In this modern world, a massive amount of data is processed and broadcasted daily. This includes the use of high energy, massive use of memory space, and increased power use. In a few applications, for example, image processing, signal processing, and possession of data signals, etc., the signals included can be viewed as light in a few spaces. The compressive sensing theory could be an appropriate contender to manage these limitations. “Compressive Sensing theory” preserves extremely helpful while signals are sparse (...) or compressible. It very well may be utilized to recoup light or compressive signals with less estimation than customary strategies. Two issues must be addressed by CS: plan of the estimation framework and advancement of a proficient sparse recovery calculation. The essential intention of this work expects to audit a few ideas and utilizations of compressive sensing and to give an overview of the most significant sparse recovery calculations from every class. The exhibition of acquisition and reconstruction strategies is examined regarding the Compression Ratio, Reconstruction Accuracy, Mean Square Error, and so on. (shrink)

Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech. Therefore, no matter what we think of its content, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don’t extend to other actions.1 In response, Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, they claim, is that it silences women’s speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that (...) warranted the special protections in the first place.2 At first glance, it is hard to see how to make sense of this response. If the claim is that pornography prevents women from actually uttering words, then it just seems false; on the other hand, if that isn’t the claim, then it isn’t clear how anyone can be said to be silenced. Faced with such worries, many have been inclined to dismiss these claims about silencing as confused. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the phenomenon that has been labeled 'silencing' in some of the recent philosophical literature. A speaker who is silenced in this sense is unable to make herself understood, even though her audience hears every word she utters. For instance, consider a woman who says “No”, intending to refuse sex. Her audience fails to recognize her intention to refuse, because he thinks that women tend to be insincere, and to not say what they really mean, especially (...) in sexual situations. This speaker’s utterance then goes astray in the manner that constitutes silencing in my sense. Regarding this phenomenon, philosophers such as Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued, first, that women are particularly liable to be thus affected, i.e., silenced; second, that, as a result of this silencing, they are systematically disadvantaged; and third, that pornography is responsible for this silencing. Here, I focus on the third of these claims, explaining what it might mean for silencing to be systematic. (shrink)

We argue against the knowledge rule of assertion, and in favour of integrating the account of assertion more tightly with our best theories of evidence and action. We think that the knowledge rule has an incredible consequence when it comes to practical deliberation, that it can be right for a person to do something that she can't properly assert she can do. We develop some vignettes that show how this is possible, and how odd this consequence is. We then argue (...) that these vignettes point towards alternate rules that tie assertion to sufficient evidence-responsiveness or to proper action. These rules have many of the virtues that are commonly claimed for the knowledge rule, but lack the knowledge rule's problematic consequences when it comes to assertions about what to do. (shrink)

This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which (...) show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways. (shrink)

This paper begins with the idea that there are sometimes gaps in our shared linguistic/ conceptual resources that make it difficult for us to understand our own social experiences, and to make them intelligible to others. In this paper, I focus on three cases of this sort, some of which are drawn from the literature on hermeneutical injustice. I offer a diagnosis of what the gaps in these cases consist in, and what it takes to fill them. I argue that (...) these gaps are filled in, at least initially, by labels of a particular kind. Specifically, these are labels that allow us to see the experiences in question as novel instances of phenomena with which we are already normatively familiar. Further, I also show that these labels bring with them important downsides: they introduce distortions into our understandings of these experiences. Using a pair of case studies (‘statutory rape,’ ‘sexual harassment’), I illustrate these distortions. (shrink)

In recent work, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore have argued that neither Radical nor Moderate Contextualism can explain how we regularly succeed in communicating with each other. In this chapter, I argue that their preferred view (Pluralistic Minimalism) encounters the same difficulty with respect to explaining communication. Further, I offer a characterization (different from the one offered by Cappelen and Lepore) of what is at issue between the Moderate and the Radical Contextualist. This way of drawing the distinction between the (...) two Contextualist camps has the advantage of being stable, in the sense that it is immune to Cappelen and Lepore’s “collapse” arguments. I then sketch a version of Contextualism that is Moderate in my sense. I show that this version has the resources to explain how communication is successful across a wide range of contexts. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on a widely held package of views, according to which: (i) assertions are governed by some alethic or epistemic norm, (ii) such a norm is intimately connected to assertion, in the sense that it individuates or characterizes the speech act, and (iii) this sense of intimate connection can be explained with the help of an analogy between language use and games. It is argued that this package of views must be rejected. More specifically, by considering some different (...) ways of spelling out the analogy mentioned in (iii), it is shown that at least that part of the package must be abandoned: even if some alethic or epistemic norm is intimately connected to assertion, that relationship is not mirrored by the relationship between norms and the games they govern. (shrink)

This volume draws on a range of approaches in order to explore the problem and determine what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech.Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important liberal values, such as social equality. Might a genuine commitment to free speech require that we legally permit speech even when it is (...) harmful, and even when doing so is in conflict with our commitment to values like equality? Even if such speech is to be legally permitted, does our commitment to free speech allow us to provide material and institutional support to those who would contest such harmful speech? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, which kinds of speech are harmful in ways that merit response, either in the form of legal regulation or in some other form? This collection explores these and related questions. Drawing on expertise in philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal theory, the contributors to this book investigate these themes and questions. By exploring various categories of speech (including pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial literature, 'Whites Only' signs), and attending to the precise functioning of speech, the essays contained here shed light on these questions by clarifying the relationship between speech and harm. Understanding how speech functions can help us work out which kinds of speech are harmful, what those harms are, and how the speech in question brings them about. All of these issues are crucially important when it comes to deciding what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech. (shrink)

Organizations are increasingly looking for ways to reap the benefits of cognitive diversity for problem solving. A major unanswered question concerns the implications of cognitive diversity for longer-term outcomes such as team learning, with its broader effects on organizational learning and productivity. We study how cognitive style diversity in teams—or diversity in the way that team members encode, organize and process information—indirectly influences team learning through collective intelligence, or the general ability of a team to work together across a wide (...) array of tasks. Synthesizing several perspectives, we predict and find that cognitive style diversity has a curvilinear—inverted U-shaped—relationship with collective intelligence. Collective intelligence is further positively related to the rate at which teams learn, and is a mechanism guiding the indirect relationship between cognitive style diversity and team learning. We test the predictions in 98 teams using ten rounds of the minimum-effort tacit coordination game. Overall, this research advances our understanding of the implications of cognitive diversity for organizations and why some teams demonstrate high levels of team learning in dynamic situations while others do not. (shrink)

In recent work, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore have argued that neither Radical nor Moderate Contextualism can explain how we regularly succeed in communicating with each other. In this chapter, I argue that their preferred view (Pluralistic Minimalism) encounters the same difficulty with respect to explaining communication. Further, I offer a characterization (different from the one offered by Cappelen and Lepore) of what is at issue between the Moderate and the Radical Contextualist. This way of drawing the distinction between the (...) two Contextualist camps has the advantage of being stable, in the sense that it is immune to Cappelen and Lepore’s “collapse” arguments. I then sketch a version of Contextualism that is Moderate in my sense. I show that this version has the resources to explain how communication is successful across a wide range of contexts. (shrink)

Close-reading sequential comics and cartoons such as He Zhu’s “Lockdown,” Rivi Handler-Spitz’s “Morning Commute,” Yang Ji’s “Quarantine,” and Thi Bui, Will Evans, Sarah Mirk, Amanda Pike, and Esther Kaplan’s “In/Vulnerable,” this article investigates the networked spatial crises that have emerged during COVID-19. As the global pandemic reshaped social, economic, and cultural landscapes, it is crucial to understand the spatial implications of these transformations. By analyzing graphic medical texts, which serve as visual narratives that capture the lived experiences and perceptions of (...) individuals within these crises, the present essay offers a nuanced exploration of the intricate relationships between space, society, and the effects of the pandemic. The article identifies and examines the various spatial crises that have emerged in the COVID era, such as disrupted urban environments, altered social dynamics, spaces of contamination, contraction of space, and the reconfiguration of workspaces. Drawing on theorists like Michael Foucault and Henri Lefebvre, this essay illustrates how these crisis-induced spatial transformations are represented, experienced, and contested. Ultimately, the article not only contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between the pandemic and space but also addresses the challenges of our evolving world. (shrink)

This paper examines Jason Stanley’s account of propaganda. I begin with an overview and some questions about the structure of that account. I then argue for two main conclusions. First, I argue that Stanley’s account over-generalizes, by counting mere incompetent argumentation as propaganda. But this problem can be avoided, by emphasizing the role of emotions in effective propaganda more than Stanley does. In addition, I argue that more propaganda is democratically acceptable than Stanley allows. Focusing especially on sexual assault prevention (...) campaigns, I show that propaganda can be acceptable even when it represents some in our communities as worthy of contempt. (shrink)

Many liberal societies are deeply committed to freedom of speech. This commitment is so entrenched that when it seems to come into conflict with other commitments (e.g., gender equality), it is often argued that the commitment to speech must trump the other commitments. In this paper, we argue that a proper understanding of our commitment to free speech requires being clear about what should count as speech for these purposes. On the approach we defend, should get a special, technical sense, (...) different from its ordinary sense. We offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. Finally, we argue that if certain theorists (e.g., MacKinnon) are right about what (some) pornography does, then it should fall outside the scope of the free-speech principle. If so, then contrary to first appearances, pornography may not be a case in which our commitments to freedom and gender equality come into conflict. (shrink)

Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech; therefore, no matter what we think of it, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don't extend to other actions. In response, it has been argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, it is claimed, is that it silences women's speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that warrant the special (...) protections in the first place. ;This dissertation offers a way of making sense of the view that pornography silences women. In Chapter 1, I develop an account of silencing which, unlike other accounts of the same phenomenon, helps make clear why a speaker who is silenced is thereby deprived of the benefits that led us to place a special value on speech. In Chapter 2, I respond to an objection that purports to show that, even if women are silenced, pornography cannot be responsible: in fact, according to this objection, the responsibility for any instance of silencing cannot lie with any party other than the speaker and the audience involved. I show that this objection relies on an overly simplistic picture of what audiences can reasonably be required to do in a speech situation; I also offer an alternate picture, which leaves open the possibility that a speaker may be silenced in a context in which both she and her audience behave competently. In Chapter 3, I consider a view about the way in which pornography contributes to the silencing---and more generally, to the subordination---of women. I argue that this view fails because it is too individualistic: it ignores how the social and political context in which the pornography is consumed helps determine whether it subordinates. I then make some suggestions about what a more satisfactory view would be. ;Though pornography is the principal case study throughout this dissertation, much of what I say generalizes to other forms of representation that set limits on what speakers are able to convey. The main aim of my discussion is to contribute to the philosophical and feminist understanding of communication, by showing how an individual's social role can constrain her possibilities as a speaker. (shrink)

Prostate cancer (PCa) is one of the the most common cancers in men. A blood test called prostate-specific antigen (PSA) has a potential to pick up this cancer very early and is used for screening of this disease. However, screening for prostate cancer is a matter of debate. Level 1 evidence from randomised controlled trials suggests a reduction in cancer-specific mortality from PCa screening. However, there could be an associated impact on quality of life due to a high proportion of (...) overdiagnosis and overtreatment as part of the screening. The US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) in 2012 recommended that PSA-based PCa screening should not to be offered at any age. However, considering the current evidence, USPSTF recently revised its recommendation to offer the PSA test to men aged 55–69 years with shared decision-making, in line with earlier guidelines from the American Cancer Society and the American Urological Association. A shared decision making is necessary since the PSA test could potentially harm an individual. However, the literature suggests that clinicians often neglect a discussion on this issue before ordering the test. This narrative discusses the main controversies regarding PCa screening including the PSA threshold for biopsy, the concept of overdiagnosis and overtreatment, the practical difficulties of active surveillance, the current level 1 evidence on the mortality benefit of screening, and the associated pitfalls. It offers a detailed discussion on the ethics involved in the PSA test and highlights the barriers to shared decision-making and possible solutions. (shrink)

Study of concept of God in schools of Indic philosophy.

The diversity of knowledge surrounding behavioural insights (BI) means in the policy sciences, although visible, remains under-theorized with scant comparative and generalizable explorations of the procedural prerequisites for their effective design, both as stand-alone tools and as part of dedicated policy 'toolkits'. While comparative analyses of the content of BI tools has proliferated, the knowledge gap about the procedural needs of BI policy design is growing recognizably, as the range of BI responses grows in practice necessitating specific capabilities, processes and (...) institutional frameworks to be in place for their design. This Element draws on the literature on policy design and innovation adoption to explore the administrative, institutional and capacity endowments of governments for the successful and appropriate integration of BI in existing policy frameworks. Further, we present three illustrative cases with respect to their experience of essential procedural endowments facilitating for the effective integration of BI in policy design. (shrink)

Since the conceptualization of unethical pro-organizational behavior ten years ago, scholarly interest in exploring this phenomenon has multiplied. Given a burgeoning body of empirical research, a review of unethical pro-organizational behavior literature is warranted. This study, therefore, systematically reviews the extant literature on unethical pro-organizational behavior and presents a comprehensive theory-based review of the past developments in this field. We classify previous studies based on their underlying theoretical perspectives and discuss the antecedents and consequences of unethical pro-organizational behavior in work (...) context. We also explicate the boundary conditions under which the influence of these antecedents gets accentuated or alleviated. Overall, this study synthesizes past knowledge to elucidate why, how, and when unethical pro-organizational behavior unfolds in the workplace. Finally, the gaps in the extant theorization are identified and an agenda for future research is proposed. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Nellie Wieland argues that silencing in the sense put forward by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby has the unpalatable consequence of diminishing a rapist's responsibility for the rape. We argue both that Wieland misidentifies Langton and Hornsby's conception of silencing, and that neither Langton and Hornsby's actual conception, nor the one that Wieland attributes to them, in fact generates this consequence.

Socio-cognitive theory conceptualizes individual contributors as both enactors of cognitive processes and targets of a social context's determinative influences. The present research investigates how contributors’ metacognition or self-beliefs, combine with others’ views of themselves to inform collective team states related to learning about other agents (i.e., transactive memory systems) and forming social attachments with other agents (i.e., collective team identification), both important teamwork states that have implications for team collective intelligence. We test the predictions in a longitudinal study with 78 (...) teams. Additionally, we provide interview data from industry experts in human–artificial intelligence teams. Our findings contribute to an emerging socio-cognitive architecture for COllective HUman-MAchine INtelligence (i.e., COHUMAIN) by articulating its underpinnings in individual and collective cognition and metacognition. Our resulting model has implications for the critical inputs necessary to design and enable a higher level of integration of human and machine teammates. (shrink)

This paper examines Mary Kate McGowan’s account of oppressive speech. McGowan argues that ordinary hateful speech can oppress by enacting discriminatory norms, and further, that this enactment sometimes renders the speech regulable under current United States law. In response, the paper raises two sets of questions. First, it asks about the contents of the norms enacted by a given hateful utterance, and specifically, about what determines those contents. Second, the paper also questions McGowan’s emphasis on the distinction between causing harm (...) and enacting (or constituting) harm. It argues that, contra that emphasis, this distinction doesn’t matter for the regulability of speech in McGowan’s central cases. (shrink)

Avec plus de cent soixante mémorandums d’accords signés avec des constructeurs de barrages, l’Etat d’Arunashal Pradesh, situé dans l’Himalaya, dans une région nord-orientale de l’Inde faisant limite avec la Chine, le Boutant et le Myanmar, occupe une place de choix dans les plans d’aménagement hydroélectrique de l’Inde. Cet état est le foyer d’environ vingt-cinq communautés autochtones, chacune avec ses différentes traditions culturelles et institutionnelles pour l’administration des propriétés collectives, comme les terres agricoles et les forêts. À l’Arunachal Pradesh, à la (...) différence de nombreuses autres communautés de l’Inde, les droits de la communauté sur la terre et les forêts sont protégés par la loi. Malgré cela, avec le boom de l’énergie hydroélectrique, les contradictions entre les droits collectifs et les prérequis institutionnels du modèle de croissance néolibéral ont aiguisé les conflits dans cette région frontalière. (shrink)

To submit a case that has been reviewed by an ethics committee or to submit papers on related topics in clinical ethics, readers are invited to contact Ruchika Mishra, editor of at: ruchika.mishra@gmail.com.

Despite the appeal of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ as an ethical ideal for businesses to pursue, applying this utilitarian principle in practice proves challenging. This is not least due to fundamental disagreements as to what constitutes the ‘greatest good.’ For example, the concept of ‘wellbeing’ now commonly proposed as a way of apprehending the greatest good is itself subject to widely varying interpretations. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative study of 64 managers in different sectors and country contexts, (...) we explore this variation through the lens of constructivist ethics, asking how and why managers systematically differ in their ethical meaning-making around wellbeing. Our theorizing advances constructivist ethics by relating these differences to developmental stages identified in constructivist psychology, finding that systematic variations in ethical meaning-making are shaped by differences in actors’ capacities to process complexity. Our analysis reveals that managers’ ethical meaning-making about wellbeing is subjective, socially constructed, dynamic, and evolutionary, progressing in stages that we differentiate with a novel concept of ‘subjective wellbeing complexity.’ We contribute to practice by discussing how managers’ ability to work with more complex conceptions of wellbeing can be purposefully enhanced through stage-by-stage capacity-building in the form of ‘vertical development.’. (shrink)

Mr. C was a 62-year-old Chinese-American man suffering from end stage liver disease secondary to Hepatitis C. While on the waiting list for a liver, he was told that his current condition and MELD score were not advanced enough to expect a liver transplant for several years. Because of his chronic fatigue, he asked if there was any way to speed up the process but was told that was not possible.

In this account, the author shares her long-standing personal and professional relationship with her mentor, Albert R. Jonsen, PhD, a prominent figure in the history of bioethics.

On October 5, 2015, Governor Jerry Brown approved bill ABX2 15, the End of Life Option Act, making California the fifth state in the country to allow physician-assisted dying. The law was modeled after Oregon's 1997 Death with Dignity Act. When the legislative special session ended on March 10, 2016, California health care providers had only ninety days to respond to the state mandate before the law would take effect, on June 9, 2016. Experience with the law so far suggests (...) several challenges with implementation. (shrink)

This paper finds its origin in a debate between Georges Bataille (1897-1962) and Octavio Paz (1914-1998) on what is central to the idea of eroticism. Bataille posits that violence and transgression are fundamental to eroticism, and without prohibition, eroticism would cease to exist. Paz, however, views violence and transgression as merely intersecting with, rather than being intrinsic to, eroticism. Paz places focus on imagination, and transforms eroticism from a transgressive, to a ritualistic act. Eroticism thus functions as an intermediary, turning (...) animal sexuality into ceremony and rite. In this paper, I argue that Paz and Bataille are not fundamentally at odds in their conceptualisation of eroticism. Instead, Paz redefines the locus of eroticism by subverting its unsettling aspects. His conception of eroticism gives precedence to the imagination, which in itself is an act of violation. Imagination transgresses normal life, but this transgression – the violation of the habitual world – also introduces a glimpse of the numinous that Paz associates with belongingness. The paper further explores eroticism, as this is perceived today, and argues that it ultimately eliminates the threshold marked by transgression. The rise of the contemporary pornographic society is marked by a loss of imagination and transcendence, which ultimately reduces the subject into a mere automaton that demands instant gratification. (shrink)

This essay discusses Rae Langton’s recent collection of essays, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. After introducing some of the major themes of the collection, I raise questions about two of the central concepts in the book. The first question has to do with Langton’s notion of subordination. I ask why she takes pornography to be a subordinating speech act, rather than a subordinating practice, and argue that the latter view has several advantages. The remaining questions have to (...) do with Langton’s notion of objectification. Looking first at the moral dimension of objectification, I raise some concerns about Langton’s strategy for distinguishing instances of objectification from non-instances. Then, turning to Langton’s discussion of the epistemic dimension of objectification, I ask under what circumstances certain belief-forming mechanisms, such as desire-driven projection, are objectifying, on her view. (shrink)

In Down Girl, Kate Manne sets out to reclaim the word ‘misogyny’. To do this, she takes on the naïve conception, according to which misogyny is the hatred of women – universally or at least generally speaking – simply because they are women. Manne argues that this conception has many drawbacks, chief among them its tendency to “deprive women of a suitable name for a potentially potent problem facing them”. Her aim, then, is to develop an alternate conception of misogyny (...) that names this problem, and in so doing, provides a more effective tool for understanding this aspect of gender-based oppression. In this commentary, I focus on two themes. First, I look in more detail at Manne’s critique of the naïve conception. I find that critique entirely persuasive. However, I argue that Manne’s preferred conception of misogyny ends up being very broad, in at least three respects. This breadth, I worry, is incompatible with generating predictions about the phenomenon. I’ll also consider some responses to this worry, but argue that these too have a cost. Some mis-classify clear cases, while others risk re-raising some difficulties for the naïve conception. Second, I consider Manne’s rejection of humanism. In this part, I argue that her substantive account of patriarchy, and the resulting conception of misogyny, is more closely related to humanism than she allows. I also emphasize differences between distinct versions of humanism, and argue that some may be able to counter some of Manne’s main criticisms of this family of views. This part of the discussion seeks to press Manne on precisely how much of humanism she ultimately wishes to reject. (shrink)

Speech perception has been a very productive and important area in psycholinguistics. In this review easy, I discuss Cutler's new book on native language listening. Cutler argues for a theory of speech perception, where all speech perception is accomplished by competence in native speech. I review this book and attempt to situate its main contributions in the broader context of cognitive science.

Includes complete text in Sanskrit with English translation.

The author in this book highlights the ruptures and gaps in western discourses such as those of modernity, poststructuralism, postmodernism, deconstruction, nihilism, feminism, and multiculturalism, while also addressing the anomalies within these frameworks using Indian discursive perspectives which are dhrama centric yet open ended. The author in this book uses a comparative lens to expand the scope of Gandhi's Hind Swaraj with respect to enlightenment thought in order to examine issues of equality, freedom, wealth generation- distribution, industrial society and its (...) epistemology. (shrink)

This study examines how the top two English-language newspapers in India constructed the entrepreneurship discourse used by online cab aggregator firm, Uber Technology Inc., in India, its second-la...

This paper introduce a new variant of the Genetic Algorithm whichis developed to handle multivariable, multi-objective and very high search space optimization problems like the solving system of non-linear equations. It is an integer coded Genetic Algorithm with conventional cross over and mutation but with Inverse algorithm is varying its search space by varying its digit length on every cycle and it does a fine search followed by a coarse search. And its solution to the optimization problem will converge to (...) precise value over the cycles. Every equation of the system is considered as a single minimization objective function. Multiple objectives are converted to a single fitness function by summing their absolute values. Some difficult test functions for optimization and applications are used to evaluate this algorithm. The results prove that this algorithm is capable to produce promising and precise results. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore the idea of mind on the basis of René Descartes and Gilbert Ryle’s vision. Descartes, a 17thcentury philosopher, developed a dualistic theory that posits the mind and body as distinct entities. According to him, the mind is an immaterial, non- extended entity with consciousness and rational thought, while the body is a material substance subject to physical laws. In contrast, 20th-century philosopher Ryle rejected the idea of a separate mental realm and argued for the unity (...) of mind and body. He criticized Cartesian dualism, proposing that mental states and mental processes are not separate from bodily behavior but are intricately intertwined with it. This comparative analysis delves into Descartes’s arguments for dualism, including the interaction between mind and body through the pineal gland and his ideas on the mind’s independence from the body. On the other hand, Ryle’s critique of dualism is examined, with a focus on his concept of “category mistake” and his advocacy for behaviorism, which prioritizes observable behavior over unobservable mental states. By exploring these two contrasting perspectives, this paper aims to comprehensively understand the historical development and implications of the notion of mind. It highlights the influence of Descartes’s dualistic framework on philosophical discourse and Ryle’s efforts to challenge it, emphasizing the importance of considering the relationship between mind, body, and behavior in understanding human cognition and experience. (shrink)

In “Against Arguments from Reference” (Mallon et al., 2009), Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (hereafter, MMNS) argue that recent experiments concerning reference undermine various philosophical arguments that presuppose the correctness of the causal-historical theory of reference. We will argue three things in reply. First, the experiments in question—concerning Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt example—don’t really speak to the dispute between descriptivism and the causal-historical theory; though the two theories are empirically testable, we need to look at quite different data (...) than MMNS do to decide between them. Second, the Gödel/Schmidt example plays a different, and much smaller, role in Kripke’s argument for the causal-historical theory than MMNS assume. Finally, and relatedly, even if Kripke is wrong about the Gödel/Schmidt example—indeed, even if the causal-historical theory is not the correct theory of names for some human languages—that does not, contrary to MMNS’s claim, undermine uses of the causalhistorical theory in philosophical research projects. (shrink)

Well elucidated and defined education policy is the most essential criteria for comprehensive progress of all human beings. From the time immemorial it is known that progress can be ushered only through education. A futuristic education policy both at the school and university level is extremely imperative. Countries at the global level have been adopting effective education policies to meet the changing needs of education and society at large. There is a need to shift educational approach from rote learning to (...) understanding, from exhaustive learning techniques to excitement of discovery and towards the joyful exploration. True education must encompass a synchronized working of body, mind and spirit. The ultimate aim of education must be to help the growing soul draw out the best and make it perfect for a noble use. The aim of education is not only to prepare an individual to succeed in life and society, but to reach the optimum. With this background, the paper is attempting at the theoretical level, to study the Integral philosophy, in the light of NEP 2020. It also tries to inquire into the modalities of Integral thinking, propose the application of the same in education and pedagogies to characterize its practice and goals in Integral Education. (shrink)