Scholarship in neuroethics and related disciplines has long reflected on the value of different conceptual models of disability and impairment. While this theoretical work is valuable, centering the voices of people with mental health conditions in neuroethics research can help us better understand how such models apply in everyday people’s lives. Drawing on qualitative data from a study on mental health peer providers’ lived experiences of recovery, this paper will demonstrate that peers borrow from both a neurodiversity framework and the (...) medical model of disability, though their feelings toward the two models were often complex and ambivalent. These findings advance neuroethics by indicating that future research and clinical practice should take a nuanced approach to responding to the needs of people with mental health conditions and turn to peers as experts, honoring their values and recognizing both the promise and pitfalls of living with a mental health condition. (shrink)

Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...) attractive view: it is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection. (shrink)

Writing philosophy well is an essential skill in our discipline. Philosophical writing must aim for clarity, precision, and rigor, but in doing so, it can often wind up dry, long-winded and boring. It can take many drafts to produce a paper that is suitable for publication in a journal, and many aspiring (and accomplished!) academic philosophers find the process of writing arduous and frustrating. Still, some people make it look easy – if you’ve read anything by Alan Hájek, you’ve probably (...) noticed his breezy style that effortlessly communicates complex ideas in simple terms. His concise and witty prose makes even formal epistemology, a notoriously complicated, math-heavy subject, accessible and engaging to readers. However, while it might look effortless, Hájek’s spirited style is in fact born out of deep and thoughtful engagement with the craft of writing. His motto is: “Work hard for your readers, so that they don’t have to.” Hájek’s approach is decidedly anti-genius: he believes that having good ideas and communicating them well can be taught, and he has devoted considerable energy to helping his graduate students improve their writing. He has written multiple articles about philosophical creativity, as well as an unpublished lengthy manuscript on the mechanics of writing. I have benefited myself from his advice – at least I believe I have, readers may judge for themselves. My aim in this article is to share a few of his insights that I have found most helpful for myself and for my students. I won’t try to summarize all of Hájek’s advice, and I also don’t claim that all of this is totally new. Rather, I will offer a small collection of greatest hits. I will cover eight aspects of philosophical writing, and for each one, I will explain the basic idea, and then discuss some ways of implementing it for oneself and one’s students. (shrink)

Metaphysics of Science is the philosophical study of key concepts that figure prominently in science and that, prima facie, stand in need of clarification. It is also concerned with the phenomena that correspond to these concepts. Exemplary topics within Metaphysics of Science include laws of nature, causation, dispositions, natural kinds, possibility and necessity, explanation, reduction, emergence, grounding, and space and time. Metaphysics of Science is a subfield of both metaphysics and the philosophy of science—that is, it can be allocated to (...) either, but it exhausts neither. Unlike metaphysics simpliciter, Metaphysics of Science is not primarily concerned with metaphysical questions that may already arise from everyday phenomena such as what makes a thing (a chair, a desk) the very thing it is, what its identity criteria are, out of which parts is it composed, whether it remains the same if we exchange a couple of its parts, and so forth. Nor is it concerned with the concrete entities (superstrings, molecules, genes, and so forth) postulated by specific sciences; these issues are the subject matter of the special philosophies of science (for example, of physics, of chemistry, of biology). Metaphysics of Science is concerned with more abstract and general concepts that inform all of these sciences. Many of these concepts are interwoven with each other. For example, metaphysicians of science inquire whether dispositionality, lawhood, and causation can be accounted for in nonmodal terms; whether laws of nature presuppose the existence of natural kinds; and whether the properties of macrolevel objects supervene on dispositional or nondispositional properties. This article surveys the scope (section 1), historical origin (section 2), exemplary subject matters (section 4), and methodology (section 5) of Metaphysics of Science, as well as the motivation that drives it (section 3). (shrink)

This paper investigates a novel question about the relationship between belief and deliberation: Is it ever rationally permissible to believe an answer to a question Q prior to concluding one’s deliberation about Q? This question differs from a more commonly discussed one, insofar as it asks about the rationality of believing that p before settling on p as the answer to some question Q. By contrast, recent literature in this area has focused on whether it can ever be rational to (...) keep inquiring into a question after one has adopted a belief that answers it. I argue that it is possible for rational agents to hold beliefs of a certain kind, namely transitional beliefs, prior to settling on an answer to a question. Developing the argument for this view can help us better understand the nature of belief and its relation to inquiry and deliberation. In particular, it follows that many common claims about what beliefs are don’t identify important features of belief itself, but of attitudes that are held as conclusions of deliberations more generally. Further, the view has the surprising consequence that it is typically beneficial to have transitional beliefs that are epistemically akratic. (shrink)

We give Scott sentences for certain computable groups, and we use index set calculations as a way of checking that our Scott sentences are as simple as possible. We consider finitely generated groups and torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank. For both kinds of groups, the computable ones all have computable \ Scott sentences. Sometimes we can do better. In fact, the computable finitely generated groups that we have studied all have Scott sentences that are “computable d-\” sentence and a (...) computable \ sentence). In [9], this was shown for the finitely generated free groups. Here we show it for all finitely generated abelian groups, and for the infinite dihedral group. Among the computable torsion-free abelian groups of finite rank, we focus on those of rank 1. These are exactly the additive subgroups of \. We show that for some of these groups, the computable \ Scott sentence is best possible, while for others, there is a computable d-\ Scott sentence. (shrink)

In [3], two different effective versions of Borel embedding are defined. The first, called computable embedding, is based on uniform enumeration reducibility, while the second, called Turing computable embedding, is based on uniform Turing reducibility. While [3] focused mainly on computable embeddings, the present paper considers Turing computable embeddings. Although the two notions are not equivalent, we can show that they behave alike on the mathematically interesting classes chosen for investigation in [3]. We give a “Pull-back Theorem”, saying that if (...) Φ is a Turing computable embedding of K into K’, then for any computable infinitary sentence φ in the language of K’, we can find a computable infinitary sentence φ* in the language of K such that for all. (shrink)

The analysis of video-recorded interaction consists of various professionalized ways of seeing participant behavior through multimodal, co-operative, or intercorporeal lenses. While these perspectives are often adopted simultaneously, each creates a different view of the human body and interaction. Moreover, microanalysis is often produced through local practices of sense-making that involve the researchers’ bodies. It has not been fully elaborated by previous research how adopting these different ways of seeing human behavior influences both what is seen from a video and how (...) it is seen, as well as the way the interpretation of the data ultimately unfolds in the interaction between researchers. In this article, we provide a theoretical-methodological discussion of the microanalytic research process. We explore how it differs from “seeing” affect in interaction either as a co-operative and multimodal action or as an intercorporeal experience. First, we introduce the multimodal conversation analytic, co-operative, and intercorporeal approaches to microanalysis. Second, we apply and compare these practices to a video-recorded interaction of a romantic couple. Furthermore, we examine a video-recorded episode of us, the researchers, reflecting on our analytic observations about this interaction. We suggest that adopting a multimodal and co-operative perspective constructs affect as co-produced and displayed through observable action, while an intercorporeal perspective produces affect as an embodied and experienced phenomenon. While the former enables locating affect in a specific moment and identifiable body parts, the latter facilitates recognizing the experienced side of affect. These different modes of professional vision complement one another in capturing affect in interaction while being fundamentally used in local interactions between the researchers. (shrink)

There is a Turing computable embedding $\Phi $ of directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$ in undirected graphs. Moreover, there is a fixed tuple of formulas that give a uniform effective interpretation; i.e., for all directed graphs $\mathcal {A}$, these formulas interpret $\mathcal {A}$ in $\Phi $. It follows that $\mathcal {A}$ is Medvedev reducible to $\Phi $ uniformly; i.e., $\mathcal {A}\leq _s\Phi $ with a fixed Turing operator that serves for all $\mathcal {A}$. We observe that there is a graph G (...) that is not Medvedev reducible to any linear ordering. Hence, G is not effectively interpreted in any linear ordering. Similarly, there is a graph that is not interpreted in any linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _2$ formulas. Any graph can be interpreted in a linear ordering using computable $\Sigma _3$ formulas. Friedman and Stanley [4] gave a Turing computable embedding L of directed graphs in linear orderings. We show that there is no fixed tuple of $L_{\omega _1\omega }$ -formulas that, for all G, interpret the input graph G in the output linear ordering $L$. Harrison-Trainor and Montalbán [7] have also shown this, by a quite different proof. (shrink)

This volume launches a new series of contemporary conversations about scientific classification. Most philosophical conversations about kinds have focused centrally or solely on natural kinds, that is, kinds whose existence is not dependent on the scientific process of synthesis. This volume refocuses conversations about classification on unnatural, or synthetic, kinds via extensive study of three paradigm cases of unnatural kinds: nanomaterials, stem cells, and synthetic biology.

Synesthesia is a fascinating phenomenon which has captured the imagination of scientists and artists alike. This inherited condition gives rise to a kind of 'merging of the senses. The Oxford Handbook of Synesthesia brings together a broad body of knowledge about this conditions into one definitive state-of-the-art handbook.

In all the literature about ethical dilemmas facing the accounting practitioner little attention has been paid to those which arise from the accountant's role in the process of accounting regulation. This treatment explores that role in the light of differing national modes of accounting regulation, economic impact issues in accounting regulation, some ethical principles and a number of different national illustrations. John Blake is Professor of Accounting in the Department of Accounting and Financial Services at the University of Central Lancashire, (...) Preston PR1 2HE, in which Catherine Gowthorpe is Principal Lecturer, while Julia Clarke is a member of the Department of Business Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Building, Aytoun Street, Manchester M1 3GH. (shrink)

Studies of linguistic synaesthesias in English have shown a range of fine-grained language mechanisms governing the associations between colours on the one hand, and graphemes, phonemes and words on the other. However, virtually nothing is known about how synaesthetic colouring might operate in non-alphabetic systems. The current study shows how synaesthetic speakers of Mandarin Chinese come to colour the logographic units of their language. Both native and non-native Chinese speakers experienced synaesthetic colours for characters, and for words spelled in the (...) Chinese spelling systems of Pinyin and Bopomo. We assessed the influences of lexical tone and Pinyin/Bopomo spelling and showed that synaesthetic colours are assigned to Chinese words in a non-random fashion. Our data show that Chinese-speaking synaesthetes with very different native languages can exhibit both differences and similarities in the ways in which they come to colour their Chinese words. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Artikel greift die Überlegung auf, dass sich die Bioethik auch deshalb der empirischen Forschung zuwenden solle, um ihre Anwendbarkeit und Kontextsensitivität zu erhöhen. Am Beispiel der Norm, dass Schmerzen zu lindern seien, und mit Hilfe eines allgemeinen Modells ethischer Urteilsbildung werden verschiedene Bedeutungen der Anwendung und der Kontextsensitivität unterschieden und es wird untersucht, welche Rolle deskriptive Annahmen hierbei jeweils spielen können. Es wird die These vertreten, dass Kontextsensitivität in den meisten ihrer Bedeutungen von fundamentalethischen Grundannahmen unabhängig ist und dass (...) deskriptive Annahmen einen Prozess der Spezifikation ethischer Urteilsbildung auslösen, der in dieser Form nicht von der ethischen Begründung von Normen und Werten aus initiiert und antizipiert werden kann, jedoch zu seinem (zumindest vorübergehenden) handlungsorientierenden Abschluss auf diese zurückverwiesen ist. (shrink)

This paper responds to criticisms of sympathy-based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.

The article presents the results of research on the relationship between social support and self-care of people with myocardial infarction. 127 patients treated in a rehabilitation centre participated in the study. The Inventory of Socially Supportive Behaviours and the Self-care Questionnaire developed by the author, were used. The findings suggest that persons receiving little support are characterised by lower level of self-care than people with medium and high level of support. No such difference was noted between people with medium and (...) high support level. This suggests that social support is of considerable importance for the changes in the level of self-care only in the case of people previously receiving little support. The research also indicates that informational support is related to higher level of self-care whereas instrumental support is related to lower level of self-care. Emotional support was significant only for the care for social functioning. (shrink)

Many antislavery authors in the eighteenth century contend that enslavement degrades the human mind and causes enslaved people to exhibit inferior moral or intellectual traits. They often use this contention to combat the racist claim that Black people are naturally inferior to Whites and that this natural inferiority justifies enslavement, insisting instead that the disparity is simply an effect of enslavement. After examining this argumentative strategy and what makes it appealing, this paper investigates several ways in which it is problematic. (...) First, this strategy was sometimes used to oppose the immediate abolition of slavery: some eighteenth-century authors argue that many enslaved people have become incapable of living good lives outside of slavery and that immediate emancipation would therefore be detrimental for them and for society. Moreover, this strategy may further marginalize and demonize an already oppressed group and it sometimes blames, or seems to blame, enslaved people for their condition. The paper ends with some reflections on whether the strategy can nevertheless be useful for antislavery purposes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give an account of the use of imagination at the core of artistic creative processes involving experiential imagination, and to show that this use of the imagination does not always lead to a creative output. Creative imagining is a value-guided process, where the values are essentially subjective in that they are given in the phenomenal aspects of experience or imagined experience. But creative imagining is neither sufficient nor necessary for artistic creative processes. It (...) is not sufficient because creativity in other domains may involve value-guided experiential imagining, and it is not necessary because some art may be produced without the use of imagination, or in a manner that employs mostly other forms of imagination. (shrink)

Leibniz’s correspondence with Antoine Arnauld is one of the clearest and most comprehensive expressions of Leibniz’s philosophy in the so-called middle period. This chapter will explore the philosophical content of this correspondence. It will concentrate on four of the most central topics: (a) complete concepts and contingency, (b) substance and body, (c) causation, and (d) the special status of rational souls in God’s plan.

There are considerable gaps in our knowledge of how children develop abstract language. In this paper, we tested the Affective Embodiment Account, which proposes that emotional information is more essential for abstract than concrete conceptual development. We tested the recognition memory of 7- and 8-year-old children, as well as a group of adults, for abstract and concrete words which differed categorically in valence. Word valence significantly interacted with concreteness in hit rates of both children and adults, such that effects of (...) valence were only found in memory for abstract words. The pattern of valence effects differed for children and adults: children remembered negative words more accurately than neutral and positive words, whereas adults remembered negative and positive words more accurately than neutral words. In addition, signal detection analysis revealed that children were better able to discriminate negative than positive words, regardless of concreteness. The findings suggest that the memory accuracy of 7- and 8-year-old children is influenced by emotional information, particularly for abstract words. The results are in agreement with the Affective Embodiment Account and with multimodal accounts of children’s lexical development. (shrink)

In this text, the authors confront the many issues which can confuse, frighten or ensnare young people as they struggle to make their own decisions in a world where the hard edges of moral choice have become increasingly blurred. Issues such as drug abuse and abortion are explored in their secular context, while also being placed under the microscope of both Biblical and church teaching. The positions of the Roman Catholic, Church of Ireland, Prebyterian and Methodist churches are examined through (...) their own statements and publications. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty has been a source of inspiration for philosophers concerned with the notion of deep disagreement (see Fogelin in Informal Logic 25(1):3–11, 2005; Pritchard in Topoi 40:1117–1125, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y ). While Wittgenstein’s examples of certainties do not include moral certainties, some philosophers have argued that an analogy can be drawn between certainty regarding the empirical world and moral certainty (Goodman in Metaphilosophy 13:138–148,1982; Hermann in On moral certainty, justification, and practice: A Wittgensteinian perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015; Pleasants (...) in Inquiry 51(3):241–267, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201740802120673 ). Moral certainty manifests itself in our fundamental ways of feeling, thinking, and acting morally. It is closely related to an “agreement in form of life” (Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Third ed., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968, § 241.), which makes moral disagreements possible in the first place. In this paper, I aim to shed light on the phenomenon of moral deep disagreement by relating it not only to the notion of moral certainty but also to the concept of deep disruption as it is currently developed and discussed in the philosophy of technology. I argue that certainty, deep disagreement, and deep disruption are all located at the level of “bedrock practices” (Williams in Wittgenstein, mind and meaning, Routledge, Milton Park, 1999, p. 198), and that the fundamentality of their objects should be understood in terms of relationality and interconnectedness. Deep disagreements can occur through deep technology-induced disruption and can take the form of a disruption of deep conceptual agreement. Conceptual common ground can be re-established by continuous interaction and a collective process of moral articulation. Deep disruption and moral deep disagreement can lead to moral progress, for instance in the form of recognising and correcting an epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Recently, political models which employ lottery-selection instead of ballot voting have been proposed. Proponents argue that such lottocratic models can improve the representation of the population and reduce undemocratic influences. In this paper, I argue that these proposals also satisfy the egalitarian requirement of democracy. I claim that having an equal chance to be selected by lot is equally egalitarian as having an equally weighed vote for two reasons: first, having a chance to be selected by lot satisfies the requirement (...) for political justice better than electoral democracy, and second, it provides citizens with equal political influence and not merely equal impact. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude (...) concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. I urge that we should therefore reject the invitation to revise the application of these concepts in the ways that would be required by recent proposals in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Every winter in the classical period, on a specifically chosen day, Athenians gathered together to mourn the men who had died in war. According to Thucydides, the bones of the dead killed in that year lay in state for two days before being carried in ten coffins organized by tribe to thedêmosion sêmawhere they were buried and then a speech was made in honour of the dead men by a man chosen by the city. As his description makes clear, this (...) ceremony was a public event attended not only by citizens and foreigners, but also by the female relatives of the dead men. Other sources report that thepolemarchosput on theagônfor those who died in the war and these contests included musical, athletic and hippic competitions. The war-dead also received sacrifices. The occasion combined burial with cult and games usually afforded to the divine, although how exactly this combination worked in practice is not clear because Thucydides, our single best source for the Epitaphia, focusses on the burial and the oration given by Pericles in the winter at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War. (shrink)

This book examines cultural recognition and the struggle for identity in America's schools. In particular, the contributing authors focus on the recognition and misrecognition as antagonistic cultural forces that work to shape, and at times distort identity.

Partiendo de las coordenadas en que se ubica el sistema de I+D desde nuestro ingreso en la Unión Europea, se hace un análisis de los desafíos (institucional, cooperativo y tecnológico) que tienen planteados las bibliotecas al servicio de la investigación, así como del lugar que ocupan en dicho sistema, viendo las necesidades de las futuras bibliotecas y las exigencias requeridas a los nuevos bibliotecarios.

Bilder in Kunst und Wissenschaft sind Orte des Denkens und Forschens.

This is a response to Donald Rutherford's review of Jorati, Leibniz on Causation and Agency. The review is published in Leibniz Review 27 (2017), 183-197.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Sounds and Silences:Acknowledging Political EngagementJulia Eklund KozaThis symposium grapples with such questions as "Should music educators participate in political understandings?" The term "politics" often brings to mind "Big P" political matters, including citizenship, governance of the state, the election of officials, and the formation of public policy. Another way of thinking about politics is to associate it with power relations in social interactions of any kind. If one (...) thinks about it in the second way, then wherever there are two or more people, there are politics. Questions such as "Should we participate in politics?" and "How engaged should we be?" become meaningless. Michel Foucault's discussions of the pastoral forms of governance employed by the modern state, specifically the uses of technologies of the self, challenged long-held views about relationships between the individual and the state. In particular, his claim that major dominations are the effects, not the causes, of myriad local and particular mobilizations of power provides a rationale for examining these local mobilizations.1 If major dominations and "Big P" politics are the effects of local mobilizations, then everyone participating in social interactions participates in "Big P" politics, as well.This more global conception of political engagement stands in sharp contrast to a narrower one, which can be described using a "swimmer-on the-shore" metaphor. The swimmer stands on a beach looking out at the sea and decides whether this is a day for a toe dip, wading to the knees, total immersion, or staying out of the water altogether. The swimmer can choose to stay dry (unless inundated by the tide or a tidal wave). This conception is evident in a comment reportedly made by a music education professor in response to two back-to-back annual meetings of the music education researchers at Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC) institutions. Both meetings had been devoted to critique of MENC's policies and practices, and the disgruntled professor reportedly remarked, "That's enough about politics; let's get back to talking about music." In his view, which is shaped by the "swimmer" conception, some discussions are political, others are not; while some curricular areas, such as civics and sex education, are political, music is not, nor should it be. If, however, we assume that there is power in all social relations, then the "swimmer" conception has no salience because everyone is immersed; music, because it is a social activity, is political. Its engagement in politics is neither good nor bad, in and of itself; rather, it is inevitable. [End Page 168]Some may concede that although it is not possible to be disengaged, it is necessary and good for scholars and teachers to be politically "neutral." Conceptions of neutrality rely on a one-dimensional linear integers model of political engagement. On the line representing the integers, there is a plus side, a minus side, and zero, the zero presumably being the point of neutrality. People and views associated with the far ends of the line are extreme, while those closer to the zero point are moderate. In addition, positions on the line are assigned a moral value; depending upon the issue and the perspective from which the line is being viewed, plus can be good but minus is bad, plus can be bad but minus is good, neutral can be good, or neutral can be bad. If every issue and every social relation is political, however, and if we assume that people and relationships change, then the linear integers model is inadequate because it fails to embody the dynamic, multi-dimensional character of the complex social relations in which all of us engage. Another problem with the linear integers model is that it fails to interrogate the power vested in whomever or whatever decides what will constitute extreme, moderate, or neutral—what will be deemed reasonable and what outrageous. Sometimes this responsibility has been assigned to a fictitious "reasonable" person without much thought having been given to the political dimensions of the construction of reasoning. What is deemed outrageous in one system of reasoning may be perfectly reasonable in another.Belief that education can and should be objective and neutral comes from... (shrink)

En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée (...) par les spectateurs ? (shrink)