The publication of "The Practice of Liberal Pluralism" by Willam Galston has appeared as an event of first importance regarding contemporary theory about the relation between pluralism and liberalism. William Galston’s theory has had a visible evolution: in "Liberal Purposes", the main object is a critique of neutralism and a defence of perfectionist liberalism, whereas "Liberal Pluralism" main concern was to draw the limits of state intervention. This evolution is the object of numerous questions in the following discussion. "The Practice (...) of Liberal Pluralism" operates an interesting synthesis on this point. Galston defines himself as a liberal pluralist such as Berlin, but although he acknowledges that conflict between values can be tragic, he minimizes this aspect in the following discussions, and considers the possibility of having prima facie duties. One of the main arguments for the defence of value pluralism is its capacity to explain the complexity of the moral universe. Galston endorses a political pluralism, which means that the sources of authority are multiple. Galston’s liberalism is very tolerant regarding non-liberal communitarian practices, although this tolerance is based on the defence of an exit right, which is a fundamental notion in his theory. In the following discussion, Galston proposes how to understand this right of exit in an adequate manner. (shrink)

The Proceedings of the National Summit on Legal Preparedness for Obesity Prevention and Control is based on a two-part conceptual framework composed of public health and legal perspectives. The public health perspective comprises the six target areas and intervention settings that are the focus of the obesity prevention and control efforts of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.This paper presents the legal perspective. Legal preparedness in public health is the underpinning of the framework for the four “assessment” papers and (...) the four “action” papers that are integral to the application of public health law to any particular health issue. In addition, this paper gives real-world grounding to the legal framework through examples that illustrate the four core elements of legal preparedness in public health that are at work in obesity prevention and control. (shrink)

Every essay in The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic deals with various problems arising from "possible world semantics." A philosopher with little understanding of these problems naturally approaches a book having such a title with some trepidation. It is clear enough what the logic of epistemology is; the notion of an epistemology of logic is intelligible only from a certain philosophical perspective. Those philosophers who think of "possible world semantics" as a basically misconceived endeavor will find very (...) little in this book to make them reconsider their position. Jaakko Hintikka notes in his introduction that "expressions of frustration and criticisms have been levelled at the entire enterprise...," and recognizes that a systematic treatment is needed. He does not pretend that this book is such a treatment, and indeed it is not. It is simply a collection of fourteen essays. Merrill Hintikka is credited as the co-author of two of the essays, and her help with others is acknowledged. (shrink)

puri in 1026 can hardly be right. Bed-wetting is normally confined to children, and tum quibus…in 1030 presupposes the mention of an earlier stage of life in the previous sentence. And what does puri mean? Munro and Bailey translated it as ‘cleanly people’ , though Munro himself pointed out that the Latin for this was mundi rather than puri, and in any case there is no reason to suppose that in ancient Rome cleanly people were addicted to bed-wetting. Giussani, followed (...) by Merrill and by Leonard and Smith, tried to give the required sense by supposing that puri meant ‘innocents’ and hence ‘children’, an expedient which is very far from convincing. Emendation seems called for. M. F. Smith in the 1982 edition of the Loeb Lucretius adopts Avancius' multi,2 but this does not provide the reference we need to the age of those concerned. (shrink)

Talent and Education was first published in 1960. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.The problem of identification, development, and utilization of talented young people is a matter of prime concern to all who are interested in the welfare of the individual and the future of the nation. This book, constituting a progress report on research related to the problem, will be of (...) particular value to educators, psychologists, social workers, community leaders, and others who are engaged in the effort to make the most of our human resources.The volume contains chapters by a number of contributors drawn from various fields in elementary, secondary, and higher education. The contributors include John E. Anderson, Robert H. Beck, Florence N. Brumbaugh, Walter W. Cook, Willis E. Dugan, Dale B. Harris, Arthur J. Lewis, Catherine Cox Miles, Mary Pilch, Maynard C. Reynolds, Anne Roe, Merrill F. Roff, Paul C. Rosenbloom, Audrey Shechtman, and E. Paul Torrance. Orville L. Freeman, governor of Minnesota, writes an indtroduction.Among the topics discussed are the nature and scientific measurement of talent, the effects of life experiences on the development of talent, the enrichment of school curricula, special grouping and acceleration in the schools, psychological aspects of some of the problems, and Russian methods of dealing with individual differences. The volume is based on papers from an Institute on Exceptional Children held at the University of Minnesota. (shrink)

Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the meaning of the word 'property,' the concept of property, and the nature of property. For much of the twentieth century, the work of W.N. Hohfeld and Tony Honoré represented a consensus around property. The consensus often went under the heading of property as bundle of rights, or more accurately as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. But by the mid-l 990s, (...) the consensus was under attack. Key figures in the attack were James Penner, a legal philosopher, and Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, two highly regarded professors of property law. This article aims to repel the attack and argues for property as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. The positive case for this view of property pays special attention to the philosophy of language and the analysis of concepts. The positive case also maintains that the right to use and the power to transfer are as central to property as the right to exclude. It is possible that the virtues of Smith's modular theory of property differ from the virtues of a well-crafted bundle theory. Indeed, it may be the case that these two theories throw light on different features of property law and are not, save at the margin, competitors with each other. The label 'new essentialism' sometimes applied to the work of Penner, Merrill, and Smith seems inapt if property does not have an essence. Of course, they might refuse the label. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 95 OCKHAM ON INTUITIVE COGNITION t In the first part of what follows, I try to locate Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition in the context of one set of philosophical problems rather than another. The device I use is to emphasize the major error Ockham wants to avoid: "platonism" rather than scepticism. In the second part, I try to show how difficulties raised by some recent (...) commentary result from the wrong orientation. This very limited project involves neither exposition nor assessment of Ockham's proposed solutions for the philosophical problems. But hopefully it will prove useful or at least suggestive for others working in this or related areas in Ockham. According to Ockham, 2 someone can be said to hold to or cognize a proposition evidently when he knows it to be true. The paradigm of knowing something to be true is seeing that it follows from the premisses in a demonstrative syllogism. However, first principles, or any proposition per se nota, can also be known to be true or cognized evidently. And, what is most important for our purposes, contingent propositions can be cognized evidently when, as one might say, they are known in experience. When someone is looking at a white wall, to ~se one of Ockham's examples, he can cognize evidently the proposition "The wall is white." 3 i Aside from a few quotations, I have given only the location of references in Ockham. Only very extensive quotations would make the article self-sufficient or, for that matter, even be helpful to the reader. My effort is both tentative and parasitic on earlier commentary and can, perhaps, be excused from providing logistic support that would far exceed its own weight. Moreover, I have tried to direct the reader to the most convenient materials, using fairly common or obvious abbreviations for Ockham's writings and the symbols given in the brackets for each of these sources. [Baudry] L Baudry, Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris, 1958). [McKeon] R. McKeon, Selections /tom Medieval Philosophers, Vol. II (New York, 1929). This almost literal translation of selected Quodlibeta is sufficient for my present purposes. The Strasbourg edition of 1491, of course, is not more readily available m the reimpression from Louvain, Editions de la Biblioth~que Sd., 1962. [OPW] P. Boehner, Ockham: Philosophical Writings (New York, 1957). The page numbers given are from the Nelson edition, containing both Latin and English. The Library of Liberal Arts (Bobbs-Merrill) edition which consists only of the English text runs from one to sixteen pages ahead as a result of numbering the blank pages at the beginning of each section. [Ordinatio] Opera Philosophica et Theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967). Vol. I: Scripture in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Prologus et Distinctio Prima, edited by G. Gal and S. Brown. The lines referred to are given as superscripts to the page numbers. a Expos. Physicorum, Prologue ([OPW] pp. 4-5). See also [Baudry] under scire and evidens. a The issue of translation raises a host of problems of varying degrees of philosophical importance. I am not settled in my own mind about the best English equivalents for many important terms, and in my translations and commentary I have not tried for consistency. In principle, I prefer odd or quaint terms, since they bear their faults on their 96 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY At one point, Ockham gives this description: Whoever knows some proposition evidently cannot dissent from that proposition by the power of the will alone, but it is necessary that he be persuaded by an argument more strongly moving his intellect to dissent, or it is necessary that he have forgotten something evidently known.4 Let me call your attention to the un-Cartesian way in which Ockham removes the judgement of some contingent (and all necessary) propositions from the (total) dominion of the will. I may remain silent or talk of something else, or I may avail myself of questions and conditionals, but if I intend to deal head-on with equals added to equals or (while looking at the white wall) with walls and whiteness, I cannot but assert that equals added to equals are equal or... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC PRIDE AND LIBERAL VICE 1 PAUL J. WEITHMAN University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana L IBERALISM IS often portrayed, and sometimes portrays itself, as a moral and political view that rejects the claims of tradition. Thus liberals characteristically claim that the traditional standing of a social arrangement contributes little or nothing to its political legitimacy. Whether an arrangement is legitimate depends upon whether or not those who (...) currently live under it can understand and accept its rationale. Members of each generation must be able to examine arrangements as if they themselves were signatories of the social contract; the justification of regimes must, as it were, be susceptible of renewal in every age and to every citizen. Jefferson gave this view its most extreme expression when he claimed that each generation has the right to begin its nation's political life anew, and that national constitutions should be rewritten every two decades.2 Liberals often seem no kinder to intellectual than to political traditions. As they think political life can periodically begin anew, so they sometimes seem to think that political and moral philosophy can begin anew. Hobbes famously castigated the obscurities of scholasticism and argued that political philosophy could achieve firm footing only if the rubble of the past were swept away.3 Liberal contract theorists have followed Hobbes's lead, developing political theories that rely not at all upon classi1 Thanks to Alasdair Macintyre, David O'Connor, Michael Pakaluk, David Solomon, Eleonore Stump, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend, Prof. Judith Shklar. 2 See Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789 (The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Viking, 1977], 444ff.), as well as his lesser known missive to Samuel Kercheval of July 12, 1816 (ibid., SS2ff.). 3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 727, for an especially pungent expression of a view that runs throughout the Leviathan. 241 242 PAUL J. WEITHMAN cal and medieval moral philosophy. To take but one example of this neglect of the past, the ethical writings of scholasticism are dominated by richly detailed analyses of the virtues and vices, yet liberal writers roundly ignore these discussions. Liberals have been quick to defend their suspicions of the thought and politics of the past, but critics of liberalism have been equally quick to seize upon them. Champions of virtue ethics have been among the most vocal critics of liberalism in recent years, arguing that liberals court philosophical peril by neglecting the insights of earlier moral theories. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century opponent of liberalism, had an additional complaint. Burke discerned an arrogance in the liberal rejection of intellectual and political tradition. It was mere pride, Burke thought, to suppose that politics and political theory could be made transparent to the reason of every individual in the way that liberals sometimes claim.4 Burke's allegation that the liberal rejection of tradition reflects pride is ironic, for pride is a central element of one of the traditions of moral thought that liberals seem determined to reject. During a lengthy period of philosophy's history, pride was thought to be a motive of all wrong action. The biblical book of Sirach says that pride is the beginning of all evil5 and a long line of medieval moralists labored to explain how this might be so. Yet the tradition of moral thought that accorded pride so central a role now suffers from neglect at the hands of many philosophers. And pride itself is a vice that many philosophers now consider unworthy of attention. Most fail to consider it seriously as a motive for any wrong action at all. I have three aims in this paper. One is to examine pride's neglect more closely. I shall argue that pride suffers this neglect because of its centrality to a religiously based tradition of moral thought that many philosophers no longer accept. The alleged connection between pride and religion is, I shall argue, suggestive. It suggests what an account of pride would have to include 4 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:94. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1976 A fairly complete coverage of the recent Hume literature up to 1970 is available in my booklet, A Hume Bibliography from 1930 (York, 1971; obtainable direct from the author, post free, on payment of jé 1.25 within the U.K., c^3.00 or $8.00 elsewhere). Coverage up to 1975 is obtained when this is combined with the addenda and supplement published in the Philosophical Quarterly (...) in January 1976. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of 1976. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year. In a forthcoming book (Edinburgh University Press; probable title, Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship) I have tried to provide all that the student of Hume needs as a guide to the secondary literature: an introductory essay on the development of Hume scholarship up to the present time, thorough coverage of the Hume literature from 1925 to 19 76, with indexing by author, language, and subject, and also a list of the main writings on Hume earlier this century. The following abbreviations of journal titles have been used: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie 95. RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious. ALEJANDRO, de, J. M. 'El atomismo gnoseologico de David Hume (1711-1776)', Pensamiento 32, 383-403. ANDERSON, R. F. 'The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions', in Livingston & King (see below), 153-71. ARDAL, P. S. 'Some Implications of the Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume's Treatise', in Livingston & King, 91-106. ARDLEY, G. 'Hume's Common Sense Critics', RIP 30, 104-2 5. ATKINSON, R. F. 'Hume on the Standard of Morals', in Merrill & Shahan (see below), 25-44. BAGOLINI, L. David Hume e Adam Smith: Elementi per una ricerca di filosofia giuridica e politica. Bologna. BAYLES, M. D. 'Hume on Blame and Excuse', Hume Studies 2, 17-35. BEANBLOSSOM, R. E. 1A New Foundation for Humean Scepticism1, Phil. Studies 29, 207-10. BEAUCHAMP, T. L. 'An Analysis of Hume's Essay "On Suicide"', RM 30, 73-95. BERfIAN, D. "David Hume on the 1641 Rebellion in Ireland', Studies: a Quarterly Review 65, 101-102. BIRO, J. I. 'Hume on Self-Identity and Memory", RM 30, 19-38. BJELKE, J. F. 'Wirklichkeitserkenntnis und Wirklichkeitsimagination bei Hume', Archiv für Geschichte der Phil. 58, 23-39. BOATRIGHT, J. R. 'Hume's Account of Moral Sentiment", RIP 30, 79-90. BOSSERT, P. J. "Hume and Husserl on Time and Time-Consciousness ", J. Br. Soc. Phenomenol. 7, 44-52. 96. BURNS, S. "The Humean Female", Dialogue 15, 415-2 4. [425-40.] BUTLER, R. J. ' Distinctiones Rationis, or the Cheshire Cat which left its smile behind it", PAS 76, 165-76. BUTLER, R. J. 'Hume's Impressions', in Royal Inst, of Phil. Lectures, Vol. 9, 122-36. CAPALDI, N. 'Hume's Theory of the Passions', in Livingston & King, 172-90. CHERRY, C. 'Nature, artifice and moral approbation", PAS 76, 265-82. COHEN, R. 'The Rationale of Hume's Literary Inquiries', in Merrill & Shahan, 97-115. COLVER, A. W. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion and PRICE, J. V. David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Oxford. [PB_ 18 (1977), 49-54. ] COURTENAY, W. J. et al. Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-Knowledge, Substance, and Causality. Madison, Wis. CONNON, R. W. 'Some Hume MS Alterations on a Copy of the Abstract', JHP 14, 353-6. DAVIDSON, D. 'Hume's cognitive theory of pride', JP- 73, 744-57. DAVIE, W. 'Hume's Catalog of Virtue and Vice', in Merrill & Shahan, 45-57. DERATHÉ, R. 'L'obligation politique selon Hume', RIP 30, 91-103. ESPOSITO, J. L. 'Hume and the Transcendental Idealists', Southern J. Phil. 14, 431-42. FALK, W. D. 'Hume on Is and Ought', Canadian J... (shrink)

Law and morals in the Hebrew Scriptures, Plato, and Aristotle, by M. R. Konvitz.--The ethics of the Pharisees, by L. Finkelstein.--Doubts about justice, by W. Kaufmann.--Law and disorder: Some reflections on the political philosophy of Edmond Cahn, by D. D. Williams.--Ethics and business, by P. Sporn.--Mission and opportunity: religion in a pluralistic culture, by R. Niebuhr.--Reflections on over-population, by C. Merrill.--Ethical issues in psychotherapy, by N. W. Ackerman.--Drama: a mirror of conflict, by E. M. Jackson.--Toward a new cultural federalism, (...) by E. Warren. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume, Shaftesbury, and the Peirce-James Controversy EDMUND G. HOWELLS I. ACCORDING TO HUME, the "religious hypothesis" is "a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe''1 that is "mere conjecture and hypothesis," (Enquiry, 145) and "both uncertain and useless" (Enquiry, 142). But there was one version of this hypothesis that seemed to pose particular difficulties for him in making these claims convincing. This was Shaftesbury 's (...) view of the world as the object of "divine passion." Besides Shaftesbury's massive influence at the time, Hume was wrestling with the peculiar disadvantage of having agreed with him on so many points, particularly in the attempt to solve the problem of personal identity. He attempted to discredit Shaftesbury's "particular method" on several levels: viz., it cannot be rationally justified, deductively or inductively ; it is not really a belief, so afortiori it is not a natural belief; to the extent it is confused with a genuine belief, its effects are very rare and transitory unless it degenerates into superstition or enthusiasm, which are demonstrably pernicious. 2 These attacks were frequently reinforced with arguments ad hominem. Shaftesbury's theism is extremely ambiguous. In the Essay Concerning Virtue or Merit he pronounced, "to believe therefore that everything is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good or permanent, is to be a perfect theist" (CH I:240). This is merely the least common denominator of what all eighteenth-century natural theologians agreed could be inferred a posteriori from some form of design argument. Shaftesbury used several analogies to support this view, each based upon a comparison of a part of the universe to the whole:(l) an artifact, for example, a watch (CH I: 190), a ship (CH i Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902),p. 139;hereafter cited as Enquiry. The quotes in my opening statement are technically not from Hume himself but from his "sceptical friend who lovesparadoxes." But the closest Hume comes to a single refutation of all forms of the "religious hypothesis," comparable to Cleanthes' "entirely decisive" refutation of Demea's version of the ontological argument (Dialogues, 189),is stated by Hume in his own person in the final paragraph of this section (Enquiry, XI). Other abbreviations used in this paper are: Treatisefor.4 Treatiseof Human Nature, ed. L. A. SelbyBigge {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949);Abstract for An Abstract of a Treatiseof Human Nature, 1740, ed. J. M. Keynesand P. Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938);G&G for David Hume: The Philosophical Works, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. (London, 1886); Dialogues for Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947); Letters for The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932); CH for Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. J. M. Robertson, 2 vols. (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). A roman numeral followed by a colon denotes volume; other roman numerals denote parts or sections; arabic numbers denote pages. 2For a striking exampleof one of their many points of agreement cf. Hume's essay(G&G 111: 144-150) with CH 11: 178-180. [4491 450 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY II:66), "a pile of regular architecture" (CH II:66-67), is to the artisan as the universe is to God. (2) A work of art, for example, a symphony (CH II :66), is to the artist as the universe is to God. (3) An organ is to the organism as the organism or species is to the teleologically structured and intelligent whole (CH I:243ff.) 3 (4) Microcosm (man) to Macrocosm (God), that is, man's mind is the governing principle over the other parts of his nature as God's mind is to the universe: though "all else may be only dream and shadow. All which even sense suggests may be deceitful.... Reason subsists." We are "in a manner conscious" that our reason is part of the pervasive world soul which inhabits our own, and "all nature's wonders serve to excite and perfect this idea of their author" (CH II : 112). In keeping with... (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in the vibrant and emerging subfield of philosophy of emotion research. Given the dominance of 'cognitivist' theories of emotion in the philosophy, neurobiology, and cognitive science of emotion, we have witnessed a move away from attempts to pit reason and emotion against each other. This move, however, has opened the door to a host of thorny challenges for how we think about our affective relationship with the world, with concepts, and with other (...) minds. (shrink)

탈냉전 탈이념의 시대상을 피력하고, 21세기 세계사 주도권 참여를 위한한국인의 역사적 소명, 문명론적 근거를 제시한 저술.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE INSCRUTABILITY O:F MORAL EVIL IN KANT ((W:HENCE COMETH EVIL?" Late in his career, Immanuel Kant would turn his attention to this perennial question with an elaborate account of " radical evil " in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. His discussion produced consternation among his admirers, such as Goethe, and continues to produce puzzlement among his commentators. Among the chief difficulties facing the modern-day interpreter has been (...) the welter of complex terminology tossed up by Kant's attempts to tame his topic. The Kant specialist can justifiably suppose that if only he or she could un-scramble the terminology, grasp the intended interconnections among the terms, and set the discussion within the context of the entire critical philosophy, the result would be a reasonably clear view of Kant's theory of the nature and source of moral evil. There is of course some justification to this vaguely masochistic approach to the matter, yet such an approach, I fear, leads inevitably to frustration. This is because, despite all the appearances to the contrary, Kant never really explains moral evil in the discussion of radical evil in Religion. To be sure, he offers a definition of what moral evil is, by the terms of his philosophy. Nevertheless, he never really accounts for evil, nor does he offer anything remotely approaching an answer to my opening question. The deepest part of Kant's analysis is not a response to that question, but a link between moral evil and human freedom, and this link is utterly inexplicable, for the same reason that freedom itself is, for Kant, ultimately inexplicable. Thus, by this reading of the theory of radical evil, we are not finally led to comprehend Kant's view of evil. Instead, we are 246 THE INSCRUTABILITY OF MORAL EVIL IN KANT 247 reminded of the contingent nature of the exercise of freedom, the unfathomable quality of the process of character-building, and, finally, the sheer inscrutability of moral evil itself. Kant is theorizing about human nature in a way that gradually discloses the futility of domesticating this topic conceptually or rationally. This point is worth stressing, partly because of certain stereotypes that persist regarding the things Kant's philosophy supposedly renders in rational form. And, obviously, the point can be stressed in the present context by pursuing further the notion that moral evil is, for Kant, inscrutable. The inscrutability of moral evil does not pop into view all at once, for Kant's discussion in Religion is set in the context of a complex account of the structure of the will, the nature of the incentives capable of determining the will, and the issue of freedom. Consequently, in what follows I shall attempt to trace the Kantian line of thought lying behind his agnosticism regarding the source of moral evil. -IFor Kant, moral evil resides in a maxim.1 A maxim is for him a special kind of principle, one which guides or informs actionin effect, a "practical principle." The very idea of a maxim is a key element in Kant's efforts to determine how reason can be practical. Discourse about maxims is Kant's way of accounting for those practical principles by which we actually do act, instead of only those principles by which we ought ideally to act.2 In effect, a maxim is the guiding principle that I could state to myself were I to reflect upon the overall policy determining a given act (" I should enrich myself by whatever 1 Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 6*7. English translation, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Religion, followed by page numbers in both Weischedel and Greene/Hudson, with all translations taken from the latter. 2 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. trans. Lewis White Beeck, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 17 n.l, 38 n.9. Q48 GORDON E. MICHALSON means possible," " I should at all times tell the truth "). This distinction between guiding principles by which we actually do... (shrink)

In addition to the transmission of the science of hadith from the Eastern Islamic world to the west, particularly to Andalusia, a rich literature also developed in Andalusia. Therefore, the development of the science of hadith and hadith methodology in the Andalusian region and the impact of scholars from that region on these sciences is an important issue that deserves attention. This article examines how the intellectual atmosphere of Andalusia was enriched by the hadith works that came from the East (...) and the scholarly activity these works generated. It also addresses the hadith methodology literature that emerged in the Andalusian region and the reflections of this literature in the hadith methodology works of the From this perspective, the study first briefly highlights the hadith and hadith methodology literature that reached Andalusia from the Mashriq region, followed by the works written by Andalusian scholars that contributed to the hadith methodology literature. Subsequently, the influence of hadith methodology works by hadith scholars from the Eastern Islamic world on Andalusian literature is examined. Furthermore, the study evaluates how Andalusian scholars were referenced in the Mashriq hadith methodology literature and their influence on these works. Through this analysis, the interaction between the Mashriq and Andalusian regions within the context of hadith methodology is demonstrated. The contribution of Andalusian scholars to the hadith literature by enriching the knowledge and expertise they received from the East with their interpretations and original works increased the importance of the region in the Islamic world. Additionally, the influence of the hadith methodology works written in Andalusia on Eastern literature reveals the reciprocal nature of cultural interaction. (shrink)

Arguments in support of a Citizens' Income often focus on the freedom from fear, anxiety, and uncertainty such an initiative would offer. Arguments against a Citizens' Income often assert that without fear, individuals would not be motivated to work. These arguments, however, are made without consideration of the empirical or theoretical research we have on fear. In this paper, I draw on the philosophy and cognitive science of fear to evaluate whether either argument can deliver what its proponents want.