Mentoring Away the Glass Ceiling in Academia: A Cultured Critique describes how women of diverse backgrounds perceive their mentoring experiences or the lack of mentoring experiences in the academy. This book provides a space for envisioning strategies and practices to improve mentoring practices and the collegiate environment.

In their recent article in this journal, Giubilini, Gur-Arie, and Jamrozik argue that there is more to expertise than individual healthcare professionals’ knowledge of their fields. To be an expert is to be recognized as a credible authority, they explain, and being a credible authority necessitates trust. Among the core ethical principles they identify for trustworthy experts in medicine and healthcare are honesty, humility, and transparency. Here I aim to affirm these authors’ linkage of expertise and trust by decoupling both (...) from a presumptive norm of transparency. My suggestion is not that medical or healthcare experts should lie or deceive, but that articulating their credible authority in terms of transparency mischaracterizes things. We see this in several ways: through the negative epistemic effects of a general norm of expert transparency, the importance of discretion in healthy trust relations, and the need for relationally responsive interpretation in how medical and health experts communicate with different patients and publics across social-epistemic difference. (shrink)

I distinguish between instantial sentences (_There are elephants that swim_), particular quantification, and predication of existence in natural language. I explore the logical relation between the first two, while the last one is shown independent of either. I continue to consider the incorporation of the three kinds of sentence in the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). I provide formalisations that preserve the logical relations specified earlier. I also extend the analysis to quantified instantial sentences (_There are_ five _elephants that swim_) and (...) modal ones. A conclusion of this work is that quantification and instantial sentences provide no guide to ontology. (shrink)

This article applies the thesis of the extended mind to ambient smart environments. These systems are characterised by an environment, such as a home or classroom, infused with multiple, highly networked streams of smart technology working in the background, learning about the user and operating without an explicit interface or any intentional sensorimotor engagement from the user. We analyse these systems in the context of work on the “classical” extended mind, characterised by conditions such as “trust and glue” and phenomenal (...) transparency, and find that these conditions are ill-suited to describing our engagement with ambient smart environments. We then draw from the active inference framework, a theory of brain function which casts cognition as a process of embodied uncertainty minimisation, to develop a version of the extended mind grounded in a process ontology, where the boundaries of mind are understood to be multiple and always shifting. Given this more fluid account of the extended mind, we argue that ambient smart environments should be thought of as extended allostatic control systems, operating more or less invisibly to support an agent’s biological capacity for minimising uncertainty over multiple, interlocking timescales. Thus, we account for the functionality of ambient smart environments as extended systems, and in so doing, utilise a markedly different version of the classical thesis of extended mind. (shrink)

According to anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), logic is not as exceptional in terms of its subject matter and epistemology as has been conventionally thought. As such, AEL either outright rejects certain traditional properties of logic, such as its formality, apriority, or necessity, or rather proposes that while logic possesses these properties, it does so in a similar way to other research areas. In this second part of a two‐part entry on AEL, we focus on contemporary proposals for Methodological AEL, the (...) view that the mechanisms of theory‐choice in logic are similar to those in the sciences. Firstly, we consider the various contemporary motivations for Methodological AEL and highlight how these motivations need not equally motivate Evidential AEL, the view that the sources of logical evidence are the same as the sources of evidence within the sciences. Secondly, we discuss the two most prominent versions of Methodological AEL in the literature, logical abductivism and predictivism, and end by briefly outlining some of the important challenges presently facing Methodological AEL. (shrink)

This paper explores privation in the Statesman, first from a methodological point of view, and then politically. I begin (§1) with the Rule of Bisection (262a–e): classes should be bifurcated by form, which apparently excludes division by positive and negative terms (e.g. human and non-human). The significance of the restriction is debated. I argue that the correct interpretation must take into account the preponderance of privative terms in the subsequent divisions of animals. According to one definition, humans are two-footed, non- (...) interbreeding, hornless land animals; according to another, they are featherless, two-footed land animals (264d–266e). On my reading of the rule, classes should be bifurcated with reference to constitutive features of the resulting subclasses; while negative properties never satisfy this requirement, privations are in some cases partly constitutive of the target class in division. This insight allows me to offer a charitable reading of the Eleatic Stranger’s definitions of the human herd, which others have disparaged, as relevant for political theory (§2) and tightly linked with the Myth of the Ages (268e–274d) that follows these divisions (§3). In the final section, I sketch a unified outlook on the dialogue as concerned with effective political collaboration, under the supervision of a statesman who expertly integrates each member into the self-protective fabric of society (§4). (shrink)

This paper outlines a novel framing of the normative significance of health by considering the idea of ‘health capital’. Health capital is a set of health-related assets of individuals that enable them to pursue their interests and to collaborate with others. The specific contribution of this paper is to establish the notion of health capital beyond a metaphorical idea and to initially explore the repercussions of it for theories of health justice. We propose a sufficientarian approach to health capital justice. (...) Our theory claims that social justice requires enabling people to achieve enough health capital to meet threats to health. This is a dynamic ideal, establishing claims of justice over time. The overarching goal is to avoid disadvantageous tipping points of health depletion. (shrink)

I track the origin in Wittgenstein's work of Waismann's concept of open texture and compare their related ideas. Although Waismann published his work on open texture before the publication of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, he had access to drafts of that work and to other writings of Wittgenstein and heard him present related ideas. A key example of his is closely derived from Wittgenstein's work. We shall see advantages of Wittgenstein's ideas over Waismann's. Waismann does not satisfactorily distinguish semantic from epistemic (...) points; he seems to think that drawing boundaries is done only by definitions; he unjustly sees open texture as the possibility of vagueness, which he problematically conceives as a fluctuating use of a word, and more. In all these respects, Wittgenstein is more precise in his characterisation of the idea. Accordingly, we better follow Wittgenstein in our use of the concept of open texture. (shrink)

An important strand of argument in Alastair Norcross's Morality by Degrees: Reasons without Demands is the rejection of the standard account of harm, which underwrites non-comparative statements of the form “act A harms person X.” According to Norcross, the correct account of harm is a contextualist one that only underwrites comparative statements of the form “act A results in a worse world for X than alternative act B, and a better world than alternative act C.” This article criticizes Norcross's contextualist (...) account and his rejection of the standard account. It follows that moral theorists of all kinds should not be deterred by Norcross's arguments from continuing to rely on the standard account and using it to non-comparatively categorize some acts as harmings. (shrink)

According to Daniel Philpott (2009, 2019, 2021), religious activity can be understood as meaningfully distinct from political activity. Call this the distinct sphere claim. In this article, I will argue that the distinct sphere claim should be rejected. I will consider three different arguments for the distinct sphere claim that Philpott appears to offer: that it is generally accepted by adherents of religions; that it follows from a suitable definition of religion; and that it is supported by everyday intuitions about (...) religion. I will show that all three arguments are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Is or has economics ever been the imperial social science? Could or should it ever be so? These are the central concerns of this book. It involves a critical reflection on the process of how economics became the way it is, in terms of a narrow and intolerant orthodoxy, that has, nonetheless, increasingly directed its attention to appropriating the subject matter of other social sciences through the process termed "economics imperialism". In other words, the book addresses the shifting boundaries between (...) economics and the other social sciences as seen from the confines of the dismal science, with some reflection on the responses to the economic imperialists by other disciplines. Significantly, an old economics imperialism is identified of the "as if market" style most closely associated with Gary Becker, the public choice theory of Buchanan and Tullock and cliometrics. But this has given way to a more "revolutionary" form of economics imperialism associated with the information-theoretic economics of Akerlof and Stiglitz, and the new institutional economics of Coase, Wiliamson and North. Embracing one "new" field after another, economics imperialism reaches its most extreme version in the form of "freakonomics", the economic theory of everything on the basis of the most shallow principles. By way of contrast and as a guiding critical thread, a thorough review is offered of the appropriate principles underpinning political economy and its relationship to social science, and how these have been and continue to be deployed. The case is made for political economy with an interdisciplinary character, able to bridge the gap between economics and other social sciences, and draw upon and interrogate the nature of contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

A response to commentaries on Park and Davies (2024) 'Rationing, Responsibility, and Vaccination During COVID-19: A Conceptual Map'.

In a world of industralized farming and feed lots, is eating meat ever a morally responsible choice? Is eating organic or free range sufficient to change the moral equation? Is there a moral cost in not eating meat? As billions of animals continue to be raised and killed by human beings for human consumption, affecting the significance and urgency in answering these questions grow. This volume collects twelve new essays by leading moral philosophers who address the difficult questions surrounding meat (...) eating by examining various implications and consequences of our food choices. Some argue for the moral permissibility of eating meat by suggesting views such as farm animals would not exist and flourish otherwise, and the painless death that awaits is no loss to them. Others consider more specific examples like whether buying french fries at McDonalds is just as problematic as ordering a Big Mac due to the action's indirect support of a major purveyor of meat. The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat is a stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate on meat consumption and actively challenges readers to reevlaute their stand on food and animal ethics. (shrink)

Advocates of Structuralist theories of phenomenal intentionality maintain that the content of perceptual experiences depends on the relations among their phenomenal components. This paper extends this view beyond basic perceptual experiences to mental imagery and experiences of seeing-as without relying on cognitive phenomenology. I develop a Structuralist account of mental imagery that distinguishes between two types of imaginative content, one of which is determined by an image’s sensory phenomenal character, while the other derives from the representation that produced the image. (...) This proposal is then combined with a treatment of certain representations I call perceptual concepts to provide a Structuralist account of experiences of seeing-as. On this account, the deployment of perceptual concepts in experiences of seeing-as alters the phenomenal character and content of such experiences by imbuing them with imagery, thereby making them perceptual/imaginative hybrids. (shrink)

The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots in academic peer review (PR) has sparked both excitement and concern, raising critical questions about the future of scientific integrity. This paper examined how AI tools, particularly Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer, are reshaping scientific PR. As these tools become more prevalent in academic evaluation, they bring both opportunities and challenges to scholarly communication. AI assistance offers valuable benefits: it can speed up review processes, help non-native English speakers express their ideas clearly, and (...) improve overall text readability. However, our research revealed growing concerns about whether AI-assisted reviews can maintain the depth and authenticity that quality PR demands. We explored how the scientific community can balance these technological capabilities with the need for thorough, expert-driven evaluation. The potential for AI to introduce bias, overlook novel contributions, and promote uniformity in feedback threatens the nuanced insights traditionally offered by human experts. In this review we critically evaluated the ethical implications of AI use in PR, focusing on three main issues: (i) The risks associated with over-reliance on AI tools by reviewers, including diminished engagement and critical thinking; (ii) The need for transparency and disclosure when AI tools assist in review generation; and (iii) The creation of ethical guidelines to balance AI’s capabilities with human expertise. With AI’s increasing role in academia, the academic community shall address these ethical challenges by establishing robust policies that ensure AI complements rather than replacing human judgment. We call for immediate action to develop clear guidelines governing AI’s role in academic evaluation, promoting a transparent and responsible use of AI that upholds the integrity of PR, which is essential for the advancement of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [41] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest’s logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau’s argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter (...) and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments, the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialetheism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature. (shrink)

Many philosophers endorse the view that global or “narrative” features of a life at least partly determine its value. For instance, a life in which the subject redeems her past failures and sacrifices with later successes is thought to be better, ceteris paribus, than one in which her later successes are unrelated to her previous failures. In this paper I distinguish some views about narrative value, including Fischer’s views about the importance of free will for narrative value, and raise a (...) number of problems for the idea of narrative value. (shrink)

None of us can avoid being interested in food. Our very existence depends on the supply of safe, nutritious foods. It is then hardly surprising that food has become the focus of a wide range of ethical concerns: Is the food we buy safe? Is it produced by means which respect the welfare of animals and sustain the land? Are modern biotechnologies employed in food production immoral? This book addresses such issues by applying ethical principles to many areas of current (...) concern. The contributors provide original and thought-provoking treatments of a number of highly topical issues - from global hunger and its ethical implications to the cultural habits affecting consumption. This interdisciplinary study will prove to be essential reading for all those concerned with food, as professionals, students or consumers. (shrink)

PANDEMIA Y ÉTICA es una introducción clara y provocativa a los temas éticos del COVID-19, apropiada para estudiantes de nivel universitario, académicos y diseñadores de políticas públicas, así como para el público general. Es también una contribución original a la literatura emergente acerca de este importante tema. El autor ha lanzado este libro con acceso abierto para pueda ser descargado y leído en forma gratuita por todas las personas interesadas en estas cuestiones. Algunas de las características principales de este libro (...) son: - Una clara organización de los temas éticos planteados por la pandemia. - Una exploración de las múltiples y complejas interrelaciones entre estos temas. - Un argumento conciso a favor de un confinamiento continuado hasta que desarrollemos una vacuna. - Una formulación original del Profundo Problema Ético de la Pandemia, así como un Argumento Revolucionario acerca de cómo deberíamos cambiar a la sociedad después de la pandemia. - Referencias a, e interacciones con, muchos de los mejores escritos sobre la pandemia hasta ahora (tanto en medios de comunicación populares como en revistas especializadas). (shrink)

Whilst certain verbs may appear in both the intransitive inchoative and the transitive causative constructions (The ball rolled/The man rolled the ball), others may appear in only the former (The man laughed/*The joke laughed the man). Some accounts argue that children acquire these restrictions using only (or mainly) statistical learning mechanisms such as entrenchment and pre-emption. Others have argued that verb semantics are also important. To test these competing accounts, adults (Experiment 1) and children aged 5–6 and 9–10 (Experiment 2) (...) were taught novel verbs designed to be construed — on the basis of their semantics — as either intransitive-only or alternating. In support of the latter claim, participants' grammaticality judgments revealed that even the youngest group respected these semantic constraints. Frequency (entrenchment) effects were observed for familiar, but not novel, verbs (Experiment 1). We interpret these findings in the light of a new theoretical account designed to yield effects of both verb semantics and entrenchment/pre-emption. (shrink)

Through a re-articulation of Derridean différance, Bernard Stiegler claims that the human is defined by an originary default that displaces all psychic and social life onto technical supplements. His philosophy of technics re-articulates the logic of the supplement as concerning both human reflexivity and its supports, and the history of the différance of life itself. This has been criticised for reducing Derrida's work to a metaphysics of presence, and for instituting a humanism of the relation to the inorganic. By refuting (...) these claims, this article will show that Stiegler's doubling of différance enables him to articulate the human as constituted by both the individuation characteristic of ‘life’, and that of a technical, psychic, and collective individuation. Putting forward a reading of the logic of the trace in life, and emphasising the aspects of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that Stiegler uses in his reading of Derrida, I will demonstrate that the political stakes of adaption and adoption in his Noopolitics require this re-articulation of différance. Technics shapes the human future, arising from this differential mutation; marking the invention of the human as the site of the political. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument‐structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., *Don’t giggle me) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax‐semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy‐two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (...) (*The funny man’s joke giggled Bart) and lower (*The funny man giggled Bart) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more‐direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less‐direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great. (shrink)

The concept of well-being plays a central role in moral and political theory. Policies and actions are justified or criticized on the grounds that they make people better or worse off. But is there really such a thing as well-being, and if so, what is it? Is it pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, virtue, achievement, some combination of these, or something else entirely? How can we measure well-being, amongst individuals and society? And how can we use it to make moral judgements about (...) people, policies and institutions? In this entertaining and accessible new book, Ben Bradley guides readers through the various philosophical theories of well-being, such as hedonism, perfectionism and pluralism, showing the benefits and drawbacks of each theory. He explores the role of well-being in moral and political theory, and the limitations of welfare-based approaches to ethics such as utilitarianism and welfare egalitarianism. Finally, he introduces puzzles about well-being that arise in moral and prudential deliberations about procreation and death. Well-Being is an ideal introduction to these topics for those with no philosophical background, or for philosophers looking for an overview of current thinking about the subject. (shrink)

The notion of financialisation as the exploitation or expropriation of workers’ wages in the sphere of exchange is taken as a critical point of departure. In this way, financialisation is more deeply rooted in contemporary developments, including the slowdown preceding the current global crisis, and in Marx’s own theory of finance. Financialisation is seen to represent the increasing penetration of interest-bearing capital across economic and social reproduction and to be a key defining moment of neoliberalism.

Abstract:Recently the scope of protections afforded those healthcare professionals and institutions that refuse to provide certain interventions on the grounds of conscience have expanded, in some instances insulating providers (institutional and individual) from any liability or sanction for harms that patients experience as a result. With the exponential increase in the penetration of Catholic-affiliated healthcare across the country, physicians and nurses who are not practicing Catholics are nevertheless required to execute documents pledging to conform their patient care to the Ethical (...) and Religious Directives for Health Care Services as a condition of employment or medical staff privileges. In some instances, doing so may result in patient morbidity or mortality or violate professional standards for respecting advance directives or surrogate decisionmaking. This article challenges the ethical propriety of such institutional mandates and argues that legal protections for conscientious refusal must provide redress for patients who are harmed by care that falls below the prevailing clinical standards. (shrink)

Toulmin’s formulation of “analytic arguments” in his 1958 book, The Uses of Argument, is opaque. Commentators have not adequately explicated this formulation, though Toulmin called it a “key” and “crucial” concept for his model of argument macrostructure. Toulmin’s principle “tests” for determining analytic arguments are problematic. Neither the “tautology test” nor the “verification test” straightforwardly indicates whether an argument is analytic or not. As such, Toulmin’s notion of analytic arguments might not represent such a key feature of his model. Absent (...) a clearer formulation of analytic arguments, readers of Toulmin should be hesitant to adopt this terminology. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of blame in organizations. Existing work suggests that ‘no-blame’ approaches may be conducive to organizational learning and may foster innovation. However, both the apparently strong public appetite for blaming, and research into no-blame approaches, suggest that wider application of ‘no-blame’ in organizations may not be straightforward. The article explores the contribution of the rich philosophical literature on blame to this debate, and considers the implications of philosophical ideas for the no-blame idea. In doing so, it (...) identifies conceptual and practical issues, sheds light on why the benefits of ‘no-blame’ may be difficult to realize, and offers the basis for an alternative approach. The article also contributes by providing foundations for future research, and identifies some fruitful lines of enquiry. (shrink)

The First Last Man is the third installment of Hunt’s trilogy on Shelley’s thought. It deftly weaves together different interpretive and political theory methods. Her careful archival work in particular stands out. She uses Shelley’s journals as an entry into the author’s psyche and motivations for writing The Last Man. While walking the reader through the journals, Hunt convincingly shows the cathartic role that writing The Last Man had for the young Shelley after her husband drowned and her first three (...) children all died. Just as Lionel Verney, the protagonist of The Last Man, chooses to push forward and find meaning in the world even as it falls apart around him, so too does Shelley. (shrink)

None of us can avoid being interested in food. Our very existence depends on the supply of safe, nutritious foods. It is then hardly surprising that food has become the focus of a wide range of ethical concerns: Is the food we buy safe? Is it produced by means which respect the welfare of animals and sustain the land? Are modern biotechnologies employed in food production immoral? This book addresses such issues by applying ethical principles to many areas of current (...) concern. The contributors provide original and thought-provoking treatments of a number of highly topical issues - from global hunger and its ethical implications to the cultural habits affecting consumption. This interdisciplinary study will prove to be essential reading for all those concerned with food, as professionals, students or consumers. (shrink)

The concept of person is integral to bioethical discourse because persons are the proper subject of the moral domain. Nevertheless, the concept of person has played no role in the prevailing formulation of human death because of a purported lack of consensus concerning the essential attributes of a person. Beginning with John Locke's fundamental proposition that person is a ‘forensic term’, I argue that in Western society we do have a consensus on at least one necessary condition for personhood, and (...) that is the capacity for conscious experience. When we consider the whole brain formulation of death, and the most prominent defense of it by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, we can readily identify the flaws that grow out of the failure to define human death as the permanent loss of the capacity for conscious experience. Most fundamental among these flaws is a definition of human death that reduces persons to the capacity of the brain to regulate purely physiological functioning. Such a formulation would, in theory, apply to any member of the animal kingdom. I suggest that an appropriate concept of death should capture what it is about a particular living being that is so essential to it that the permanent loss of that thing constitutes death. What is essential to being a human being is living the life of a person, which derives from the capacity for conscious experience. (shrink)

Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an (...) explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met. (shrink)

Political theorists have developed and refined the concept of culture through much critical discussion with anthropology. This article will deepen this engagement by claiming that political theory...

In this paper I argue that applied philosophers hoping to develop a stronger role in public policy formation can begin by aligning their methods with the tools employed in the policy sciences. I proceed first by characterizing the standard view of policymaking and policy education as instrumentally oriented toward the employment of specific policy tools. I then investigate pressures internal to philosophy that nudge work in applied philosophy toward the periphery of policy debates. I capture the dynamics of these pressures (...) by framing them as the “dilemma dilemma” and the “problem problem.” Seeking a remedy, I turn to the interdisciplinarity of a unique approach to policymaking generally known as the “policy sciences.” Finally, I investigate the case of bioethics, an instance where philosophy has made decent headway with policymakers. From this I draw parallels to public policy. I suggest that because the policy sciences are essentially analchemist’s brew of academic fields, and because philosophy covers many of the foundational questions associated with these fields, it is only natural that applied philosophers should begin collaborations with other applied academics by adopting the strategies that have so successfully applied in other theoretical fields. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction. By Fletcher Guy.