Surely since the Enlightenment, if not before, the study of mind has centered principally on how man achieves a “true” knowledge of the world. Emphasis in this pursuit has varied, of course: empiricists have concentrated on the mind’s interplay with an external world of nature, hoping to find the key in the association of sensations and ideas, while rationalists have looked inward to the powers of mind itself for the principles of right reason. The objective, in either case, has been (...) to discover how we achieve “reality,” that is to say, how we get a reliable fix on the world, a world that is, as it were, assumed to be immutable and, as it were, “there to be observed.”This quest has, of course, had a profound effect on the development of psychology, and the empiricist and rationalist traditions have dominated our conceptions of how the mind grows and how it gets its grasp on the “real world.” Indeed, at midcentury Gestalt theory represented the rationalist wing of this enterprise and American learning theory the empiricist. Both gave accounts of mental development as proceeding in some more or less linear and uniform fashion from an initial incompetence in grasping reality to a final competence, in one case attributing it to the work out of internal processes or mental organization, and in the other to some unspecified principle of reflection by which—whether through reinforcement, association, or conditioning—we came to respond to the world “as it is.” There have always been dissidents who challenged these views, but conjectures about human mental development have been influenced far more by majoritarian rationalism and empiricism than by these dissident voices. Jerome Bruner is research professor of psychology at New York University, where he is also serving as Meyer Visiting Professor of Law. His most recent book, Acts of Meaning, appeared in 1990. In 1987 he received the Balzan Prize for “a lifetime contribution to the study of human psychology.”. (shrink)

Is jealousy eliminable? At what cost? Must it be pathological? Distinctions between jealousy and envy (and between malicious and admiring envy) are explored, as are the psychological and social roots of both. Jealousy need not be mere possessiveness, it may have more to do with self-identity, and envy should not be confused with legitimate resentment of injustice. The relations of jealousy to claims of right, to certain underlying fears, and to certain forms of love are considered.

In this two-part analysis, I analyze Marc Lewis’s arguments against the brain-disease view of substance addiction and for a developmental-learning approach that demedicalizes addiction. I focus especially on the question of whether addiction is a medical disorder. In Part 1, I argued that, even if one accepts Lewis’s critique of the brain evidence presented for the brain-disease view, his arguments fail to establish that addiction is not a disorder. Relying on my harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, I defended the view (...) that addiction is a medical disorder and a brain disorder. In Part 2, I consider some broader philosophical issues raised by Lewis’s arguments: I consider a larger puzzle, at the heart of the neo-Kraepelinian program in contemporary psychiatry, that is raised by Lewis’s argument that addiction is not a disorder because the brain displays no damage but only normal learning: must all mental disorders be brain disorders, or can mental disorders occur in normal brains? I argue that mental disorders can occur in normal brains. I critique Lewis’s response to the evolutionary “novel environment” approach to explaining why addiction is a disorder. Lewis agrees with brain-disease proponents that interpreting addiction as brain disorder relieves addicts of moral censure, but I argue that moral defect and brain disease are not exclusive. Finally, I consider Lewis’s “developmental-learning” account of addiction that encourages positive and empowering narrativizing of addiction, but I argue that the developmental-learning view is vacuous due to use of an overly broad notion of “development.”. (shrink)

Si L’Étoile de la rédemption de Franz Rosenzweig se veut encore un « système de philosophie », c’est dans la pleine conscience de ce que la forme du système a trouvé, dans l’œuvre de Hegel, un accomplissement en lequel toute l’histoire de la philosophie se rassemble et s’achève. Une « pensée nouvelle » est‑elle dès lors possible, qui surmonte réellement la tradition qui la précède, sans qu’un tel dépassement la conduise hors de la philosophie? Cet article se penche sur la (...) manière dont Rosenzweig a conçu l’histoire de la philosophie et déterminé, depuis la Révélation, la position d’extériorité qui devait être la sienne. La voie rosenzweigienne est mise en regard de celle de Heidegger, l’un et l’autre penseur n’ayant pas seulement discerné dans leur temps l’achèvement des systèmes, mais conçu le renouveau de la philosophie comme un mouvement de traduction vers l’origine, grecque ou biblique, de la pensée. (shrink)

Because most chemical reactions, by definition, cannot avoid breaking of bonds, weakly bonded species exist fleetingly in almost every chemical change. Historically, chemical quantum mechanics was aimed at explaining the nature of strong bonds. The theory involved a number of approximations to the full solution of the Schrödinger equation. The study of non‐Kekulé molecules provides an opportunity to test whether modern quantum chemical computations are competent to deal with the nature of molecules with very weak bonds. †To contact the author, (...) please write to: Department of Chemistry, Yale University, New Haven, CT: 06520‐8107; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Pierre-Henri Castel provides a short but richly argued precis of his recently published two-volume 1,000-page masterwork on the history of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Having not read the as-yet-untranslated books, I write this commentary from Plato’s cave, trying to infer the reality of Castel’s analysis from expository shadows. I am unlikely to be more successful than Plato’s poor troglodytes, so I apologize ahead of time for any misunderstandings. Moreover, I cannot assess Castel’s detailed evidential case for his substantive theses.1 I thus focus (...) on some key philosophical issues that impinge on an area of my concern, the concept of mental disorder. Castel is a rare breed of French.. (shrink)

This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud’s implicit argument for unconscious mental states. The author employs the unique approach of applying contemporary philosophical methods, especially Kripke-Putnam essentialism, in analyzing Freud’s argument. The book elaborates how Freud transformed the intentionality theory of his Cartesian teacher Franz Brentano into what is essentially a sophisticated modern view of the mind. Indeed, Freud redirected Brentano's analysis of consciousness as intentionality into a view of consciousness-independent intentionalism about the mental that in (...) effect set the agenda for latter-twentieth-century philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This article opens with two generic definitions of religious naturalism in general: one by Jerome Stone and one by Rem Edwards used by Charley Hardwick. Two boundary issues, humanism and process theology, are discussed. A brief sketch of my own “minimalist” and pluralist version of religious naturalism follows. Finally, several issues that are, or should be, faced by religious naturalists are explored.

Ce livre a pour ambition de penser l'amour, d'en produire une pensée contemporaine. A cet effet, il articule deux axes a priori divergents. Il présente d'abord une lecture inédite des trois grandes pensées contemporaines sur l'amour : celles d'Emmanuel Levinas, de Jacques Lacan et d'Alain Badiou. Il développe ensuite une élaboration singulière qui traverse les très anciens enseignements du judaïsme biblique et talmudique. Il ne s'agit pas pour Jérôme Benarroch d'exposer une pensée historiquement reconnue du judaïsme sur le sujet, (...) mais de proposer une théorie de l'amour formulée dans le langage de la pensée contemporaine, à l'école de ses enjeux et questionnements. La méthode de cette élaboration consiste en un dialogue de la philosophie et de la psychanalyse avec ces divers et parfois paradoxaux enseignements traditionnels. Malgré leur hétérogénéité indiscutable, les pensées de Levinas, de Badiou et de Lacan partagent un même geste, qui apparaît presque comme une constante de la contemporanéité : le rejet de la figure de l'Un. Le livre soutient la thèse qu'en amour, l'Un n'est pas, mais qu'il doit advenir. Que l'unicité de chacun - de chaque sujet amoureux - advient par l'effort d'une construction éperdue de l'Un de l'amour. (shrink)

This article explores the plurivocality of temporalities that is at work in contemporary management. The aim is to understand the relationship that a century-old industrial company has with temporality. Based on a longitudinal case study and a series of interviews conducted within the family business Fleury Michon, the article identifies the discursive mobilizations of different temporalities specific to contemporary capitalism. The logics of the long term are required as constitutive elements of the company. In a presentist regime, these temporalities interact, (...) clash and sometimes oppose each other. One of the challenges of management is to produce both a possible conciliation of these temporalities and an euphemization of the power relations that they cannot conceal. (shrink)

Quantum cognition is an emerging field that uses mathematical principles of quantum theory to help formalize and understand cognitive systems and processes. The topic on the potential of using quantum theory to build models of cognition (Volume 5, issue 4) introduces and synthesizes its new development through an introduction and six core articles. The current issue presents 14 commentaries on the core articles. Five key issues surface, some of which are interestingly controversial and debatable as expected for a new emerging (...) field. (shrink)

Incest taboos should be seen as involving non?sexual objections to sexual relations, that is, objections based on who people are in relation to each other, rather than their activities. What is at stake is brought out by considering certain objections to father?daughter incest and certain features of taboos. The objections that matter do not depend on social ties and distinctions having a biological basis, but there is nonetheless a biological element in incest taboos. To see it, one must look to (...) the nature of the Oedipus complex, and to the conditions for the development of the individual and of society. There may be prohibitions which are necessary (to morality, to society, to humanity) even though they may not be justifiable within a narrower conception (e.g. utilitarian) of morality and justification. And so taboos which are universal (occur, in one form or another, in every society), and absolute (allow no questioning), and impose strict liability (allow no excuse), may not be irrational: they may mark the boundaries that shape a way of life. (shrink)

Cet entretien réalisé avec une personne transsexuelle Male to Female témoigne de l’impact que la transformation physique du corps peut avoir sur la perception de Soi. Si les catégories de sexe et de genre paraissent, aux observateurs que nous sommes, bien distinctes, naturalisées et, de ce fait, « allant de soi », l’itinéraire d’un androgyne montre, au contraire, qu’elles s’imposent à un certain moment de la vie – ici après la trentaine – après avoir été tenues pour insignifiantes. Il montre (...) aussi combien leurs chevauchements sont complexes et s’articulent, souvent mal, avec des pratiques sexuelles présumées féminines ou masculines. Avec sa dimension intimiste, le témoignage proposé pose directement la question du rapport à l’autre : pour qui change-t-on de sexe? Le poids du regard d’autrui parait primordial, davantage que le sentiment de Soi qui, semble-t-il, s’accommode très facilement des discordances entre genre, sexe et sexualité. Le témoignage de Sandrine montre également comment une construction identitaire subjective de « femme », y compris en termes de sexualité, peut entièrement s’appuyer sur une expérience de vie en tant qu’« homme », fût-il androgyne. (shrink)

Platon, dans les Lois, renonce au vocabulaire des « parties de l’âme » et souligne l’unité de l’activité psychique humaine: nous sommes mus de l’extérieur, comme une marionnette par des fils (I, 644c-645a). Comment comprendre la mollesse de l’or et la dureté du fer dont il est alors question? Y a-t-il nécessairement conflit entre ces différentes impulsions?

L’univers de Lucrèce (la summarum summa) est fragile. Hormis les agrégats divins dans les inter-mondes, tout y est mortel : l’âme humaine, le corps, le monde et les étoiles. Le sage cherche cependant une stabilité qu’il ne peut fonder sur un Principe unique, Bien, Premier moteur ou Providence de Zeus : il cherche donc des fondations pour que le bonheur soit possible au sein des moenia mundi, des « murailles du monde ». Comment comprendre cette image et plus généralement la (...) place de l’architecture dans le De natura rerum? sur quoi repose l’ataraxie du sage? (shrink)

L'homme ne se rapporte droitement a lui-meme qu'en se rapportant a la totalite du monde qui l'entoure. Ce monde qui est unique selon Platon, sans qu'il soit double par le monde intelligible dont parlera le neoplatonisme, est rendu possible par la rencontre de l'intelligible et du sensible. Ainsi, le logos, par quoi l'homme a acces aux Formes, est ce qui permet d'operer la deliaison proprement philosophique du corps et de l'ame, selon les termes du Phedon, sans qu'il faille poser un (...) dualisme cosmique qui se retrouverait dans l'homme. De meme que le sensible s'intelligibilise par la Participation et ainsi se maintient comme phenomene stable, de meme l'homme peut avoir un usage harmonieux de son corps et de ses sensations. Deliaison n'est pas rupture. L'enfance, la sexuation, le sommeil, les reves, la mort et la parole, ici interroges, montrent que l'anthropologie de Platon ne condamne ni le plaisir, ni le corps. La vie de la pensee ne s'absente pas des mouvements corporels qu'elle accompagne. C'est pourquoi le corps est le signe de l'ame. (shrink)

Pour un stoïcien, l’utilisation de la première personne du singulier a une valeur d’exercice spirituel, notamment dans la pratique de l’examen de conscience le soir (qu’ai-je fait de ma journée?) et de l’anticipation des événements à venir (que dois-je faire aujourd’hui?). Dire « je » ou egô en grec participe de cette systole par quoi le sage se recentre et se recueille en lui-même. Notre étude cherche à montrer également que le « je » renvoie à différentes dimensions de l’homme (...) Marc Aurèle, selon la typologie des quatre personae soutenue par Posidonius selon Cicéron : je suis homme donc un membre de l’espèce humaine, je suis cet homme-ci avec ce corps-ci, je suis le chef de l’Empire romain, je suis les décisions que je prends et assume, pouvait dire et penser Marc Aurèle. (shrink)

Ce qu'en dit l'éditeur Nous n'aimons pas les obstacles. Nous les voyons comme des empêchements. Ils nous feraient perdre du temps, mettraient en danger notre vie. Pourtant, les obstacles ne sont pas que des défauts à éliminer: ils sont aussi une des composantes essentielles de nos mouvements et de notre existence. Dès qu'il est question de rester ou de passer quelque part, de trajet ou de migration, de frontière ou de mur, mais aussi de corps-à-corps, de contact entre les chairs, (...) d'épreuve, il y a toujours quelque chose, ou quelqu'un, ou une foule, qui fait obstacle et qu'on ne peut effacer. Pour Jérôme Lèbre, cette omniprésence oblige à poser une question d'une importance capitale: et si le monde était avant tout la somme de ces obstacles? Et si, par conséquent, plutôt que de les ignorer, il s'agissait avant tout d'apprendre, en les contournant et les surmontant, à en devenir un soi-même--à devenir une résistance aux mouvements d'appropriation ou de destruction? Et si, en somme, il n'y avait rien de plus politique qu'un obstacle? Car penser l'obstacle, c'est aussi penser une manière nouvelle de repartir--malgré tout."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Le développement du secteur privé et de la régulation par le marché à Cuba depuis dix ans questionne le projet de construction socialiste encore prôné par le pouvoir. Or, la concurrence inévitable entre le secteur d’État « socialiste » et le secteur privé marchand et capitaliste peut réduire à néant ce projet. En effet, la coexistence pacifique entre ces deux secteurs est illusoire. L’objectif de cet article est de mettre en évidence les modifications nécessaires des politiques économiques dans ce nouveau (...) contexte et de souligner l’importance d’appréhender le secteur productif privé comme un outil temporaire, permettant, à travers l’aliénation d’une partie de son surproduit, le développement du secteur socialiste. (shrink)

Les critiques actuelles des diagnostics psychiatriques, qu’elles viennent des antipsychiatres, des béhavioristes, des constructionnistes sociaux, des szasziens et des foucaldiens, rejettent généralement l’idée que le concept de trouble mental est légitime du point de vue médical, ne laissant donc aucun argument solide à partir duquel il soit possible de mener une critique constructive et d’établir un dialogue avec la psychiatrie. Ces positions ne réussissent également pas à expliquer les fortes intuitions populaires qui permettent aux gens de distinguer les troubles psychologiques (...) des autres conditions psychologiques négatives. Selon l’analyse de la dysfonction préjudiciable présentée dans cet article, un trouble mental est une condition : 1) préjudiciable, un concept évaluatif basé sur des valeurs sociales ; et 2) causée par une dysfonction psychologique, un concept factuel se rapportant à un mécanisme psychologique qui accomplit une fonction pour laquelle il a été biologiquement conçu . L’analyse DP est ainsi une position hybride qui requiert à la fois que des critères évaluatifs et factuels soient satisfaits pour garantir l’attribution d’un trouble. Nous argumentons que l’analyse DP réussit admirablement à expliquer les jugements intuitifs quant à ce qui est un trouble et à ce qui en n’est pas. La composante factuelle permet également de critiquer le critère diagnostique du DSM, ce que nous ferons à l’aide de plusieurs exemples . Ces critiques déterminent où le DSM a dévié de ses propres hypothèses et ainsi considéré comme des troubles ce qui n’en est pas. Elles expliquent également pourquoi les tentatives du DSM de remédier au problème en introduisant le critère du « cliniquement significatif » échouent.Current antipsychiatric, behaviorist, social-constructivist, Szaszian, and Foucauldian critiques of psychiatric diagnosis generally reject mental disorder as a medically legitimate concept, thus allowing no place to stand from which to mount a constructive critique and dialogue with psychiatry. These views also fail to explain the robust folk intuitions by which people distinguish psychological disorders from other negative psychological conditions. According to the harmful dysfunction analysis presented in this paper, a mental disorder is condition that is harmful, a value concept judged by social values ; and caused by a psychological dysfunction, a factual concept referring to failure of a psychological mechanism to perform a function for which it is biologically designed . The HD analysis is thus a hybrid account that requires both value and factual criteria to be satisfied before attribution of disorder is warranted. It is argued that the HD analysis has considerable success in explaining intuitive judgments about disorder versus non-disorder. The factual component also allows for a critique of DSM diagnostic criteria for specific categories, with several examples discussed. These critiques identify where the DSM has deviated from its own deepest assumptions and labeled non-disorders as disorders, and why the DSM’s own attempts to fix the problem, as with the «clinical significance» criterion, do not succeed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:just Men and Just Acts in Plato's Republic JEROME SCHILLER I. Introduction Too MUCHhas already been written about Plato's Republic. But this, strangely enough, is why a little more needs to be written. For the book has been worked over so often that an obvious sign of fatigue has set in: critics are beginning to find such elementary flaws in the Republic that one wonders why he should waste (...) time on such a philosophically embarrassing work at all. It is to counter one of these recent criticisms and thus, hopefully, to help offset the fatigue, that this study is written. It purports not only to show the criticism mistaken, but also to sketch a way of looking at the Republic which should send the reader back for a further look at this incredibly rich work. The richness of the Republic is, indeed, a source of embarrassment for anyone writing on it. For because of its structure it is at least misleading to isolate one topic from the myriad others treated there, and because of its complexity, impossible to document interpretations of more than a few topics. I shall follow the time-honored practices here of merely expressing my bias on some topics (such as my non-political interpretation) and leaving it up to the reader to follow up hints of my interpretations of other topics (such as that of the Sun, Line, and Cave). II. Plato's Alleged Fallacy in the Republic David Sachs and A. W. H. Adkins have recently claimed that Plato commits the fallacy of equivocation in the Republic, not in the course of some minor argument, but in answering what is probably the central problem posed by the work: Why be just?1 Simply put, their objection goes like this: In the first book of the Republic, Socrates attempts to prove to Thrasymachus why justice is preferable to injustice. But even Socrates is dissatisfied with this answer and early in the second book, after a brilliantly fashioned defense of the Thrasymachean position by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the brothers ask for a more convincing demonstration from "You, [who have] passed your entire life in the consideration of this very matter." e Socrates seems to accept the challenge and proceeds to a search for the concept of justice writ large in the state. Now, claim Adkins and Sachs, Plato never does answer Glaucon's and AdeiDavid Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato s Republic, Philosophical Review, LX(XII (1963),141158 ;A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, A Study in Greek Values (Oxford,1960),p. 289. Adkins,in developingapolitical interpretation ofthe Republic, doesnot elaborate the criticism as does Sachs; hence I refer in this study primarily to the latter's article. sPlato, Republic 376e 2-3,trans. P. Shorey (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1937-42).All subsequent quotations are from this translation. [1] HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY mantus' request. For though he does eventually purport to show that justice is preferable to injustice, the justice he attempts to prove this of is not at all the same justice that Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind. Plato has simply equivocated on the term "iustice," meaning at one time the set of acts generally considered just,s but at another time a certain order in the individual's soul. He has purported to show that an individual with a well-ordered soul reaps advantages, but unless he can show a clear relation between this "Platonic" notion of justice and the "vulgar" notion of justice, the notion which Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind, he will not have answered the brothers' question, and will thus have avoided the central problem of the Republic. The relation he has to establish is, Sachs claims, that Platonic justice is a necessary and a sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Then he could argue that since he has shown that a man reaps advantages just to the extent that he is Platonically just, (1) a vulgarly unjust individual will not reap more advantages than a vulgarly just one (on the grounds that Platonic justice entails vulgar justice), and (2) a vulgarly just man will reap more advantages than a vulgarly... (shrink)

In this book, Jerome Carroll draws on the epistemological, ontological, and methodological aspects and implications of anthropological holism to read the philosophical significance of classical twentieth century anthropology through the lens of eighteenth century writings on anthropology.

Afropessimism incites controversy within and without the academy for the provocation that modernity’s ethical life, including its purportedly progressive facets, is entirely undergirded by a rejection of blackness. On this basis it squares a self-concept as a non-prescriptive theoretical framework with a negative prescription of “world-abolition.” I reconstruct Afropessimism’s conceptual apparatus in light of its criticism in academic philosophy. I then relate the theory’s negativism with Theodor Adorno’s view that “in wrong life there is no right life,” to argue that (...) Afropessimists should take up the implication that there is no right thinking. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held in Sept. 2009 in London, England.

Joshua 13–21 makes the remarkable claim that the Lord conquered, possessed, and gave the land as a gift to Israel. Although these chapters likely originated in political concerns of Israelite kings, the theological cast of the material outstrips any political motivations that gave rise to the material. The enduring role of this section of Joshua is to shape a society devoted to and dependent on God.