Selected contributions to the symposium on "Mirror neurons and the evolution of brain and language" held on July 5-8, 2000 in Delmenhorst, Germany.

During the Zimbabwean crisis, millions crossed through the apartheid-era border fence, searching for ways to make ends meet. Maxim Bolt explores the lives of Zimbabwean migrant labourers, of settled black farm workers and their dependants, and of white farmers and managers, as they intersect on the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Focusing on one farm, this book investigates the role of a hub of wage labour in a place of crisis. A close ethnographic study, it addresses the complex, shifting (...) labour and life conditions in northern South Africa's agricultural borderlands. Underlying these challenges are the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis of the 2000s and the intensified pressures on commercial agriculture in South Africa following market liberalization and post-apartheid land reform. But, amidst uncertainty, farmers and farm workers strive for stability. The farms on South Africa's margins are centers of gravity, islands of residential labour in a sea of informal arrangements. (shrink)

Dire toute la vérité et rien que la vérité. Vivre dans la transparence et la franchise. Ces préceptes, les chantres du vrai ont voulu les appliquer de force à ce que tout nous désigne comme une forme retorse du mensonge : la littérature. Quelle est la légitimité de cette posture? N'est-on pas amené à la suspecter, à en reconnaître la fragilité et les impasses? Car, examinant l'inlassable guerre qui a opposé les tenants de la sincérité (Rousseau, Leiris, Sartre) à leurs (...) détracteurs (Molière, Laclos, Dostoïevski, Gary, Perec), on aperçoit se profiler une autre définition de ce qu'est la littérature. En toute mauvaise foi : ne serait-ce donc pas ainsi que les oeuvres se présentent à nous et se jouent de nous? C'est-à-dire en s'inscrivant dans une structure qui n'est ni le mensonge ni la vérité, mais leur mélange incertain. Qui affirme en niant et qui dément en proclamant. Sommes-nous pourtant prêts à accepter que tout discours échappe à ce qu'il est tout en continuant de l'être, à admettre que la littérature ne produise qu'une vérité, parfois contradictoire, et non la vérité? Percevoir la manière dont l'oeuvre pose la mauvaise foi, la suscite et la défie, c'est approcher ce qui constitue sa matière même, tant le moteur de ses intrigues que sa métaphysique implicite ou explicite. Mais c'est aussi repenser son rapport au lecteur, au réel et au savoir. Car il y a un paradoxe commun au menteur et au sincère que seule la mauvaise foi permet de décrire en s'arrachant à nos routines intellectuelles. (shrink)

Um den phänomenologischen Anspruch der Dekonstruktion ans Licht zu bringen, hat sich der Autor der vorliegenden Studie vorgenommen, die Bedeutungsverschiebung des Begriffs,transzendental‘ in Jacques Derridas Werk zu verfolgen. Die Untersuchung legt nahe, dass die Dekonstruktion des Begriffs ‚transzendental’ nicht als eine bloße Zurückweisung des Erbe der Transzendentalphilosophie hinausläuft. Die durch Derridas ganzes Werk hinduch stets geübte Kritik dieser umfangreichen Tradition – in all ihren Formen: mittelalterliche Onto-Theo-Logie, Kritizismus oder Phänomenologie – geht seit den allerersten Werken Derridas mit einer immer wieder (...) betonten Notwendigkeit einher, transzendentale Fragen zu stellen, um überhaupt philosophieren zu können. Zwar gilt es, den Wert ‚transzendental’ zu dekonstruieren und die Geschichtlichkeit der transzendentalen Fragestellung kritisch zu untersuchen; es darf aber nicht vergessen werden, dass die Dekonstruktion ebenfalls nach den transzendentalen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Art Phänomenen fragt. In diesem Zusammenhang bestand die Herausforderung dieser Studie darin, der doppeldeutigen Bewegung von Kritik und Aneignung der transzendentalphilosophischen Tradition am Leitfaden der in Derridas Werk erfahrenen Bedeutungsveränderung des Begriffs ‚transzendental’ in ‚ultra’ und ‚quasi transzendental’ die sorgfältigsten Analysen zu unterwerfen. (shrink)

Since its first formulation in the 1980s, the disjunctivist theory has changed the way philosophers think about perception. Fundamentally, the disjunctivist view is a negative metaphysical thesis about the nature of perceptual experience: it is based on a refutation of the so-called “common kind claim,” that is to say, the claim that perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations are conscious experiences of the same fundamental kind. Given the importance granted to perceptual experience in the phenomenological tradition, a few commentators have, in recent (...) years, attempted to situate the phenomenological point of view vis-à-vis these two positions. While Romano (2012) and Bower (2020) have argued that Husserl’s conception of illusions and hallucinations entails a form of conjunctive analysis, Smith (2008), Hopp (2011), and Overgaard (2018) attempted to show that Husserl’s theory of perception amounts to a kind of disjunctivism avant la lettre. In this chapter, I side with Staiti (2015) and Zahavi (2017) and argue that the very opposition between conjunctivism and disjunctivism is hardly thinkable on Husserlian grounds. After brushing in very rough strokes Husserl’s normative theory of perception, I defend this claim with two arguments. The first – dubbed the metaphysical argument – targets one core metaphysical commitment of both conjunctivism and disjunctivism, namely their defense of metaphysical realism, which I deem incompatible with Husserl’s phenomenology, whether before or after the transcendental turn. The second argument – called the phenomenological argument – targets another presupposition shared by both parties, namely the idea that “perfect hallucinations” are possible. I lay out a series of reasons as to why this idea should be resisted, and then explain how this impacts the discussion between disjunctivism and conjunctivism. (shrink)

In an ideal democracy, people from all walks of life would come together to talk meaningfully and respectfully about politics. But we do not live in an ideal democracy. In contemporary democracies, which are marked by deep social divisions, different groups for the most part avoid talking to each other. And when they do talk to each other, their speech often seems to be little more than a vehicle for rage, hatred, and deception. -/- Democratic Speech in Divided Times argues (...) that we should nevertheless not give up on the ideal of democratic public speech. Drawing on the resources of political theory, epistemology, and philosophy of language, this book develops a sustained account of the norms that should govern public discourse in deeply divided circumstances. Should we try to find common ground when we talk to our political opponents, even though they seem unreasonable? Should we refrain from expressing anger, if we want to get things done? How can we use our speech to fight hate speech and disinformation? And is it even possible to speak to 'the other side,' in settings where different groups dislike one another, live apart from one another, and don't know much about one another? By tackling these questions, Lepoutre demonstrates that, when governed by the right set of norms, public speech can be a powerful force for good even amidst profound social divisions. (shrink)

Public opinion research has shown that voters accept many falsehoods about politics. This observation is widely considered troubling for democracy—and especially participatory ideals of democracy. I argue that this influential narrative is nevertheless flawed, because it misunderstands the nature of political understanding. Drawing on philosophical examinations of scientific modelling, I demonstrate that accepting falsehoods within one’s model of political reality is compatible with—and indeed can positively enhance—one’s understanding of that reality. Thus, the observation that voters accept many political falsehoods does (...) not necessarily establish that they lack political understanding. I then address three worries: that voters cannot generally engage in such political modelling; that political modelling obscures facts that are crucial to political understanding; and that successful political modelling would require knowing that one’s model contains falsehoods. My responses reveal how, going forward, we should measure political ignorance; and they highlight the standing importance of participatory democracy. (shrink)

Introduction Linguistic literature on the problem of language and consciousness is, by all means, not a voluminous one. One can scarcely find an article or ...

How promising is Bitcoin as a currency? This paper discusses four claims on the advantages of Bitcoin: a more stable currency than state-backed ones; a secure and efficient payment system; a credible alternative to the central management of money; and a better protection of transaction privacy. We discuss these arguments by relating them to their philosophical roots in libertarian and neoliberal theories, and assess whether Bitcoin can effectively meet these expectations. We conclude that despite its advocates’ enthusiasm, there are good (...) reasons to doubt that Bitcoin can fulfill its promises and act as a functioning currency, rather than as a mere speculative asset. (shrink)

On trouvera dans cet ouvrage les principaux jalons du parcours philosophique étonnant de Maxime Chastaing (1913-1997) qui culmine dans une psycholinguistique, et même une psychophonétique, une étude des interactions sociales, enfin une théorisation du pacte romanesque liant l'écrivain à ses lecteurs.

In several of his works, Immanuel Kant insists on the transcendental role of imagination in perception. In the Kantian scholarship, this claim has been interpreted in at least three ways: it is believed that the imagination is necessary to solve the riddle of the amodal character of perception, to justify the possibility of perceptual identity across time, and to explain the possibility of perceiving particular objects as such, viz. as belonging to a specific class of objects. The paper aims to (...) show how E. Husserl inherited these sets problems without however having recourse to the imagination at all. In the last section, I will briefly analyse two types of mixed acts where perception and imagination unite, namely image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and what Husserl calls perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie). I here argue that these analyses do not contradict, but rather strengthen the argument defended throughout the paper, namely that in Husserl's phenomenology, and contrary to Kant's, the imagination does not assume a synthetic or transcendental function in perception. (shrink)

Le structuralisme a été le grand espoir de modernisation des sciences humaines. Sous la houlette, principalement, de Claude Lévi-Strauss en ethnologie, de Jacques Lacan en psychanalyse, de Roland Barthes en sémiologie, de Louis Althusser en sociologie et de Michel Foucault en histoire et en philosophie, ce mouvement intellectuel prend, dans la France des années 1950-1960, une ampleur telle qu'il bouleverse le paysage intellectuel et remanie en profondeur l'Université française. Puis, à partir des années 1970, l'ambitieux programme s'effondre, plus rapidement encore (...) qu'il ne s'était imposé, et nourrit au passage une position hypercritique à l'égard de la modernité. Un demi-siècle après, il est temps de revenir sur cette aventure intellectuelle pour en comprendre l'engouement ainsi que les raisons de l'échec ; mais également pour expliquer sous et angle la singularité française et ses conséquences, puisqu'elles trouvent des prolongements jusqu'à aujourd'hui. (shrink)

The proliferation of conspiracy theories poses a significant threat to democratic decision-making. To counter this threat, many political theorists advocate countering conspiracy theories with ‘more speech’ (or ‘counterspeech’). Yet conspiracy theories are notoriously resistant to counterspeech. This article aims to conceptualise and defend a novel form of counterspeech – narrative counterspeech – that is singularly well-placed to overcome this resistance. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that conspiracy theories pose a special problem for counterspeech for three interconnected (...) reasons relating to salience, emotion and internal coherence. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, philosophy of emotion and cognitive science, I then demonstrate that narrative forms of counterspeech constitute an apt response to this diagnosis. Finally, I forestall two objections: the first questions the likely effectiveness of narrative counterspeech; the second insists that, even if it were effective, it would remain unacceptably manipulative. Neither objection, I contend, is ultimately compelling. (shrink)

L’analyse du double emploi du verbe « valoir » dans l’évaluation et l’appréciation éclaircit quelques aspects de la valeur. Évaluer, c’est prendre conscience d’un être qui est valorisé ou valeureux, non d’un être qui a une valeur. La valeur appartient à l’être même d’un objet. Il n’est pas question de demander si celui-ci la possède ou non, de résoudre le problème et de prouver la solution. Toute évaluation est une épreuve : l’objet convainc l’évaluateur en lui révélant la valeur intrinsèque, (...) celle-ci n’est pourtant pas une propriété. (shrink)

It will be argued that the virtual agent (VA) can be characterized using phenomenological descriptive tools and other conceptual means within related paradigms of the analysis of subjectivity. From such a point of view, the main features of VA are: •VA is constituted by its communicative valencies; •VA is intentionally active in perception, and it is the case also at the intersubjective level; •VA establishes and supports the truth of its statements, which come out as a creative boundary, an "unquestionable (...) point of contact" between virtual "I" and virtual reality; •communicative intersubjectivity in cyberspace is better describedthrough recursive ontologies. Peirce's conception of the Subject as a species of semiosis can be helpful to clarify these points. Unlike the traditional concept of subject where communication stands at a level resting on an underlying level of being, for Peirce communication is inherent in mind itself. Along these lines, I argue for the open multivalence of the signified as overdetermined by communicative acts. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the symposium on Maxime Lepoutre, Democratic Speech in Divided Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). The symposium contains articles by Paul Billingham, Rachel Fraser, and Michael Hannon, and a response by the author.

Il est une figure souvent croisée dans la littérature et les arts de la représentation : c'est l'Autre. Dès sa naissance, le cinéma a reçu un immense héritage à partir duquel il a généré à son tour des représentations spécifiques de l'Autre. Aussi bien imaginaires et réelles, étranges et banales, proches et lointaines, elles surgissent tantôt du dehors, tantôt du dedans de l'humaine réalité des êtres. Notamment décryptées par la psychanalyse et l'anthropologie, elles s'incarnent dans toutes sortes de films : (...) des fictions allant du réalisme au fantastique aussi bien que des documentaires. Cet ouvrage réunit des analyses rapprochées de certains films exemplaires, de toutes les époques et de tous les continents. (shrink)

Les zombies sont partout, au cinéma, à la télévision, dans nos rues, chez notre libraire. Grotesques et terrifiants, ils pourraient n’être qu’une tendance kitsch, un divertissement à la mode. Derrière sa démarche traînante et ridicule se cache pourtant une figure symptomatique de notre époque. Peur de l’épidémie ou fantasme de la catastrophe, aliénation moderne ou fascination pour la violence : le zombie et le monde apocalyptique qu’il crée nous parlent d’abord, intimement, de nous-mêmes. Par l’obscène exhibition de la mort, l’ultime (...) tabou de la société occidentale, il brise les limites de la condition humaine : celles de la conscience, de la vie, de la civilisation. Mais surtout, il trahit un fantasme émergeant dans notre culture, celui d’en finir. (shrink)

Eines der Hauptanliegen der Phänomenologie Husserls besteht darin, eine Analyse der Wesensstruktur des Bewusstseins vorzunehmen. Husserls Konzeption des Bewusstseins als Bereich von Erlebnissen ist insofern ›phänomenologisch‹, als er auf eine kausale Erklärung der die mentalen Zustände begleitenden neurologischen Prozesse verzichtet, bzw. sie bewusst ausblendet. Aufgabe der Phänomenologie ist es vielmehr, die unveränderlichen und wesenshaften Eigenschaften, Strukturen und Erkenntnisleistungen des Bewusstseins in der erstpersonalen (›ich‹) Perspektive zu beschreiben.

Ce texte a déjà été publié dans Sur le journalisme, About Journalism, Sobre jornalismo [En ligne, online], Vol. 9, n°1 - 2020, 15 juin - June 15 - 15 de juno. A partir d'une étude sémiotique et communicationnelle de l'exposition de l'Agence France-Presse sur les réseaux socionumériques, nous nous demanderons de quelle manière la photographie agencière a été en partie bouleversée et transformée par ces moyens de communication. Face à un nouveau rythme de - Sciences de l'information et de la (...) communication – Nouvel article. (shrink)

A critical approach on tolerance can be done as an endeavor to asset its rational arguments brought in its support or/and as a justification of its moral value within the process of human being completion. The commitment to such critical task is more necessary as it is unyieldingness summon in contemporary debates in political religious and, especially moral contexts, it has been equally valorized and contested. The most remarkable analyses of this rather summary rubric for many and often contradictory connotations, (...) then concept, underline the idea that a limit-matter is at stake: can be tolerated the intolerable? Because these boundaries are hard to be distinguished the critical position intellectually reasonable seems to be that of examining if is not more socially profitable and morally justifiable to be tolerant rather than intolerant.Developing possible arguments for and against the universal value of tolerance, critical discourse imposes a very meaningful statement: to uphold our humanity, even the demand for our right to intolerance must be done within the framework and with the means of tolerance. (shrink)