Education is a fundamental pillar in human development, and its evolution throughout history has been influenced by a variety of factors, including imaginative culture and human nature. In this study, we explore how educational methods have evolved in response to the interaction between these two aspects. We look at how human creativity, imagination, and adaptation have influenced the way we teach and learn, from early forms of knowledge transmission to more contemporary approaches focused on active student engagement and the development (...) of practical skills. Our research is based on a comprehensive review of the academic literature in the fields of education, evolutionary psychology, cultural anthropology, and imagination studies. We explore how societies have used imagination as a tool to transmit knowledge and values, as well as to foster creativity and individual expression. We also examine how adaptive aspects of human nature, such as the ability to learn collaboratively and adapt to changing environments, have influenced the way educational methods are designed. Our results show a clear evolution in educational methods over time, from approaches focused on the one-way transmission of knowledge to more interactive and participatory models that encourage exploration and discovery. We identify common patterns in the way societies have used imagination and adaptation to promote learning and socialization and discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary education. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between imaginative culture, human nature, and education. It provides a solid foundation for the design of educational methods that harness the innate creativity and adaptability of human beings and offers guidance for educators and policymakers on how to promote meaningful and lasting learning in today's world. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo se estructura en torno a dos ejes: la concepción de la filosofía como una actividad extremadamente recursiva en su aplicación al saber científico, a la ética y a la pedagogía; la discusión en torno al realismo y al papel que le cabe a las representaciones en la explicación de la cognición. Se pone énfasis en mostrar la plausibilidad de los enfoques antirrepresentacionistas o constructivistas en las ciencias cognitivas, en la medida que estos enfoques pretenden superar las limitaciones (...) y prejuicios que son propios de los enfoques computacionalistas y conexionistas que le precedieron.This paper consists of two main topics: the conception of philosophy as an extremely recursive activity applied to scientific, ethics and educational knowledge; the discussion about realism and the role of the representations in the explanation of cognition. The validity of the anti-representationism or constructivist-based perspectives, is highlighted in Cognitive Sciences where these pretend to overcome the limitations and prejudices that belong to the previous computacionalism and connectionism perspectives. (shrink)

Como muy bien lo dice el autor, su interesante libro fue fruto de una discusión a mitad del camino del último gobierno de 6 años que, en la multiplicidad de ensayos institucionales postdictadura, ha tenido el país: el de Ricardo Lagos. Este es un tema de debate en todos los países que han adoptado un sistema económico de más o menos libre mercado, y no lo es en los demás porque en ellos no se discute lo que sus gobiernos hacen.Finalmente, (...) como se recordará, dicho período presidencial concluy.. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.

In this paper, I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize experiences as “another one of those.” Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form “another experience of the same type,” which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we avoid the (...) circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same type without appealing to any further phenomenal concepts. However, he argues, this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, unable to reveal anything about their referents, which seems problematic. In this paper, I present a new version of the recognitional account that avoids the circularity worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.

The aim of this paper is to combine several Ivlev-like modal systems characterized by 4-valued non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices) with $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$, a 4-valued expansion of Belnap–Dunn’s logic $$FDE$$ with an implication introduced by Pynko in 1999. In order to do this, we introduce a new methodology for combining logics which are characterized by means of swap structures, based on what we call superposition of snapshots. In particular, the combination of $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$ with $$Tm$$, the 4-valued Ivlev’s version of KT, will (...) be analyzed with more details. From the semantical perspective, the idea is to combine the 4-valued swap structures (Nmatrices) for $$Tm$$ (and several of its extensions) with the 4-valued twist structure (logical matrix) for $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$. This superposition produces a universe of 6 snapshots, with 3 of them being designated. The multioperators over the new universe are defined by combining the specifications of the given swap and twist structures. This gives rise to 6 different paradefinite Ivlev-like modal logics, each one of them characterized by a 6-valued Nmatrix, and conservatively extending the original modal logic and $$\mathcal {IDM}4$$. This important feature allows to consider the proposed construction as a genuine technique for combining logics. In addition, it is possible to define in the combined logics a classicality operator in the sense of logics of evidence and truth (LETs). A sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatization is also presented for the 6 combined systems, as well as a Prolog program which implements the swap structures semantics for the 6 systems, producing a decision procedure for satisfiability, refutability and validity of formulas in these logics. (shrink)

For this handbook, we decided to combine a first strategy that looks at different research approaches and asks for their specific contribution to the study of science communication. This is the aim of section I. A second and third strategy is to describe main topics and central aspects of internal and external science communication. This is the aim of sections II and III, respectively: In section II the authors deal with text types, media, and practices of internal science communication. Section (...) III is devoted to external science communication and the relation between science, scientists, and the public. A fourth strategy is based on an evolutionary perspective: How has science communication evolved, what are current trends, and what could or should be future developments? In sections IV and V the authors share an evolutionary perspective: they deal with the history of science communication and with current and future trends. (shrink)

Verónica Adriana Ramírez, Eliana Ruetti: Memoria emocional en niñas y niños preescolares de diferentes condiciones socio-ambientales; Anne-Lise Saive: Reír para recordar: mejora de la memoria en relación con el humor; Veronika Diaz Abrahan, Maria Benitez, Leticia Sarli, Maximiliano Bossio, Nadia Justel: Memoria emocional. Una revisión sistemática sobre la capacidad modulatoria de la música, la actividad física y el bilingüismo; Matías Bonilla, Camila Isabel Jorge, Malen Daiana Moyano, Cecilia Forcato: Modificación de memorias maladaptativas durante el sueño y la vigilia: una visión (...) interdisciplinaria; María Angélica Fierro: Éros el memorioso; Marina Trakas: Dimensiones de análisis de los recuerdos personales como recuerdos afectivos; Marcelo Vieira Lopes: Sentimentos existenciais e memória corporal: Dois casos em filosofia da psiquiatria. -/- . (shrink)

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

En este artículo se discute acerca de la existencia y la consistencia de un concepto de naturaleza humana en la obra de Nietzsche que no recaería en los extremos de las lecturas biologicistas ni historicistas de la misma. Para ello se lleva a cabo una interpretación que aúna la consideración nietzscheana de la naturaleza y de la historia alrededor del concepto-matriz de lo ahistórico, lo que conducirá la reflexión inicial sobre la cultura a un análisis en términos ontológico-formales de la (...) naturaleza del hombre y de su anclaje en la del mundo. (shrink)

We here attempt to address certain criticisms of the philosophical import of the so-called Brazilian approach to paraconsistency by providing some epistemic elucidations of the whole enterprise of the logics of formal inconsistency. In the course of this discussion, we substantiate the view that difficulties in reasoning under contradictions in both the Buddhist and the Aristotelian traditions can be accommodated within the precepts of the Brazilian school of paraconsistency.

This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...) term ‘compatibilism’ as it is usual in the contemporary literature on free will, i.e., as the thesis that free will can exist even if determinism is true. Moreover, the conception of free will Gomes proposes actually has an incompatibilist commitment. I argue that, more than a mere terminological point, acknowledging the incompatibilist aspect of Gomes’ view motivates important questions about the details of the view and helps to reveal a limitation of his defense of the existence of free will. [Este artigo tem como tema o trabalho de Gilberto Gomes sobre o livre-arbítrio. Em uma série de contribuições que tiveram um impacto significativo na respectiva literatura, Gomes elaborou uma concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio e argumentou que sua existência é consistente com descobertas científicas recentes, especialmente na neurociência. Neste artigo, questiono uma afirmação de Gomes sobre sua concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio, a saber, que se trata de uma concepção compatibilista. Busco mostrar que Gomes não usa o termo ‘compatibilismo’ como é habitual na literatura contemporânea sobre o livre-arbítrio, isto é, como a tese segundo a qual o livre-arbítrio pode existir ainda que o determinismo seja verdadeiro. Ademais, a concepção sobre o livre-arbítrio desenvolvida por Gomes tem, efetivamente, um compromisso incompatibilista. Argumento que, mais do que uma mera elucidação terminológica, reconhecer o elemento incompatibilista presente na proposta de Gomes suscita questões importantes sobre os detalhes da proposta e também ajuda a reconhecer uma limitação de sua defesa da existência do livre-arbítrio.]. (shrink)

O objetivo do estudo é analisar a série De onde vem? , a qual introduz o conhecimento científico na infância, identificando aspectos que justifiquem o seu emprego como um recurso pedagógico adequado para a introdução de conceitos de Ciência de forma lúdica e dinâmica na infância. Os resultados apresentam aspectos gerais dos episódios da Série, além da descrição estrutural dos episódios de forma generalizada de acordo com as categorias sugeridas por Gomes (2008). A Série introduz conceitos científicos, presentes no cotidiano, (...) por meio de uma linguagem adequada à compreensão infantil, tornando, assim, este material uma importante alternativa de apoio ao professor do Ensino Fundamental para a introdução da ciência na infância. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to make a rhetorical analysis of the op-ed entitled «Finding Design in Nature» by Cardinal Christoph Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, published by The New York Times in 2005, three months after the death of John Paul II. In this essay, the Cardinal states that it is an error to affirm that Catholic doctrine is compatible with the «neo-Darwinist» theory of evolution and that the Roman Catholic Church accepts that theory. For the Archbishop, the origin (...) of this error lies in the abuses committed in the interpretation of John Paul’s 1996 speech in which the Pope affirmed that evolution was more than a hypothesis and showed himself more favourable towards evolutionary theory than his predecessors. In his article the Cardinal described that papal message as «vague and unimportant». In this paper, the rhetorical techniques used by Schönborn in his article are analysed: the lexical choices to make a negative assessment of «neo Darwinist» evolutionary theory; the argumentative definition to make a polemical description of that theory; and the polyphonic proceedures designed to decontextualise the papal discourse and present Catholic beliefs as the truth. We interpret Cardinal Schönborn’s position as a rhetorical change with respect to John Paul II’s 1996 speech. From our point of view, the Archbishop directed his criticism against evolutionary theory not only because of its scientific theories (not rejected by Church teaching) but also for being potentially dangerous in its use by certain authors as a scientific argument in defence of their atheism. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of some subvarieties of the variety Q of Q-Heyting algebras, that is, Heyting algebras with a quantifier. In particular, a deeper investigation is carried out in the variety Q subscript 3 of three-valued Q-Heyting algebras to show that the structure of the lattice of subvarieties of Q is far more complicated that the lattice of subvarieties of Heyting algebras. We determine the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras in Q subscript 3 and we construct (...) the lattice of subvarieties lambda (Q subscript 3) of the variety Q subscript 3. (shrink)