses: aestheticization, or embodied philosophical knowing that remains faithful to the earth; anacarnation, or willful return to the wonders of embodied life, purged of romantic sentimentality; and attestation, or speaking up on behalf of the haecceitas or thisness of living creatures systematically instrumentalized for profit and pleasure. Together these responses help us to regain touch with animality by embracing the earth that hosts us, thus becoming more gracious guests, and to become more fully human by becoming better hosts to the multitude of earth's creatures, whose lives hang in the balance. (shrink)

Responding to the unique challenge posed by the climate crisis, several recent commentators have invoked the concept of basic needs. Whilst that concept proves useful in meeting many of the distinctive practical and normative problems posed by climate change, those commentators largely neglect the politics surrounding our needs. This article responds by distinguishing three notionally sequential political moments – the politics behind needs, in specifying needs, and following needs – showing how each of these problematizes any attempt to determine the (...) normative importance of needs outside of the political. I finish by considering the implications for needs-based approaches to the climate crisis. (shrink)

The overarching issue addressed in Catia Faria’s Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature is ‘the problem of wild animal suffering in nature: Ought we to prevent,...

The debate surrounding individual climate duties is divided between collectivists and unilateralists. The fair shares argument is the most influential unilateralist position. In this paper, I demonstrate how a Kantian approach could solve three problems the fair share argument faces. Firstly, the Kantian focus on an agent’s will avoids skepticism regarding the causal connections between individual actions and climate effects. Secondly, a Kantian argument for the imperfect duty to minimally restrict our emissions to an equal share justifies egalitarian fair shares. (...) Thirdly, a Kantian ethical approach has direct political implications, taking away concerns about a distracting focus on individual efforts. (shrink)

Sufficientarianism is a theory of social justice that determines individual entitlements by setting a threshold of what is enough for a decent life. Sufficientarianism therefore seems to be a suitable ally for theories of climate justice, because it restricts claims of justice to a minimum. Furthermore, the notion of sufficiency has been theorized in ecological discourse, so there is pertinent conceptual overlap between the two perspectives. In this paper, I aim to combine sufficientarianism with eco-sufficiency. I will use a framework (...) of needs to highlight different normative urgencies involved in practices that involve carbon emissions. However, as I will argue, the normative urgency of needs might cause problems for restricting emissions to levels that are compatible with planetary limits. In brief, the very aim of achieving sufficientarian justice might clash with the aim of eco-sufficiency. Sufficientarians should therefore critically engage with needs satisfiers as well, which are the means provided to satisfy needs. This step in my argument will be achieved through complementing sufficientarianism with an element of comparative justice, that is, interpersonal and diachronic considerations that help to determine the comparative urgency of claims. The overarching aim of sustainable sufficientarianism is to provide enough for everyone to live a decent life over time. (shrink)

Background: Exposomics, the study of the exposome, is flourishing, but the field is not well defined. The term “exposome” refers to all environmental influences and associated biological responses throughout the lifespan. However, this definition is very similar to that of the term “environment”—the external elements and conditions that surround and affect the life and development of an organism. Consequently, the exposome seems to be nothing more than a synonym for the environment, and exposomics a synonym for environmental research. As a (...) result, some have rebranded their “standard” environmental health research with the neologistic exposome term, whereas others ignore or seek to abandon the seemingly redundant concept of the exposome. -/- Objectives: We argue that exposomics needs to sharpen its mission focus to counteract this apparent redundancy. Exposomics should be defined as a research program in environmental health aimed at enabling a comprehensive and discovery-driven approach to identifying environmental determinants of human health. Similar to the aim of the Human Genome Project, exposomics aims to analyze the complete complexity of exposures and their corresponding biological responses. Exposomics’ primary premise is that the existence of undiscovered, potentially interconnected, nongenetic (environmental) risk factors for health necessitates a comprehensive discovery-driven analysis approach. -/- Discussion: We argue that exposomics researchers should adopt our reconceptualization of exposomics and focus on the productiveness and integrity of their research program: its purpose and principles. We suggest that exposomics researchers should coordinate the writing of reviews that assess the program’s productiveness and integrity, as well as provide a platform for exposomics researchers to define their vision for the field. (shrink)

To accomplish a just transition, energy scenarios is a helpful tool. Participatory and deliberative methods are increasingly used when constructing and assessing energy scenarios to improve the democratic legitimacy of the results. This article contributes to the scientific debate by analyzing how such methods can include considerations of justice issues in a more systematic manner. It is based on a study of four workshops conducted in Sweden, in which the participants discussed different energy scenarios from a justice perspective. It discusses (...) what can be achieved by methods for participatory-deliberative ethics assessment of the consequences of energy scenarios and how such methods should be designed. (shrink)

This article clarifies the puzzling lack of adequate human environmental behavior, the primary driver of the ongoing climate crisis. It advocates using Wittgensteinian attitude analysis as an investigative framework and argues that attitudes toward nature are crucial yet understudied factors in shaping environmental behavior. The study focuses on the Romantic attitude toward nature as wilderness (understood as the negation of extractivism) and reveals its profound yet often misunderstood adverse impact on environmental behavior. This leads to a reflection on which attitude (...) toward nature could foster more adequate environmental behavior, suggesting kinship as its core. (shrink)

I discuss themes of misanthropy, grief, trauma, and relations to nature in the life of 'the Hermit of Trieg', Ken Smith, subject of the recent award-winning documentary, 'The Hermit of Trieg'.

When an athlete is genetically engineered, s/he performs over and above the normally conceived and born athletes. That is because, a person can be (and specimens are currently being engineered) to have superior muscles and stamina for given sports specializations. It is not a big leap from designing athletes to specialized soldiers. Nature already has soldier ants, worker bees and the creator knows how many other reference points.

Nuclear waste is ethically contentious, concerning institutional trust, community engagement and the role nuclear plays in different sociotechnical configurations of energy futures. Using Q-methodology with a diverse UK-based stakeholder group, we find three emergent discourses: a) ‘Managing a distrustful public’, b) ‘Fair and democratic nuclear waste decision-making’, and c) ‘Putting the experts in control’. Although multi-stakeholder support is expressed for geological disposal of wastes, disagreements arise toward the ethics of nuclear-powered energy futures and for community decision-making roles. We recommend that (...) policy authorities must first strengthen community withdrawal rights, and second, renew deliberative democratic decision-making mechanisms within energy policy strategy. (shrink)

Pigovian policy is developed in economic theory as an efficient resolution to externality problems. The use of this type of policy to resolve real-world externality problems, including climate change in the form of carbon taxes, assumes that the Pigovian policy result derived in theory holds in the real world. By examining the bridging conditions from theory to the real world, I argue that this assumption holds only in an ambiguously defined subset of externalities. It is thus unclear when Pigovian policy (...) could be coherently applied, which is problematic given its widespread use in critical policy contexts. (shrink)

The ʻōhiʻa lehua is an ecologically and culturally important Hawaiian tree. It is currently threatened by two exotic fungal pathogens. One potential way to save the tree may be to genetically modify it. In this paper I consider two different metaphysical perspectives on ʻōhiʻa lehua – western conservation and Indigenous Hawaiian conservation. I will argue that a possible intervention using plant biotechnology appears value-supporting from each perspective. Hence, it is a morally permissible strategy to pursue. Finally, I argue that given (...) the importance of the tree, multiple strategies ought to be pursued. (shrink)

This paper discusses two approaches to climate ethics for practical reflection and decision-making in concrete local climate change governance. After a brief review of the main conceptual frameworks in climate ethics research, we show that none of these leading approaches is sufficiently context specific and pluralistic to provide guidance appropriate for concrete local climate governance. As alternatives, we present principlism as a methodology of mid-level principles and environmental pragmatism as an ethical approach. We argue that the two methodologies of principlism (...) and pragmatism offer a new pluralistic framework that allows real-world conditions and contexts to be properly integrated into ethical analysis and decision-making in climate governance. (shrink)

The complexity and emotional/psychological responses to the environmental challenges of the 21st century has led to the coining and development of new words and concepts that, for some people, better describe how they are personally grappling with anthropogenic ecosystem damage and climate breakdown. This paper identifies some of the more commonly used environmental neologisms within scholarly literature and evaluates their usefulness and contradictions for those influenced by the virtue ethics promoted by the ancient Stoics and the Catholic Church. We find (...) that environmental neologisms, when framed by these philosophical and/or theological ideas, offer an alternative and, ultimately, helpful means to contemplate the nature of what might be considered an environmental crisis and how best we might address, or at least, mitigate it, as conscientious spiritual human beings. (shrink)

This paper explores what kind of uncertainty a research program governing solar climate engineering through Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) needs to account for. Specifically, it tries to answer two central issues with regards to SAI research and it’s ethical evaluation: One, what irreducible uncertainties remain throughout the decision-process, and, two, how do these remaining uncertainties affect the ethical evaluation of SAI research. The main assumption is that decisions on SAI research governance will be made under normative uncertainty, i.e. situations under (...) irreducible knowledge-constraints that arise in concrete, practical decision-contexts. These decision-contexts are multi-lateral and empirically ambiguous, and the decision-makers need to reconcile a plurality of values. While normative uncertainty complicates the ethical evaluation of policy decisions, I argue that moral considerations can be accommodated through the inclusion of recognitional, participatory justice approaches, as well as adaptive and anticipatory governance methods. (shrink)