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Philosophy of Cognitive Science > Science of Consciousness > Science of Visual Consciousness > Change/Inattentional Blindness
Change/Inattentional Blindness
Edited by Bradley Richards (Toronto Metropolitan University, York University)
About this topic
| Summary | Change blindness is the experimentally demonstrated phenomenon in which a subject fails to notice a distinguishing feature or change when consecutively presented with two slightly different stimuli (e.g., words, illustrations or photographs). Change blindness occurs when stimuli are changed during saccadic eye movements, when changes are introduced to a stimulus display that flickers on and off, or when the stimulus is interrupted by a 'mask', for example a blank display or a 'mudsplash', consisting of small, high-contrast shapes temporarily 'splattered' over the image. Inattentional blindness is a related experimentally demonstrated phenomenon in which subjects fail to notice stimuli in their visual field because they are engaged in a task that requires attention to a different stimulus. For example, some subjects fail to notice a stimulus presented close to fixation because they are attending to a cross at fixation to discern which of its lines is longer. Inattentional blindness also occurs with complex and dynamic stimuli. In a popular experiment subjects fail to notice a man in a gorilla suit who walks through the action in the video they are watching. Similar effects can be produced in "real-world" situations, situations in which subjects interact directly with other people and not merely with video images. These results have been taken to show that there is no explicit conscious awareness of an item without attention, and that if it seems to us that we experience many items in our visual field simultaneously or in detail we are subject to an illusion. Both of these conclusions are contested. |
| Key works | Key works on change blindness include: Rensink et al 1997, O'Regan et al 1999, and Rensink et al 2000. Key works on inattentional blindness include: Mack & Rock 1998, Mack & Rock 2003, Simons & Chabris 1999, Most et al 2000 Key works on the grand illusion include: Noë 2002 and Mack 2002. |
| Introductions | Good introductory works include: Mack & Rock 1998, Mack & Rock 2003. For a popular introduction see Chabris and Simons (2010), The Invisible Gorilla. |
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Related
Siblings
- Neural Correlates of Visual Consciousness (193)
- Binocular Rivalry (245)
- Visual Pathways (71)
- Visual Imagery and Imagination (260)
- Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc (100)
See also
Contents
320 found
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| 1 — 50 / 320 |
- Visual Object Detection using Frequent Pattern Mining.A. Yousuf & B. Ravindran - forthcoming - The Proceedings of the Twenty Third Florida Ai Research Society Conference (Flairs 2010).
- How to get rich from inflation.Simon Alexander Burns Brown - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 117 (C):103624.We seem to have rich experience across our visual field. Yet we are surprisingly poor at tasks involving the periphery and low spatial attention. Recently, Lau and collaborators have argued that a phenomenon known as “subjective inflation” allows us to reconcile these phenomena. I show inflation is consistent with multiple interpretations, with starkly different consequences for richness and for theories of consciousness more broadly. What’s more, we have only weak reasons favouring any of these interpretations over the others. I provisionally (...)
- Putting Aside One’s Natural Attitude—and Smartphone—to See what Matters More Clearly.Marc Champagne - 2024 - In Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Mohammad Shafiei (eds.), Phaneroscopy and Phenomenology: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Ideas. Cham: Springer. pp. 25–55.Peirce and Husserl both realized that our habits and habitual conceptions, though vital to the success of most activities, nevertheless occlude large portions of the experiential canvass. So, unless preparatory work puts us in the right mindset, we risk perceiving the world—not as it is—but rather as we expect it to be. While Peirce and Husserl were predominantly concerned with supplying a better observational basis for inquiries like science, semiotics, and mathematics, I draw on their phaneroscopic/phenomenological tools to combat the (...)
- Sources of Richness and Ineffability for Phenomenally Conscious States.Xu Ji, Eric Elmoznino, George Deane, Axel Constant, Guillaume Dumas, Guillaume Lajoie, Jonathan A. Simon & Yoshua Bengio - 2024 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2024 (1).Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds (...)
- Mapping the Visual Icon.Sam Clarke - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):552-577.It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain pre-attentive vision's characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its (...)
- (1 other version)Clarifying the effect of facial emotional expression on inattentional blindness.Dennis Redlich, Daniel Memmert & Carina Kreitz - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 100 (C):103304.
- Contents of Unconscious Color Perception.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):665-681.In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a (...)
- Transparency, privacy commons and civil inattention.Emmanuel Alloa - 2021 - In Cultures of Transparency: Between Promise and Peril. London/New York: pp. 171-192.
- Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not noticing the (...)
- The developmental difference of inattentional blindness in 3-to-5-year-old preschoolers and its relationship with fluid intelligence. [REVIEW]Hui Zhang, Chunli He, Congcong Yan, Dingwei Zhao & Dongjie Xie - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 69:95-102.
- To have seen or not to have seen: A Look at Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997).Ronald A. Rensink - 2018 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 13 (2):230– 235.Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997) drew attention to the phenomenon of change blindness, in which even large changes can be difficult to notice if made during the appearance of motion transients elsewhere in the image. This article provides a sketch of the events that inspired that article as well as its subsequent impact on psychological science and on society at large.
- Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
- Blindness and social trust: The effect of early visual deprivation on judgments of trustworthiness.C. Ferrari, T. Vecchi, L. B. Merabet & Z. Cattaneo - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:156-164.
- Beware of the gorilla: Effect of goal priming on inattentional blindness.Jean-Baptiste Légal, Peggy Chekroun, Viviane Coiffard & Fabrice Gabarrot - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:165-171.
- Scene incongruity and attention.Arien Mack, Jason Clarke, Muge Erol & John Bert - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:87-103.
- Blindness, Short-sightedness, and Hirschberg’s contextually ordered alternatives: a reply to Schlenker (2012).Giorgio Magri - 2017 - In Salvatore Pistoia-Reda & Filippo Domaneschi (eds.), Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions. Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument from Feature-Integration.Joshua Myers - 2017 - Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1):28-44.In the past two decades a number of arguments have been given in favor of the possibility of phenomenal consciousness without attentional access, otherwise known as phenomenal overflow. This paper will show that the empirical data commonly cited in support of this thesis is, at best, ambiguous between two equally plausible interpretations, one of which does not posit phenomenology beyond attention. Next, after citing evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention, this paper will give an account of the relationship between (...)
- The relationship between fluid intelligence and sustained inattentional blindness in 7-to-14-year-old children.Hui Zhang, Congcong Yan, Xingli Zhang, Jiannong Shi & Beiling Zhu - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 55:172-178.
- Process vs. Processor Accounts of Stage Models: A Cautionary Tale. Commentary: Seeing changes: How familiarity alters our perception of change.Luke Kersten - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.A commentary on: Seeing changes: How familiarity alters our perception of change by Tovey, M., and Herdman, C. (2014). Vis. Cogn. 22, 214–238 .
- Attention and seeing objects: The identity-crowding debate.Bradley Richards - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):743-758.Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity-crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role of unconscious perception. Although unconscious perception plays an important role, it cannot support conscious object-seeing in identity-crowding. Nevertheless, unconscious perception assists in making successful judgments about unseen objects. Further, compelling conceptual evidence against seeing unattended objects places the burden of proof on Block. I argue that countability is necessary for seeing objects and (...)
- Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 blindsight differs (...)
- The History of Vision.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3):259-271.One of the most influential ideas of twentieth-century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least (...)
- The state of a central inhibition system predicts access to visual targets: An ERP study on distractor-induced blindness.Michael Niedeggen, Niko A. Busch & Gesche N. Winther - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:308-318.
- A Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 347-375.It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience can be simplified by distinguishing different aspects of both visual attention and visual experience. A set of principles is first proposed for any possible taxonomy of the processes involved in visual attention. A particular taxonomy is then put forward that describes five such processes, each with a distinct function and characteristic mode of operation. Based on these, three separate kinds—or possibly grades—of conscious visual experience can be distinguished, (...)
- A Function-Centered Taxonomy of Visual Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 347-375.It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience can be simplified by distinguishing different aspects of both visual attention and visual experience. A set of principles is first proposed for any possible taxonomy of the processes involved in visual attention. A particular taxonomy is then put forward that describes five such processes, each with a distinct function and characteristic mode of operation. Based on these, three separate kinds—or possibly grades—of conscious visual experience can be distinguished, (...)
- Advancing the overflow debate.Bradley Richards - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):124-144.Introspective subjective reports cannot provide direct evidence that phenomenal experience overflows cognitive access. This problem for the overflow view is underappreciated in several ways: first, it places the onus on the overflow theorist to explain how sub-jective reports can be used to provide evidence for overflow. Second, it implies that there must be a true non-overflow account of subjective reports of overflow, even if there is overflow. Thus, attempting to dis-prove all anti- overflow explanations of subjective reports is futile. Third, (...)
- Brief mindfulness induction reduces inattentional blindness.Timothy P. Schofield, J. David Creswell & Thomas F. Denson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:63-70.
- Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, edited by Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, and Wayne Wu.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):623-628.
- Anger superiority effect for change detection and change blindness.Pessi Lyyra, Jari K. Hietanen & Piia Astikainen - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:1-12.
- Visual Experience.Michael Madary - 2014 - In Lawrence A. Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-271.
- Visual long-term memory and change blindness: Different effects of pre- and post-change information on one-shot change detection using meaningless geometric objects.Megumi Nishiyama & Jun Kawaguchi - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:105-117.
- On Detection and Attribution.H. von Storch - 2014 - Constructivist Foundations 10 (1):131-132.Open peer commentary on the article “On Climate Change Research, the Crisis of Science and Second-order Science” by Philipp Aufenvenne, Heike Egner & Kirsten von Elverfeldt. Upshot: I discuss the concepts of detection and attribution as they are used in scientific discussions about the cause of global warming.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - (1 other version)Attention.Wayne Wu - 2014 - New York: Routledge.A systematic overview and assessment of different empirical and philosophical aspects of attention.
- When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattentional blindness and task instructions.Anne M. Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah C. White & Martin Davies - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified (...)
- Eye movements to audiovisual scenes reveal expectations of a just world.Mitchell J. Callan, Heather J. Ferguson & Markus Bindemann - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):34.
- Priming effects under correct change detection and change blindness.Corrado Caudek & Fulvio Domini - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):290-305.In three experiments, we investigated the priming effects induced by an image change on a successive animate/inanimate decision task. We studied both perceptual and conceptual priming effects, under correct change detection and change blindness . Under correct change detection, we found larger positive priming effects on congruent trials for probes representing animate entities than for probes representing artifactual objects. Under CB, we found performance impairment relative to a “no-change” baseline condition. This inhibition effect induced by CB was modulated by the (...)
- Drunk, but not blind: The effects of alcohol intoxication on change blindness.Gregory Jh Colflesh & Jennifer Wiley - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):231-236.Alcohol use has long been assumed to alter cognition via attentional processes. To better understand the cognitive consequences of intoxication, the present study tested the effects of moderate intoxication on attentional processing using complex working memory capacity span tasks and a change blindness task. Intoxicated and sober participants were matched on baseline WMC performance, and intoxication significantly decreased performance on the complex span tasks. Surprisingly, intoxication improved performance on the change blindness task. The results are interpreted as evidence that intoxication (...)
- When you fail to see what you were told to look for: Inattentional blindness and task instructions.Anne Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah White & Martin Davies - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified (...)
- Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics.Michiel van Elk - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1041-1046.It has been hypothesized that illusory agency detection is at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and paranormal beliefs. In the present study a biological motion perception task was used to study illusory agency detection in a group of skeptics and a group of paranormal believers. Participants were required to detect the presence or absence of a human agent in a point-light display. It was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was due to (...)
- The nature and nurture of expertise: a fourth dimension. [REVIEW]Gregory J. Feist - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):275-288.One formative idea behind the workshop on expertise in Berkeley in August of 2010 was to develop a viable “trading zone” of ideas, which is defined as a location “in which communities with a deep problem of communication manage to communicate” (Collins et al. 2010, p. 8). In the current case, the goal is to have a trading zone between philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists who communicate their ideas on expertise such that productive interdisciplinary collaboration results. In this paper, I review (...)
- Visual Attention and Consciousness.Jay Friedenberg - 2013 - New York: Psychology Press.Examines the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience behind visual experience. Chapters on attention, illusions, aftereffects, binocular rivalry, hemispheric differences, attentional blink, agnosias and other disorders. Particular attention paid to consciouseness. The systematic review of key topics and the multitude of perspectives make this book an ideal primary or ancillary text for graduate courses in perception, vision, consciousness, or philosophy of mind.
- Violence and blindness: The case of uchuraccay.James Mensch - 2013 - Phenomenologies of Violence, Ed. Michael Staudigl, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers:145-155.Only rarely does life imitate art in the starkness and directness of its message. When that message is a tragic one the effect becomes indelible. Such was the impact on Peru of the events of Uchuraccay, a small village located in its central highlands. Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission called it “an emblematic referent of the violence and pain in the collective memory of the country” (TRC, 121). [i] In the twenty-year turmoil that engulfed Peru at the end of the (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The study of blindness and technology can reveal the mechanisms of three-dimensional navigation.Achille Pasqualotto & Michael J. Proulx - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (5):559-560.Jeffery et al. suggest that three-dimensional environments are not represented according to their volumetric properties, but in a quasi-planar fashion. Here we take into consideration the role of visual experience and the use of technology for spatial learning to better understand the nature of the preference of horizontal over vertical spatial representation.
- Perception and Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2013 - In Daniel Reisberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. Oup Usa. pp. 97-116.Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular colors, shapes, and motions. This experience is so coherent, so immediate, and so effortless that it seems to result from a single system that lets us experience everything in our field of view. But however appealing, this belief is mistaken: there are severe limits on what can be visually experienced. -/- For example, in a display for air-traffic control it is important to track all (...)
- Identity-Crowding and Object-Seeing: A Reply to Block.Bradley Richards - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):9-19.Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about (...)
- Consciousness, Attention, and Justification.Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
- Looking ahead: Attending to anticipatory locations increases perception of control.Laura E. Thomas & Adriane E. Seiffert - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):375-381.When people manipulate a moving object, such as writing with a pen or driving a car, they experience their actions as intimately related to the object’s motion, that is they perceive control. Here, we tested the hypothesis that observers would feel more control over a moving object if an unrelated task drew attention to a location to which the object subsequently moved. Participants steered an object within a narrow path and discriminated the color of a flash that appeared briefly close (...)
- Silencing the experience of change.Sebastian Watzl - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1009-1032.Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, (...)
- Anxiety, conscious awareness and change detection.Sally M. Gregory & Anthony Lambert - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):69-79.Attentional scanning was studied in anxious and non-anxious participants, using a modified change detection paradigm. Participants detected changes in pairs of emotional scenes separated by two task irrelevant slides, which contained an emotionally valenced scene and a visual mask. In agreement with attentional control theory, change detection latencies were slower overall for anxious participants. Change detection in anxious, but not non-anxious, participants was influenced by the emotional valence and exposure duration of distractor scenes. When negative distractor scenes were presented at (...)
- Concepts about agency constrain beliefs about visual experience.Daniel T. Levin - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):875-888.Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two (...)
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