I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . (...) And thus we can’t sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that $p$ , a non-propositional view of seeing that $p$ is, I argue, perfectly intelligible. (shrink)

Creativity and morality are key attributes that stakeholders demand of organizations. Accordingly, higher education institutions and professional training programs also seek to cultivate these attributes in future leaders. However, research has hitherto shown that, under certain conditions, creativity may conflict with morality. This complicates the development of creative individuals who are also moral. We examined the complex relationship between creativity and moral reasoning with data collected from a group of undergraduate students. By considering the cognitive processes behind creativity (...) and moral reasoning, we propose perspective taking as a moderating factor. Specifically, we found that while creative individuals might not necessarily adopt a lower level of moral reasoning, there was a more nuanced moderating relationship among creativity, perspective taking, and moral reasoning. That is, individuals who were weak in perspective taking tended to adopt a lower level of moral reasoning if they were also creative. Perspective taking was also directly and positively associated with moral reasoning. We explore the implications of our findings for future research and curriculum/program design. (shrink)

The article by Academician P. L. Kapitsa published below is devoted to problems of the utmost importance, which have come to be termed "global." The Twenty - fifth Congress of the CPSU pointed to the need to study them scientifically and solve them practically, emphasizing that they touch on the interests of humanity as a whole and will exercise an increasingly marked influence on the lives of every people and on the entire system of international relations. In their social (...) philosophical aspects they have been discussed more than once in the pages of Voprosy filosofii. Discussions of these problems took place at the round tables entitled "Man and His Environment" [See translation in our Fall-Winter 1974 number. — Ed., Soviet Studies in Philosophy], "Social Philosophy Problems of Demography," and "Science and Global Problems of Our Time," and numerous articles have been published in such series as "Science and Social Progress," "The Peace Program and the Dialectics of International Relations" [See translation in our Fall 1975 issue. — Ed., Soviet Studies in Philosophy], and "Man — Society — Nature." The editors of the journal, guided by the directives of the Twenty-fifth Party Congress on the need for further investigation of such global problems of our time, are inclined to continue the discussion of them in the future; another round table devoted to these problems is being planned now. The article by Academician P. L. Kapitsa, it seems to us, will provide fruitful stimuli for discussion at this round table, which will probably be published in several installments. As the author himself emphasizes, certain positions in his article are debatable and require discussion. The journal invites philosophers, demographers, economists, and representatives of the natural sciences to take part in discussions of the problems posed. Certain questions examined in Kapitsa's article are also treated in articles by Howard L. Parsons, A. D. Ado, and Iu. A. Kirshin published in this issue of the journal. (shrink)

Paul Sheehy has argued that the modal realist cannot satisfactorily allow for the necessity of God's existence. In this short paper I show that she can, and that Sheehy only sees a problem because he has failed to appreciate all the resources available to the modal realist. God may be an abstract existent outside spacetime or He may not be: but either way, there is no problem for the modal realist to admit that He exists at (...) every concrete possible world. (shrink)

In 1956, a few writings of Wittgenstein that he didn't publish in his lifetime were revealed to the public. These writings were gathered in the book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956). There, we can see that Wittgenstein had some discontentment with the way philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians were thinking about paradoxes, and he even registered a few polemic reasons to not accept Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

The aim of this text is to present the evolution of the relation between the concept of number and magnitude in ancient Greek mathematics. We will briefly revise the Pythagorean program and its crisis with the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes. Next, we move to the work of Eudoxus and present its advances. He improved the Pythagorean theory of proportions, so that it could also treat incommensurable magnitudes. We will see that, as the time passed by, the existence of (...) incommensurable magnitudes was no longer something strange. Already in the period of Plato and Aristotle, their existence was common place: up to the point of being considered absurd that all magnitudes were commensurable. Aristotle criticized the Pythagorean program and defended that, though belonging to the same category, number and magnitude are of distinct species: number is discrete and magnitude is continuous. We finish by presenting briefly how the concept of number was amplified throughout the centuries until it came also to include the notion of continuity. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?’, 97–110) William F. Vallicella argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological Argument begs the question is unsuccessful. 1 I believe he is wrong about this, but before endeavouring to vindicate my position I must first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us. The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the argument are frequently put (...) forward by philosophers in an effort to avoid difficulties that have been pointed out in previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I believe, prove that all the standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely that the argument can be formulated in such a way as to avoid this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six best-known versions of the argument all beg the question and that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when it is asserted that it is possible that an absolutely perfect being exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could be formulated without including this claim as one of its premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the inference from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the argument that avoids this fallacy. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century the new science was introduced through the works of Bacon, Hooke, Boyle, Power, and others. The advocates of the new science promised to divulge the inner workings of nature and to help man overcome his painful fallen state by means of controlling nature. The new sciences of mechanism and corpuscularism were to be based on objective experiments that would reveal the secret inner natures of minerals, vegetables, animals, the sun, moon, and stars. These experiments were (...) done with new and improved telescopes and microscope with magnifications of up to 100 times. One early critic of the new science was Margaret Cavendish. Cavendish was skeptical of the ambitious claims, methodology, instruments, and institutions of the new science. In her work, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, Cavendish argued against “experimental and dioptrical writers,” provided her own account of the natural world, investigated aspects of chemistry, medicine, and the nature of heat and color, as well as many other topics in natural philosophy (OEP 10). While many think Cavendish landed on the wrong side of history with respect to her skepticism regarding microscopes and telescopes, her criticisms of the new science were wide ranging and she was by no means the only one to question the value of such experiments and instruments. While several commentators, like Eve Keller (1997), have argued that Cavendish was against all things experimental, several recent commentators, Emma Wilkins (2014) and Deborah Boyle (2018), have tried to show the much more complicated relationship between Cavendish and the Royal Society and medical studies, respectively. In addition, some commentators, such as Lisa Sarasohn (1984, 2010) and Eve Keller (1997), have argued that Cavendish’s criticisms of the new science are based on her belief that Nature, as a representation of the feminine, was under attack by the experimentalists desire to “penetrate” and “manipulate” her for their own ends. While it is certainly true that Cavendish and many of the experimentalists personified nature as a woman, and that Cavendish does portray the men as trying to make her into something she is not, I agree with Deborah Boyle (2004) that these descriptions are not the focus of her objections to experimentalism. Rather than hold that Cavendish is concerned with, as Sarasohn claims, “the sexual implications for both women and nature of the new philosophy” (2010: 147), it seems that Cavendish’s objections were largely based on her philosophical commitments. However, I believe there is one aspect of the new science that Cavendish does critique from a feminist perspective, and that is what she sees as its institutional nature and its exclusion of women on the basis of sex, and to this I will turn in the last section of the chapter.1 My aim is to address Cavendish’s three major critiques of the new science. The chapter is divided as follows: The first section provides a brief overview of Cavendish’s views on the nature of bodies and perception. The second regards her critique of the methods and aims of the new science as represented by Bacon and Boyle. The third section examines her critique of Hooke and the instruments of experimentalism. The final section lays out her feminist critique of the institution of the new science. (shrink)

There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images (...) in response to users’ text prompts. Depending on the parameters, the output can resemble specific people or things which are named in the prompt. This resemblance does not depend on the user’s beliefs, so generated images are in this sense like photographs. Given this parallel, how should we think about AI-generated images? (shrink)

This practical and essential text, co-authored by an engineer and an ethicist, covers ethical dilemmas that any engineer might encounter on the job, emphasizing the responsibility of a practicing engineer to act in an ethical manner. To illustrate the complexities involved, the authors present characters who encounter situations that test the engineering code of ethics. The dialogue between the characters highlights different perspectives of each dilemma. As they proceed through the book, students see how the code of ethics (...) can help in decision making, as well as the implications of various decisions. The philosophical theory that supports the ethical situations encountered is presented as boxed material following each section. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Trinity by Thomas Joseph White, O.P.:A Model of Living ThomismSerge-Thomas Bonino O.P."The human being naturally seeks wisdom." From the very first line of the magisterial work we are dealing with, Fr. Thomas Joseph White's 2022 The Trinity: On the Nature and Mystery of the One God, it is all about wisdom. Wisdom was already at the heart of a previous work by Fr. White devoted to the natural (...) theology of St. Thomas, his 2009 Wisdom in the Face of Modernity. Wisdom is more than the accumulation of information or the juxtaposition of knowledge. It is an eminent form of knowledge that, on the one hand, involves the person of the thinker in all its dimensions, intellectual, emotional, existential, and on the other, seeks to understand its object in the light of the most fundamental causes, which are simultaneously the most enlightening and explanatory principles because they are the most universal. The Trinity: On the Nature and Mystery of the One God is undoubtedly a work of wisdom. Fr. White grasps the entire Christian mystery from its Trinitarian source, since, as we shall see, the entire Mystery (in the Pauline sense of the economy of salvation in Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of the Father's benevolent purpose) is at the same time rooted in the eternal mystery of the triune God and makes it known to us as it unfolds its truth and saving power in time.But the sapiential nature of the object studied has some effect on the form of the work itself. Indeed, if Fr. White were not Rector Magnificent of the Angelicum, he would be a magnificent architect, because he possesses a sense of order to the highest degree and knows how to introduce unity in diversity. The presentation of The Trinity is perfectly structured, and therefore very [End Page 461] clear and didactic. Among many other factors that create its unity, I was especially interested in the highlighting of what the philosopher André de Muralt calls "structures of thought": similarities of proportionality between the ways in which authors from even very different theological epochs have treated a problem.1 I am thinking for instance of how Fr. White shows the strong structural similarities between contemporary Trinitarian theologies and the three types of medieval Trinitarian theology (the Franciscan, the Thomist, and the Nominalist). "My claim here is that the modern Trinitarian tradition tends to reproduce various elements of the medieval traditions, … albeit in creative and unexpected ways" (399). So it is a conceptually well-unified work, and where there is unity, there is being, goodness and beauty.The introduction, as I said, is placed under the sign of wisdom. Fr. White takes up there the neo-Scholastic theme of the "three wisdoms": philosophical wisdom, theological wisdom, and mystical wisdom.2 The book's perspective is explicitly that of theological wisdom, as a scientific form of the intelligence of faith, but (we shall return to this point in connection with the place given to philosophy) it puts into practice in an exemplary manner the collaboration, without confusion or separation, between the three wisdoms.3My purpose, of course, is not, nor can it be, to "summarize" the contents of a book of more than seven hundred pages, which manages to be both a comprehensive handbook for higher theological education and a true personal theological essay. I will therefore limit myself to highlighting three partial but significant aspects.(1) The first is the explicit and overt Thomistic character of the book (see 6–7). The Trinity is in fact a vibrant plea in favor of the relevance of the theology of St. Thomas, as indicated by the very last sentence:The Church today can and should still have recourse to the theology of Thomas Aquinas, and to the living Thomistic tradition, as a privileged means of interpreting and advancing her own understanding of the mystery of God.(690) [End Page 462]The Trinity is the demonstration in actu exercito of the truth of this concluding statement. I therefore propose to reflect, in the first part of my paper, on the nature of Fr. White's Thomism, which depends, as we... (shrink)

Heroides9 takes the form of a letter sent by Deianira to Hercules as a reinforcement to the tunic smeared with Nessus' blood which she has already dispatched in the mistaken belief that it will revive the hero's love for her. In this epistle she tries to persuade her husband to give up his latest girlfriend by showing him that she loves him, by arousing pity for herself, and by making him feel ashamed of his philandering and see (...) class='Hi'>that he thereby disgraces himself. Obviously there is pathos here, particularly as the deaths of Hercules and Deianira loom in the background, but there is also wit, irony, and humour, creating a piquant tonal mixture which has been almost entirely neglected by critics. They have seen the sadness, and some of the irony, but they have not grasped the facetious aspects, whereby our irreverent poet ensures that the piece does not lapse into mawkishness and engages the head as well as the heart. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dharma Bums: The Beat Generation and the Making of Countercultural PilgrimageP. J. JohnstonI believe in the sweetness of Jesus And Buddha— I believe, In St. Francis, Avaloki Tesvara, the Saints Of First Century India A D And Scholars Santidevan And Otherwise Santayanan Everywhere.(Kerouac 1959: 15)Preliminary Polemics“PILGRIM, n. A traveler that is taken seriously.”—Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary 2007: 133As Beat commentator Stephen Prothero describes in his article “On (...) the Holy Road: The Beat Movement as Spiritual Protest” (1991), the Beats and their pilgrimages have most emphatically not been taken seriously. Both critics and scholars have been unkind to members of the Beat generation, and this unkindness has manifested itself in relative neglect of the Beats in all possible aspects of scholarly investigation. But nowhere does this appear more pronounced than in the area of Beat religion. Though some recent scholarship has been picking up from this earlier neglect and it is now [End Page 165] possible to find serious biographies of most of the major Beat writers and some belated attention to the movement as a literary phenomenon, the only book-length treatment of Beat Buddhism I was able to locate (Tonkinson 1995) hardly qualifies as a scholarly work and was published not by an academic press but as a special feature of the Buddhist magazine Tricycle. Prothero hypothesizes that this is because of the movement’s reputation as rebellious and antinomian—in its heyday the movement was characterized in identical unsavory terms by publications representing interests as diverse as Life and Playboy, with the latter describing the Beats as “nihilists” and the former claiming that the Beats were at war with “Mom, Dad, Politics, Marriage, the Savings Bank, Organized Religion, Literary Elegance, Law, the Ivy League Suit and Higher Education, to say nothing of the Automatic Dishwasher, the Cellophane-wrapped Soda Cracker, the Split-Level House and the clean, or peace-provoking H-bomb” (Prothero 1991: 206). Norman Podhoretz of Partisan Review went further still, claiming that the Beats were “hostile to civilization” and that the movement as a whole amounted to “a revolt of the spiritually underprivileged and crippled of soul” and “an affirmation of death” (ibid., 206). One couldn’t ask for a more passionate disavowal of the Beats or a more thorough polemic that the movement was profoundly antireligious.This could not contrast more with the Beats’ representation of their movement and its aims, with Jack Kerouac going so far as to reinterpret the crucial term “Beat” (a term for someone down and out originally borrowed from criminal street jive) as a noun derived from the adjective “beatific,” a specifically religious term familiar from such phrases as “the beatific vision” (ibid., 206–207). Several of the representative Beat writers were practicing Buddhists, influencing the entire movement to such an extent that Buddhist ideas and imagery suffused Beat literature as a whole. Ginsberg and Kerouac especially emphasized the positive and constructive elements of their spiritual vision, arguing that literature such as On the Road and Howl should be understood as religious affirmations of what is good and holy rather than as purely critical undertakings: “For the crucifix I speak out, for the Star of Israel I speak out, for the divinest man who ever lived who was German (Bach) I speak out, for sweet Mohammed I speak out, for Buddha I speak out, for Lao-tse and Chuang-tse I speak out” (ibid., 206–207). Or, as Allen Ginsberg put it less lyrically (and rather more bluntly): “Howl is an ‘Affirmation’ by individual experience of God, sex, drugs, and absurdity... the poems are religious and I meant them to be” (ibid., 207).But for the most part, Beat asseverations in no way diminished scholarly wariness about the Beat movement and its spirituality—as Prothero concludes, “the tendency among literary scholars is to see these [religious] concerns as tangential rather than constitutive” while “historians of American religion who have explored beat spirituality have tended to focus almost exclusively on the beats’ engagement with Zen and then to dismiss that engagement as haphazard” (ibid., 207).It is my contention that the mainstream scholarly neglect of Beat spirituality is in some part... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Christ Who Meets Us in the Sacraments:The Influence of St. Ambrose on the tertia pars of St. Thomas's Summa theologiaeDamian Day O.P.IntroductionThe recent increased interest in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers of the Church has produced a number of excellent studies of the Angelic Doctor's understanding of the authority of the Fathers and his use of them.1 In this article, I hope to contribute to the ongoing (...) study of Aquinas and the Fathers by examining how Thomas employs St. Ambrose in the tertia pars of his Summa theologiae [ST]. Thomas's use of Ambrose has received little detailed [End Page 103] attention. One of Leo Elders's last contributions to the study of Aquinas and the Fathers provided an overview of Ambrose's presence in Thomas's writings.2 I hope to expand upon Elders's work of cataloging and describing Thomas's numerous citations of Ambrose—Thomas names Ambrose over eleven hundred times in his writings3—by making a particular argument about Thomas's Christological and sacramental use of Ambrose. While Elders gives an excellent summary of where Ambrose appears in Thomas's corpus, he does not connect Thomas's use of Ambrose in his treatises on Christ and the Eucharist. I argue that Thomas's citations of Ambrose in the tertia pars help him develop an understanding of the Incarnation that supports his sacramental realism, especially emphasizing contact with Christ in the Eucharist.4Much recent reflection on the Eucharist has sought to deemphasize the substantial presence of Christ and emphasize his presence in other ways. Michael C. McGuckian, for example, argues that the Western emphasis on Christ's presence in the Blessed Sacrament has damaged the understanding of participation in the heavenly liturgy and obscured other ways in which Christ is present, such as in the bishop presiding and the proclamation of the word. He claims that "those other presences surpass the presence in the elements in their personal quality, their dynamic force and their effect on our [End Page 104] spirits and are not to be undervalued."5 Looking at Thomas and Ambrose, we will see that Christ's substantial presence in the Eucharist is preeminently personal, dynamic, and efficacious for our spirits. Colman O'Neill's masterful work of sacramental realism, Meeting Christ in the Sacraments, provides an entrée into such a study. The title derives from Ambrose. In his work A Defense of the Prophet David to Theodosius Augustus, Ambrose reflects on Psalm 51. Suddenly, in the middle of confessing his sins, David foresees the cleansing sacrament of baptism. In prophetic wonder, he cries out, "face-to-face you have shown yourself to me, Christ; I have discovered you in your sacraments."6 Even prior to their institution, David prophetically glimpses what the sacraments of the Old Law prefigure. In this vision, David sees "no longer in shadow, nor in figure, nor in type," but meets Christ in his sacraments.7 For Ambrose, the sacraments are real encounters with Christ. As O'Neill puts it, "Christ, who was worshipped from afar, comes near and touches the believer; and at his touch power goes out from him."8 For [End Page 105] Thomas, too, one meets Christ in the sacraments.9 While all the sacraments apply the merits of his Passion,10 the Eucharist is the locus par excellence for meeting Christ, since the whole Christ is there contained.11 The encounter is both personal and powerful.While the language of meeting or encountering Christ in the sacraments may seem to echo modern phenomenological philosophy, Thomas grounds the encounter in a realism of the Incarnation.12 His treatment of the encounter with Christ in the sacraments flows from his treatment of the Incarnation.13 Guy-Thomas Bedouelle summed up O'Neill's approach, which reflects Thomas's, as simply stressing, again and again, "that sacramental realism implies that the Church draws its life from the dynamism of the Incarnation itself."14 I argue that Thomas, in drawing his sacramental realism from the Incarnation, employs Ambrose as a key authority. First, I examine Thomas's knowledge and use of Ambrose's works. Second, I... (shrink)

Authentic existentialism turns out to be Thomism interpreted in the tradition of Maritain. The primacy of existence over essence is affirmed, but in such a way as to preserve essences and intelligibility. Philosophical positions outside the Thomist family are brought in only where they support the author's argument, never as serious alternative analyses of existence. Plato is distilled down to the idea that there are some relatively permanent aspects of reality after all, and Sartre appears simply as a modern (...) Heraclitean who sees that change permeates reality. The presentation and elaboration of the basic Thomist categories is clear; and the frequent summarization of the argument is helpful, making the book a good introduction to Thomist thinking if not to metaphysics or existentialism more broadly conceived.—P. M. (shrink)

We consider the structure of all labeled trees, called also infinite terms, in the first order language with function symbols in a recursive signature of cardinality at least two and at least a symbol of arity two, with equality and a binary relation symbol which is interpreted to be the subtree relation. The existential theory over of this structure is decidable (see Tulipani [9]), but more complex fragments of the theory are undecidable. We prove that the theory of the (...) structure is in , where formulas are those in prenex form consisting of a string of unbounded existential quantifiers followed by a string of arbitrary quantifiers all bounded with respect to . Since the fragment of the theory was already known to be -hard (see Marongiu and Tulipani [5]), it is now established to be -complete. (shrink)

This essay presents a critique of current views of Hugo Grotius which erroneously see him as a major theorist of natural rights and a formative influence upon the rights theory of Thomas Hobbes. Especially singled out for criticism are the misconceptions due to Richard Tuck in a number of writings that discuss the political ideas of Grotius and Hobbes and the relationship between them. In an examination of Hobbes's conception of natural rights, the essay reaffirms its originality and notes (...) its revolutionary potential contrary to the main intention of Hobbes's own political doctrine. (shrink)

It is well known that Kant was stirred from his "dogmatic slumber" by the writings of David Hume. It is not well known that Hume had a similar effect upon his contemporary Thomas Reid. Yet it was Hume who led Reid to see that the path along which British Empiricism was moving might well end in Pyrrhonian skepticism-Hume's denial to the contrary. Interest in the writings of Reid has been increasing in recent years. One reason is (...) class='Hi'>that the range of Reid's philosophical inquiry covers a number of areas which attract a good deal of attention today. Reid offers interesting and often significant insights into aspects of epistemology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and philosophy of action. His philosophy has contributed to the writings of such men as G. E. Moore, C. S. Peirce, R. Chisholm, P. Winch, to mention only a few. This new edition of An Inquiry Into the Human Mind follows closely upon the heels of new editions of Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, both of which appeared in 1969. In introducing this latest edition, Duggan chose to concentrate his attention upon one aspect of Reid's thought rather than offer a rapid and perhaps superficial treatment of the multifaceted thinking of this 18th century philosopher. Duggan's critical analysis of Reid's interpretation of sensation and perception is invaluable for introducing the reader to Reid's philosophical alternative to Hume. It was this alternative which came to be known as the philosophy of common sense.--W. P. G. (shrink)

There is a strong perception in the social sciences that the welfare state and socialism differ qualitatively rather than by degree. This perception holds that the welfare state is fundamentally incapable, in any incarnation, of realizing the social aspirations of socialism, and that socialism is likewise destructive of welfare state ideals. As a result of such thinking, the marginal, intersectional world that does exist between the welfare state and socialism becomes hidden from view. This consequence is (...) of particular concern to theorists in search of a more egalitarian society than markets, on their own, can produce. This paper analyses the welfare state/socialism dichotomy in the works of Marx and J.S. Mill, looking to see whether it was plausible at its point of historical origin. The conclusion is that it was not; that the dichotomy only seemed to make sense because neither theorist employed a language capable of capturing the complexity of the social relations in question. (shrink)

Philosophers are inclined to raise philosophical dust by asking such questions as, what relations must exist between two body occurrences for them to be body occurrences of the same body? or what relation among person-stages makes them stages of the same person? and then complain that they cannot see the answers. I want to argue that the reason they cannot see the answers is that these questions and others like them are misconceived.

This is the second volume published in the series Studies in Eurolinguistics, which is a collection of papers presented at three different symposia in the period 2001--2003. In the present volume, the more important papers from north of the Alps (Eurolinguistics North) and south of the Alps (Eurolinguistics South) have been collected. Thus readers can look into the future and evaluate for themselves the promises and possibilities of Eurolinguistics.Eurolinguistics is a new challenge for all of us who are involved with (...) the integration of Europe and who see the chance for a renaissance of linguistic studies in the European unification. We are convinced that a rejuvenation of linguistics is necessary to reach this goal, away from an obsession and preoccupation with empty formalism in structural or generative orthodoxy. What unites us and brings us together as Eurolinguists, working towards a new kind of linguistics with a human face, is the concern with time, space and the social dimensions of language contacts, all of which play crucial roles in dealing with languages in present-day Europe. Conversely, we believe that isolated treatments of linguistic phenomena within national-philological or structural frameworks give us a false picture of the interdependencies between the European languages and their mutual contacts in the past and the present.The volume published here in the Eurolinguistics series of the Logos Verlag Berlin is, itself, the result of the on-going integration and enlargement of Europe. The current volume is also a collection of papers from two different parts of the European continent: the two symposia in Mannheim -- Strasbourg (2001) and Zadar (2002). Since this volume also includes papers given at the small workshop held in connection with Baden-Wuerttemberg's Europa Woche in May 9-10, 2003. (shrink)

In an essay on Nietzsche's view of morality written in 1891, Eduard von Hartmann suggested that Nietzsche's most important contribution to philosophy was in the sphere of ethics; at the same time, he drew attention to the affinity between Nietzsche's ideas and the philosophy of Max Stirner. Hartmann's remarks open up Nietzsche's philosophy to examination in terms of a radically materialist framework. Nietzsche sees the ethics of asceticism, and hence Christianity, as a consequence of metaphysical dualism , a stance (...) which enables him to advance a positive, because physiologically based, sexual ethics. His philosophy proposes a profound and instrinsic relationship between the sexual and the aesthetic. This article shows how an appreciation of the radical materialism advanced by Nietzsche serves as evidence of the relevance of his philosophy to contemporary concerns and debates in ethics, and explores Nietzsche's ethical programme to develop ‘a more Goethean attitude toward sensuality’. (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but (...) instead as providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

The philosophical symbolism of H. Skovoroda’s works lies in wisdom, congenial work, seeing the big in the small, unveiling mysteries through the symbolic world. Skovoroda states that to be a human-being is to be a philosopher. The aim of philosophy is to reawaken the main mottos of the Age of Enlightenment (honor, dignity, freedom, justice, solidarity, morality). Creating open society in Ukraine on the basis of these mottos is the aim of the modern national state-building. The aim of (...) the article is to ascertain the influence and meaning of the philosophical and anthropological problems in the works of H. S. Skovoroda for building open society in the modern Ukraine. Methodology of the study is complex and based on the social-philosophical and historic-philosophical analysis of anthropological problems in the works by H. S. Skovoroda and its significance for finding personal freedom and building open society. The leading methodological tools are fundamental research basics of the scientific analysis – principles of objectivity, systematicity, integrity, unity of the historic and the logical, determinism, development, and interrelation. Methodology of social and symbolic representations, ethnic representations, and structural functionalism has been used. Results. As Ukraine is experiencing complex social and political processes, the philosophical works by H. S. Skovoroda acquires special importance: formation and preservation of the Ukrainian national identity, national values, morality, and culture. The society needs politically-minded citizens with clear ideas about the prospects of the state development. Researching works of Skovoroda, one can trace the development of the human spirit: an internally-devastated person devoid of life reference points is gradually adapting to the life in society, overcomes the discrepancies between the singular and the whole finding a compromise in the relations with the world around them. The fates of the people and the nation, language and the state were the key problems which H. S. Skovoroda thoroughly and passionately analyzed through the perspective of universal human values. Conclusions. The modern Ukrainian society needs people in harmony with themselves and the world who work on improving themselves and the society. Such people should be able to overcome both their own internal contradictions and the conflicts in society and the world. Putting significant hope on the human-being as the creator of the new morality, H. Skovoroda believed in the possibility of building solid foundations of the state. An internally rich person and citizen is going to contribute to harmony of the nature, the world, human relations focusing on the issues of good and love as integral attributes of the human existence. The writer considered such personalities to be able to carry peace and unity to the unstable reality full of life challenges and to oppose the alienation, absurdity, and insignificance of the human existence. (shrink)

Analyses in detail the accounts given respectively by Locke and by Hume of the mental factors such as pleasure, pain, uneasiness, and desire, which they see as causing all human actions. Foot argues that this enterprise was misconceived. Philosophers should no more try to describe a mechanism underlying acting on a reason (as e.g. a prudential or moral reason) than a mechanism underlying believing on a reason. Practical and theoretical reasoning are here on a par, the first issuing in (...) action and the second in belief. (shrink)

This famous iambic line is described—alike by commentators on the New Testament and by writers on the Greek drama—as a quotation in the first place from the lost Thaïs of Menander, and it is further stated that it was there borrowed from some play of Euripides no longer extant. In view of the revival of interest in Euripides during recent years, it seems worth while to examine the line in detail, and to see whether, in the light of our (...) present knowledge, any further information can be extracted as to its precise source. (shrink)

Many of our concepts are introduced to us via, and seem only to be constrained by, roughand-ready explanations and some sample paradigm positive and negative applications. This happens even in informal logic and mathematics. Yet in some cases, the concepts in question – although only informally and vaguely characterized – in fact have, or appear to have, entirely determinate extensions. Here’s one familiar example. When we start learning computability theory, we are introduced to the idea of an algorithmically computable function (...) (from numbers to numbers) – i.e. one whose value for any given input can be determined by a step-by-step calculating procedure, where each step is fully determined by some antecedently given finite set of calculating rules. We are told that we are to abstract from practical considerations of how many steps will be needed and how much ink will be spilt in the process, so long as everything remains finite. We are also told that each step is to be ‘small’ and the rules governing it must be ‘simple’, available to a cognitively limited calculating agent: for we want an algorithmic procedure, step-by-minimal-step, to be idiot-proof. For a classic elucidation of this kind, see e.g. Rogers (1967, pp. 1–5). Church’s Thesis, in one form, then claims this informally explicated concept in fact has a perfectly precise extension, the set of recursive functions. Church’s Thesis can be supported in a quasi-empirical way, by the failure of our searches for counterexamples. It can be supported too in a more principled way, by the observation that different appealing ways of sharpening up the informal chararacterization of algorithmic computability end up specifying the same set of recursive functions. But such considerations fall short of a demonstration of the Thesis. So is there a different argumentative strategy we could use, one that could lead to a proof? Sometimes it is claimed that there just can’t be, because you can never really prove results involving an informal concept like algorithmic computability.. (shrink)

Suppose a computer prints out the following little "poem": The shooting of the hunters she heardBut to pity it moved her not. What can we say about the meaning of this "poem"? We can say that it is ambiguous. It could mean: She heard the hunters shooting at animals, people, etc., but she had no pity for the victims. . . . She heard the hunters being shot but did not pity them. . . . She heard the hunters (...) shooting at someone or something and she heard the hunters being shot but did not pity either. An author could use the above word sequence to convey either , , or . But since we cannot treat the text produced by the computer as anyone's use of the words in question, it would not make sense to decide among its linguistically possible readings, just as it would not make sense to choose among the linguistically possible readings of an ambiguous sentence if it is considered in abstraction from its use by a speaker on a particular occasion. For example, it would not make sense to say of the sentence "He saw the man carrying the suitcase" that it just means "He saw the man who is carrying the suitcase" if we know that and in which what ways the sentence is ambiguous. If someone did say this, we would be inclined to think either that he does not know that the sentence is ambiguous or that he is talking not about the sentence but about an utterance of that sentence by a speaker on some occasion. Hence all we can do in interpreting the computer "poem" is to specify the set of its linguistically possible readings, namely, {, , }. But it would not make sense to select , for example, and say, "That is what the computer poem means, not , nor ." P. D. Juhl is an assistant professor of German at Princeton University. The present essay, in a different form, will appear in his forthcoming book, The Nature of Literary Interpretation. See also: "Against Theory" by Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels in Vol. 8, No. 4. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:P. Christopher Smith HEIDEGGER'S MISINTERPRETATION OF RILKE Certainly one of Heidegger's most important accomplishments is to have reminded us of the original unity of poetry and philosophy. The "metaphysical" philosophy which Heidegger calls into question is characterized by its sharp separation of itself from what it calls "unscientific" modes of discourse. But that, Heidegger shows, is a limitation which comes from its narrowed conception of itself as strict, (...) methodical science, and one need only turn to Parmenides before the tradition of metaphysics or Nietzsche at the end of that tradition to see that in fact Heidegger is right: philosophy and poetry are not necessarily to be dissociated. Indeed, the former can and should grow out of the soil of the latter. The point here is one which Heidegger might be said to have learned by experience: he found that the poetry of Hölderlin opened a way for philosophy out of the cul de sac into which phenomenological science had led it. And of course not only Hölderlin: Rilke was obviously important too. In fact to some, myself included, it seems that certainly as much as Hölderlin and perhaps even more, Rilke is the poet who displays the pre-metaphysical unity of poetry and philosophy. But that is not how Heidegger views Rilke. In respect to its philosophical value, Rilke's poetry, we are told, is inferior to Hölderlin's. There is, I suggest, a most puzzling blend of attraction and suspicion in Heidegger's interpretation of Rilke. On the one hand, Heidegger, perhaps better than anyone, is able to make clear the philosophical importance of Rilke's poetry and yet, having done that and having shown thereby the greatest sympathy for Rilke's thought, Heidegger goes on to portray Rilke as "metaphysical" and to claim for that reason that he is not the poet Hölderlin is. Is that assessment valid? And how did Heidegger arrive at it? It is to these questions that the following study is addressed. On my reading of "Wozu Dichter"1 the charge that Rilke persists in "metaphysical" thought has three dimensions. To begin with, the overriding consideration in the whole of the essay is that, like all "metaphysicians," Rilke is oblivious to the Being event. There are in 4 Philosophy and Literature turn two consequences which follow from that obliviousness: first, Rilke grounds all of what is in some highest existent, namely nature taken as will, and second, in turning inwards to consciousness he re-presents the original presencing of existents. The theme of grounding in a highest existent is worked out from page 256 (p. 100) to page 281 (p. 126) and that of the re-presentation in consciousness, from page 281 (p. 126) to page 294 (p. 141). It will become evident, I think, that the discussions of two other apparently separate questions, that of the Open and that of saying and singing, fit respectively into each of these major sections of the essay. Let us now consider the aspects of the charge that Rilke is "metaphysical" one by one. Just what does obliviousness to Being mean? It means obliviousness to the clearing or lighting {Lichtung). Heidegger, it must be kept in mind, distinguishes between what is and the event in which what is comes to be displayed as such. He refers to the event itself as the lighting and it is only in the light of the lighting, he tells us, that what is can be. Obliviousness to Being is obliviousness, not to some highest existent or even to the whole of beings, but to the Being event, to the lighting. "Metaphysics," in seeking the ontos on, the being which in being most truly underlies all other existents, forgets the event in which any being, even the highest, comes to be. Consequently, instead of experiencing temporal presencing, arising out of non-presence, das Nichts, "metaphysics" reduces anything which comes to be to something which always is in steady presence. Obliviousness to Being is, if seen in this way, obliviousness to the nicht-ist, das Nichts from which any ist originates. That shows up in Rilke in that for him beings are not "dissolved in void... (shrink)

Let Mn♯ denote the minimal active iterable extender model which has n Woodin cardinals and contains all reals, if it exists, in which case we denote by Mn the class-sized model obtained by iterating the topmost measure of Mn class-many times. We characterize the sets of reals which are Σ1-definable from R over Mn, under the assumption that projective games on reals are determined:1. for even n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΠn+11;2. for odd n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΣn+11.This generalizes a theorem of Martin and Steel for (...) L, that is, the case n=0. As consequences of the proof, we see that determinacy of all projective games with moves in R is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists for all n∈N, and that determinacy of all projective games of length ω2 with moves in N is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists and satisfies AD for all n∈N. (shrink)

Mapping one's ignorance also has affective benefits. Wherever mastery of knowledge and skills creates professional status, especially in practices that give professional power over clients, there arises a natural pride that rests on what one knows, and a regrettable tendency for authority to develop arrogance. We know the effects: failure to listen, premature dismissal of relevant information, overreaching and overbearing professional conduct, mistakes and the denial of them, and so on. An explicit acknowledgement of ignorance may generate a (...) corrective humility, a desire to see rather than presume understanding, alertness to unforeseen consequences, and openness to alternative approaches. (shrink)

Over the last decade, empirical research on compassion has burgeoned in the biomedical, clinical, translational, and foundational sciences. Increasingly sophisticated understandings and measures of compassion continue to emerge from the abundance of multi- and cross-disciplinary studies. Naturally, the diversity of research methods and theoretical frameworks employed presents a significant challenge to consensus and synthesis of this knowledge. To bring the empirical findings of separate and sometimes siloed disciplines into conversation with one another requires an examination of their disparate assumptions about (...) what compassion is and how it can be known. Here, we present an integrated theoretical review of methodologies used in the empirical study of compassion. Our goal is to highlight the distinguishing features of each of these ways of knowing compassion, as well as the strengths and limitations of applying them to specific research questions. We hope this will provide useful tools for selecting methods that are tailored to explicit objectives (methods matching), taking advantage of methodological complementarity across disciplines (methods-mixing), and incorporating the empirical study of compassion into fields in which it may be missing. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory” by Etienne B. Roesch, Matthew Spencer, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay & J. Mark Bishop. Upshot: Artificial life computer simulations hold the potential for demonstrating the kinds of bottom-up, cooperative, self-organizing processes that underlie the self-construction of observer-actors. This is a worthwhile, if limited, attempt to use such simulations to address this set of core constructivist concerns. Although we concur with (...) much of the philosophical perspective in the target article, we take issue with some of the implied positions related to dynamical systems, sensorimotor contingency theory, and neural information processing. Ideally, we would like to see computational approaches more directly address adaptive, constructive processes and mechanisms operant in minds and brains. This would entail using tasks that are more relevant to the psychology of human and animal learning than performing digit sums or sorts. It also could involve relating the dynamics of agents more explicitly to ensembles of communicating neural assemblies. (shrink)

Anyone who knows Solov'ev mainly from his mystical speculations and aspirations will of course be surprised to hear that he was a brilliant and outstanding representative of the philosophy of law. One is not immediately able to see how such a supremely real and practical idea as the idea of law [pravo] was able to find a place among his dreams and prophecies. And yet we have all the evidence to affirm that this idea was for him one (...) of the most important and precious. It would be an act of unfairness toward the late philosopher, at this solemn celebration of his memory, to forget that aspect of his activity, which he bequeathed to us to remember and esteem. (shrink)

Change blindness illustrates a remarkable limitation in visual processing by demonstrating that substantial changes in a visual scene can go undetected. Because these changes can ultimately be detected using top–down driven search processes, many theories assign a central role to spatial attention in overcoming change blindness. Surprisingly, it has been reported that change blindness can occur during blink-contingent changes even when observers fixate the changing location [O’Regan, J. K., Deubel, H., Clark, J. J., & Rensink, R. A. . (...) Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking. Visual Cognition, 7, 191–212]. However, eye blinks produce a transient disruption of vision that is independent of any associated changes in the retinal image. We determined whether these ‘attentive blank stares’ could occur in the absence of blink-mediated visual suppression. Using a flicker change-blindness paradigm we confirm that despite direct attentive fixations, obvious scene changes often remain undetected. We conclude that change detection involves object or feature based attentional mechanisms, which can be ‘misdirected’ despite the allocation of spatial attention to the position of the change. (shrink)

What lies at the heart of physical inquiry? What are the foundational ideas and working assumptions that inform the enterprise of natural science? What principles guide research? How do scientists decide whether they are building theories in the right direction? Is there a right direction? Do physical theories actually approximate an objective reality, or are they simply useful summaries, mnemonics for experimental results? This book is Nobel Prize winner Jim Peebles's contribution to such big, classic debates in the philosophy (...) of science, drawing on a lifetime of experience as a leading physicist and taking the development of physical cosmology as a "worked example." He begins with a consideration of the history of thought about the nature of the physical sciences since Einstein, culminating in a succinct statement of what he sees as the fundamental working assumptions of physics. Then, through a careful examination of the development of the general theory of relativity, Einstein's cosmological principle, the big bang theory, and our current model of the universe, he makes the argument that physical theories ultimately are useful approximations to an objective reality whose nature science is discovering. An essential reflection on and interrogation of the nature and practice of science by a giant in the field, The Whole Truth will be illuminating reading for cosmologists, physicists, and historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science alike. (shrink)

Recently I have read in succession the four articles on formal logic and dialectics in the current year's Hsin chien-she: Mr. Chou Ku-ch'eng's "Formal Logic and Dialectics" in the second issue, Mr. I Chih's "A Criticism of Confused Concepts on Problems of Logic" in the fourth issue, Mr. Shen Ping-yuan's "A Discussion of ‘Formal Logic and Dialectics,’ " and Mr. Chou Ku-ch'eng's "Further Discourse on Formal Logic and Dialectics," both in the seventh issue. In my opinion, in Mr. Chou's articles, (...) several main theses on formal logic and on the relationship between formal logic and dialectics are erroneous; basically, I agree with the criticisms of Messrs. I and Shen. Nonetheless, I believe that Mr. Chou's errors have had their source in the theory of cognition in that he has unilateralized and absolutized certain aspects that were originally correct, thus leading himself in the wrong direction. In criticizing Mr. Chou, both Messrs. I and Shen failed to proceed from this premise, so they could not make others see where Mr. Chou's errors basically lie. Based on this approach, I am merely offering some personal views on several main problems concerning formal logic and the relationship between formal logic and dialectics as mentioned in Mr. Chou's article. It is hoped that Mr. Chou and other comrades will correct me. (shrink)

The desire to see a sign phenomenon in different ways always has a reason to interpret it in an unbiased, panoramic way, and in some places - even allowing for contradictions in its understanding by different participants in the interpretative process. For modern humanities, this disposition is quite understandable, since it follows from its very postmodern nature, thereby defining the semantic semantic fields of the leading humanities. True, it is not so wide-spread, but instead, it is evident that Ukrainian (...) religious thinkers of the Middle Ages and Baroque have interpreted the iconic phenomena more deeply. In the story of Petro Mohyla "On the Wonderful Elder Grigory Mezhyhirsky" the metropolitan Mohyla clearly expresses the need to build before the thinking gaze of the reader his own, immanently religious-philosophical conception of the Divine, which every time would present him not just as an act of manifestation, otherwise he appears before the person, while remaining alone. The contemporary study of this issue in order to integrate its leading concepts in the religious-philosophical and general cultural discourse of the postmodern era has largely determined the relevance of the proposed article. The study of the phenomenon of "leaving" by itself in changing forms of the phenomenon of the Divine is also one of the key ones in the proposed studio, because it expresses the very meaning of the Divine as a religious, and therefore a cultural phenomenon. (shrink)

This would be admirably clear and would give excellent sense, but it does entail the deletion of as an interpolation before Marshall is aware that is a word that is not likely to be used by an interpolator, but still feels able to propose its deletion and gives a detailed account of the way in which an interpolator might have approached the sentence. When one attempts to read the mind of an ancient scribe, all sorts of possibilities are (...) opened up; in this instance, it seems equally possible that a reader who, as Marshall suggests, was faced with … and was not able to understand the sentence because he failed to separate from and to see that was to be taken in the second clause, would have been inclined first at least to see whether sense could be obtained by separating from rather than to conjure up the word. (shrink)

First Criticism of the Theory.—This is of the nature of an argumentum ad hominem. In the first place, It is surprising that so clever a man as Protagoras did not see that he proved more than he intended, for according to his theory not only are all men, the wise and the foolish, reduced to the same level, but on the plane of sentient experience it is just as true to say that a pig or a tadpole (...) is the measure of all things. (shrink)

Controversies surrounding social media platforms have provided opportunities for institutional reflexivity amongst users and regulators on how to understand and govern platforms. Amidst contestation, platform companies have continued to enact projects that draw upon existing modes of privatized governance. We investigate how social media companies have attempted to achieve closure by continuing to set the terms around platform governance. We investigate two projects implemented by Facebook (Meta)—authenticity regulation and privacy controls—in response to the Russian Interference and Cambridge Analytica controversies (...) surrounding the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Drawing on Goffman’s metaphor of stage management, we analyze the techniques deployed by Facebook to reinforce a division between what is visible and invisible to the user experience. These platform governance projects propose to act upon _front-stage data relations:_ information that users can see from other users—whether that is content that users can see from “bad actors”, or information that other users can see about oneself. At the same time, these projects relegate _back-stage data relations_—information flows between users constituted by recommendation and targeted advertising systems—to invisibility and inaction. As such, Facebook renders the user experience actionable for governance, while foreclosing governance of back-stage data relations central to the economic value of the platform. As social media companies continue to perform platform governance projects following controversies, our paper invites reflection on the politics of these projects. By destabilizing the boundaries drawn by platform companies, we open space for continuous reflexivity on how platforms should be understood and governed. (shrink)

Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and (...) possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project. (shrink)

We review the relativistic classical and quantum mechanics of Stueckelberg, and introduce the compensation fields necessary for the gauge covariance of the Stueckelbert–Schrödinger equation. To achieve this, one must introduce a fifth, Lorentz scalar, compensation field, in addition to the four vector fields with compensate the action of the space-time derivatives. A generalized Lorentz force can be derived from the classical Hamilton equations associated with this evolution function. We show that the fifth (scalar) field can be eliminated through the (...) introduction of a conformal metric on the spacetime manifold. The geodesic equation associated with this metric coincides with the Lorentz force, and is therefore dynamically equivalent. Since the generalized Maxwell equations for the five dimensional fields provide an equation relating the fifth field with the spacetime density of events, one can derive the spacetime event density associated with the Friedmann–Robertson–Walker solution of the Einstein equations. The resulting density, in the conformal coordinate space, is isotropic and homogeneous, decreasing as the square of the Robertson–Walker scale factor. Using the Einstein equations, one see that both for the static and matter dominated models, the conformal time slice in which the events which generate the world lines are contained becomes progressively thinner as the inverse square of the scale factor, establishing a simple correspondence between the configurations predicted by the underlying Friedmann–Robertson–Walker dynamical model and the configurations in the conformal coordinates. (shrink)

It is generally recognised that Western civilization is faced with a double threat to its survival, communism from without and disintegration from within. The latter had its beginnings in the Renaissance and the Reformation, both of which had disruptive effects of a size that is now being more or less clearly seen. We also see that there is urgent need to offset the consequences of these movements, and as rapidly as possible. To-day the accent is on co-operation (...) between the diverse elements of Western culture, and a good deal of thought is being given to devising ways and means of bringing the estranged components together, and re-establishing a unity akin to that which formerly existed in Christendom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the “De Anima.” by H.J. BlumenthalLloyd P. GersonH.J. Blumenthal. Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpretations of the “De Anima.” Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 244. Cloth, $57.50.The label ‘Neoplatonism’, coined in the eighteenth century to indicate a putative and rather ill-defined development within the Platonic tradition, is to this day applied in sundry ways. Presumably, ‘Neoplatonic’ (...) is supposed to be distinguished from ‘Platonic’, but the problem with this is that most of those ancient philosophers called ‘Neoplatonic’ thought of themselves simply as Platonists, that is, as authentic interpreters and continuators of Plato. Nevertheless, there are several important and relatively clear differentiations to be made among those within this tradition. One such refers to those Platonists who attempted to appropriate Aristotle’s philosophy. This was done principally in two ways. For Plotinus, Aristotelian concepts and distinctions were employed to defend Plato against Peripatetic attacks. For Porphyry and the later Platonic commentators on the works of the Aristotelian corpus, Aristotle was co-opted as an authority on the philosophy of the sensible world, leaving the higher, intelligible world to Plato. The commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima are particularly revealing in this regard. For one would assume that in matters regarding the soul it would be extremely difficult to see Aristotle and Plato as anything other than irreconcilable. Aristotle’s hylomorphism and explicit denial of the immortality of the soul hardly seem to be compatible with that which can be called, even on the most charitable interpretation, genuinely Platonic. In fact, the reconciliation of Aristotelian and Platonic soul doctrines is one of the central tasks late Platonists set for themselves. As Blumenthal notes: “Whatever the historical truth about the relation of Aristotle’s thought to Plato’s may have been, the Neoplatonist regarded it as propaedeutic to Plato’s as well as aiming at the same goal” (25).H. J. Blumenthal’s long-anticipated monograph explores in minute detail the extant commentaries on Aristotle’s De Anima written by late Platonic or, if one insists, Neoplatonic philosophers. This book builds upon a large body of frequently groundbreaking work by the author on various facets of late Greek philosophy. The main commentaries studied are those of John Philoponus and the unknown authors dubbed ‘Pseudo-Philoponus’ and Pseudo-Simplicius’, though there is also considerable attention paid to Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on De Anima and, of course, [End Page 315] Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentary on De Anima has not survived but whose own immensely influential Peripatetic treatise on the soul does.This book is divided into two parts: I. Commentaries and Commentators and II. Interpretations of the De Anima. The first part provides the essential background to the second. Anyone approaching the Aristotelian commentators for the first time will find here a most useful guide. Even those who have some familiarity with this material will benefit from the author’s extensive knowledge of detail and judicious examination of some of the difficult issues of dating, authorship, philosophical lineage, and so on.The second section of the book concentrates on the De Anima commentaries. Here the author, following the order of the text of De Anima, systematically surveys the positions of the commentators on some of the central issues taken up in Aristotle’s work. These include the commentators’ efforts to reconcile Aristotle’s definition of the soul with Platonic assumptions about its nature and Plato’s tripartite division of the soul with Aristotle’s not entirely clear divisions. One of the instructive features of this comparative study of the commentaries is to see frequently how the issues that seize the imagination of modern commentators trouble the ancients not at all and vice versa.Most readers will be mainly interested in the chapters on the commentaries on the latter part of Book Two and Book Three of De Anima. From Plotinus onward, some of the most original philosophizing in the Platonic tradition focuses on self-consciousness, memory, imagination, and the integrative operation of the rational and arational powers. The last two chapters are filled with material about these issues as well as the... (shrink)

In research textbooks, and much of the research practice, they describe, qualitative processes and interpretivist epistemologies tend to dominate visual methodology. This article challenges the assumptions behind this dominance. Using exemplification from three existing visual data sets produced through one large education research project, this article considers the affordances and constraints of the research process focusing particularly on analysis. It examines how and when the visual can be incorporated, gives some critical reflections on the role and use of visual methods (...) to fulfil different research intents, and, in particular, considers combining large, open-ended data sets with acceptable and rigorous analysis techniques. We then explore arguments about the nature of visual data, what is considered epistemologically appropriate and the decision-making which accompanies any appraisal of process in education research. The intention is to challenge ourselves, and fellow visual methods researchers, to develop a more complete understanding of the theory and practice of visual research. (shrink)

This work considers the future of driving in terms of both its short- and long-term horizons. It conjectures that human-controlled driving will follow in the footsteps of a wide swath of other, now either residual or abandoned human occupations. Pursuits that have preceded it into oblivion. In this way, driving will dwindle down into only a few niche locales wherein enthusiasts will still persist, much in the way that steam train hobbyists now continue their own aspirational inclinations. (...) Of course, the value of any such prognostication is in direct proportion to the degree that information is conveyed, and prospective uncertainty reduced. In more colloquial terms: the devil is in the details of these coming transitions. It is anticipated that we will see a progressive transformation of the composition of on-road traffic that will be registered most immediately in the realm of professional transportation in which the imperative for optimization exceeds that in virtually all other user segments. The transition from manual control to full automation will be more punctate than gradualist in is evolutionary development. As performance optimization slowly exhausts the commercial sector, it will progressively transition more into the discretionary realm by dint of simple technology transfer alone. The hedonic dimension of everyday driving will be dispersed and pursued by progressively fewer individuals. The traveling window of generational expectation will soon mean that human driving will be largely ‘forgotten,’ as each sequential generation matures without this, still presently common, experience. Indications of this stage of progress are beginning to... (shrink)

It can be unnerving to read and teach Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in a world plagued by religious violence. The book’s praise of Abraham as the “father of faith” precisely for his willingness to kill his son Isaac, combined with its suggestion that through faith one could “suspend” ethics, seems to provide a defense and even an endorsement of religiously motivated violence. In order to see why this is a misreading of the text, we will need to go beyond (...) arguments based on the book’s pseudonymous or symbolic nature. Only by considering in detail what Fear and Trembling says about Abraham’s faith can we see that, far from endorsing religious violence, the book provides an insightful contrast between true Abrahamic faith and the orientation of hatred, bigotry, ideological blindness behind today’s religious violence. (shrink)

It is frequently noted that a “crisis in language” accompanied the profound changes in human consciousness everywhere evident near the turn of the century. As the nature of reality itself became problematic—or at least suspect, distrusted for its imposition of limits upon individual imagination—so, necessarily, did the relationship of language to reality. Thus in the later nineteenth century, the adequacy of an essentially standardized form of “classical” writing was increasingly questioned as an effective vehicle for artistic expression: even though (...) often in “elevated” form, such writing bore too close a connection to ordinary discourse. Indeed, it was precisely the mutually shared, conventional aspects of language that came to be most deeply distrusted for their failure to mirror the more subjective, obscure, and improbable manifestations of a transcendent reality or, rather, realities—the plural reflecting an insistence upon the optional and provisional nature of human experience. Language in its normal manifestations—with its conventionalized vocabulary and standardized rules for syntactical combination—proved inadequate for an artistic sensibility demanding, in Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “a world of abnormally drawn perspectives.”This dissatisfaction with “normal” language received its classic statement through Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos. Writing in 1902, Hofmannsthal conveys through the figure of the aristocratic Chandos the loss of an encompassing framework within which the various objects of external reality are connected with one another and integrated with the internal reality of human feelings. Chandos’ world has become one of disparate, disconnected fragments, resistant to the abstractions of ordinary language. It is a world characterized by “a sort of feverish thought, but thought in a material that is more immediate, more fluid, and more intense than that of language.” Chandos longs for a new language in which not a single word is known to me, a language in which mute objects speak to me and in which perhaps one day, in the grave, I will give account of myself before an unknown judge.”2 The content and forms of art thus shifted away from exterior reality, which no longer provided a stable, “given” material, toward language itself—to “pure” language in a sense closely related to the symbolists’ “pure” poetry. “No artist tolerates reality,” Nietzsche proclaimed.3 And Gustave Flaubert’s farsighted advice to himself was that he should write “a book about nothing, a book dependent on nothing external, which would be held together by the internal strength of its style.”4 2. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, “Ein Brief,” Gesammelte Werke, ed. Bernd Schoeller with Rudolf Hirsch, 10 vols. , 7:471-72; my translation. All further translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.3. Friedrich Nitzsche, Complete Works, ed. Oscar Levy, 18 vols. , vol. 15, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici, p. 74.4. Gustave Flaubert, Flaubert to Louise Colet, 16 Jan. 1852, The Letters of Gustave Flaubert 1830-1857, ed. and trans. Francis Steegmuller , p. 154. Other passages in this letter are equally remarkable for their “modernist” tone. Flaubert argues that from the standpoint of l’Art pur, “one might almost establish the axiom that there is no such thing as subject—style in itself being an absolute manner of seeing things” . Further:The finest works are those that contain the least matter; the closer expression comes to thought, the closer language comes to coinciding and merging with it, the finer the result. I believe the future of Art lies in this direction. I see it, as it has developed from its beginnings, growing progressively more ethereal …. Form, in becoming more skillful, becomes attenuated, it leaves behind all liturgy, rule, measure; the epic is discarded in favor of the novel, verse in favor of prose; there is no longer any orthodoxy, and form is as free as the will of its creator. This progressive shedding of the burden of tradition can be observed everywhere: governments have gone through similar evolution, from oriental despotisms to the socialisms of the future. [P. 154] Robert P. Morgan, professor of music at the University of Chicago, is currently writing a history of twentieth-century music and working on a study of form in nineteenth-century music. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “On the Analysis of Recent Music” and “Musical Time/Musical Space”. (shrink)