The Highest Good and the Practical Regulative Knowledge in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason

Con-Textos Kantianos 3:210-230 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I defend three different points: first, that the concept of highest good is derived from an a priori but subjective argument, namely a maxim of pure practical reason; secondly, that the theory regarding the highest good has the validity of a practical regulative knowledge; and thirdly, that the practical regulative knowledge can be understood as the same “holding something to be true” as Kant attributes to hope and believe.

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Citations of this work

Kant’s constitution of a moral image of the world.Joel Thiago Klein - 2019 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 60 (142):103-125.

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References found in this work

Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness.Paul Guyer - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.L. W. BECK - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 19 (3):438-439.
Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness.Paul Guyer - 2001 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (3):602-603.
Das Problem des höchsten Gutes in Kants praktischer Philosophie.K. Düsing - 1971 - Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 62 (1):5.

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