RESUMO A operação que nos interessa destacar gira em torno da zona de problematicidade que ilumina o trabalho crítico com materiais culturais e que supõe uma complementaridade conceitual entre os caminhos da biopolítica e da precariedade. Aquilo que essas análises e seu trabalho com materiais indicam, de um modo muito nítido, é um conjunto de dimensões, linhas de indagação e zonas de problematização que não adquirem a suficiente relevância nos debates contemporâneos sobre biopolítica e precariedade. Daí advém a necessidade de (...) elaborar uma ferramenta de trama conceitual que dê conta dos marcadores que codificam uma vida precária. Justamente, este é o ponto cego em comum e, ao mesmo tempo, o espaço de interseção conceitual que nos interessa: os percursos em biopolítica que não tenham considerado os processos de precarização da vida e, em igual medida, as teorizações sobre a condição precária que não tenham pensado em termos estritamente biopolíticos. Denominamos bios-precário a este nó conceitual a partir da conjunção entre a caixa de ferramentas de Judith Butler em relação à ontologia corporal da precariedade e ao cruzamento do percurso biopolítico de Roberto Esposito entre vida impessoal e biopolítica afirmativa. ABSTRACT The operation that we want to emphasize revolves around the problematic area that brings light to the critical work that uses cultural material and assumes a conceptual complementarity between the paths of biopolitics and precariousness. What these analyses and their work with materials clearly indicate is that a set of dimensions, lines of questioning and problematic zones are not given enough relevance in contemporary debates about biopolitics and precariousness. Therefore, there emerges the need to develop a conceptual tool that may account for markers that encode a precarious life. That is, precisely, the common blind spot and, at the same time, the space of conceptual intersection on which we focus: the biopolitical paths that have not been taken into account in the processes of precarization of life and, in equal measure, the theorization about the precarious condition that has not been developed in strictly biopolitical terms. We call this conceptual knot bíos-precarious. This concept stems from the confluence between Judith Butler’s tools in relation to the bodily ontology of precariousness and the intersection between impersonal life and affirmative biopolitics in Roberto Esposito’s biopolitical path. RESUMEN La operación que nos interesa subrayar gira en torno a la zona de problematicidad que ilumina el trabajo crítico con materiales culturales y que supone una complementariedad conceptual entre los recorridos de la biopolítica y de la precariedad. Lo que estos análisis y su trabajo con materiales indican, de un modo muy nítido, es un conjunto de dimensiones, líneas de indagación y zonas de problematización que no adquieren la suficiente relevancia en los debates contemporáneos sobre biopolítica y sobre precariedad. De allí la necesidad de elaborar una herramienta de entramado conceptual que dé cuenta de los marcadores que codifican una vida precaria. Y justamente, ese es el punto ciego en común y a la vez, el espacio de intersección conceptual que nos interesa: los recorridos en biopolítica que no han considerado los procesos de precarización de la vida y en igual medida, las teorizaciones sobre la condición precaria que no han pensado en términos estrictamente biopolíticos. Denominamos bíos-precario a este nudo conceptual a partir de la conjunción entre la caja de herramientas de Judith Butler en relación a la ontología corporal de la precariedad y el cruce en el recorrido biopolítico de Roberto Esposito entre vida impersonal y biopolítica afirmativa. (shrink)

Phenomenological analyses of ageing and old age have examined themes such as alterity, finitude, and time, not seldom from the perspective of “healthy” aging. Phenomenologists have also offered detailed analyses of lived experiences of illness including lived experiences of dementia. This article offers a phenomenological account of what we label as entering the grey zone of aging between “healthy” aging and aging with a disease. This account is developed through a qualitative phenomenological philosophy analysis of elderly persons’ lived experiences (...) of being tested for dementia through primary care in Sweden, i.e., within a cultural context where dementia commonly is understood as a frightening a loss of self even though this understanding also is questioned. To enter this grey zone of aging, we argue, does not dissolve dynamic self-becoming but can involve an experience of oneself as being old. Further, in the grey zone, the self experiences itself as neither fully healthy nor as having a disease, and as needing to negotiate and live this ambiguity. To enter this grey zone is to enter an affectively charged, sociocultural and medicalized zone, and while the self can still act in different ways within it, staying in the grey zone can result in a re-orientation in the self’s mode of being, in ways that are thoroughly beyond its control. To stay in the grey zone can have detrimental effects on the self, even though the self does not have a disease: the self can become “stuck” in a reflective mode of attending to embodiment, aging, health, and disease. (shrink)

When authors act by either publishing or non-publishing their texts, they sometimes use a language of gestures. These gestures can assist to position the author in the intellectual field. In this way some German eighteenth-century philosophers who thought against the grain of mainstream rationalism withdrew from the public sphere, using the image of the Egyptian god Harpocrates, who puts his index finger to his lips—a symbol for maintaining silence. In a sense one can thus label this kind of quietism as (...) “harpocratism.” The essay examines the imagery and contextualizes it in three case studies from the years 1720-50. Moreover, it explores its sources in political as well as antiquarian and hermetic discourses of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The essay serves as a model for defining intellectual positions not so much by their content, but rather by their practices of symbolic distancing from others, of building identities in emotional communities, and of shaping free zones of inquiry where they could flourish. (shrink)

Responsible research and innovation features the dialog of science “with society,” and research performed “for society,” i.e., for the benefit of the people. I focus on this latter, outcome-oriented notion of RRI and discuss two kinds of problems. The first one concerns options to anticipate the future course of science and technology. Such foresight knowledge seems necessary for subjecting research to demands of social and moral responsibility. However, predicting science and technology is widely considered impossible. The second problem concerns moral (...) evaluation. The benefit or harm produced by certain research and innovation achievements is often hard to estimate. Against this background of uncertainty in factual and moral assessment, I explore opportunities left for RRI. First, RRI should contribute to maintaining a wide range of approaches. Second, judgments about RRI should draw on zones of convergence among the variety of research approaches pursued. Third, decisions about implementing a technology should be revisable. Fourth, the more specific inclusion of demands from society should be reserved to technology development. Fifth, in many respects, the social compatibility of a new technology is due rather to the social context than the inherent features of the product. Favorable circumstances are transparency, representation of all relevant parties, and procedural fairness. As a result, some of the benefits and detriments of research and innovation can be identified without detailed knowledge of future findings. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la philosophie occidentale, habituée aux sommets lumineux de la raison, peut dire des sous-sols, des bas-fonds, des zones obscures de l'humanité qui côtoient l'enfer ? Jean-Clet Martin, poursuivant son travail d'exploration des marges et des recoins de l'histoire de la pensée, qui lui vaut une place singulière dans le paysage philosophique français, tente dans ce nouvel essai de faire surgir de l'ombre " des formes immaculées que le philosophe ne peut apercevoir qu'en devenant tout autre ". Il (...) explore, par de courts textes qui sont autant de coups de sonde dans la nuit, l'angoisse, la mort, la déchéance, la folie, la misère, l'absence de Dieu, tout ce qui échappe aux différents triomphes de l'homme sur l'homme. On retrouve, au fil de cette enquête à la fois profonde et joueuse, pédagogique et exigeante, aussi bien Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Deleuze ou Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe que Dante, Hôlderlin, Hesse, Kafka, Munch, Mahler : des philosophes, des écrivains, des artistes - la pensée dans tous ses états. (shrink)

Se caracteriza la expresión ciencia abierta, relacionándola con el acceso abierto, y se muestra el modo en que un buen diseño de los repositorios digitales y de sus interconexiones en Internet pueden incrementar sensiblemente la interdisciplinariedad. Además, dichos repositorios se caracterizan como trading zones o “mercados académicos”, de donde las revistas académicas podrían recuperar artículos que deberían presentar en forma de discursos unitarios, en el contexto de un modelo propuesto radicalmente diferente a las prácticas editoriales comunes actualmente.

Au Cap, le nouvel an est célébré depuis plus d’un siècle et demi par des parades de rue et des compétitions de chœurs et de troupes carnavalesques. Elles rassemblent des milliers de personnes qui, du temps de l’apartheid, avaient été classées dans la catégorie coloured. Ces fêtes du nouvel an sont nées d’usages sociaux de la rue résultant des conditions de vie matérielle dans les quartiers à population majoritairement « métisse » ; la rue devint ainsi non seulement un espace (...) de sociabilité mais un lieu de création contredisant les stéréotypes négatifs attribués aux « métis ». Ces fonctions furent gravement mises en péril par le classement en « zone blanche » de ces quartiers puis par l’interdiction de défiler dans le centre-ville du Cap édictée après 1976. Ces mesures entraînèrent une lutte symbolique pour le droit à l’espace urbain qui ne rejoignit pas directement le combat politique des années 1980 mais exprima, en plus d’une opposition implicite à l’apartheid, l’idée partagée par un grand nombre de « métis » que Le Cap, « Cité-mère » de l’Afrique du Sud, est « leur » ville. (shrink)

Dans la situation de guerre civile créée pendant la Révolution française, les rapports hommes-femmes se détériorent. D'une part, la compétition politique ne profite en rien aux femmes, reléguées dans la sphère privée, à l'exception des femmes contre-révolutionnaires, dont l'action en faveur de leurs communautés ou de la religion devient un véritable moyen d'intervention politique. D'autre part, la compétition des pouvoirs libère l'agressivité contre les femmes, permettant que les femmes de la Contre-Révolution ou habitant dans les zones les moins contrôlées administrativement (...) puissent être soumises au bon vouloir des troupes. La compréhension de cette réalité par le prisme de la guerre civile permet d'en restituer la complexité et d'ouvrir de nouvelles voies à l'histoire. (shrink)

If we hope to see values of equality and democracy embodied in our societies’ institutions, then we have a range of good reasons to favor expansive public provision of goods and services, and to oppose many forms of privatization. While Joseph Heath is right to argue that there are at least some forms of ‘anodyne privatization’, and while he is also right to argue for a more nuanced philosophical debate about the different dimensions of choice between forms of public and (...) private provision, Heath fails to register various regards in which private provision can undermine these central public values. We often have strong egalitarian and democratic reasons to protect zones of decommodification; to resist the imposition of user-charges; and to favor insourcing and direct public procurement over various forms of outsourcing of public services. Public libraries provide a totemic illustration of some of the deep virtues of collective public provision in democratic societies. Overall, our reasons to reject privatization are stronger and more diverse than theorists such as Heath might have supposed. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la aplicación de la técnica del andamiaje en un proceso de evaluación a nivel de máster universitario. En el ámbito de la comunicación digital, se propuso al alumnado la realización de una campaña para un cliente real, una asociación protectora de animales. A través de la técnica de la observación participante y de una encuesta al alumnado, se llevó a cabo este proyecto cuyos resultados muestran que el andamiaje es efectivo en el nivel de máster y que (...) su combinación con la tecnología y la motivación del profesorado contribuye a obtener mejores resultados. (shrink)

Although the body of literature in sport science is growing rapidly, certain sports have yet to benefit from this increased interest by the scientific community. One such sport is Ultimate Frisbee, officially known as Ultimate. Thus, the goal of this study was to describe the nature of the sport by identifying differences between winning and losing teams in elite-level competition. To do so, a customized observational system and a state transition model were developed and applied to 14 games from the (...) 2017 American Ultimate Disc League season. The results reveal that, on average, 262.2 passes were completed by a team per game and 5.5 passes per possession. More than two-thirds of these passes were played from the mid zone and the rear zone, nearest the team’s own end zone. Winning and losing teams do not differ in these general patterns, but winning teams played significantly fewer backward passes from the front zone to the mid zone, nearest the opponent’s end zone than losing teams = −4.980, p < 0.001, d = −1.16). Furthermore, losing teams scored fewer points when they started on defense, called breakpoints = −6.365, p < 0.001, d = 2.30), and committed significantly more turnovers per game = 5.85, p < 0.001, d = −1.18). Overall, this study provides the first empirical description of Ultimate and identifies relevant performance indicators to discriminate between winning and losing teams. We hope this article sheds light on the unique, but so far overlooked sport of Ultimate, and offers performance analysts the basis for future studies using state transition modeling in Ultimate as well as other invasion sports. (shrink)

Neurulation, the curling of the neuroepithelium to form the neural tube, is an essential component of the development of animal embryos. Defects of neural tube formation, which occur with an overall frequency of one in 500 human births, are the cause of severe and distressing congenital abnormalities. However, despite the fact that there is increasing information from animal experiments about the mechanisms which effect neural tube formation, much less is known about the fundamental causes of neural tube defects (NTD). The (...) use of computer models provides one way of gaining clues about the ways in which neurulation may be compromised. Here we employ one computer model to examine the robustness of different cellular mechanisms which are thought to contribute to neurulation. The model, modified from that of Odell et al (Odell, G.M., Oster, G., Alberch, P. and Burnside, B., (1981)) mimics neurulation by laterally propagating a wave of apical contraction along an active zone within a ring of cells. We link the results to experimental evidence gained from studies of embryos in which neurulation has been perturbed. The results indicate that alteration of one of the properties of non-neural tissue can delay or inhibit neurulation, supporting the idea, gained from observation of embryos bearing genes which predispose to NTD, that the tissue underlying the neuroepithelium may contribute to the elevation of the neural folds. The results also show that reduction of the contractile properties of a small proportion of the neuroepithelial cell population may have a profound effect on overall tissue profiling. The results suggest that the elevation of the neural folds, and hence successful neurulation, may be vulnerable to relatively minor deficiencies in cell properties. (shrink)

Two approaches have emerged to resolve discrepancies between predictions and observations at galactic and cosmological scales: introducing dark matter or modifying the laws of gravity. Practitioners of each approach claim to better satisfy a different explanatory ideal, either unification or simplicity. In this chapter, we take a closer look at the ideals and at the successes of these approaches in achieving them. Not only are these ideals less divisive than assumed, but moreover we argue that the approaches are focusing on (...) different aspects of the same ideal. This realisation opens up the possibility of a more fruitful trading zone between dark matter and modified gravity communities. (shrink)

Through bringing Christian ethics into conversation with original fieldwork and archival research on environmental justice activists, this essay develops an ecopolitical theology and practice of environmental justice as the work of transforming “sacrifice zones” into “sacred zones.” Sacrifice zones are places of concentrated environmental injustice, where harmful toxins and ecological degradation are channeled to secure the social and ecological flourishing of other places. During the movement against the environmentally destructive practice of mountaintop removal coal mining in West Virginia, leading activist (...) Robyn Kincaid borrowed from Martin Luther King Jr. and green economy visionary Van Jones to envision Appalachia’s transformation from a sacrifice zone into a sacred zone. This essay argues that Kincaid’s constructive conceptualization of sacrifice—“to make sacred”—holds promise for a Christian ethics and politics of environmental justice; develops its implicit theology; demonstrates its relevance beyond Appalachia; and contrasts it with climate politics as usual. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

This article proposes an ecophilosophy of the cinema. It builds on Martin Heidegger’s articulation of art as ‘world-disclosing,’ and on a Whiteheadian and Deleuzian understanding of the universe as a lively and eventful place in which subjects and objects are persistently coming into being, jointly constituted in the process of their becoming. Accordingly, it proposes that cinema be considered a machine that produces or discloses worlds. These worlds are, at once, anthropomorphic, geomorphic, and biomorphic, with each of these registers (...) mapping onto the ‘three ecologies,’ in Felix Guattari’s terms, that make up the relational ontology of the world: the social, the material, and the mental or perceptual. Through an analysis of Andrei Tarkovsky’s Stalker (1979), I suggest that cinema ‘stalks’ the world, and that our appreciation of its potentials should similarly involve a kind of ‘stalking’ of its effects in the material, social, and perceptual dimensions of the world from which cinema emerges and to which it returns. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dialogical and creative character of pedagogic work by analyzing the affinities between Martin Buber's I-Thou relation and Lev Semenovich Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development. Backed up by empirical studies on the teacher-student relation, we understand that education can only result in students' development if meaningful processes are undertaken. The paper asserts that education shall primarily aim at promoting relational possibilities.

Growing interest has been shown toward humanism in the 21st century after decades of critique and rejection. Posthumanism and transhumanism have redefined the topic primarily through developments in technology and by focusing on relations of interconnectedness between humans and the environment. A different concern with ‘being human’ can be found in the writings of Zygmunt Bauman and Ernst Bloch. The leitmotif of Bauman’s sociology and of Bloch’s utopian philosophy is their assertion that humans have the distinct capacity to transcend necessity (...) and inevitability. Their works share the concern for a good society that would ameliorate social fragmentation and disintegration. Following this, the article seeks to theorize the meaning of humanism in the contemporary era. Taking up Bauman’s notion of interregnum, the article will argue that the contemporary importance of humanism is social in the sense of redeeming the currently casualized human condition, i.e. diminished life-chances, inequality and alienation. Interregnum marks a historical epoch where the old order has decayed, but the new one is not yet present. In interregnum, or in what Bloch calls Mischzeit, humanism is about a human being-in-the-world which contains the possibility to do better. (shrink)

Među mnoštvom dimenzija kolektivnog identiteta, ovaj rad istražuje identitet kao retorički alat. Identitetska oznaka je upravo primjer pragmatične učinkovitosti. Kako bi se objasnila ta moć, izložit će se hipotetički model identitetskih kategorija. Njegovi konstitutivni moduli oblikuju četiri osnovne dimenzije: pozicija, deindividualizacija, isključenje i kognitivna zaštita. Tako ocrtan narativni identitet postaje ekvivalentan neformalnoj ideologiji . Kao konstitutivna retorika , narativna konstrukcija identiteta pretvara autoreferencijalnu tautologiju u strategije diskriminacije, pročišćenja i istrebljenja nositelja drugosti. Masovna uništenja u prošlom stoljeću – totalitarizam, kolonijalizam, etno-nacionalizam (...) – proizvodi su identitetske paradigme. (shrink)

In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this (...) is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason to engage in one of these procedures. (shrink)

Naturalism's Philosophy of the Sacred furthers the tradition of religious naturalism by offering an approach to the sacred through the metaphysical categories of ordinality and ontological parity put forward by twentieth-century American naturalist Justus Buchler. The book's chief argument is that the most effective antidote to religious violence is an aesthetic interpretation of the sacred understood as an order in and of nature.

Tanto la explicación de sentido de la modernidad como el lenguaje de la posmodernidad han rechazado la noción de presente intemporal conocida otrora por la filosofía. Aquí se quiere mostrar en qué sentido y por qué razón el novísimo pensamiento logotectónico permite recuperar aquella noción merced a una nueva distinción del presente.

Preliminary Material /Hans Adler and Rainer Godel -- Formen des Nichtwissens im Zeitalter des Fragens /Hans Adler and Rainer Godel -- Das gewisse Etwas der Aufklärung /Hans Adler -- Zur Prekarität der Aufklärung. Vernunftkritik und das Paradigma der Anthropologie (Taine, Horkheimer / Adorno, Foucault, Lyotard) /Heinz Thoma -- Von den berechenbaren Grenzen des Nichtwissens zur Zeit der Aufklärung /Eberhard Knobloch -- L'effi cace de la raison /Bertrand Binoche -- Aufgeklärtes Nicht-Wissen /Rainer Enskat -- 'Fabelhaft' und 'wunderbar' in Aufklärungsdiskursen. Zur Genese (...) des modernen Mythosbegriffs /Stefan Matuschek -- Un-Möglichkeit der Ausnahme: Die Wunderkritik der Aufklärung /Daniel Weidner -- La sagacité de l'esprit. La conjecture au XVIIIe siècle /Denis Thouard -- Séjourner dans la contradiction. L'idée de «nouvelles Lumières» et les contradictions de l'universalism /Etienne Balibar -- Doing Without Knowing in Kant and Diderot: Experiments in Enlightenment /Claudia Brodsky -- Ways of Being Ignorant: A Field Guide /Arnd Bohm -- Wissenwollen trotz Nichtwissenkönnens. Von den Erkenntnisgrenzen der psychologischen und pädagogischen Wissenschaften des späten 18. Jahrhunderts /Gunhild Berg -- "Ein Abgrund innerer dunkeln Kräfte". Nichtwissen in den Bildungsdiskursen der Aufklärung /Stefan Metzger -- "There is nothing so intrinsically rational as religion is." Zum Versuch einer vernünftigen Entschlüsselung des Nicht-mehr-Wissbaren in der Frühaufklärung /Insa Kringler -- Ein falsches Bild. Oder: Was passiert, wenn Katharsis Form wird? Zu Lessings Emilia Galotti /Ralf Simon -- Die Schattenseiten der Seele: Zu Johann Georg Sulzers Theorie der dunklen Vorstellungen /Élisabeth Décultot -- Arten der Unwissenheit im anthropologischen Diskurs der Aufklärung /Angela Holzer -- Die Zone der Unbestimmtheit - Melancholiediskurs zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen /Cornelia Bogen -- Die Produktion des Nicht-Wissens vom Selbst: Autobiographie bei Goethe und Hegel /Fritz Breithaupt -- "Charakter" - Die Konkurrenz einer metaphorischen und einer begriffl ichen Erkenntnisform des Nicht-/Wissens vom Menschen /Monika Sproll -- Unzuverlässige Leser - unzuverlässige Erzähler; oder: Literarische Wege aus dem Nicht-Wissen /Rainer Godel -- Labyrinthe der Aufklärung. Goethes Roman Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre /Harald Tausch -- Nichtwissen in Johann Gottfried Herders Geschichtsphilosophie /Luca Crescenzi -- Ins Narrenschiff mit Sokrates! Formen des Abderitismus bei Christoph Martin Wieland /Geneviève Espagne -- Zur Interdependenz von Wissen und Nichtwissen. Anthropologie als Aufklärungskritik bei Christoph Martin Wieland /Antonio Roselli -- Nichtwissen und Glaube. Zur Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis /Mark-Georg Dehrmann -- Darstellung und Gegendarstellung von Aufklärung. Handlung, Erzählung und Schein in Schillers Geisterseher /Dirk Oschmann -- Wissen und Nicht-Wissen von anderen Menschen. Das Problem der Gemütererkenntnis von Gracián bis Schiller /Daniel Fulda -- Historische Vaterschaftsprozesse: Nichtwissen, verborgenes und verkehrtes Wissen bei Goethe, Hogarth und Kleist /Alexander Košenina -- Translating Knowledge and Prescribing Taste: English Enlightenment Critics /Sabine Volk-Birke -- Autorenverzeichnis /Hans Adler and Rainer Godel -- Namenregister /Hans Adler and Rainer Godel. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es criticar un artículo de Michael B. McNulty publicado en 2015, a saber, “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws”. En este artículo, McNulty examina la concepción kantiana de la necesidad de las leyes empíricas pertenecientes a lo que, en los Primeros principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza, se denomina ciencia en un sentido “impropio”. McNulty considera la única ciencia en sentido impropio mencionada por Kant, a saber, la (...) química. En su artículo, McNulty presenta una interpretación original e interesante de esa concepción. Según esta interpretación, ciertas ideas de la razón, que el autor llama “elementos”, son el fundamento de la necesidad de las leyes químicas. Haremos tres críticas a esta interpretación. 1) La tesis de McNulty según la cual desde la perspectiva de la razón las leyes químicas son estrictamente necesarias es cognitivamente irrelevante para nosotros. 2) McNulty no menciona textos de Kant que muestren claramente que su interpretación del fundamento de la necesidad de las leyes químicas es correcta. 3) Nuestra interpretación de la necesidad regulativa de las leyes químicas es más cercana a la concepción kantiana de esas leyes que la lectura de McNulty. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las diferencias y relaciones entre las concepciones kantianas de dos disciplinas. La primera es la psicología empírica contenida en la Metafísica de Baumgarten, que Kant empleaba para dar sus lecciones de antropología. Consideraremos principalmente la interpretación kantiana de esta psicología. La segunda es la antropología pragmática. Con respecto a esta última disciplina, tendremos en cuenta las lecciones de antropología de Kant y la publicada Antropología en sentido pragmático. Mostraremos que, aunque las concepciones kantianas (...) de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática son esencialmente diferentes, hay relaciones entre las mismas. Nuestra conclusión es que la psicología empírica permanece como un cierto enfoque metodológico dentro de la antropología pragmática. Tal enfoque consiste en la consideración de los fenómenos internos, y es uno, entre otros, de los recursos metodológicos empleados por la antropología pragmática. (shrink)

A referência a um conjunto de reportórios e catálogos publicados desde 1890 onde se reproduzem portadas de obras produzidas na Península Ibérica entre finais do século XV e inícios do XVI é o ponto de partida para, através de quatro dezenas de exemplos, propor uma metodologia para identificação, registo e classificação de marcas de impressores.

Les "Seconds analytiques" contiennent les concepts et méthodes de la science aristotélicienne qui se retrouvent en acte dans les écrits biologistes. Cette étude s'intéresse aux passages sur la définition de l'âme, où Aristote use de deux procédés, la division et la démonstration. Elle met en évidence le caractère méthodique de l'argumentation et propose des solutions aux difficultés du texte.