In this way a domain for the theory of desire will be sketched out. One preliminary clarification: In the beginning is the word, "desire. ...

I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.

This paper argues that the political adage “Be ye prudent as serpents and guileless as doves” involves three different types of relation between prudence and morality, namely: unification (Vereinigung), subordination (Unterordnung), and association (Beigesellung). I maintain that these relations are set up according to the same principle that determines the relationship between mechanical and teleological causality in the third Critique. Thus, I argue that morality and prudence are much more systematically related within the system of critical philosophy than is normally (...) assumed in the literature and that this is made possible by way of an intimate relationship between prudence and teleological judgment. (shrink)

In this paper, we take moral agency to be that context in which a particular agent can, appropriately, be held responsible for her actions and their consequences. In order to understand moral agency, we will discuss what it would take for an artifact to be a moral agent. For reasons that will become clear over the course of the paper, we take the artifactual question to be a useful way into discussion but ultimately misleading. We set out a number of (...) conceptual pre-conditions for being a moral agent and then outline how one should — and should not — go about attributing moral agency. In place of a litmus test for such an agency — such as Allen et al.'s Moral Turing Test — we suggest some tools from the conceptual spaces theory and the unified conceptual space theory for mapping out the nature and extent of that agency. (shrink)

Like being able to drive a car, being autonomous is a socially attributed, claimed, and contested status. Normative debates about criteria for autonomy (and what autonomy entitles one to) are best understood, not as debates about what autonomy, at core, really is, but rather as debates about the relative merits of various possible packages of thresholds, entitlements, regulations, values, and institutions. Within different “regimes” of autonomy, different criteria for (degrees of) autonomy become authoritative. Neoliberal, solidaristic, and perfectionist regimes entail conflicting (...) understandings of what gets you autonomy and what autonomy gets you—for example, in relation to policies regarding physician-assisted suicide or financial support for senior citizens. In light of this, justifying a particular understanding of autonomy is inseparable from the task of arguing for the context-specific merits of a regime of autonomy as a whole and in relation to other ethical and political commitments. (shrink)

In apparent conflict with the popular conception of veterinarians as animals' best friends, the Veterinarian's Oath, as well as its clarifying Principles of Animal Welfare, imply that animal welfare is entirely derivative from human welfare. This article calls for an explicit alignment of the Oath and Principles with the priority of nonhuman animals.

In the last six or seven years, aphantasia has received attention from media outlets, television shows, and social networks. This alleged condition, however, has hardly been discussed in the philosophy of mind. In this paper, I assess some of the research conducted in cognitive science and provide, for the first time in the literature, a comprehensive assessment of possible explanations for aphantasia. Specifically, the hypotheses I submit for consideration ascribe the reports of absence of visual imagery to (i) a discrepancy (...) at the level of concepts, (ii) a failure of attentional mechanisms that modulate introspection, (iii) a lack of personal-level access to sub-personal imagistic representations, and (iv) an absence of sub-personal imagistic representations. I conclude that hypotheses (i) and (ii) can be rejected while hypotheses (iii) and (iv) can be accepted as defensible candidates for explaining aphantasia, although the latter is better suited to account for the available evidence in both comparative and absolute terms. Finally, I present some educated guesses and empirical research that could shed further light on the study of this condition. (shrink)

How do certain social conflicts come to fall within the law? How does the law come to have its space? I argue that law emerged in British Honduras through a structure of racial differentiation. The law arrived as a mode of ordering space, bodies, and justice that realizes an immanent structure of racial difference. Racial difference thus founds the space of law. To advance this argument, I examine the record of the first criminal trial prosecuted in the place now called (...) southern Belize—for the murder of an unnamed Indigenous woman by an enslaved Black man. Through an analysis of the trial record that draws upon Jameson’s reading of Greimas’s semiotic method, I show that the standing of the trial, as well as the evaluation of evidence, hinge upon the delineation and operation of racial categories. While British colonialism has ended, these categories persist. (shrink)

: This paper addresses the need to examine teaching practices from the observation that they are beyond what they should be. This task devolved to scientists of education is to learn about teaching practices in their relationship to student learning in order to build the database useful to teacher educators and reflexivity necessary for any teacher about their own practice. The concepts of competence, pattern and are useful instrument in this endeavor of explanation and understanding of the practices. The proposed (...) theoretical framework is illustrated by a perspective of teaching practices of teachers in schools and colleges. These differ in many aspects and this requires the testing of new hypotheses to explain -/- La présente contribution traite de la nécessité d’étudier les pratiques d’enseignement à partir du constat de ce qu’elles sont au delà de ce qu’elles devraient être. Cette tâche dévolue aux chercheurs en sciences de l’éducation vise à mieux connaître les pratiques d’enseignement dans leurs relations aux apprentissages des élèves afin de constituer la base de données utiles aux formateurs d’enseignants et nécessaire à toute réflexivité des enseignants à propos de leur propre pratique. Les notions de compétence, de schème et d’instrument sont utiles à cette entreprise d’explication et de compréhension des pratiques. La proposition de cadrage théorique est illustrée par une mise en perspective des pratiques d’enseignement de professeurs des écoles et de collèges. Celles-ci se distinguent sur bien des aspects ce qui réclame la mise à l’épreuve de nouvelles hypothèses explicatives. (shrink)

Despite the apparently universal recognition of a pervasive "success at any cost" amorality in the professional and business world, and the need to do something about it, attempts to establish a campus-wide professional ethics curriculum continue to encounter resistance at many colleges and universities. The main stumbling block seems to be a purely practical one: How do you fit a course on professional ethics into academic worksheets that are already over-crowded with essential technical courses in every professional discipline? I maintain, (...) to the contrary, that the real problem is one of attitude and will, and these in turn rest upon a set of mistaken notions about the nature of professional ethics. In this essay I highlight what I take to be a number of fallacies about professional ethics and then suggest a better way to think about its place in the formal education of professionals. (shrink)

Moderate rationalism is the view a person's having a rational intuition that p prima facie justifies them in believing that p. It has recently been argued that moderate rationalism requires empirical support and, furthermore, that suitable empirical support would suffice to convince empiricists to abandon their opposition to rationalism. According to one argument, the causal requirement argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that any actual token belief is based on rational intuition and moderate rationalism requires (...) such a claim for its justification. According to a second argument, the reliability argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that a putative source of evidence is reliable and moderate rationalism requires such a claim for its justification. According to a third argument, the empirical case argument, certain sorts of empirical evidence would be dialectically sufficient to resolve the traditional dispute between empiricists and rationalists in the rationalists' favor. Against the causal requirement argument, I maintain that the core doctrines of moderate rationalism are not hostage to causal claims and that such causal claims as may be plausibly part of other recognizably rationalist doctrines can be justified on broadly non-empirical grounds. Against the reliability argument, I show that no empirical evidence is required to justify belief in the reliability of rational intuition. Against the empirical case argument, I argue that the envisioned empirical support for moderate rationalism should not convince any traditional empiricist. (shrink)

Questions for Further Consideration and Recommended Further Reading, which follow each relevant chapter, encourage readers to think further and to craft their own perspectives.

This article defends the ethical theory of william wollaston against the objections of hume and later writers who uncritically accepted hume's account of what wollaston said. I then argue that the true flaws in wollaston's view that all wrongdoing is false representing are that it cannot explain why some immoral acts are worse than others, And it presupposes antecedent moral principles of a different kind. I conclude that wollaston's theory, While failing as a general account of all immorality, Can nevertheless (...) be used to explain the difference between actions that are specifically unjust and actions that are immoral in other ways. (shrink)

In this paper I defend three different points: first, that the concept of highest good is derived from an a priori but subjective argument, namely a maxim of pure practical reason; secondly, that the theory regarding the highest good has the validity of a practical regulative knowledge; and thirdly, that the practical regulative knowledge can be understood as the same “holding something to be true” as Kant attributes to hope and believe.

John Rawls’ account of our obligations towards future generations has received considerable criticism in the environmental ethics literature relative to the scant few passages in which he discusses the issue. I argue that much of this criticism is warranted because Rawls’ Heads of Family strategy for grounding obligations to future generations is not only independently problematic, but also inconsistent with his general framework. Furthermore, the oft-suggested Time Travel strategy will not work either, and for just those reasons which Rawls gave. (...) However, I contend that the less often discussed “Universalizability Principle,” which Rawls discusses most prominently in Political Liberalism, is a plausible account of our obligations to future generations and is consistent with Rawls’ general framework. I then defend this Rawlsian account of our future-oriented obligations against objections in the environmental ethics literature such as those recently advanced by the consequentialist Tim Mulgan. (shrink)

Le 14e siècle est une période où les débats sur l'infini se multiplient. Les mêmes doctrines se trouvent indifféremment développées dans les oeuvres théologiques, dans les commentaires sur la "Physique" d'Aristote voire dans des traités spécialement dévolus à la question du continu. Cet ouvrage révèle la place de ces doctrines dans la logique, les mathématiques, la philosophie naturelle.

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

Neste artigo apresenta-se o significado do conceito de sociabilidade insociável e de sua importância para a filosofia histórico-política de Kant. Defendem-se aqui duas teses importantes: primeira, que esse conceito se insere essencialmente num paradigma biológicoteleológico em vez de físico-mecânico; segunda, que a insociabilidade deve ser compreendida como se referindo a inclinações e não a paixões, o que, por sua vez, permite pensá-la em concordância com um progresso moral também dos indivíduo.

Neste artigo faz-se uma comparação entre a perspectiva metodológica e epistemológica desenvolvida por Bacon no Novum Organum e por Kant na Crítica da razão pura. Nesse sentido, defende-se que apesar de não se poder ignorar as divergências com relação ao modo como cada filósofo desenvolve a delimitação dos seus conceitos de conhecimento e de ciência, ainda assim é possível encontrar importantes elementos de convergência tanto com relação à ilusão transcendental e outras formas de erros no que concerne a teoria dos (...) ídolos, quanto com relação à perspectiva metodológica subjacente ao conceito de experiência e experimento. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that the idea of a universal history is systematically legitimized in Kant’s transcendental system of philosophy by way of the concept of a need [Bedürfnis] for pure practical reason. In this sense, the idea of a universal history is a fundamental part of the moral image of the world that emerges from Kant’s whole philosophy, and it is crucial for understanding both the possibility of the system of pure reason, as well the full development (...) of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially for political philosophy. RESUMO Nesse artigo eu argumento que a ideia de uma história universal é sistematicamente legitimada no sistema da filosofia transcendental de Kant por meio do conceito de precisão [Bedürfnis] da razão pura prática. Nesse sentido, a ideia de uma história universal é uma parte fundamental da imagem moral do mundo que emerge da totalidade da filosofia de Kant e é crucial para o entendimento tanto da possibilidade de um sistema da razão pura, quanto para um desenvolvimento completo da filosofia moral, particularmente para a filosofia política. (shrink)

Horgan and Mahtani (Erkenntnis 78: 333–351, 2013) present a new argument for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem resting on a principle for updating probabilities which they call “generalized conditionalization.” They allege that this new argument is immune to two attacks which have been recently leveled at other arguments for thirdism. I argue that their new argument rests on a probability distribution which is (a) no more justified than an alternative distribution favoring a different answer to the problem, (...) and (b) ultimately unjustified. I go on to show that generalized conditionalization cannot be applied in the manner suggested, given the cogency of the aforementioned attacks on thirder arguments. Hence, the new argument fails to advance the case for the 1/3 answer. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta os aspectos liberais e republicanos da filosofia política de Rousseau e defende que eles devem ser interpretados como complementares. Entretanto, essa complementaridade pode ser caracterizada num sentido específico, qual seja, como sendo um liberalismo republicano.

The essay has two purposes. One is to point out connections and parallels between, On one hand, The debates of metaphysical realists and anti-Realists, And on the other hand, The debates surrounding moral realism. The second is to provide the outlines of a case for a kind of position that would generally be classified as moral realism. One feature of this position is that it emerges as parallel to, And compatible with, A metaphysical position that would generally be classified as (...) anti-Realism. (shrink)

For the “respectable” part of society there can be a presumption of virtuousness, rather like the presumption of innocence in the law. In both cases, the presumption can be defeated, as we learn more and get into specifics. We still might insist that to be genuinely virtuous is to be able to pass the more familiar sorts of tests of virtue, and to be reliably virtuous also in the ordinary business of life, especially in things that really matter. Something like (...) this is a necessary condition for virtue. Factors of motivation, especially those related to what a person's basic concerns are, can vary enormously. Imagine an extreme case. Someone might be inherently indifferent to what happens to other people, and have no sense of the inherent dignity or worthiness of moral principles, but also be totally convinced that God is watching his or her every move, and that the prospects of heaven or hell depend heavily on one's following accepted morality at every step. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo analisa a influência da filosofia de Rousseau na teoria antropológica de Kant. No primeiro momento, apresentam-se as semelhanças e diferenças acerca do modo como cada autor compreende o estado de natureza. No segundo momento, estabelece-se uma comparação entre o conceito de sociabilidade insociável de Kant e os conceitos de piedade e amor próprio, na filosofia de Rousseau.This paper analyses the influence of Rousseau’s philosophy on Kant’s anthropological theory. Firstly, the similarities and differences between each philosopher’s understanding of (...) the state of nature is presented. Secondly, a comparison between Kant’s concept of unsocial sociability and Rousseau’s concepts of piety and self-love is presented. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a teoria da democracia de Carl Schmitt e procura destacar, a partir disso, suas virtudes e deficiências. O texto é dividido em duas partes. Na primeira sustenta-se que a teoria schmittiana de democracia se desenrola em dois níveis diferentes, um nível conceitual, essencialmente analítico, e um nível fenomênico, que segundo Schmitt seria meramente descritivo. Nesse horizonte pode-se compreender melhor a teoria schmittiana da democracia e sua crítica à democracia parlamentar. Na segunda parte, apresenta-se algumas críticas à posiçáo (...) de Schmitt. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta e analisa as principais teses que constituem a concepção de educação cívica de Rousseau. Além disso, faz-se considerações críticas acerca da proposta político-pedagógica de Rousseau, apontando tanto para elementos equivocados e potencialmente problemáticos, quanto indicando aspectos relevantes para se pensar questões relativas a política e a educação.

Neste artigo fazem-se algumas considerações sobre a justificação da propriedade privada na filosofia do direito de Kant. A partir da análise do conceito de lei permissiva da razão, defende-se que na filosofia do direito opera uma perspectiva teleológico- reflexionante de caráter prático, a qual permite compreender, por um lado, que a propriedade no estado de natureza seja legítima ao mesmo tempo em que é problemática, enquanto, por outro lado, o estado civil envolve a exigência de que a propriedade seja adequada (...) segundo as condições de um sistema de justiça distributiva. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta o conceito de juristocracia midiática como uma categoria política que indica uma desfiguração dos ideais normativos de democracia e do estado de direito. Essa categoria se apresenta como o desenvolvimento, por um lado, do conceito de juristocracia analisado e elaborado por Hirschl e, por outro lado, da categoria de democracia plebiscitária analisada e elaborada por Urbinati. Argumenta-se que essa categoria permite enquadrar alguns dos problemas políticos pelos quais o Brasil vem passando na última década.

De acordo com a filosofia kantiana existem três princípios que deveriam regular a forma como a política se relaciona com a religião, quais sejam, o princípio da não coercitividade da crença religiosa; a exigência moral da veracidade nas profissões de crença e a incapacidade de máximas com conteúdo religioso se conformarem com o princípio político-jurídico da publicidade. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar, explicar e justificar a aplicação desses três princípios com relação à religião e indicar como eles poderiam ajudar (...) a resolver problemas políticos e morais com respeito à intolerância religiosa que continua a assolar a sociedade contemporânea. (shrink)

This article distinguishes and evaluates the various forms of legal moralism from a liberal vantage point. It devotes special attention to the most plausible form of the theory, That which is often called "the conservative thesis," and to that supporting argument which is based on the need to prevent "freefloating social-Change evils." freefloating evils are defined as evils that are imputable to human beings but which do not give rise to personal grievances as harms, Offenses, And "harmless exploitative injustices" do. (...) I conclude that the need to prevent such evils is a relevant, But generally inferior, Reason for coercion. (shrink)