We propose a model that identifies the configurations of relations between environmental practices and other management practices that can improve employee performance, measured as labor productivity. To test our model, we use the qualitative comparative analysis methodology, which allows us to demonstrate empirically how different configurations of management practices, including environmental practices, quality management systems, teamwork, and interorganizational relations, contribute to work systems in ways that increase labor productivity. Our results, based on data from 4,975 employees from 1,866 firms, show (...) that environmental practices are associated with higher labor productivity only when they are combined with other management practices. (shrink)

Certain characteristics make machine learning a powerful tool for processing large amounts of data, and also particularly unsuitable for explanatory purposes. There are worries that its increasing use in science may sideline the explanatory goals of research. We analyze the key characteristics of ML that might have implications for the future directions in scientific research: epistemic opacity and the ‘theory-agnostic’ modeling. These characteristics are further analyzed in a comparison of ML with the traditional statistical methods, in order to demonstrate what (...) it is specifically that makes ML methodology substantially unsuitable for reaching explanations. The analysis is given broader philosophical context by connecting it with the views on the role of prediction and explanation in science, their relationship, and the value of explanation. We proceed to show, first, that ML disrupts the relationship between prediction and explanation commonly understood as a functional relationship. Then we show that the value of explanation is not exhausted in purely predictive functions, but rather has a ubiquitously recognized value for both science and everyday life. We then invoke two hypothetical scenarios with different degrees of automatization of science, which help test our intuitions on the role of explanation in science. The main question we address is whether ML will reorient or otherwise impact our standard explanatory practice. We conclude with a prognosis that ML would diversify science into purely predictively oriented research based on ML-like techniques and, on the other hand, remaining faithful to anthropocentric research focused on the search for explanation. (shrink)

Language, Ideology, and the Human: New Interventions redefines the critical picture of language as a system of signs and ideological tropes inextricably linked to human existence. Offering reflections on the status, discursive possibilities, and political, ideological and practical uses of oral or written word in both contemporary society and the work of previous thinkers, this book traverses South African courts, British clinics, language schools in East Timor, prison cells, cinemas, literary criticism textbooks and philosophical treatises in order to forge a (...) new, diversified perspective on language, ideology, and what it means to be human. This truly international and interdisciplinary collection explores the implications that language, always materialising in the form of a historically and ideologically identifiable discourse, as well as the concept of ideology itself, have for the construction, definition and ways of speaking about 'the human'. Thematically arranged and drawing together the latest research from experts around the world, Language, Ideology, and the Human offers a view of language, ideology and the human subject that eschews simplifications and binary definitions. With contributions from across the social sciences and humanities, this book will appeal to scholars from a range of disciplines, including sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, law, linguistics, literary studies, philosophy and political science. © Sanja Bahun, Dušan Radunović and the contributors 2012. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Metaphysics and ethics are two distinct fields in academic philosophy. The object of metaphysics is what is, while the object of ethics is what ought to be. Necessitarianism is a modal doctrine that appears to obliterate this neat distinction. For it is commonly assumed that ought (at least under normal circumstances) implies can. But if necessitarianism is true then I can only do what I actually do. Hence what I ought to do becomes limited to what I in fact do. (...) This is one widespread way of construing the danger that necessitarianism poses for ethics. There is, however, another way in which this collapse of what is with what ought to be can be construed. One could think of what is as already being what ought to be, of the two being one. On this picture, everything that is, is already valuable. In this thesis I explore the theory that being is intrinsically valuable. I do so by investigating the philosophy of perfection present in the works of the early modern rationalist Spinoza. For in his philosophy of perfection, I argue, we find being and value to be perfectly aligned. Hence, my reading challenges a widespread interpretation, according to which (ontological) perfection is divested of normativity in Spinozism. The position that all being is intrinsically valuable since it is perfect may be thought to be incompatible with human perfectionism. For what room can there be for human progress toward an ideal of perfection if all that exists, is necessarily perfect? The goal of the thesis is to respond to this question by providing a systematic interpretation of the metaphysics of human perfectibility in Spinoza’s philosophy. In order to achieve this goal, I undertake two tasks. First, I examine Spinoza’s multi-faceted philosophy of perfection. I distinguish between ontological and teleological perfection. Moreover, I argue that since Spinoza maintains that everything is perfect to the extent that it is, perfection shoulders the role of a transcendental within his system. In order to highlight the normative significance of transcendental perfection, I compare Spinoza’s thought with the transcendental theory of the good in Thomas Aquinas. In addition, I distinguish between ontological and speculative perfection. Speculative perfection is conscious awareness of ontological perfection. Second, I show how infinity plays an essential role in Spinoza’s ethics by indicating how we, by availing ourselves of this notion, are able to acquire a perspective on reality from which its ontological perfection may be discovered. On this basis, I am able to demonstrate the (relatively understudied) ethical and soteriological importance of Spinoza’s conception of infinity. I argue that it is because (a) Spinoza’s ideal of human perfection is speculative, and because (b) one will be able to establish the (ontological) perfection of things by deducing it from the divine essence only when one considers this essence absolutely infinite, that (c) the absolute infinity of the divine essence plays a significant role in Spinoza’s account of human perfection as consisting in conscious awareness of the value of all being. (shrink)

Sanja Ivic offers a philosophical analysis of the concept of European values from the origin of this concept to the present day. This book rethinks European values in light of the various crises that the European Union (EU) has faced since 2008 and analyzes EU initiatives to create a new narrative for Europe.

In a short paper bearing the title “The Deleuzian Fold of Thought” (1996), Jean-Luc Nancy engages a concept that has a prominent place in contemporary continental philosophy, the fold, so as to accentuate a shared tendency that nevertheless estranges his own thought from Gilles Deleuze’s. This shared tendency deals with the shifting conception of thinking through the fold itself, the unfolding and refolding of the fold, which in its discontinuity has transformed the image of what it means to think. I (...) do not seek to reconcile the two thinkers through the fold, but to demonstrate the way in which their estrangement through the fold is what it means to think and defines the exigency of thought. (shrink)

Matthew Shields (2022) argues that “generalists” regarding conspiracy theories make a mistake: they focus uncritically on what he calls “Non-Dominant Institution Conspiracy Theories” (Non-DITs). He argues that generalists should include “Dominant Institution Conspiracy Theories” (DITs) as paradigmatic cases of conspiracy theories because they are by their own lights the clearest representatives of their views. In my response, I argue that Shields’s conclusion does not necessarily follow. Before we can answer the question of whether generalists should include DITs as paradigmatic cases (...) of conspiracy theories, we need to clarify what conceptual project generalists are pursuing. I argue that the inclusion of DITs depends on the conceptual project one pursues and that the inclusion of DITs makes sense for some projects but not for others. Furthermore, I argue that the difference between DITs and Non-DITs may not be as stark as Shields suggests if we distinguish between the producers and the recipients of conspiracy theories. (shrink)

This study brings together various disciplines: hermeneutics, literary theory, philosophy of science, aesthetics, etc. to reflect on the issue of reference and narrative knowing from the perspective of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics.

In the “Vienna lecture”, the whole of the world’s history is at one moment depicted through the allegory of a wavy sea without borders. In The Idea of Phenomenology, the philosopherstoryteller is caught up in a heavy sea, but at the end, they finally manage to “drop the anchor on the shore of phenomenology”. With the break into the “mainland of absolute givenness” through phenomenological reduction, allegorical representation should lose its philosophical justification. However, metaphors which evoke allegories continue to proliferate (...) even in the most rigorous phenomenological descriptions. Despite its inherent metaphoricity, so vivid that at the crucial points of Husserl’s analyses often reappears a mythical clash of land and sea, the phenomenological interpretation of the world seems nonetheless essentially non-allegorical. (shrink)

The book Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity is a contribution not only to the phenomenological tradition of thought and Hannah Arendt studies, but also political science and, most importantly, political philosophy. Sophie Loidolt advances an intervention that stands in contrast to contemporary phenomenological research which in certain times have had the tendency to perform depoliticized examination of the self and sociality, actually revealing the intention of Phenomenology of Plurality to articulate the numerous elements that comprise the methodological (...) novelty with which Arendt changes the theory of the political. (shrink)

This article explores Vietnam’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of good ethical practice in dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak. Vietnam’s response to the pandemic is in accordance with the ethics of care which emphasizes solidarity and responsibility. Vietnam’s approach to the COVID-19 pandemic is also in accordance with the third generation of human rights that promote solidarity and responsibilities towards the community. A full implementation of human rights requires more emphasis on responsibilities, especially in the time of (...) crisis. (shrink)

Because of its practical advantages, machine learning (ML) is increasingly used for decision-making in numerous sectors. This paper demonstrates that the integral characteristics of ML, such as semi-autonomy, complexity, and non-deterministic modeling have important ethical implications. In particular, these characteristics lead to a lack of insight and lack of comprehensibility, and ultimately to the loss of human control over decision-making. Errors, which are bound to occur in any decision-making process, may lead to great harm and human rights violations. It is (...) important to have a principled way of assigning responsibility for such errors. The integral characteristics of ML, however, pose serious difficulties in defining responsibility and regulating ML decision-making. First, we elaborate on these characteristics and their epistemic and ethical implications. We then analyze possible general strategies for resolving the assignment of moral responsibility and show that, due to the specific way in which ML functions, each potential solution is problematic, whether we assign responsibility to humans, machines, or using hybrid models. Then, we shift focus on an alternative approach that bypasses moral responsibility and attempts to define legal liability independently through solutions such as informed consent and the no-fault compensation system. Both of these solutions prove unsatisfactory because they leave too much room for potential abuses of ML decision-making. We conclude that both ethical and legal solutions are fraught with serious difficulties. These difficulties prompt us to re-weigh the costs and benefits of using ML for high-stake decisions. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the crucial role that language use plays in climate change communication. In particular, this paper examines UN public discourse and narratives about climate change. It will be shown that the climate change is often described as a "threat to human wellbeing" and as an external enemy—the Other. On the other hand, humanity is often portrayed as a victim of climate change. The consequence of this rhetoric and logic of apocalypse is insufficient action in relation to climate change. (...) The narrative construction of the Other that is described as a threat is founded on binary oppositions: we/they, self/other, culture/nature, human/non-human and so forth. As long as climate change is described as an external enemy and "independent matter" and climate policy is based on binary oppositions, action to combat climate change will remain insufficient. (shrink)

There are two ways in which sense has been approached in contemporary philosophy. The dividing line is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition and those who determine sense and paradox as co-present. In The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze puts forth a paradoxical constitution of sense in order to render that which is new in being something untimely, the always new in being. In placing paradox at the center of the constitution of sense, Deleuze effectively (...) works to displace the two aspects of doxa, good sense and common sense. In relation to paradox, sense moves in two directions simultaneously; it is actualized in the present, and it is continuously reborn in the transcendental field .. (shrink)

This book offers an ability-based view of mental disorders. It develops a detailed analysis of the concept of inability that is relevant in the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic context by drawing on the most recent literature on the concepts of ability, reasons and harm. What is it to have a mental disorder? This book contends that an individual has a mental disorder if and only if (1) they are-in the relevant sense-unable to respond adequately to their available (apparent) reasons in their (...) thinking, feeling or acting and (2) they are harmed by the condition underlying or resulting from that inability. The author calls this the "Rehability View". This view can account for what is "mental" about mental disorders: it is the rational relations among an individual's attitudes and actions that is "disordered", and the relevant norms are the norms of reasons. This view is compatible with explanations of mental disorders in terms of biological dysfunctions, without reducing the former to the latter. The aim is not to offer just another conception of mental disorder, but to develop a systematic approach that incorporates insights from philosophy of psychiatry and adjacent philosophical disciplines. Philosophy of Mental Disorder will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and mental health. (shrink)

For some time now, certain theorists have been urging us to move beyond text-based understandings of culture to consider the impact of new media on the structure and organization of knowledge. This article, however, reconsiders the usual priority given to digital media by comparing Wikipedia, the free, user-led online Encyclopedia, with Diderot and D'Alembert's eighteenth-century Encyclopédie. It begins by suggesting that the dichotomy between information system and text is not sufficient for describing the differences between the two. It then considers (...) more closely the type of critical thinking presupposed by the Encyclopédie. It concludes by raising the question of the role of judgement in making sense of any encyclopedia in a modern world in which knowledge systems only coexist on the condition of being partially blind to one another. (shrink)

Focussed around three core themes - capitalism, the metaphysics of democracy and aesthetics - these 12 essays emphasise the potential of Nancy's political thought, and collectively situate it within a broader intellectual context which includes engagements with Badiou, Ranciere, Foucault, Agamben and Lefort.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spinoza's Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics by Claire CarlisleSanja SärmanCARLISLE, Claire. Spinoza's Religion: A New Reading of the Ethics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2021. 288 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $22.95Spinoza has variously been read as presenting a fully naturalized theology (Steven Nadler), as a secretive Marrano philosopher of immanence cleverly hiding his true allegiances in plain sight (Yirmiyahu Yovel, see also Leo Strauss) and as (...) a God-intoxicated man (Novalis). Rarely have the assessments of a man's religion been so varied and conflicted. In an exemplarily searching spirit, Claire Carlisle explores the issue while keeping the question of what religion is an open one. The book comprises nine chapters—essayistic in form but scholarly in content—devoted to examining the issue from different angles.The leitmotif of Spinoza's religiosity is, for Carlisle, being-in-God, a term of art that denotes at once a metaphysical reality and a spiritual project. We are inevitably in God: This is an ontological as well as a conceptual dependence-relation. Being-in-God is participatory dependence on God's own being. In illuminating the relation between God and non-God, Carlisle draws on the rich Catholic tradition. For example, being in-God means being in another (God) without ever being the other of God, to whom all being belongs. This asymmetrical take on the otherness-relation clearly echoes Nicholaus of Cusa's thoughts about God as non-aliud, and Carlisle cites him, not as an ancestor of Spinozism but as a cotraveler along a certain pathway for understanding God.Although being-in-God is an indisputable reality, it is also a spiritual challenge. Since we are by necessity in-God, the spiritual task will paradoxically consist in becoming what we already are, and thereby gaining freedom-in-necessity.In my view, Carlisle's reading reaps rich fruit from its assumption that ontology and normativity are not, indeed cannot be, sequestrated within Spinoza's thought. Moreover, its study of the affectivity—the qualia, even—of being-in-God presents us with a welcome counterweight to descriptions of Spinoza's system from without. Differently put, for Carlisle, the question "What is it like?" can sensibly be asked about being-in-God. Inspired by Spinoza's earliest work, Carlisle sketches a philosophical diagnosis of the devout person who is compelled ("necessitated") by the work she has to do and therefore enjoys an enviable singularity of purpose: Following Latour and Foucault, Carlisle sees a distinctively spiritual quality in certain modes of attention. Attending to oneself and others as they are in-God instills calm; in other words, on Carlisle's reading, the affective aspect of being-in-God is characterized by being at rest with oneself and others (quies is Latin for "rest"). Her careful reading of the Latin text exposes a network of acquiescentia (and cognate terms) in Spinoza's work, somewhat obfuscated through Curley's English translation, which variously renders the word as "esteem" and "satisfaction": What the text gains in stylistic points, it may lose in spiritual significance. In the Ethics, acquiescentia in se ipso is a kind of self-esteem or self-confidence that becomes religiously poignant when mediated through the insight that one is in God: [End Page 347] Through the realization of being in-God, one's calm yet affective appreciation of oneself becomes indistinguishable both from one's love of God and from God's love of oneself. This is an interesting phenomenal perspective on Spinoza's doctrine of the third kind of knowledge.At times, one could perhaps wish for a more systematic discussion of core concepts, such as that of infinity. For example, Carlisle cites Spinoza's idea that we cannot bridge the infinite distance which separates us from God but does not explicitly discuss how this infinite distance is to be reconciled with ontological intimacy; while we sense the proper response, it is not demonstrated.In the end, Carlisle's work successfully shows that we cannot understand Spinoza's religiosity if we model it after our late-modern concept of religion—a construct that, as the historian Peter Harrison has argued, was... (shrink)

The ontological and epistemological priority of the infinite has been extensively dealt with in Spinoza scholarship. However, Spinoza’s widely debated understanding of the infinite has not figured to the same extent in accounts of his therapy of the passions, the topic which this essay sets out to explore. My reasoning consists of six steps. First, I introduce Spinoza’s cognitive therapy, which claims that we can be healed from our passions by acquiring adequate ideas of them; second, I show that Spinoza’s (...) cognitive therapy is subject to the Affective Force Condition, i.e., the claim that only a stronger affect can defeat another affect ; third, I suggest that the one way an affect can be reliably weakened or strengthened is by us considering its intentional object as necessary or free, respectively; fourth, I argue that we can only adequately ascribe freedom to things if we regard them as absolutely infinite, and necessity to finite things if we can have an adequate idea of them as inscribed in an infinite causal nexus. This presupposes having an adequate idea of the infinite, and so fifth, I ask by which capacity, or from which perspective, we can acquire such an idea, on Spinoza’s view. Sixth, I finally ask whether the infinity of the causal history of a finite thing qualifies as the kind of infinity which we can adequately conceive, and give a tentative answer to this question by situating this infinity in Spinoza’s taxonomy of infinities. (shrink)

A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them—not in the form of a mythical past or former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general.1In Difference and Repetition (1968), Gilles Deleuze calls for a new Meno. The Meno is one of (...) the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates asserts that learning is recollection. While Deleuze’s central philosophical writing has not been interpreted as a text on learning, his treatment of Plato’s Meno cannot be reduced .. (shrink)

“The addict” is a well-known figure in philosophy, but analytical attempts to define “addictive disorder” are rare. According to extant views, the “hallmark” of addiction lies in an individual’s inability or impaired ability to control the behavior the individual is addicted to doing. But how exactly are we to understand the relevant concept of (in)ability (or impaired ability) in the first place? Furthermore, what else is necessary for an individual to have an addictive disorder? I argue for a definition of (...) “addictive disorder” in terms of desire, tolerance and withdrawal, inability, and harm. The main focus of this paper is on the concept of ability. The view I propose integrates insights from the literature on abilities and develops them further as they are relevant to addiction. The resulting view offers a more differentiated perspective on questions about what individuals with an addictive disorder can and cannot do. (shrink)

Selfhood is a topic of great interest in early modern philosophy. In this essay, I will discuss Spinoza’s radical position on the topic of selfhood. Whereas for Descartes and Leibniz, there is a manifold of thinking substances, for Spinoza, there is, crucially only one: God. Minds, for Spinoza, do not have substantial status, they are instead merely complexes of ideas, and thus complex modes of the one substance: God. Observations such as these often lead Spinoza’s readers to the conclusion that, (...) whereas for Descartes as for Leibniz, human beings have robust or genuine selves, this is not so for Spinoza. However, this reductionist interpretation is also challenged—in recent times most intriguingly by Koistinen. Koistinen has argued that there are, fundamentally, human selves of whom agency can be predicated in Spinozism. In this paper I discuss to what extent this is true. In section 1, I introduce the reductionist interpretation of selfhood in Spinoza’s thought. In section 2.1, I present and criticize Koistinen’s proposal. In section 2.2, I acknowledge the strength of Koistinen’s view that insofar as human beings act, they are God somehow. In section 3, I propose an alternative reading of human selfhood in terms of witnessing being acted out rather than in terms of being an agent. This view isprima facieparadoxical. In section 4, I nonetheless support it by highlighting that Spinoza seems to have seen practical benefits in knowing oneself to be acted out by God. I conclude the essay by pointing out some comparative directions for future research. (shrink)

Menschen haben psychische Störungen, zum Beispiel Depressionen, Angst- oder Abhängigkeitsstörungen. Doch was genau heißt es, eine psychische Störung zu haben? Dies ist die Hauptfrage, um die es in meinem Buch geht. Die Hauptthese, für die ich argumentiere, ist folgende: Eine Person hat dann und nur dann eine psychische Störung, wenn sie (i) mindestens eine der Fä- higkeiten, in ihrem Denken, Fühlen oder Handeln angemessen auf die ihr ver- fügbaren (scheinbaren) Gründe zu reagieren, nicht hat und sie (ii) durch den Zustand, (...) der dieser Unfähigkeit zugrunde liegt oder aus ihr resultiert, geschädigt wird. Ich nenne dies den “;Rehability View" (RHA), wobei “;;Rehability" ein Port- manteau aus den drei relevanten Grundbegriffen “;reasons" (Gründe), “;;harm" (Schädigung) und “;ability" (Fähigkeit) ist. (shrink)

La Fontaine’s allegory of “montrer patte blanche / showing the white paw” – from his fable «The Wolf, the Goat, and the Kid – should help me trace the problem of documenting sex and/or gender. In the first decade of the 21st century, the legislative bodies of certain social democratic countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Nepal, Germany) have made a change into the binary system of presenting sex or gender on official identification documents, by introducing a third possibility – that (...) of gender indeterminacy. Would it now be possible to issue an official Id without knowing the precise sex of the person? My questioning tackles this new practice, measuring it from the standpoint of social ontology. (shrink)

The mainstream philosophical approach to inference, which insists on sentence-like representations and a linguistic capability, excludes non-human animals as possible agents capable of making inferences. However, an abundance of studies show that many animal species exhibit behaviors that seem to rely on some kind of reasoning. My focus here are the transitive inference tasks, which most species solve quite successfully. These findings put pressure on the mainstream views, and still lack a convincing explanation. I introduce the concept of affective representations, (...) which satisfy the semantic and structural requirements for participating in inferences. I also argue for a broader conception of inference, and show how we can apply this view to explain the results of the transitive inference studies. Finally, I suggest it is more useful to think of flexibility of thought in terms of a continuous range, rather than a dichotomy of flexible vs. inflexible. (shrink)

The article presents Hanslick’s aesthetic formalism as the starting point of the contemporary aesthetics of music. His book, written in the 19th century, is considered contemporary because it still proves to be influential and fruitful in the contemporary theoretical circles, especially in the modern analytic aesthetics of music, where it is widely cited and discussed. The article positions Hanslick’s book in relation to his nearest predecessors Kant and Herbart, and to the neighbouring area where the formalistic view appeared, namely in (...) Fidler’s visual formalism in fine arts. It is shown that by being the first piece of writing to attempt to systematically and comprehensively determine the essence and the content of music, and the criteria for evaluation of musical worth, Hanslick’s book sets the foundation for a rigorous examination of the aesthetics of music, and also breaks off with the widely ingrained preconceptions of music, which were in themselves an obstacle to establishing the aesthetics of music as a scientific discipline. (shrink)

The paper deals with the approaches to researching music from the scientific perspective. It is argued that the scientific literature concerning music contains two different methodological approaches which significantly determine the range of possible conclusions to be reached by the research. The approach „from the outside“ investigates music by automatically applying to music the more general conclusions concerning human cognition and other capacities and behaviors. Thus, this approach omits music’s internal factors. In contrast, the approach „from within“ consists in empirically (...) investigating reactions to music, capacities necessary for its understanding, performing, etc., and their relationships with the reactions and capacities outside the domain of music. The paper shows that, even though the scientific research of music is still in the beginning stage, the approach from within enables more complete explanations concerning music, due to taking into account a larger number of factors relevant for philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of music. (shrink)

It is by now generally understood that the nature of events are central to Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. This has not meant, however, that the process mapped out by this concept has been adequately grasped. Indeed, the lines mapping out events are obscured, theoretical, even otherworldly, whenever the complexities of the creating of the virtual and the actual as the created, are reductively conceived as giving way to two separated domains; two separated domains whereby the repeater would be forever condemned to (...) be the result of an otherworldly will that “works through it,” one that would signal that they would never be capable of becoming worthy of the events that make a life. [i] The perspectival reality of the virtual with respect to the actual, which despite its fragmentary nature is in its entirety encompassed in each singular event, requires of us that we grasp what it is that Antonin Artaud’s points to when saying, I “am my son, my father, my mother, and myself.” It is not as though events perceived in the form of a virtual complex render beings inconsequential; instead, events are capable of ousting the verb “to be” in a double sense, because they enfold what is most affirmative in the activity of beings, the being of becoming whereby a life is born, always yet again, and as a function of which, as Alfred North Whitehead notes, what an actual being is, is how that entity becomes. It is adequate to its becoming. The actual as present-being expresses the verb “to be” in an ephemeral sense, or it is expressed by it in a restrictive way, while when affirmed as indistinct from the virtual, being, the verb “to be,” implies nothing else than the return of becoming. It is an untimely instant in which what is affirmed is the continuation of becoming; an instant that makes each event be the infinite becoming-finite of an actual being. So as to explore the nature of events in Deleuze’s philosophy, it is this displacement, the ousting of the verb “to be,” that I focus in on in this paper. (shrink)

If a conclusion was reached that creatures without a language capability exhibit some form of a capability for logic, this would shed a new light on the relationship between logic, language, and thought. Recent experimental attempts to test whether some animals, as well as pre-linguistic human infants, are capable of exclusionary reasoning are taken to support exactly that conclusion. The paper discusses the analyses and conclusions of two such studies: Call’s (2004) two cups task, and Mody and Carey’s (2016) four (...) cups task. My paper exposes hidden assumptions within these analyses, which enable the authors to settle on the explanation which assigns logical capabilities to the participants of the studies, as opposed to the explanations which do not. The paper then demonstrates that the competing explanations of the experimental results are theoretically underdeveloped, rendering them unclear in their predictions concerning the behavior of cognitive subjects, and thus difficult to distinguish by use of experiments. Additionally, it is questioned whether the explanations are rivals at all, i.e. whether they compete to explain the cognitive processes of the same level. The contribution of the paper is conceptual. Its aim is to clear up the concepts involved in these analyses, in order to avoid oversimplified or premature conclusions about the cognitive abilities of pre- and non-linguistic creatures. It is also meant to show that the theoretical space surrounding the issues involved might be much more diverse and unknown than many of these studies imply. (shrink)

In his treatise on the essence of human freedom, Schelling recognizes that any true philosophical articulation must begin with the experience of freedom. If freedom as he tells us is the center with respect to which the grounding of all beings emerges, then, the relationship of the human and non-human, along with their taken for granted distinction, must be thought in light of the question of freedom. If such an orientation is to be made within Schelling’s philosophy, the central aspect (...) of the spirit of freedom must be directed away from Heidegger’s generality that “freeing man to himself is a setting free of man in the middle of beings as a whole,” towards the notion that the setting free of the human being in the middle of beings, supposes as its mutual determinant the letting-be free of beings in light of which the human being arrives at a freedom for something. Through a focused evaluation of some of Heidegger’s key texts, this paper seeks to pave the way for an alternative conception of freedom as mutually reflected affirmation, one that would prompt a return to Schelling after Heidegger. (shrink)

Human rights do not represent an absolute truth. Otherwise, they would represent ideology, which is contradictory to the basic idea of human rights itself. Consequently, there is a need for redefinition of the main presuppositions of modern conception of human rights represented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paper argues that Rawls’s conception of human rights is significant for the refiguration of human rights. It.

The purpose of this inquiry is to point to some unclearities and contradictions inside the framework of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This inquiry is based on the philosophical analysis of some basic concepts employed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The four concepts ( dignity, freedoms, equality and solidarity ) which are presented in the preamble of the Charter as “indivisible and universal values” will be analyzed. On the other hand, the definition and the scope (...) of rights guaranteed by these values will also be examined. It will be argued that those values reflect modernist political liberalism and its universalist and metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Problemi identiteta i razlike u okviru politicke teorije artikulisani su u vidu spora koji se od uspostavljanja liberalnih demokratija intenzivira, spora o nacinu na koji se politicka zajednica uspostavlja i opravdava, u relaciji sa pitanjem odnosa pojedinca i kolektiva. Rad analizira najaktuelnije refleksije evropske politike na problem razlike i verovatnost teze o kraju multikulturalizma koja se cula na konferenciji za bezbednost odrzanoj u Minhenu 2011. godine, kroz objasnjenje geneze problema i razmatranje ponudjenih resenja. Pored toga, rad obrazlaze pojam moderne drzave (...) kroz principe gradjanstva i nacije u relaciji sa pitanjem identiteta i razlike, sa posebnim akcentom na konceptima neutralnosti i tolerancije kao kljucnim tackama u sporu. Kao zakljucak, iznose se razlozi zasto problem razlike ne moze tako lako da bude prevazidjen i na koji nacin diskurzivna demokratija potencijalno moze da bude buduca smernica za drugaciji fokus spora. PR Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 179049: Politike drustvenog pamcenja i nacionalnog identiteta - regionalni i evropski kontekst. (shrink)

What is it to have a mental disorder? The paper proposes an ability-based view of mental disorder. It argues that such a view is preferable to biological dysfunction views such as Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory. According to the proposed view, having a mental disorder is basically a matter of having a certain type of inability (or: an ability that is not sufficiently high): the inability to respond adequately to some of one’s available reasons in some of (...) one’s reasons-sensitive attitudes or actions, where the threshold of inability is determined by one’s being harmed. The relevant concepts of inability, reasons, and harm are sketched. The paper argues that the proposed view evades some problems of biological dysfunction views by remaining neutral on questions of causation and the evolution of the mind. Furthermore, it can capture better what is distinctively “mental” about mental disorder. On the proposed view, it is the rational relations among an individual’s attitudes and actions that are “disordered” and the relevant norms in mental disorder are the norms of reasons. As further merits, the view can account for degrees of disorder, incorporate biological as well as social aspects, and elucidate the relations among disorders, symptoms, and their causes. (shrink)

The paper deals with the formalistic view on music presented in Eduard Hanslick’s treatise On the Musically Beautiful, which is taken to be the foundingwork of the aesthtetics of music. In the paper I propose an interpretation of Hanslick’s treatise which differs on many points from the interpretations displayed in the works of several most influential contemporary aestheticians of music. My main thesis is that Hanslick’s treatise is misunderstood and incorrectly presented by these authors. I try to demonstrate this thesis (...) by referring to Hanslick’s original formulations in the German edition and by showing that my interpretation renders Hanslick’s view far more coherent and his arguments successful in showing his main conclusions. Accepting this alternative interpretation should have further implications on many contemporary theories in the aesthetics of music that reckon on the failure of Hanslick’s arguments as presented by usual interpretations. (shrink)

The author explores whether Spinoza can consistently maintain two doctrines which he espouses in his Ethics. The first doctrine is the equivalence between perfection, reality, being, and essence. The second doctrine is the Metaphysical Difference between that in which essence and existence are identical (God) and those things for which essence and existence are distinct (everything but God). The article is structured as follows. First, the author shows that these two key doctrines apparently clash. Second, she shows two ways in (...) which this clash can be avoided. The first way consists in drawing a line between mere being and existence. This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called “Platonist” in the secondary literature. The second way consists in denying that the Metaphysical Difference cuts reality at its joints. Instead, the Metaphysical Difference, on this reading, differentiates between appearances (those things in which essence and existence come apart) and reality (that thing in which they are one). This reading of Spinoza has sometimes been called Eleatic in the secondary literature. The author concludes by suggesting that, if the Spinozist rejects both the Eleatic and the Platonist approach, she is obliged to find another way to salvage her system. (shrink)

This paper presents social and political dimensions of forgiveness within Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness is an example of how philosophy can help us understand and resolve contemporary social and political issues. Derrida believes that traditional concept of forgiveness should be broadened beyond the bounds of the rational and the imaginable. According to Derrida, traditional concept of forgiveness needs rethinking because of the phenomenon of proliferation of scenes of forgiveness after the Second World War that produced globalization of (...) forgiveness and trivialized and decharacterized this term. According to Derrida, the act of forgiveness can only be thought beyond the limits of common sense and in the space of the impossible, and that is the forgiveness of something that common sense cannot forgive. Derrida’s philosophy of forgiveness has wide social and political implications as it transcends binary oppositions: present/past, self/other, friend/enemy and so forth. All concepts within Derrida’s philosophy of politics (friendship, enemy, hospitality, forgiveness, justice, and so on) are significant for societies eroded with traumas of wars and ethno-national divisions and conflicts. (shrink)