A natureza dinâmica dos direitos humanos: a crítica de Rawls ao universalismo Moral

Trans/Form/Ação 33 (2) (2010)
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Abstract

Human rights do not represent an absolute truth. Otherwise, they would represent ideology, which is contradictory to the basic idea of human rights itself. Consequently, there is a need for redefinition of the main presuppositions of modern conception of human rights represented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paper argues that Rawls’s conception of human rights is significant for the refiguration of human rights. It

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Sanja Ivic
Institute for European Studies

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References found in this work

Liberalism and the limits of justice.Michael Sandel - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):336-343.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.Michael J. Sandel - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (6):336-343.
23 The Politics of Recognition.Charles Taylor - 1994 - Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader.
Gender and the Politics of History.Joan Wallach Scott - 1990 - Science and Society 54 (2):226-228.

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