A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, whereas (...) a positive side effect is not. We report the first empirical investigation into intentionality ascriptions made by professional judges, which finds (i) that professionals are sensitive to the moral valence of outcome type, and (ii) that the worse the outcome, the higher the propensity to ascribe intentionality. The data shows the intentionality ascriptions of professional judges to be inconsistent with the concept of mens rea supposedly at the foundation of criminal law. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

Behind the images, the actual logical work iscarried out by reasoning-specific operations on these spatial layout models.

This chapter sheds light on a response to experimental philosophy that has not yet received enough attention: the reflection defense. According to proponents of this defense, judgments about philosophical cases are relevant only when they are the product of careful, nuanced, and conceptually rigorous reflection. The chapter argues that the reflection defense is misguided: Five studies (N>1800) are presented, showing that people make the same judgments when they are primed to engage in careful reflection as they do in the conditions (...) standardly used by experimental philosophers. (shrink)

In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven (...) asymmetry across perceived probabilities constitutes a systematic cognitive distortion. We then explore three distinct strategies to alleviate the hindsight bias and its downstream effects on mens rea and culpability ascriptions. Not all are successful, but at least some prove promising. They should, we argue, be taken into consideration in criminal jurisprudence, where distortions due to the hindsight bias are likely considerable and deeply disconcerting. (shrink)

This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments, perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It is hypothesized (...) that the surprising findings are driven by the special epistemic authority we enjoy in assessing our own belief states, which does not extend to the assessment of our own knowledge states. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the (...) fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate from the norms of formal logic. (shrink)

I attempt to answer the question of what Aristotle's criteria for 'being a substance' are in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, I argue that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance (...) universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, I argue that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the Categories. (shrink)

It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justified in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justification, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justification that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justification is a necessary condition of knowledge by relying on Craig's genealogy of the concept (...) of knowledge. I will then respond to the accusation that the dialectical conception leads to radical skepticism. My response is partly concessive. It does lead to skepticism in areas where controversy prevails, such as philosophy, politics and religion, but this sort of skepticism is quite intuitive. Finally, I deal with the objection that my defense of skepticism about philosophy is self-refuting. (shrink)

Die Untersuchung von Strukturen des Exemplarischen ist in den letzten Jahren vermehrt in den Fokus geisteswissenschaftlicher Forschung gerückt. Der Band beleuchtet in systematischer und historischer Perspektive Funktionen der Verwendung von Bildern als Beispielen, Illustrationen und Exempla. Im Mittelpunkt des Buches steht die Frage, wie Bilder in epistemologische, kunsttheoretische und philosophische Diskurse eingebunden sind. Die grundlegende Annahme lautet: Der theoretische Umgang mit Bildern gehorcht einer Logik des Exemplarischen, welche die Allgemeinheit der Argumente an die konkrete Gegebenheit eines Anschaulichen bindet. 'Logik' wird (...) dabei in einem weiten, inklusiven Sinn verstanden, der die lange Tradition der Rhetorik, aber auch Kants Überlegungen zum reflexiven ästhetischen Urteil und die psychoanalytische Analyse des singulären Falls umfasst. (shrink)

Resenha do livro "Morte", de Giovanni Casertano.

We present an argument against physicalism in two steps: 1) Physics reduces the world to a mathematical structure; 2) The notion of 'structure' only makes sense when carried by something and interpreted by something else. Physicalism does not allow such a carrier and interpreter at a fundamental level, hence it must be wrong. An extended notion of Mind is presented as the fundamental 'hardware' which is necessary by the argument. In particular, qualia correspond to the 'monitor component' of mind. Some (...) ideas are presented on how to extend this mind-matter relation to a more elaborate picture: (1) A system of two complementary reductionisms (one physical, the other mental) may hint toward a deeper reality in which mind and the physical world are closely entangled. (2) A division of mind into a conscious 'monitor' and an unconscious 'processor' is suggested using the analogy of dreams. Finally, the problem of Solipsism and the existence of 'minds other than my own' is discussed. (shrink)

To many readers, it has seemed that Kant's discussion of the relation between practical and transcendental freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic is inconsistent with his discussion of the same relation in the Canon of Pure Reason. In this paper I argue for a novel way of preserving the consistency of Kant's view: in both the Dialectic and the Canon, 'transcendental freedom' requires the absence of determination by all natural causes, whereas 'practical freedom' requires the absence of determination by, specifically, sensuous (...) incentives. However, I argue that the defense of freedom presented in the Canon is abandoned by Kant in the Groundwork when he first develops his conception of the absolute purity of moral motivation. (shrink)

How can we ever find out whether our psychological processes are reliable? According to many reliabilists—e.g. Alston, Goldman, Papineau, and Van Cleve —there is no problem: We just use our psychological processes and then arrive at the belief that these very same processes are reliable. If our psychological processes are actually reliable, we can arrive in this way at a justified belief. And, indeed, we can even come to know that they are reliable.

Das Buch weist in exemplarischen Fallstudien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart die zentrale Rolle von Bildern für Prozesse der Vergemeinschaftung auf. Gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts setzt in der akademischen Diskussion eine verstärkte Rückwendung zum Konzept der Gemeinschaft ein.

Legislation and ethical guidelines around the globe call for effective human oversight of AI-based systems in high-risk contexts – that is oversight that reliably reduces the risks otherwise associated with the use of AI-based systems. Such risks may relate to the imperfect accuracy of systems (e.g., inaccurate classifications) or to ethical concerns (e.g., unfairness of outputs). Given the significant role that human oversight is expected to play in the operation of AI-based systems, it is crucial to better understand the conditions (...) for effective human oversight. We argue that the reliable detection of errors (as an umbrella term for inaccuracies and unfairness) is crucial for effective human oversight. We then propose that Signal Detection Theory (SDT) offers a promising framework for better understanding what affects people’s sensitivity (i.e., how well they are able to detect errors) and response bias (i.e., the tendency to report errors given a perceived evidence of an error) in detecting errors. Whereas an SDT perspective on the detection of inaccuracies is straightforward, we demonstrate its broader applicability by detailing the specifics for an SDT perspective on unfairness detection, including the need to choose a standard for (un)fairness. Additionally, we illustrate that an SDT perspective helps to better understand the conditions for effective error detection by showing examples of task-, system-, and person-related factors that may affect the sensitivity and response bias of humans tasked with detecting unfairness associated with the use of AI-based systems. Finally, we discuss future research directions for an SDT perspective on error detection. (shrink)

This interview deals with the major themes in the work of Ruth Millikan. Her most fundamental idea is that the intentionality of inner and outer representations can be understood in analogy to biological functions. Another innovative feature is the view that thought and language stand parallel to each other. Thirdly, the basic ideas concerning the ontology and the epistemology of concepts are explained. Millikan aims at clarifying her position by contrasting it with Dretske, Fodor, Sellars, and Brandom. Finally, the interview (...) addresses topics that pose problems for her account as well as questions she does not treat in her work. (shrink)

This volume provides an overview of the most recent developments in empirical investigations of morality and assesses their impact and importance for ethical thinking. It involves contributions of scholars both from philosophy, theology and empirical sciences with firm standings in their own disciplines, but an inclination to step across borders-in particular the one between the world of facts and the world of norms. Human morality is complex, and probably even messy-and this clean distinction becomes blurred whenever one looks more closely (...) at the various components that enable and influence our moral actions and ethical orientations. In that way, morality may indeed be located between facts and norms-and an empirically informed ethics that is less concerned with analytical purity but immerses into this moral complexity may be an important step to make the contributions of ethics to this world more valuable and relevant. (shrink)

The paper concerns the textual form of the sentence Crit. 48e4. A return to the transmitted infinitive πεῖσαι is proposed; at the same time, it is demonstrated that the sentence is thereby ambiguous. Yet, it can be shown that this ambiguousness does not render the passage meaningless. In fact, the transmitted text is interpretively extremely rich, because with the indefinite infinitive a central problem of the dialogue, the demand ‘to convince or obey’, is accentuated in a distinctive way, namely in (...) respect of the personal relation of the two philosophising friends. For the dramatic effect of the dialogue this passage is of great importance. (shrink)

Die Bildtheorie hat sich jüngst dem Begriff der Form zugewandt. Der interdisziplinäre Band verfolgt das Ziel, den vielfältigen Zusammenhängen von Form und Bild nachzugehen und ihre historischen, theoretischen und methodischen Voraussetzungen zu beleuchten. Das semantische Feld von Formbildung und Formbegriff umreisst einen Gegenstandsbereich, der eine doppelte Herangehensweise nahelegt: eine Untersuchung der theoretischen Implikationen von Formbegriffen der Moderne einerseits und eine historische Analyse spezifischer künstlerischer Positionen andererseits. Hat doch die Bildung konkreter Formen Auswirkungen auf deren begriffliche Reflexion. Der Terminus 'Form' bedeutet (...) ebenso emphatisch Grundform, auf das Wesentliche reduzierte Form, wie er die konkrete anschauliche Form in ihrer Gewordenheit, sinnlichen Fülle und Einbettung in kulturelle und kommunikative Zusammenhänge meint. (shrink)

Die von Kierkegaard zwischen Januar und September 1850 geführten NB-Journale enthalten autobiographische Notizen, philosophisch-theologische Reflexionen (etwa zur Hermeneutik) und Kommentare zu eigenen und fremden Werken (wobei das Spektrum der Lektüren von Hugo von St. Viktor bis zu Victor Hugo reicht). Die Texte ermöglichen so den Mitvollzug eines Denk- und Schreibprozesses, der nicht zuletzt Kierkegaards ständiger Selbstprüfung dient.

Das Interesse der Arbeit gilt den skeptischen Denk- und Ausdrucksformen, mit denen Hegel und Kierkegaard den Anspruch auf absolute Wahrheit verbinden.

Immer wieder in der Entwicklung des philosophischen und theologischen Denkens gab es Einzelne, die bestehende Ansichten radikal in Frage stellten. Manchmal wurden ihre Vorschläge angenommen und sie begründeten so eine neue Traditionslinie. Oft aber blieben sie Dissidenten und Ketzer, wurden verfolgt, verleugnet und nicht in die großen Verzeichnisse der seriösen Philosophen aufgenommen. Einzelne Ideen aus ihrem Werk wurden dann in einem neuen Kontext für das >offizielle Denken.

In contrast to Pylyshyn's view, there is no such thing as “reasoning in general.” Different types of reasoning tasks are solved with different reasoning strategies. A more specific null hypothesis is that spatial inference with mental images involves the same representational formalism as that of spatial inference with mental models. There is no evidence that this hypothesis must be rejected.

Im Zuge einer fortschreitenden Sakularisierung haben traditionelle religiose Weltbilder ihre Plausibilitat verloren. Knapp zeigt unter Heranziehung der Anerkennungstheorie, dass und wie eine christliche Gottesbeziehung auch in der Moderne gelebt und verantwortet und ein moglicher Gottesgedanke begrundet werden kann.

In "Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency", I aim to give a comprehensive interpretation and a qualified defense of Kant’s doctrine of freedom as a systematic conception of rational agency. -/- Although my book follows Kant in focusing on the idea of free will as a condition of moral agency, it denies that moral freedom of will is the only relevant (transcendental) type of freedom. Human beings also exercise absolute freedom of thought (intellectual autonomy) in their theoretical cognition. Moreover, our (...) creation and appreciation of beauty requires our freedom of imagination. I consider these three varieties of free agency both in their own rights and in their systematic connections, by examining how they differ from and yet relate to each other. On this basis, my interpretation shows that and why for Kant transcendental freedom is the proper anchor ("cardinal point") of all meaningful, rational human activity: our moral efforts to become more virtuous and to make the world a better place; our theoretical efforts to understand, explain and predict the world; and our aesthetic engagement with the world of beauty, both artistic and natural. -/- Additionally, "Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency" illuminates Kant's intricate, multifaceted account by considering the various metaphysical, semantic, epistemological and normative dimensions of Kantian freedom and by revealing their systematic interconnections. One significant benefit of tracing these links is that by doing so we can arrive at a charitable view of how Kant seeks to justify the belief in moral freedom of will. -/- For many commentators, Kant's appeal to a moral ‘fact of reason’ as our basis for believing in supersensible free will is an abject philosophical failure or a lapse into dogmatic rationalism. By contrast, I show that Kant justifies our belief in free will through a rather powerful, two-pronged argumentative strategy. First, he constructs a practical-moral proof of free will via the fact of reason doctrine. Second, he provides a theoretical defense of this moral proof against challenges arising from a naturalistic worldview. The linchpin of this defense is his argument that naturalistic cognizers must presuppose their epistemic freedom of thought as a necessary condition of all objective theoretical (including naturalistic) cognition. Since epistemic freedom of thought and moral freedom of will are both species of transcendental freedom, naturalists cannot (coherently) debunk our practical self-conception as transcendentally free moral agents. The appeal to epistemic freedom of thought provides no positive grounds for believing in a free moral will; but it shields our moral self-awareness (which does provide such grounds) against its most prominent detractors. -/- This defense strategy (among other aspects of Kant’s view that I examine in my book) shows that a significant part of Kant’s legacy is his abiding potential to challenge and provide alternatives to a naturalistic philosophical worldview (held by the “defender of an omnipotent nature”) according to which the mechanistic order of nature engulfs all metaphysical reality and (thereby) our entire humanity. (shrink)

This ‘technical memoir’ shares insider knowledge of a specific scholarly and scientific situation in the second half of the 1990s: how a group of students and researchers at Humboldt-University Berlin, together with their teacher, media historian Friedrich Kittler, combined historical questions with computer science. The discussions and projects developed in this circle constituted a scholarly practice which would be called today digital humanities.

The book creates a framework for a cohesive discourse, for a "new human ecology".

Historically, the problem of realism has often been viewed as an extension of the problem of the external world. At the same time, the assumption has often been made that realism is appropriate to some domains, while antirealism is appropriate to others. I here sketch a neutral realism that rejects both of these assumptions and thereby allows us to treat the realism debate independently of the debate over naturalism. The starting point of neutral realism is indeed neutral with respect to (...) any metaphysical commitment to the existence of some single totality of objects or facts, or to any unified all-encompassing domain that might be identified with nature. The resulting view is shown to open up new prospects for the treatment of the actuality of ethical or aesthetic values as well as for the question of the metaphysical relationship between concrete and abstract entities. (shrink)