Protagoras

This paper argues, first, that one can render Protagoras’s view on the teach ability of political virtue coherent by distinguishing between the affect required for achieving it and the capacity for developing these affect into fully fledged virtues. Second, the paper argues that by focusing on Books II - III of the Republic one might see an affinity between between Protagoras’s suggestion that virtuous citizens might give advice, without ruling it, in the affairs of the city and Plato’s conservative practical (...) political theory. (shrink)

German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s later thought is significant because of his attention to the meaning of “truth” (alētheia) and its connection to Protagoras’s thesis of anthrōpos metron (“of all things man is the measure…”), which Heidegger elevates to the “highest principle” of philosophy. Philosopher Werner Marx concurs with Heidegger that our time faces the “age of technology” as the completion of the Western tradition of metaphysics. With the “end of philosophy” in this sense, we stand to inaugurate “a new beginning” (...) in thinking without reliance on the principles and standards that have their provenance in the tradition from ancient Greek philosophy onward to late European modernity. For Marx, this elicits the possibility of a non-metaphysical ethics, hence the question of “measure” that he engages in connection with Heidegger’s later thinking. However, it is problematic that Marx engages Schelling’s reflections on the essence of human freedom to articulate a possibility of measure. Here Marx’s reflections are engaged by considering his motivation and the thought of Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, as well as the historical context of the twentieth century, all of which constrain Marx’s normative objective. Heidegger’s engagement of Schelling and Kant to elucidate the problem of human freedom raises questions whether Marx’s proposal for a measure “on this earth” can achieve the goal of a foundation for a post-metaphysical ethics. (shrink)

According to a fragment of Porphyry (410 F Smith = 80 B 2 DK), containing a dialogue on the theme of plagiarism, Plato made use of the same arguments as Protagoras’ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος against monistic thinkers, most likely the Eleatics. My paper aims to analyse Porphyry’s testimony to assess some aspects of Protagoras’ reflection on being through a comparison with parallel sources, in particular Plato’s dialogues (Theaetetus, Euthydemus, Sophist, Parmenides). I conclude that it is plausible to suppose that, within (...) the framework of a more general reflection on ὀρθοέπεια, Protagoras viewed the notion of being in Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

We combine linear temporal logic (with both past and future modalities) with a deontic version of justification logic to provide a framework for reasoning about time and epistemic and normative reasons. In addition to temporal modalities, the resulting logic contains two kinds of justification assertions: epistemic justification assertions and deontic justification assertions. The former presents justification for the agent’s knowledge and the latter gives reasons for why a proposition is obligatory. We present two kinds of semantics for the logic: one (...) based on Fitting models and the other based on neighborhood models. The use of neighborhood semantics enables us to define the dual of deontic justification assertions properly, which corresponds to a notion of permission in deontic logic. We then establish the soundness and completeness of an axiom system of the logic with respect to these semantics. Further, we formalize the Protagoras versus Euathlus paradox in this logic and present a precise analysis of the paradox, and also briefly discuss Leibniz’s solution. (shrink)

This paper investigates a reference to the voice of the legendary musician Orpheus in Plato’s Protagoras. I propose that the Orpheus image does serious philosophical work in the text. Understanding the mythic and religious elements of the Orpheus tradition can help us conceptualize the harms of sophistry from a Platonic viewpoint. In the light of the image, the sophist emerges as a quasi-magical manipulator of rhetorical beauty who charms his students into subrational creatures. Furthermore, the image provides insight into Plato’s (...) conception of the difference between sophistic and Socratic education. Playing on the tradition of Orpheus as (failed) psychopomp, I suggest that the sophist employs a descent-style education which holds students captive in an underworld of glamorous but empty sensibles. In sharp contrast, Socratic ascent-style education pulls students upwards to active contemplation of ultimate reality. (shrink)

This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras’ measure doctrine (M) and the self-refutation argument (SRA). First, I argue that the relevant interpretation of (M) has it that every individual human being determines all her own truths, including the truth of (M) itself. I then turn to what I take to be the most important move in the SRA: that Protagoras recognises not only that his opponents disagree with him about the truth of (M), but also that they (...) hold that (M) is false simpliciter. By recognising that his opponents do not make the relativising concession he makes for them, he is forced to accept that (M) is false. I go on to argue that several other defenders of the SRA end up with a regress which is difficult to end and might not favour anti-Protagoreans. On my reading, by recognising what his opponents believe, Protagoras is barred from adding qualifiers, and the possible regress doesn’t get off the ground. I conclude with brief discussions of how Protagoras might try to avoid the result of the SRA and the argument’s role in this part of the Theaetetus. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui, de la sentence de « l’homme est la mesure de toutes choses, pour celles qui sont, de leur existence ; pour celles qui ne sont pas, de leur non-existence » du sophiste Protagoras, on ne retient, souvent, que le jugement incendiaire de Platon qui la tient pour un relativisme selon lequel « à chacun sa vérité » de sorte qu’il serait impossible de mentir. C’est ainsi que cette phrase, qui est à inscrire dans le contexte des débats qui opposèrent (...) Protagoras aux éléates concernant les rapports entre le logos et la vérité, est brandie comme argument pour disqualifier, philosophiquement et moralement, Protagoras et l’ensemble des sophistes. Jugement à la hâte qui n’a rien de fécond pour qui veut étudier et comprendre la pensée du sophiste, principalement sa rhétorique politique. Le logos, dans la perspective de Protagoras, ne saurait être un discours sur l’être ou la vérité comme l’enseignait Parménide. Il est une sorte de démiurge qui fait advenir les choses : « Le choix intellectuel formulé par Protagoras est délibérément celui de la doxa, celui du non-être, celui du logos également qui ne dit pas ce qui est, mais qui fait être ce qu’il dit ». C’est à partir d’une étude du statut du logos que Protagoras va repenser les fondements de l’absolu et de la connaissance. Dans cette approche du statut du logos dans laquelle l’homme est considéré comme le critère des choses, l’originalité de Protagoras sera d’accorder à la parole un pouvoir absolu tout. (shrink)

The paper argues for an analytic interpretation of Protagoras’ myth in Plato’s dialogue by showing that its goal is not so much to reconstruct the origins of civilization as to identify some essential features of humankind. Against the widespread opinion that human progress depends on the development of technai, Protagoras claims that political art is the most important one, insofar as it is the condition for the existence of society. More concretely, the emphasis on the political art also serves to (...) bring light to what is distinctive of Protagoras as opposed to the other sophists and poets. As clearly shown in the dialogue, Protagoras can thus present himself as the only teacher who is capable of imparting the teachings suited to the needs of the new world of the polis. (shrink)

Protagoras beansprucht, die Jugend erziehen zu können. Warum nicht? Wenn «Mensch Maß aller Dinge» ist, kann jeder jeden ‘besser’ machen… Für Plato geht das nicht auf. Was fehlt? Was ist das Maß des Menschen, wenn der Mensch Maß sein soll? Protagoras claims to be able to educate the young. Why not? If «Man is Measure of Everything», anybody can make everybody ‘better’… To Plato, this doesn't add up. What's lacking? What is the measure of Man, if Man be measure?

The epistemic justification and nature of Protagoras of Abdera’s agnosticism continues to be subject to varying interpretations, and there remain several reconstructions for the theological and anthropological argumentation that apparently followed on from his declaration of agnosticism that apparently opened his book On the Gods. In this article, the grounds for these hypothetical reconstructions will be challenged and a “strong agnostic” interpretation of Protagoras’ theology interpreted critically in light of his epistemology will be proposed. The article will conclude with discussion (...) on a more recent argument for Protagorean atheism. (shrink)

Com base no Teeteto de Platão, busca-se compreender a dimensão do termo ánthropos na famosa sentença de Protágoras. Segundo a crítica platônica, Protágoras parece entender corpo e alma como diferentes tipos de percipientes: os órgãos sensoriais corporais percebem a aparência imediata de algo que provoca a sensibilidade; a alma, por sua vez, ‘percebe’ por ter julgamentos admitidos pela aprendizagem e experiência. O homem-medida protagórico, do tema da realidade sensível, conduz-nos à formulação do problema em termos de julgamento e opinião, e (...) a medida, que inicialmente é atribuída a cada indivíduo, para além de cada ser humano, é reputada a cada cidade. (shrink)

This essay explores a curious point of intersection in the historical pairing of becoming and negation, between two thinkers and two traditions: the Sophist Protagoras of fifth-century BCE Greece and the second-century CE South Asian Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. I offer a speculative account of how becoming and negation are linked in Protagoras—speculative because only so much can be deduced from the extant fragments and testimony. I compare that account to the more coherent picture offered by Nāgārjuna—more coherent because a complete (...) account of the logic that links becoming and negation is carefully preserved in the works attributed to Nāgārjuna. While no specific conclusions regarding the bridge that linked India and Greece may be reached, the similarities between these thinkers and the greater coherence of the Buddhist tradition nevertheless offer hypothetical possibilities for reconstructing the larger architecture of the world of sophistic thought that is now lost to us. (shrink)

En el Gran Discurso de Protágoras, en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre, Platón pone en boca de Protágoras un mito acerca del origen, desarrollo y naturaleza del ser humano, que es de gran relevancia filosófica. Se expresa que los dioses crearon a los seres mortales desde dos elementos: la tierra y el fuego. A su vez, también asignaron dos titanes, Epimeteo y Prometeo, para que proveyeran a los mortales de sus facultades. ¿Acaso esto implica que la creación no (...) fue terminada por los dioses? ¿Hasta qué punto los dioses crearon enteramente al ser humano? ¿Podría afirmarse que este es un mito creacionista? El desarrollo de los seres vivientes puede dividirse en cuatro instancias. A lo largo de este artículo, se proponen distintos modelos hermenéuticos para responder los interrogantes mencionados anteriormente. (shrink)

Epistemoloji alanında bilginin iki temel düşünce üzerinden günümüze kadar geldiği bilinen bir husustur. Bu düşüncelerden ilkini ve en önemlisini oluşturan Platon felsefesi, mutlakçı kanadı temsil edenken Protagoras felsefesi rölativist bir yapıyı dillendirir. Her iki yapı arasındaki karşılaştırmanın birbirinden bağımsız kaynaklardan hareketle yapılamaması, Protagoras felsefesinin açık bir şekilde anlaşılmasını engellemektedir. Çünkü bu felsefenin anlaşılması, muhalif kanatta yer alan Platon’un eserlerinden hareketle gerçekleştirilmektedir. Bu durum, Platon’un hangi Protagoras’ı eserlerinde işlediği sorusunu gündeme getirir. Bu sorunun yanlış anlama veya yanlış aktarma şeklinde iki temel (...) problem üzerinden işlenmesi her iki düşüncenin hem Platon’un eserlerinde hem de söz konusu aktarımların dışında nasıl bir çerçeveye sahip olduğunu tartışmaya açar. Bu çalışmamızın amacı da Platon’un Theaetetus diyalogunda ele aldığı Protagoras felsefesinin tarihsel açıdan gerçek Protagoras’ın düşüncelerine karşılık gelip gelmediğini incelemek ve her iki filozofun ayrıştığı noktaları ön plana çıkarmaktır. Bu noktada temel ayrımın bilgi ve algı kavramları üzerinden ortaya çıktığı ve bu durumun mutlakçı ve rölativist yaklaşımlarla doğrudan ilişkili olduğu belirtilmelidir. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Socrates adopts a philosophical stance of indifference that is particularly unique to the Protagoras. The peculiarity stems from Socrates’s significant interest in dealing with Protagoras as a certain kind of thinker rather than merely a sophist in general. The stance of indifference is shown to be a dramatic reaction to the attitude sophists like Protagoras take toward philosophical problems, specifically, thinkers who understand solutions to philosophical problems as commodities. The stance is shown to anticipate (...) certain Academic skeptical methods, to embolden Socratic ignorance, and shore up defenses against the sophistic insecurity of needing to succeed for the sake of success. This stance is elaborated upon in three specific aspects of Socrates’s dramatic portrayal culminating in a re-reading of the poem of Simonides and the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus. I resist readings that try to see the Protagoras as a simple takedown of sophistry or as a catalog of platonic doctrine, and instead treat Protagoras as a “philosopher in decline,” a significantly dangerous type of thinker who is savvy enough to repurpose genuine insight for the sake of easy answers to immensely difficult problems. (shrink)

The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a normatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim (...) that virtue is knowledge. I will show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in fact knowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic addresses some of the problems posed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues. (shrink)

The Great Speech of Protagoras in Plato’s dialogue is now widely seen as an expression of democratic theory, one of the earliest substantial expressions of democratic theory on record. At the same time, there have long been arguments to the contrary, the most formidable presentation of which is an article by Peter Nicholson that appeared in these pages in 1981. In this short piece, I address Nicholson’s skeptical arguments head-on and in full, in a way that has not yet been (...) done. By doing so, I hope to put skeptical arguments of this sort to rest, and to confirm Protagoras’ Great Speech once and for all as an early, and very interesting, fragment of democratic theory. (shrink)

In the Theaetetus Socrates provides an elaboration and discussion of Protagoras’ measure doctrine, grounding it in a “secret doctrine” of flux. This paper argues that the anthropology of the myth in the Protagoras provides an earlier, very different way to explain the measure doctrine, focusing on its application to civic values, such as “just,” “fine,” and “pious.” The paper shows that Protagoras’ explanation of the dual etiology of virtue – that it is acquired both by nature and by nurture – (...) tracks the two meanings of “anthropos” in his formulation of the measure doctrine, as “humankind” and “individual human.” On Protagoras’ account, humankind’s survival can be explained by the fact that humans share shame and justice, which enables them to live together in cities. (shrink)

Hacia el final del Protágoras, Sócrates y Protágoras disputan sobre si la valentía y el conocimiento (o sabiduría) son lo mismo. El primer argumento que Sócrates emplea para mostrarlo, y la respuesta de Protágoras, han sido objeto de mucha discusión y desacuerdo entre los especialistas (349e1-351b2). Me parece que ninguna de las interpretaciones disponibles de este debate es completamente satisfactoria, pues éstas tienden a favorecer exclusivamente a Sócrates o a Protágoras. En este trabajo presento una interpretación nueva, más equilibrada y (...) completa, según la cual, tanto el argumento de Sócrates como la respuesta de Protágoras son razonables y válidos en el contexto del diálogo, y ambos consiguen, hasta cierto punto, su objetivo. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo intentaremos poner en evidencia un singular enfoque sobre la pólis ateniense ofrecido por Protágoras en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre. Dicho enfoque, soslayado por los intérpretes, hace hincapié en la dimensión visual de la praxis política de los ciudadanos y es coherente con los posicionamientos ontológicos que emergen de los fragmentos del sofista.

Plato's Theaetetus discusses and ultimately rejects Protagoras's famous claim that "man is the measure of all things." The most famous of Plato's arguments is the Self-Refutation Argument. But he offers a number of other arguments as well, including one that I call the 'Future Argument.' This argument, which appears at Theaetetus 178a−179b, is quite different from the earlier Self-Refutation Argument. I argue that it is directed mainly at a part of the Protagorean view not addressed before , namely, that all (...) beliefs concerning one's own future sensible qualities are true. This part of the view is found to be inconsistent with Protagoras's own conception of wisdom as expertise and with his own pretenses at expertise in teaching. (shrink)

Protagoras and Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue are without doubt different. The former conceives it as the exercise of certain moral qualities that are indispensable to the attainment or maintenance of what is useful to oneself and to those who dedicate themselves to the affairs of the city. The latter conceives it as a strong and immutable state of character, which is the condition for the realization of the individual’s and of the city’s Eudaimonia. It would seem, however, that Protagoras and (...) Aristotle converge on this point: the subsistence of a city does not depend upon a ruler who holds the science of ruling well with which he rules, but rather on well educated and excellent rulers and citizens, which is the condition for good political exercise. My aim here is to indicate the affinity between the political conceptions of Protagoras and Aristotle concerning the end of civic education as a guarantee of justice in the city. (shrink)

The Protagoras examines how community can occur between people who have nothing in common. Community, Protagoras holds, has no natural basis. Seeking the good is therefore not a theoretical project, but a matter of agreement. This position follows from his claim that “man is the measure of all things.” For Socrates community is based on a natural good, which is sought through theoretical inquiry. They disagree about what community is, and what its bases and goals are. But Plato illustrates the (...) seriousness of Protagoras’s position through the repeated breakdown of their conversation. The dialogue leads us to question both speakers’ assumptions about community. Socrates must face the problem that not everything can be brought to language. Protagoras must recognize that there is a basis of community even in what cannot be shared. Community is grounded in an event that is both natural and not up to us, and cultural and articulate. (shrink)

Cet article examine le fragment de l’homme-mesure de Protagoras, tout d’abord en exposant les grands courants de son interprétation, ensuite et surtout en présentant les positions respectives et antagonistes de Nietzsche et Heidegger. Heidegger, contre Nietzsche, fait reposer l’homo-mensura sur un arrière-fond ontologique et platonicien, où la mesure n’est possible que depuis l’ouverture ontologique qui la précède. Cette interprétation a sa légitimité historique et philologique. Mais Nietzsche comprend le fragment comme entièrement irréductible au platonisme : Protagoras aurait pensé la connaissance (...) comme l’étude de types psychologiques, non pas selon une norme épistémique stable, mais selon les variations d’intensité qui touchent toute psychè mais aussi toute communauté sociale. Je prends appui sur cette dernière intuition pour dégager ce qui me semble l’interprétation la plus riche du fragment de l’homme-mesure, à partir des remarques d’Eugène Dupréel – une interprétation sociale et normative où Protagoras est le penseur d’une praxis qui, dans une situation et dans une communauté données, est capable d’améliorer les impressions subjectives du plus grand nombre. (shrink)

»Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν [Pántôn khrēmátôn métron éstin ánthrôpos, tôn mèn όntôn hôs éstin, tôn dè ouk όntôn hôs ouk éstin]« – »Čovjek je mjerilo svih stvari, onih koje jesu da jesu, onih koje nisu da nisu«, kaže Protagora. Onaj tko hoće razmotriti Protagorin iskaz (ili raspravljati o njemu), trebao bi najprije potražiti odgovor ne prethodno pitanje: što je čovjek? Utoliko će se u ovome prilogu našem razgovoru (...) najprije (uz pomoć Aristotela) potražiti neki odgovori na to prethodno pitanje, da bi se Protagorin iskaz pokušalo razmotriti s vidika tih odgovora te da bi ga se iskušalo u dva različita vida čovjekova života – u vidu što ga Aristotel naziva θεωρετικός βίος (theōretikόs bíos) i u vidu što ga naziva πολιτικός βίος (politikόs bíos). Napokon, ako se prihvati interpretacija Protagorina iskaza kao afirmacija relativističkog načela (kako to u svojoj kritici u Theaitētu drži Platon), pokušat će se mjesto i smisao relativizma odrediti s obzirom na ta dva vida čovjekova života te s obzirom na razliku između sofizma i filozofije (sofista i filozofa). Na kraju će biti sugerirano da je Protagorin iskaz moguće i drugačije interpretirati te da svaka od različitih interpretacija može imati valjanu težinu. (shrink)

Discuto neste artigo o fragmento de Protágoras sobre a existência dos deuses e a sua coerência teórica com outras teses do sofista. Primeiramente, utilizo dados históricos e biográficos para iluminar o subjetivismo da primeira linha do fragmento. Em seguida, discuto os obstáculos epistemológicos mencionados por Protágoras e sugiro uma nova tradução para o termo brachýs, um dos conceitos centrais que ele propõe. Na seção 2, analiso o ataque à transcendência que distingue suas ideias sobre a matemática e a percepção sensível. (...) Finalmente, na seção 3, mostro como a sua postura teológica está de acordo com a tese do homo-mensura e com a sua abordagem antilógica. A conclusão ressalta a unidade do pensamento de Protágoras e a sua posição no Iluminismo grego. (shrink)

This paper argues that Protagoras’ concept of education, unlike the Platonic ideal of complete transmission of cognitive knowledge, is not oriented towards the paradigm of axiomatic geometry, but seeks to develop virtue and judgment through processes of consideration, insight, imitation, and practice. Accordingly, his epistemology combines consciousness of moderate relativity with a preference for proliferation of theories, without giving up the claim to gradually better logoi. Protagoras’ position can thus be understood and defended against the reservations of Plato to Boghossian (...) as a systematically attractive and virtuous epistemic attitude. (shrink)

While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all appearances are true (as the Protagorean maintains), anytime people disagree we get a true contradiction. This argument seems clearly invalid: nothing guarantees that actual disagreement occurs over every matter of fact. The argument in fact works perfectly, I propose, because the Protagorean view falls prey to a version of Fitch's “paradox” of (...) knowability. The proposed reading shows how Aristotle treats the Protagorean view at issue as an epistemic theory of truth distinct from the mere claim that all appearances are true (which other opponents put forward on different grounds) and reveals Aristotle's underlying concern with the modal collapse of possibility into actuality. The revised Protagorean view Aristotle confronts in a subsequent chapter is furthermore best understood as an attempt to avoid this Fitch-style result. (shrink)

La cultura occidental, con la que vivimos y entendemos, nació bajo los auspicios de un triple ente: la conjugación de lacultura arábigo-musulmana, la civilización germano-eslava y el mundo clásico-bíblico; todos éstos vendrían a encajar, en principio, los miembros articulados del hombre moderno occidental. En concreto, las lenguas modernas han resultado un vehículo habitual y pertinente de la cultura clásica, en mayor o menor proporción y la someten a su propio arbitrio, creando una nueva dinámica literaria, determinada por razones estilísticas o (...) de prestigio. Por ello, no dejan de ser preocupantes los constantes vaivenes de una sociedad ávida de informaciones y conocimientos, sin ningún rumbo a seguir ni alguna meta humanamente satisfactoria. (shrink)

The Protagoras is a contest of philosophical methods. With its mix of μῦθος and λόγος, Protagoras’ Great Speech stands as a competing model of philosophical discourse to the Socratic elenchus. While the mythical portion of the speech clearly impresses its audience—Socrates included—one of its central claims appears to pass undefended. This is the claim that the political art cannot be distributed within a community as the technical arts are. This apparent shortcoming of the Great Speech does not seem to trouble (...) philosophical commentators: it is amyth, after all, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the sly sophist slips certain claims into his myth precisely to avoid having to defend them. Nevertheless, it is worth subjecting the claim to philosophical scrutiny. What could be the reason that the political arthadto be distributed differently than were the technical arts, as the myth insists? (shrink)

À partir du Théétète, cet article revient sur quelques aspects des débats épistémologiques suscités, de Zénon à Platon, par la préhistoire de la constitution de l’axiome dit d’Eudoxe-Archimède et les paradoxes métriques caractéristiques de l’angle de contingence. Après avoir rappelé les conditions axiomatiques nécessaires à l’apparition du problème des grandeurs non-archimédiennes, il s’attache à reconstruire le débat qui opposa Protagoras à Zénon à propos de la validité d’une version naïve et archaïque de l’axiome archimédien, ainsi que la réponse platonicienne qu’il (...) suscita. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone identificar, desde una perspectiva histórica, la recepción del pensamiento protagórico en las Historias de Heródoto. Para ello se efectuará un análisis de los pasajes en los que Heródoto remite a νόμος y φύσις, los cuales constituyen una antítesis conceptual en el marco de la sofística del siglo V a.C. A partir de este análisis se pretende mostrar que Heródoto retoma las discusiones intelectuales del siglo V a.C., pero realiza una recepción polémica de dichos conceptos poniendo (...) en evidencia el clima de conflictividad en el plano de lo simbólico. (shrink)

Evenus of Parus plays a surprisingly important role in Plato’s account of the life and death of Socrates: in both the Apology and the Phaedo he works as a negative foil for the philosopher at two key moments, namely when he converts, respectively, to the practice of elenchus and to the composition of poetry. Evenus’ importance in Socrates’ life, I argue, reflects Plato’s appropriation of a number of his poems, which Plato reshapes so as to adapt the sophist’s relativism and (...) values, arguably modelled on Protagoras’, to his own truth-oriented agenda. Plato’s Phaedrus echoes Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen along similar lines, that is by replacing doxa with aletheia. A pattern emerges: Plato appropriates the writings of the sophists by placing them in a markedly truth-oriented context. This helps explain a discussed piece of information, according to which Protagoras’ Antilogiai was a major influence on Plato’s Republic. (shrink)

Le célèbre incipit du Peri theon (80 B 4 DK = 31 D 10 Laks-Most), dans lequel Protagoras affirmait être dans l’incapacité de savoir si les dieux existent ou non, joue sans aucun doute un rôle important dans l’histoire de l’athéisme ancien dans la mesure où il permet, comme le souligne David Sedley, de reconstruire un contexte culturel dans lequel la négation de l’existence des dieux était considérée comme une thèse philosophique digne d’être discutée. La présente contribution portera sur les (...) principaux problèmes exégétiques relatifs au fragment protagoréen. Dans un premier moment, nous nous occuperons de la question de la constitution du texte. Nous considérerons ensuite l’historicité de la tradition biographique concernant la persécution judiciaire du sophiste, qui est évoquée par la plupart des sources citant le fragment. Finalement, nous essayerons d’étudier le fragment de Protagoras dans le cadre de la tradition philosophique et littéraire qui le précède et de l’analyser à la lumière de la réflexion philosophique du sophiste lui-même, afin de mieux comprendre le point de vue sur les dieux et la religion que Protagoras exprimait dans son écrit. (shrink)

In this paper a reinterpretation of Protagoras thesis, ‘homo mensura’ is attempted. Plato’s interpretation of Protagorean statement, ‘homo mensura’ in his Theaetetus, as ‘knowledge is perception’ is not reliable, since he was hostile towards sophists. ‘Homo mensura’ expresses a philosophical relativism, wherein Protagoras maintains that each one of us is determiner of truth. Each one of us is the unique authority on the content of our own perception. As a result, our judgments are incorrigible. However, not all judgments are equally (...) true. Protagoras provided for consensus, wherein changes are caused by wise man and he appeals to reason through common sense ways to grasp truth. It seems that Protagoras goes beyond the meaning of sense; perception in man-measure thesis. In this reinterpretation ‘measure’ stands for an insight in determining the general self-world view and the way of life implicit in such a view. It refers to the deeper valuing, and not to any external standard. It has to fit in the overall reality in which man lives, and as demonstrated by his perception and harmony of action to which it leads. This anti-dogmatic philosophical relativism places man in central position. Protagoras’s engineering approach and inseparability of thought and emotion plays an important role in man’s being ‘measure’ of all things. (shrink)

Protágoras de Abdera, conhecido sofista da Grécia antiga, é compreendido em seus dizeres no decorrer da história da filosofia principalmente devido às contribuições de Platão. O ateniense não apenas dedicou uma obra com seu nome, como também apresentou sua famosa tese do homem-medida no diálogo Teeteto, contribuindo imensamente para elucidar questões importantes sobre seu relativismo. O quão seria pertinente afirmar que é possível saber na íntegra o que queria dizer Protágoras nesse fragmento quando seguimos apenas os testemunhos de Platão. No (...) presente trabalho, iremos propor algumas interpretações dos fragmentos de Protágoras de Abdera com a finalidade de percebermos se há divergências com a interpretação platônica, acima de tudo sobre o fragmento do homem-medida. Traremos, para a análise de Protágoras, o livro de Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, fazendo as devidas considerações sobre suas conclusões, para, ao final da pesquisa, nos posicionar devidamente diante do que Platão, de fato concordou e acertou sobre o homem-medida. (shrink)

Taking a cue from the interpretive difficulties faced by Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato’s Theaetetus as they struggle to determine the meaning of Protagoras’ homo-mensura doctrine (HM), I argue that Protagoras, or early Protagoreans, used HM to speak on the relativity of literary criticism. For evidence I adduce an overlooked passage of the anonymous Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, which contains an ethical formulation of HM. This formulation of HM, compatible with the portrait of Protagoras from Theaetetus, explains the concern (...) for literary interpretation latent in two sections of the Certamen. From the evidence in the Certamen, we may infer that HM was directly related to Protagorean education in civic virtue, part of which included a study of how to read and listen to texts. (shrink)

Review of Robert C. Bartlett's Sophistry and Political Philosophy: Protagoras’ Challenge to Socrates, University of Chicago Press, 2016.

Despite Protagoras’ infamous reputation for corrupting his students, his “Great Speech” (Plato, Protagoras 320c-328d) presents one of the most important arguments in the history of ethics. Refuting Socrates’ contention that virtue must be unteachable since even the best of men cannot raise good children, Protagoras argues that everyone is capable of learning the difference between right and wrong.

In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.