Zoologist A. J. Cain began historical research on Linnaeus in 1956 in connection with his dissatisfaction over the standard taxonomic hierarchy and the rules of binomial nomenclature. His famous 1958 paper 'Logic and Memory in Linnaeus's System of Taxonomy' argues that Linnaeus was following Aristotle's method of logical division without appreciating that it properly applies only to 'analysed entities' such as geometric figures whose essential nature is already fully known. The essence of living things being unanalysed, there is no basis (...) on which to choose the right characters to define a genus nor on which to differentiate species. Yet Cain 's understanding of Aristotle, which depended on a 1916 text by H. W. B. Joseph, was fatally flawed. In the 1990s Cain devoted himself to further historical study and softened his verdict on Linnaeus, praising his empiricism. The idea that Linnaeus was applying an ancient and inappropriate method cries out for fresh study and revision. (shrink)

Several crises render our times inter alia “difficult”, “viral”, “testing”, and “uncertain”. A related rhetoric of responsiveness to crises becomes globally dispersed and is commonly used by researchers, intellectuals and global publics. In this article, after some preliminary comments on the responsiveness to our times, I critique the “uncertain/critical times” responsiveness rhetoric and explore some of its prescriptions for a better future. I single out indicative pros and cons of this rhetoric and discuss the related politics of exalting recommendations such (...) as “rethinking” the world of today within the confines of social and democratic justice. My argument is that, when meta-theoretically investigated, the ambiguities of the responsiveness rhetoric and its neglect of cosmopolitan justice raise concerns about how this rhetoric frames crises. (shrink)

The diverse essays in Joseph Cropsey’s Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics are unified by their common theme, the complex relationship between thought and politics. The book’s organization reflects its theme, moving from politics to thought. The essays of the first three sections of the book reformulate the way we view ourselves and the political-moral issues confronting us, at the same time that they strengthen our moral resources in the face of our regime’s tendency to weaken them. For example, (...) Cropsey counters the gross hedonism implied in the desire to overcome alienation when he recommends that justice replace alienation as a dominant term in political discourse. Although our regime was originally organized to function without relying on virtue to produce public advantage, Cropsey includes moral virtue, along with legality and raison d’etat, in the elements upon which statesmanship draws. The third section of the book culminates in a critique of the acquisitive egoism of capitalism from the perspective of magnanimity rather than from that of brotherly love. The former perspective favors "the moral fortitude of the individual [and] the community". Cropsey asks, however, "[i]s it possible for a nation simply to adopt the moral principle of its choice?" or do its laws and customs, its defining documents, not imply a morality? Cropsey’s most extensive treatment of the relationship between what constitutes a nation and its capacity for growth through the activity of thought is found in his introductory essay on the American regime. There he shows how a people’s national identity is modified by clarifications and interpretations of a nation’s constitutive documents. The power of thought, however, is not without limit, for the original constitution acts upon its critiques so as to assimilate them to its own moral tendencies. (shrink)

Heyting is considered to be the first individual to place the previously informal logic of the Intuitionist movement on a rigorous formal foundation; he is probably the most likely candidate one might select for a book about Intuitionism. The first edition appeared in 1956, and the revisions have been brief. Only the seventh of eight sections deals with the Intuitionistic formulation of sentential and predicate logics; the first chapter is in the form of a dialogue among an Intuitonist [[sic]], Logicist, (...) Formalist, and several supporting characters; this discussion is predominantly philosophical and deals with various views concerning the foundations of mathematics. The five succeeding chapters consider first arithmetic, spreads and species, algebra, plane pointspecies, measure and integration. The last chapter considers two controversial subjects—infinitely proceeding sequences and negationless mathematics. There is a bibliography containing references of recent as well as classical articles, an index and glossary of symbols. The reader with a classical mathematical intuition will have sticky going in certain sections and should take care not to conflate his own notions with those of the author; Intuitionism and its attendant mathematics are not merely formal systems or philosophies of mathematics, they are a way of thinking. (shrink)

In offering his analysis of the concepts of the good and the just, the author combines certain techniques of social science with a philosophical reflection upon certain fundamental issues. It is the objective of this book to establish a balanced approach differing from relativism and historicism on the one hand, and normative absolutism on the other. The task is not an easy one; many may view the attempt here to be less than conclusive, though it is certainly challenging. Essentially the (...) book argues for a concept of human nature that is "dispositional," and defined contextually, but in some sense not bound to circumstances in the way in which the historicist would have it. Kaplan utilizes the principles of "systems analysis," explained in detail in the first chapter of the book, to reach this contextual understanding of human nature. It is by identification of social systems as homeostatic that the argument is advanced that units of social and political analysis cannot be treated in the abstract, nor can they be understood without acknowledging contextual rules that are in some sense objective. (shrink)

The bulk of this massive collection is comprised of selections from about twenty medieval, modern, and contemporary writers, on legal philosophy. These selections cover the traditions of natural law, positivism, and realism on the problem of the nature of law. It would be impossible to fault Professor Christie on the pieces he has included. Each one, old or new, is an acknowledged classic or standard. The omission of Lon L. Fuller who represents a notable variety of non-Thomistic natural law should, (...) however, be mentioned. In the very last part of the book, covering the topic of legal reasoning, the philosopher will be pleased to find extensive extracts from Aristotle and Francis Bacon. (shrink)

Unger has written a thoughtful but problematic study of the shortcomings of liberal political theory. The specific method of the critique is his own, but it is well-structured and readable. The problem is that the precise nature of the "liberal psychology" and "liberal political theory" under attack is never very clear. This lack of clarity stands in marked contrast to the general tone of the work. One can assume with some justification that the author sees the classic core of the (...) liberal doctrine "in the work of Thomas Hobbes, of his contemporaries, and of his successors...." Nevertheless, the doctrine addressed by the author appears to be of much wider scope; Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Kant are all called in "to illustrate rather than to prove their adherence to the doctrines that are the subject of the critique." It is with reservations concerning the subject under attack that one must approach this study. (shrink)

The strength of this book is not a novelty of analysis, but rather its clarity and readability. The author intends it to be a useful teaching tool, "a genuine introduction, presupposing neither background in philosophy nor familiarity with the issues...." It is well arranged and quite successful as an introductory commentary. The book would appear to work best as a secondary source, supplementing more extensive philosophical texts. It need not be limited to courses specifically dealing with social and political philosophy. (...) The first chapter offers an elementary explanation of the nature of philosophical discourse in general; chapters three, "Freedom," and five "Utilitarianism and Justice," would be useful in a course on ethics. (shrink)

This book was edited by J. Dopp from a nearly completed manuscript of Feys, and Dopp has added a bibliography and interstitial material where required. Feys has tried to survey the whole range of modal logic with the exception of topological and algebraic interpretations of modal structures and operators. First we are introduced to the modal propositional calculi through both historical and non-modal viewpoints; there are then formulated five systems of modal logic, with variants, with the standard required reduction and (...) other properties, and a number of useful metatheorems about decision-methods and derivability are proved. The chapter on modal functional logic first handles a modal system with first-order quantification, then extends it to include class-abstraction. Among other topics appearing in the book are extensions of modal calculi and the seemingly-paradoxical one of identity in modal functional calculi. Although there are some rough spots caused by the state of the manuscript itself, this book is more than adequate for extensive study in modal logic and should serve that purpose well.—P. J. M. (shrink)

To those who are not specially interested in his thought, Nietzsche's life is fascinating: professor at twenty-four, retired at thirty-four, disappointed in love, wandering, deep in solitude and illumined by revelation. That his life ended in madness also pleases; the indignant find it a punishment, lovers of madness find it a proof, and novelists find it ready material.

This volume is a collection of papers and selections of previously published books of Russell. The six divisions concern themselves with the distinction between formal and empirical sciences, the connexion of sense data with the structure of physical reality and with the philosophy of science, problems concerning mental phenomena, cause vs. inference, and finally, the relation of science to its cultural matrix.—P. J. M.

A collection of essays, six of which appear in English for the first time, focusing on various problems of positivistic philosophy, this book treats such issues as the adaption of natural science methodology to sociology, the problem of generalization in the social sciences, and the implications of science for social values. These essays are argumentative in tone, and often interrelated; the editor has provided a well balanced selection of spokesmen for the diverse points of view represented. Professor Giddens’ introduction is (...) itself a valuable essay. He offers both an historical introduction to the articles and an interesting explanation of the common themes that required their inclusion in the collection. Basically, he appears to be concerned with an attempt "to impose some order upon the flux of differing usages" of the term "positivism." He sees the positivistic attitude in sociology as including certain methodological, analytical, and technical presuppositions. The collection is intended to explicate these presuppositions. (shrink)

The author here presents a series of significant, thoughtful, and well-written essays which are united by their common concern with man and his social world. The book is subtitled "Essays on the Coherence and Deformation of Social Reality." The essays, particularly in Part One, offer an introduction to and a defense of the phenomenological approach to philosophy, though Natanson does tend to slant his reading in an existentialist direction. He strongly objects to recent attempts to bridge the gap between the (...) "empirical-positivistic" and the "conceptual-phenomenological" modes of analysis by the oversimplification of the latter’s methodological postulates. Though this position may solidify differences between the two schools, Natanson’s concern for the integrity of the phenomenological method is noteworthy. (shrink)

This is a timely critique of contemporary Marxist theory, its implications for social structure, and its practical dilemmas. Three themes appear throughout: the mythologizing of Marx, the rationale of Revolution, and the significance of history for social philosophy. Contrary to the approach of many commentators, Hook emphasizes the tremendous differences between the "early" and "late" Marx. He insists that "to judge Marx’s meaning by his own intent, we must go to the published works for which Marx took public responsibility." In (...) the course of the discussion, the author criticizes contemporary Marxist theory. It has itself become an "ideology," a mythology with an uncritical belief in the seemingly universal solution to human ills offered by the socialization of the means of production through revolution. Hook emphasizes that the tone of later Marxist writings, particularly Capital, had gradually shifted away from any belief in the inevitability of violent revolution. From this perspective the author traces the ambiguities of Marx’s writings that afforded the opportunity for Leninist-Stalinist revisionism on this and other issues. Hook is suspicious of the facile and selective exegesis of Marx’s writings used to support the political bias of many commentators. Revolution itself has become a symbol, which, in the author’s view, is often taken up uncritically to support a myth of society. In this context Hook has an enlightening discussion of the putative "right" to revolution. It is essentially an extralegal power, legitimate only where the context of the historical events makes intralegal change absolutely impossible. The author is therefore disturbed by the "cult of revolution" which uses a mythologized Marx to support a program of deliberate, episodic violence as a strategy of social change. The significance of historical experience is evident throughout these later chapters, particularly where Hook undertakes a reevaluation of the Bolshevik Revolution. The historical and philosophical misconceptions underlying ideologies of violence are the most frequent subjects of his criticism. These ideologies have sought to draw moral support from legitimizing examples of history, as well as from the mythologized Marx. Hook goes to great lengths to deny them any such support. Hook concludes with an examination of the emerging scheme of human rights, insisting that they must be understood in their historical context, and that democratic principles are the key to their full realization. (shrink)

Professor Grünfeld’s book puts forward the thesis that the hard and fast lines that have been drawn between philosophy and science, as well as between the hard and soft sciences, are inaccurate and possibly illusory. He contends that values, as a function of philosophy, are related to science in various complex ways. In a sense, his approach involves a collapsing of metascientific and scientific disciplines into one another. This thesis is applied to the analysis of historical method, language, and philosophy (...) of science. The author covers a wide range of topics in a thorough and well documented fashion. His examination of Popper’s approach to history and scientific method, though by no means elementary, serves as an excellent introduction to that particular area of philosophy of science. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to a linguistic analysis of interrelated problems of logic, methodological models, and metaphysics. On the basis of that discussion, the author presents two thoughtful chapters on the implications of his thesis for philosophy of science, one concerning the concept of "self-evidence" in science, the other examining the relation between observation and theory. (shrink)

This work is a defense of positivism in social theory: Addis is committed to the view that the substantive concerns of physical and social science are essentially the same. Indeed, he states that an adequate philosophy of society presupposes an adequate philosophy of science. He therefore begins with an analysis of various themes from the latter: causation, the notions of process and closed systems, and determinism. It is in fact a basic presumption of the book that some refined theory of (...) determinism is true. The author argues that all "social objects," such as those posited by Durkheim, are no more than properties of, or relations between, individual social beings. In the course of this argument, he develops a detailed treatment of reduction of the social into the physical sciences. It is his belief that logical analysis of the notion of reduction is essential to an understanding of social theory. Reduction is examined in two phases. First, he elaborates on his contention that social objects reduce to individual human beings. Second, he examines the reduction of socio-historical explanations to psycho-physical laws. He then proceeds to apply the preceding discussions to problems of philosophy of history, the relation of ideas to historical process, freedom and purpose in history, and a critique of "Marxism.". (shrink)

Lodge’s thoughtful study is a mixture of political science, history, and economics drawn together by a central philosophical theme. The author seeks to explore the issue of the legitimacy of social institutions, and he raises certain questions concerning the nature of man in society as well as the relationship between ideology and social values. In his view, the dominant social institutions that grew with the United States were founded upon a "Lockean" ideology. At the core of this ideology was the (...) concept of man as an atomistic unit. Reflecting this concept, the traditional American ideology stressed five components: first, individualism as the basic social value; second, property as the guarantee of human rights; third, competition as the dynamic of social interaction; fourth, the limited state; fifth, scientific/technological specialization. Lodge reviews the development of this ideology and argues that it has led to an ever-increasing fragmentation of society and a frustration of social purpose. As the Lockean paradigm proved itself inadequate to resolve problems in a world of interdependent and interwoven social wholes, the need for a new American ideology became apparent. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the 1963 Berkeley symposium on the theory of models, and is one of the three or four most important collections of papers in logic ever to appear. There are forty-four papers, grouped into eight categories: model theory of first-order languages, model theory of richer classical languages, model theory of nonclassical languages, mathematical structures, model-theoretic results in set-theory, model-theoretic results in number theory and analysis, model-theoretic results in algebra and geometry, model-theoretic results in the empirical (...) sciences. One could not begin to list here the contributors and their papers, but the list of sections does exhibit the vast sweep of the topics. The scholarly value of the collection is increased by an attempt to standardize terminology and notation, notes on what model theory is—its place in logic and foundational studies—and does, and a huge bibliography which not only lists nearly all papers on model theory up to 1963, but which serves as a common reference source for all papers. A list of participants in the symposium is included. All the papers are in English.—P. J. M. (shrink)