Why would we want to develop artificial human-like arithmetical intelligence, when computers already outperform humans in arithmetical calculations? Aside from arithmetic consisting of much more than mere calculations, one suggested reason is that AI research can help us explain the development of human arithmetical cognition. Here I argue that this question needs to be studied already in the context of basic, non-symbolic, numerical cognition. Analyzing recent machine learning research on artificial neural networks, I show how AI studies could potentially shed (...) light on the development of human numerical abilities, from the proto-arithmetical abilities of subitizing and estimating to counting procedures. Although the current results are far from conclusive and much more work is needed, I argue that AI research should be included in the interdisciplinary toolbox when we try to explain the development and character of numerical cognition and arithmetical intelligence. This makes it relevant also for the epistemology of mathematics. (shrink)

Intellectual humility is an interesting but underexplored disposition. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’. We present a thesaurus-based method to map the semantic space (...) of intellectual humility as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological analysis of this disposition. We find three semantic clusters that compose intellectual humility: the sensible self, the discreet self, and the inquisitive self; likewise, we find three clusters that compose its contraries: the overrated self, the underrated other, and the underrated self. (shrink)

Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and connections between the two, by focusing on a real and detailed example (temperature) from the history of science. More specifically, our novel approach is to study the issue of validity based on the history of measurement in physics, which will lead to three concrete points that are relevant for the validity debate in psychology. First of all, studying (...) the causal mechanisms underlying the measurements can be crucial for evaluating whether the measurements are valid. Secondly, psychologists would benefit from focusing more on the robustness of measurements. Finally, we argue that it is possible to make good science based on (relatively) bad measurements, and that the explanatory success of science can contribute to justifying the validity of measurements. (shrink)

1. Bd. Die Grundlagen. Die spezielle Relativitätstheorie.- 2. Bd. Die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie.

In an important and widely discussed series of studies, Jonathan Phillips and colleagues have suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness has a substantial moral component. For in- stance, two persons who enjoy the same extent of positive emotions and are equally satisfied with their lives are judged as happy to different degrees if one is less moral than the other. Considering that the relation between morality and happiness or self-interest has been one of the central questions of moral philosophy (...) since at least Plato, such a result would be of considerable philosophical interest. On closer examination of the original research and new studies, we suggest that the data point to a different conclusion: in the dominant folk understanding of happiness, morality has no fundamental role. Findings seeming to indicate a moralized concept are better explained, we suggest, by folk theories on which extreme moral turpitude indicates that an individual suffers from psychological dysfunction. (shrink)

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend (...) a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism. (shrink)

This volume provides the reader with exclusive insights into Ernest Sosa’s latest ideas as well as main aspects of his philosophical work of the last 50 years. Ernest Sosa, one of the most distinguished contemporary philosophers, is best known for his ground-breaking work in epistemology, and has also contributed greatly to metaphysics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language.

Schelling entwirft in seiner Spätphilosophie einen neuen Philosophietypus, der in Konkurrenz zu Hegels Metaphysik tritt. Dabei greift er Hegel nicht nur auf dem Gebiet fundamentaler theoretischen Annahmen an, sondern sucht ihn insbesondere durch einen neuen Begriff von Religion zu überbieten. Die Arbeit untersucht dies im Ausgang von Schellings "Philosophie der Mythologie".

The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics. There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against the claim (...) that our perceptions are ‘locally conjoined’ with any entity (namely, a soul). (shrink)

The religious identity of Turkey’s Alevis, with the origins of their traditions, and in particular their relation to Islam, are the focus of a debate current in Turkey as well as in those western European countries with strong Turkish migrant populations. This debate began in the late 1980s, with the public coming-out of the Alevi community, when the Alevis set out on a manifest campaign to be recognized as a distinct cultural and/or religious tradition. Against the backdrop of this debate, (...) this article discusses the impact of Turkish politics of doxa on the possibilities of Alevi representation in Turkey. It gives particular attention to the implication of secularism and nationalism in the knowledge regime that subscribes heterodoxy to the Alevis – an ascription that secures their principal integratability in the Turkish nation, while at the same time preparing the ground for otherizing them from the Sunni majority perspective. (shrink)

Based on the philosophy of Michel Henry, the contributions of the anthology “Immanenz und Einheit” give different phenomenological and metaphysical foundations of the relation between immanence and unity, examine its perspectives for philosophy of religion and analyse its ethical consequences. Ausgehend vom Werk Michel Henrys geben die in der Festschrift „Immanenz und Einheit“ gesammelten Beiträge phänomenologische und metaphysische Grundlegegungen für das Verhältnis zwischen Immanenz und Einheit und untersuchen die religionsphilosophischen Perspektiven und ethischen Konsequenzen, die sich aus diesem Verhältnis ergeben.

Self-consciousness, first-person reference, and personal identity are linked fields of research. The book contains contributions from international researchers about topics like pre-reflective and reflexive consciousness, embodiment, temporality, self-location, and the practical implications of personal identity. Among the contributors are Amit Anurag, Irene Breuer, Tony Cheng, Heidi Haanila, Markus Herrmann, Muriel Leuenberger, Maik Niemeck and Jorg Noller.

Der Schweizer Johann Georg Zimmermann (1728-1795) gilt als Prototyp eines philosophischen Arzt-Schriftstellers. Die in der Forschungslandschaft Literarische Anthropologie angesiedelte Monographie untersucht einleitend Zimmermanns Bestimmung des Menschen im zeitgenössischen Kontext. Fünf daran anknüpfende Fragekreise analysieren sein Hauptwerk Über die Einsamkeit (1784/85). Der Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung fragt nach der Literarität von Zimmermanns Gesamtwerk vor dem epochalen Hintergrund, nach medizin- und wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Bezügen sowie nach seiner frommen Befürwortung der Aufklärung.

The threats we face today are unprecedented, from the existential crisis of climate change to the prospect of self-annihilation brought about by the uncontrolled expansion of AI. Add to this the crisis of liberal democracy and we seem to be swirling in a state of moral disarray, unsure whether there are any principles to which we can appeal today that would be anything other than particularistic. In contrast to this view, Markus Gabriel puts forward the bold argument that there (...) are guiding moral principles for human behaviour. These guiding principles extend across cultures, they are universally valid and form the source of universal values in the twenty-first century. In developing what he calls a 'New Moral Realism', Gabriel breathes new life into the idea that humanity's task on our planet is to enable moral progress through co-operation. It is only by achieving moral progress in a way that incorporates universal values - and thus embraces all of humanity - that we can avoid the abyss into which we will otherwise slide. Written with verve, wit and imagination, Gabriel's call for a new enlightenment is a welcome antidote to the value relativism and nihilism of our times and it lays out a moral framework within which we can work together, as surely we must, to deal with the great challenges we now face. (shrink)

The last decade has seen significant improvements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, including robotics, machine vision, speech recognition and text generation. Increasing automation will undoubtedly affect the future of work, and discussions on how the development of AI in the workplace will impact labor markets often include two scenarios: (1) labor replacement and (2) labor enabling. The former involves replacing workers with machines, while the latter assumes that human-machine cooperation can significantly improve worker productivity. In this context, it is often (...) argued that (1) could lead to mass unemployment and that (2) therefore would be more desirable. We argue, however, that the labor-enabling scenario conflates two distinct possibilities. On the one hand, technology can increase productivity while also promoting “the goods of work,” such as the opportunity to pursue excellence, experience a sense of community and contribute to society (human augmentation). On the other hand, higher productivity can also be achieved in a way that reduces opportunities for the “goods of work” and/or increases “the bads of work,” such as injury, reduced physical and mental health, reduction of autonomy, privacy and human dignity (human stunting). We outline the differences of these outcomes and discuss the implications for the labor market in the context of contemporaneous discussions on the value of work and human wellbeing. (shrink)

In seiner Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie geht es nicht nur um die einführende Darstellung von offensichtlichen Grundbegriffen der Erkenntnistheorie wie 'Erkenntnis', 'Gründe', 'Rechtfertigung', sondern auch um die Frage, wie Erkenntnis bzw. Wissen sich überhaupt in der Welt ereignet. Erkenntnis und Wissensansprüche gehören zu einer sozialen Umwelt, die ihrerseits zur Welt insgesamt gehört. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Einbettung von Erkenntnis in das Weltganze geht es um das Verhältnis von Erkenntnis und Welt. Denn jede Welterkenntnis ist auch ein Ereignis in der Welt. (...) Entsprechend kann man Erkenntnistheorie auch gar nicht völlig außerhalb des Kontextes anderer philosophischer Fragestellungen betreiben. Themen aus der neuzeitlichen und gegenwärtigen Theorie der Intentionalität und der Ontologie werden dementsprechend ebenfalls zu Rate gezogen, um die Frage, was Erkenntnis ist und wo ihre Grenzen liegen, in einem größeren Zusammenhang zu erörtern. Denn Erkenntnis ist ebenso wenig vom Rest der Welt isoliert wie irgendeine andere Tatsache oder irgendein anderes Ereignis. Erkenntnis steht der Welt nicht gegenüber, sondern findet sich in ihr vor. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich dem Schweizer Philosophen, Psychologen und Pädagogen Paul Häberlin (1878-1960). In ausgreifenden Studien wird das komplexe Werk Häberlins detailliert in philosophische und pädagogische Reflexionen gebrochen, wobei nicht das Fragmentarische als Errungenschaft eines aufgeklärten Geistes gefeiert, sondern als dessen Konvergenz ausgewiesen wird. Schließlich fügt sich Häberlins Bearbeitung der Moderne mit deren Dichotomie von Einheit und Vielheit zu einem summarischen Entwurf. Daraus ergeben sich Anknüpfungen, die Schnittstellen bezeichnen und offene Fragen der disziplinären Diskurse verhandeln.

Authentizität entwickelte sich im Lauf der letzten Jahrzehnte von einem ominösen "Wort aus der Fremde" (Theodor W. Adorno) zu einem omnipräsenten "Hauptwort der Moderne" (Alessandro Ferrara). Die vorliegenden Studien verfolgen das Ziel, die Grundlagen für ein genaueres Verständnis des Begriffs der Authentizität und der mit ihm verbundenen Verfahren der Authentifizierung zu schaffen, indem sie zentrale historische Ausprägungen und diskursive Verwendungsweisen ordnen und zueinander in Beziehung setzen. Im Fokus der Untersuchung steht dabei der historische Wechsel von Objekt- zu Subjektauthentizität, in dessen (...) Folge sich Verfahren der Authentifizierung zunehmend von überlieferten geschriebenen Texten (Textidentifikation) auf anwesende sprechende Individuen (Selbstidentifikation) verlagern. Mit der differenzierten Ausarbeitung der Begrifflichkeit von Authentizität und dem Vergleich verschiedener Formen der Authentifizierung wird in den ersten drei Abschnitten des Buches ein literatur-und sozialwissenschaftlich ausgerichtetes Beschreibungs- und Analyseinstrumentarium entwickelt, dessen Tauglichkeit und Ergiebigkeit im abschließenden vierten Abschnitt in Form von Lektüren dreier autobiografischer Texte aus dem Umfeld der "Neuen Subjektivität" konkret demonstriert wird. (shrink)

In Spengler fand die Weimarer Republik früh politisch ihre Nemesis. Nationalkonservativ gesinnt, kritisierte er die Mängel der Demokratie und forderte das Engagement des Einzelnen im Sinne einer gesellschaftlichen Wertschöpfung. Als Intellektueller und Schriftsteller polarisiert er Öffentlichkeit und Medien im In- und Ausland bis in die Gegenwart hinein.

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something (...) as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons. (shrink)

Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a philosophical perspective: underdetermination and (...) norm-circularity. His main negative result is that these arguments fall short of establishing epistemic relativism. -/- Despite arguing for epistemic absolutism, Seidel aims to provide an account of non-relative justification that nevertheless integrates the basic, correct intuition of the epistemic relativist. His main positive result is that the epistemic absolutist can very well accept the idea that people using different standards of justification can be equally justified in holding their beliefs: Rational disagreement, he maintains, is perfectly possible. -/- The book provides a detailed critique of relativism in the sociology of scientific knowledge and beyond. With its constructive part it aims at making conciliatory steps in a highly embittered discussion between sociology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

Leading linguists and philosophers report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. This book explores every dimension of this field, reporting critically on different lines of research, revealing connections between them, and highlighting current problems and opportunities.

The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal (...) libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed. (shrink)

Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...) I will argue that this challenge collapses once the underlying conditions on moral responsibility are specified in sufficient detail. I will argue, in other words, that the empirical evidence does not support a challenge to the assumption that we are, in general, morally responsible agents. In the final section, I will suggest that empirical research on human agency is nevertheless relevant to various questions about moral responsibility. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

The paper develops an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploits an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present on the basis of sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a “prediction of the past” on the basis of a minimal trace, i.e., an informationally sparse, merely causal link to a previous experience. The resulting notion of episodic memory (...) will be validated as a natural kind distinct from imagination. This trace minimalist view contrasts with two theory camps dominating the philosophical debate on memory. On one side, we face versions of the Causal Theory that hold on to the idea that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. The Causal Theory, however, fails to account for the epistemic generativity of episodic memory and is psychologically and information-theoretically implausible. On the other side, a new camp of simulationists is currently forming up. Motivated by empirical and conceptual deficits of the Causal Theory, they reject not only the necessity of preserving representational content, but also the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory. They argue that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination, peculiar only in that it has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one’s personal past. Albeit sharing their criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, rejecting its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, the paper argues that a causal connection to experience is still necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability. (shrink)

Die Interpretationen in diesem Band verfolgen das Ziel, das antike Ideal des Wissens historisch zu rekonstruieren, dem die klassische Philosophie ihre Gestalt verdankt. Denn bei Platon und bei Aristoteles hat die Wissenschaft noch Funktionen zu erfüllen, von denen heute in einer modernen Gesellschaft nur selten die Rede ist: Sie unterhält Beziehungen zu Fragen der antiken Religion, sie will die menschliche Seele von Schlamm befreien und der Begründung einer wahren Ordnung der Gesellschaft dienen. Der Weg von der göttlichen Logik zur menschlichen (...) Politik ist der steile Weg des Philosophen, auf dem er sich denkend abmüht. Winkt ihm dort oben auch die Glückseligkeit der Götter, stellt sich dem Philosophen hier doch zuallererst die Frage: Welche Politik? (shrink)