Over the last two decades or so, the need to decolonise bioethics and make it inclusive, equitable and accommodative of voices from the traditionally marginalised global South has received increasing attention in academic scholarship. The recent publication by Pratt and de Vries offers a very comprehensive critical analysis and thoughtful overview of the issue, using global health ethics as its starting point.1 I fundamentally agree with their characterisation of the issue as an ‘epistemic justice’ problem. I further find their recommended (...) conceptual and practical ideas for measuring epistemic injustice and ethical responsibilities to promote epistemic justice very thoughtful and insightful. However, I find their responses to possible objections to their arguments a bit hasty and unclear, especially the idea that ‘greater epistemic justice calls for global health ethics to advance a transcultural framework of ethical values and principles’ (p. 7). They look ambiguous on their position on the fundamental global bioethical question regarding the possibility of an intercultural ethical framework. I think the question of whether there are global ethical values and principles that are commonly shared among human beings in the global world is a fair and legitimate issue that deserves deep attention and a persuasive answer by those who call for more inclusive and equitable global bioethics. I attempt to flesh out this issue in a bit more detail to further enrich the discussion. Pratt …. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to apply a collective decision model of the principle of voluntary informed consent in African communitarian culture, in a culturally sensitive way, in order to protect research candidates from potential exploitations and abuses. Dismissing cultural and ethical skepticism surrounding the global application of the principle of voluntary informed consent, the paper ultimately concludes that international collaboration on diagnostic and therapeutic medical research in Africa, especially HIV vaccine trials, is a moral imperative.

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Ahead of Print. In the context of continuous first-order logic, special attention is often given to theories that are somehow continuous in an ‘essential’ way. A common feature of such theories is that they do not interpret any infinite discrete structures. We investigate a stronger condition that is easier to establish and use it to give an example of a strictly simple continuous theory that does not interpret any infinite discrete structures: the theory of richly branching (...) [math]-forests with generic binary predicates. We also give an example of a superstable theory that fails to satisfy this stronger condition but nevertheless does not interpret any infinite discrete structures. (shrink)

Bioethics urges us to question and debate fundamental moral issues that arise in health-related sciences. However, as a result of Western dominance and globalization, bioethical thinking and practice has inevitably been shaped and defined by Western theories. With recent discussions centering on the relationship between culture and bioethics, it is important to consider how and to what extent can bioethics reflect and accommodate non-Western values and beliefs? Debatably, many scholars working in the field of ‘African bioethics’ seek to construct a (...) bioethical practice that is grounded in indigenous African values. Yet, how relevant are ancient African cultural norms to the lives and realities of the 21st century Sub-Saharan-Africans? This edited volume explores bioethics in Africa from pluralistic and inter-cultural perspectives. The selected papers offer diverse theoretical and practical perspectives on the bioethical challenges that are common and specific to the lives of Sub-Sahara Africans. The contributors define bioethics broadly (beyond ethical issues relating to biomedical and biotechnological science) to include applied ethics that concern all aspects of life. Multidisciplinary in approach, the contributions to this book consider bioethics in relation to philosophy, social work, psychiatry, African studies, religious studies, psychology, and medicine. The broad scope of this volume means it will be of interest to those studying and working in bioethics as well as the fields mentioned above. (shrink)

Generic language (e.g., “tigers have stripes”) leads children to assume that the referenced category (e.g., tigers) is inductively informative and provides a causal explanation for the behavior of individual members. In two preregistered studies with 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 497), we considered the mechanisms underlying these effects by testing how correcting generics might affect the development of these beliefs about novel social and animal kinds (Study 1) and about gender (Study 2). Correcting generics by narrowing their scope to (...) a single individual limited beliefs that the referenced categories could explain what their members would be like while broadening the scope to a superordinate category (Study 2) uniquely limited endorsement of gender norms. Across both studies, correcting generics did not alter beliefs about feature heritability and had mixed effects on inductive inferences, suggesting that additional mechanisms (e.g., causal reasoning about shared features) contribute to the development of full-blown essentialist beliefs. These results help illuminate the mechanisms by which generics lead children to view categories as having rich inductive and causal potential; in particular, they suggest that children interpret generics as signals that speakers in their community view the referenced categories as meaningful kinds that support generalization. The findings also point the way to concrete suggestions for how adults can effectively correct problematic generics (e.g., gender stereotypes) that children may hear in daily life. (shrink)

We give a formalism for approximate isomorphism in continuous logic simultaneously generalizing those of two papers by Ben Yaacov [2] and by Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov [6], which are largely incompatible. With this we explicitly exhibit Scott sentences for the perturbation systems of the former paper, such as the Banach‐Mazur distance and the Lipschitz distance between metric spaces. Our formalism is simultaneously characterized syntactically by a mild generalization of perturbation systems and semantically by certain elementary classes of two‐sorted (...) structures that witness approximate isomorphism. As an application, we show that the theory of any ‐tree or ultrametric space of finite radius is stable, improving a result of Carlisle and Henson [8]. (shrink)

The Central American migrant caravans of 2018 are best understood as having been precipitated by entangled multi-scalar geopolitical histories among the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Unsurprisingly, the migrants traveling north to the United States garnered widespread attention on social media. So much so that the reaction to the caravan accelerated plans to deploy troops to the US southern border and deny Central Americans the opportunity to seek asylum. This example showcases how the digital world can have (...) exponential material effects. While coverage on border security and migration has been extensive, within political geography, such concerns have rarely been paired with social media. In this article, we take as our object of analysis the digitality or “digital life” of the migrant caravan. Mapping the patterns of migrant caravan-related tweeting paired with the exploration of Twitter’s networked dimensions reveals the platform to be a fundamentally spatial technology. Rather than reflect, refract or distort, Twitter produces and is in turn produced through spatial mechanisms. We present multiple cartographic visualizations in support of this claim and highlight the ways in which a contextual knowledge of the subject under study—the migrant caravan—can further inform analyses of Big Data. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there can be genuine (as opposed to merely verbal) disputes about whether a sentence form is logically true or an argument form is valid. I call such disputes ?cases of deviance?, of which I distinguish a weak and a strong form. Weak deviance holds if one disputant is right and the other wrong, but the available evidence is insufficient to determine which is which. Strong deviance holds if there is no fact of the matter. (...) In section 2 I argue that weak deviance need not be trivial and may even be interesting. Section 3 considers what it could mean to say that logic is determined by a theory, especially a theory of meaning, an idea that arises in section 2. In section 4 I discuss the dispute between classical and relevance logicians over entailment and argue that it is a case of strong deviance. Finally, in section 5 I show that the result of the previous section is not absolute but relative to the background logic used in reaching it. (shrink)

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction (...) decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed. (shrink)

In this 1958 book, Professor Hanson turns to an equally important but comparatively neglected subject, the philosophical aspects of research and discovery.

Motivated by a characterization of weakly compact cardinals due to Todorcevic, we introduce a new cardinal characteristic, the C-sequence number, which can be seen as a measure of the compactness of a regular uncountable cardinal. We prove a number of ZFC and independence results about the C-sequence number and its relationship with large cardinals, stationary reflection, and square principles. We then introduce and study the more general C-sequence spectrum and uncover some tight connections between the C-sequence spectrum and the strong (...) coloring principle U(. . .), introduced in Part I of this series. (shrink)

We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

We investigate questions involving Aronszajn trees, square principles, and stationary reflection. We first consider two strengthenings of introduced by Brodsky and Rinot for the purpose of constructing κ‐Souslin trees. Answering a question of Rinot, we prove that the weaker of these strengthenings is compatible with stationary reflection at κ but the stronger is not. We then prove that, if μ is a singular cardinal, implies the existence of a special ‐tree with a cf(μ)‐ascent path, thus answering a question of Lücke.

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)

Viale introduced covering matrices in his proof that SCH follows from PFA. In the course of the proof and subsequent work with Sharon, he isolated two reflection principles, CP and S, which, under certain circumstances, are satisfied by all covering matrices of a certain shape. Using square sequences, we construct covering matrices for which CP and S fail. This leads naturally to an investigation of square principles intermediate between □κ and □ for a regular cardinal κ. We provide a detailed (...) picture of the implications between these square principles. (shrink)

For Henry the question ‘Can the truth be learned?’ is as much an aporia as it was for Kierkegaard, and both thinkers ask this question not in order to solve some abstract or pedantic epistemological issue but because the truth they seek is the one that is appropriate to human beings and their salvation. This paper examines Henry’s and Kierkegaard’s answers to the question of how the truth is learned, and in the course of this examination will necessarily have occasion (...) to compare the two thinkers’ accounts of paradox and the phenomenality of Christ, two themes that bring into focus the nature of truth in both thinkers. The paper begins with an analysis of Henry’s theory of two truths, one of the world and the other of life. These two truths collide in the crucial eleventh chapter of I Am the Truth, which elucidates Henry’s understanding of paradox and the role it plays in his phenomenology. Finally, the paper entertains some questions for his theory that a Kierkegaardian might raise. Throughout it can be seen that despite his appreciation of Kierkegaard, Henry’s account of paradox and the specific mode of revelation that is appropriate to the Christ deviates from the Dane’s theory. Furthermore, it would seem that in a similar fashion their understandings of what counts as a paradox ultimately differ in such a way that Henry’s supposed paradoxes turn out to be by his own admission merely apparent, whereas for Kierkegaard (and perhaps in this respect his theory is a bit closer to ordinary intuitions about what it means for a truth to be paradoxical), paradox is an ineradicable feature of the highest kind of truth as reason confronts it. The thesis then that for Henry paradox and the tension between two kinds of truth are merely apparent whereas for Kierkegaard they are intensified is not merely of interest in establishing a proper reading of each respective thinker; it affects our understanding of the phenomenological notions of world, truth, and the absolute as well as establishing divergences of considerable theological interest. What is at stake is the exact status of the kind of truth phenomenology will privilege and the bearing that this question has upon the nature of the world and phenomenality. (shrink)

In the context of continuous first-order logic, special attention is often given to theories that are somehow continuous in an ‘essential’ way. A common feature of such theories is that they do not interpret any infinite discrete structures. We investigate a stronger condition that is easier to establish and use it to give an example of a strictly simple continuous theory that does not interpret any infinite discrete structures: the theory of richly branching [Formula: see text]-forests with generic binary predicates. (...) We also give an example of a superstable theory that fails to satisfy this stronger condition but nevertheless does not interpret any infinite discrete structures. (shrink)

We continue our study of strongly unbounded colorings, this time focusing on subadditive maps. In Part I of this series, we showed that, for many pairs of infinite cardinals $\theta < \kappa $, the existence of a strongly unbounded coloring $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is a theorem of $\textsf{ZFC}$. Adding the requirement of subadditivity to a strongly unbounded coloring is a significant strengthening, though, and here we see that in many cases the existence of a subadditive strongly unbounded coloring (...) $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is independent of $\textsf{ZFC}$. We connect the existence of subadditive strongly unbounded colorings with a number of other infinitary combinatorial principles, including the narrow system property, the existence of $\kappa $ -Aronszajn trees with ascent paths, and square principles. In particular, we show that the existence of a closed, subadditive, strongly unbounded coloring $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is equivalent to a certain weak indexed square principle $\boxminus ^{\operatorname {\mathrm {ind}}}(\kappa, \theta )$. We conclude the paper with an application to the failure of the infinite productivity of $\kappa $ -stationarily layered posets, answering a question of Cox. (shrink)

When attempting to answer the question, in the context of clinical healthcare, one might be tempted to leap to either of two rather obvious, but seemingly contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, we might have a general impression of religion not making much of a distinctive and clear difference, at least in the actions and outcomes of most cases of clinical interaction. Those of us in the bioethics world of discourse are likely to think only of the less common cases (...) of Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Jews, or certain religious groups who seem to the majority of the population to hold especially sectarian, if not beliefs about medical matters. The so-called mainstream religious groups do not get much attention because they largely don't cause much trouble ; they have learned to bracket their religious commitments from at least any professional settings ; or they don't hold views entailing consequences any different from those of most nonbelieving, generally upright individuals. Furthermore, although religious believers may have some distinctive views, these views don't often noticeably manifest themselves in distinctive or significant ways. (shrink)

Parallogic models the relationship between mind and context. It, as does the excerpt above, suggests that systems of logic are context specific and therefore parallel. This model points out that perceived departures in mental process, reasoning, may be more apparent than real. It also suggests a new way to conceive of mental illness by separating breakdowns in mental process from shifts in mental process.

Owing to the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on world economies, it is expected that information flows between commodities and uncertainties have been transformed. Accordingly, the resulting twisted risk among commodities and related uncertainties is presumed to rise during stressed market conditions. Therefore, investors feel pressured to find safe haven investments during the pandemic. For this reason, we model a mixture of asymmetric and non-linear bi-directional causality between global commodities and uncertainties at different frequencies through the information flow theory. (...) Consequently, we utilise the complete ensemble empirical mode decomposition with adaptive noise and the Rényi effective transfer entropy techniques to establish the dynamic flow of information. The intrinsic mode functions from the CEEMDAN are carefully extracted into multi-frequencies through cluster analysis to reconstruct the series into high, medium, and low frequencies in addition to the residue. We utilise daily data from December 31st, 2019, to March 31st, 2021, to provide insights into the COVID-19 pandemic. The correlation coefficients and variances demonstrate that the high frequency which measures the short-term dynamics is the dominant frequency, suggesting short-lived market fluctuations relative to real economic growth for institutional investors. Moreover, outcomes from the multi-frequency entropy indicate a negative bi-directional causality of information flow between global commodities and uncertainties, especially in the long term. Generally, the findings present pertinent inferences for portfolio diversification, policy decisions, and risk management schemes for global commodities and markets volatilities. We, therefore, advocate that market volatilities act as effective hedges for global commodities, and they clearly act as balancing assets rather than substitutes in the long-term dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Investors who delayed in investing within financial markets of commodities and market volatilities are likely to minimise their portfolio risks. (shrink)

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Micro-structure realism” and “Reason realism” . The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink\'s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro- structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR\'s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relation ship between moral facts and their (...) natural- scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped- together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith , which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent\'s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent\'s member ship in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons. (shrink)

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Micro-structure realism” and “Reason realism”. The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink\'s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro- structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR\'s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relation ship between moral facts and their natural- (...) scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped- together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith, which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent\'s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent\'s member ship in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons. (shrink)

There is a substantial literature on evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. According to these arguments, evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs pose a significant problem for moral realism, specifically by committing the realist to an unattractive pessimism about the prospects of our having moral knowledge. In this paper, I argue that EDAs exploit an equivocation between two distinct readings of their central claim. One is plausibly true but has no epistemic relevance, and the other would have epistemic consequences for (...) realism, but is false. If I'm right, this undermines attempts to use evolutionary explanations to debunk belief in other domains too. (shrink)

We address three questions raised by Cummings and Foreman regarding a model of Gitik and Sharon. We first analyze the PCF-theoretic structure of the Gitik–Sharon model, determining the extent of good and bad scales. We then classify the bad points of the bad scales existing in both the Gitik–Sharon model and other models containing bad scales. Finally, we investigate the ideal of subsets of singular cardinals of countable cofinality carrying good scales.

The Halpern–Läuchli theorem, a combinatorial result about trees, admits an elegant proof due to Harrington using ideas from forcing. In an attempt to distill the combinatorial essence of this proof, we isolate various partition principles about products of perfect Polish spaces. These principles yield straightforward proofs of the Halpern–Läuchli theorem, and the same forcing from Harrington’s proof can force their consistency. We also show that these principles are not ZFC theorems by showing that they put lower bounds on the size (...) of the continuum. (shrink)

The field of neuroimaging has reached a watershed. Brain imaging research has been the source of many advances in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive science over the last decade, but recent critiques and emerging trends are raising foundational issues of methodology, measurement, and theory. Indeed, concerns over interpretation of brain maps have created serious controversies in social neuroscience, and, more important, point to a larger set of issues that lie at the heart of the entire brain mapping enterprise. In this volume, (...) leading scholars -- neuroimagers and philosophers of mind -- reexamine these central issues and explore current controversies that have arisen in cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, computer science, and signal processing. The contributors address both statistical and dynamical analysis and modeling of neuroimaging data and interpretation, discussing localization, modularity, and neuroimagers' tacit assumptions about how these two phenomena are related; controversies over correlation of fMRI data and social attributions ; and the standard inferential design approach in neuroimaging. Finally, the contributors take a more philosophical perspective, considering the nature of measurement in brain imaging, and offer a framework for novel neuroimaging data structures. Contributors: William Bechtel, Bharat Biswal, Matthew Brett, Martin Bunzl, Max Coltheart, Karl J. Friston, Joy J. Geng, Clark Glymour, Kalanit Grill-Spector, Stephen José Hanson, Trevor Harley, Gilbert Harman, James V. Haxby, Rik N. Henson, Nancy Kanwisher, Colin Klein, Richard Loosemore, Sébastien Meriaux, Chris Mole, Jeanette A. Mumford, Russell A. Poldrack, Jean-Baptiste Poline, Richard C. Richardson, Alexis Roche, Adina L. Roskies, Pia Rotshtein, Rebecca Saxe, Philipp Sterzer, Bertrand Thirion, Edward Vul The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

[Anne:] “I can't, I'm in the depths of despair. Can you eat when you are in the depths of despair?”“I've never been in the depths of despair, so I can't say,” said Marilla.“Weren't you? Well did you ever try to imagine you were in the depths of despair?”” No, I didn't.”“Then I don't think you can understand what it's like. It's a very uncomfortable feeling indeed. When you try to eat a lump comes right up in your throat and you (...) can't swallow anything, not even if it was a chocolate caramel.”—L.M. Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables.Emotion, as a “suprarational” property, transcends rationality in that it can be thought of as a group, contextual rather than as a solely individual trait, and thus is a higher order property, as the above quote suggests. This proposal arises from a metatheoretical analysis of models available to broach questions of emotion. I use metatheoretical in the sense of both the context of theory production and the theory of theory. From the first arose the idea that emotion, through the use of irrationality, has surfaced as a working equivalent to inexplicability or rational relativity, and can be modelled more adequately as suprarational, with a unique nature in its own right. The latter led me to propose that the concept of emotion as contextual, a higher order group level property, is possible and tentatively profitable. (shrink)

Makins’s analysis of the philosophical justification of decision-making understates and so misinterprets the importance of patient values to ‘the deference principle.’ (Makins N,1, p1) He assesses autonomy and beneficence as two separate arguments in support of deferring to patient preferences, but they only work well considered together. Further, neither the constitutive nor the evidential view of beneficence fully recognises the importance of patient values to understanding the patient’s worldview, which in turn determines what risks and benefits matter most. Revising these (...) arguments enables a much fuller understanding of the importance of patient values to the practice of medicine, which will in turn improve the refinement of the deference principle. Autonomy requires beneficence, and vice versa, for either of them to be sufficient arguments for deferring to patient choices. Focusing on autonomy alone to justify deference overstates the value of choice in and of itself, as good medicine does not pursue just any choices. It seeks informed consent, which means that the choices we truly value are those made while understanding what is importantly relevant to the choice. A well-informed decision includes data about expected side effects and likelihood of beneficial effects; but it also includes knowing the patient’s values and goals. One must know what is actually valuable …. (shrink)

Workplace incivility is a current challenge in organizations, including smaller firms, as is the development of programs that enhance employees’ treatment of coworkers and ethical decision making. Ethics programs in particular might attenuate tendencies toward interpersonal misconduct, which can harm ethical reasoning. Consequently, this study evaluated the relationships among the presence of ethics codes and employees’ locus of control, social aversion/malevolence, and ethical judgments of incivility using information secured from a sample of businesspersons employed in smaller organizations. Results indicated that (...) ethics code presence was associated with a more internal locus of control and stronger ethical judgment of workplace incivility. Social aversion/malevolence was negatively related to ethical judgment, and internal locus of control was positively related to ethical judgment. Smaller firms should develop ethics codes to manage individuals’ perceptions of control, thus encouraging enhanced ethical reasoning in situations that involve the mistreatment of coworkers; they should also monitor counterproductive tendencies that harm such reasoning and precipitate incivility. (shrink)

Can artworks be morally good or bad? Many philosophers have thought so. Does this moral goodness or badness bear on how good or bad a work isas art?This is very much a live debate.Autonomistsargue that moral value is not relevant to artistic value;interactionistsargue that it is. In this paper, I argue that the debate between interactionists and autonomists has been conducted unfairly: all parties to the debate have tacitly accepted a set of constraints which prejudices the issue against the interactionist. (...) I identify two demands which are routinely placed on arguments seeking to establish interaction and argue that they are, in fact, mutually conflicting.There are two upshots. First, in light of this, it is unsurprising that arguments for interaction have failed to meet with everybody’s satisfaction. The constraints are such that no argument can meet them. Second, recognizing this helps us uncover a new, promising, but hitherto overlooked strategy for establishing artistic-ethical interaction. (shrink)

Reverse inference in cognitive neuropsychology has been characterized as inference to ‘psychological processes’ from ‘patterns of activation’ revealed by functional magnetic resonance or other scanning techniques. Several arguments have been provided against the possibility. Focusing on Machery’s presentation, we attempt to clarify the issues, rebut the impossibility arguments, and propose and illustrate a strategy for reverse inference. 1 The Problem of Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuropsychology2 The Arguments2.1 The anti-Bayesian argument3 Patterns of Activation4 Reverse Inference Practiced5 Seek and Ye Shall (...) Find, Maybe6 Conclusion. (shrink)

Many thinkers believe that the next transformational change in human organisation will be the onset of human-level artificial intelligence, and that the most likely method of achieving this will come through brain emulations or "ems": the ability to scan human brains and program their connections into ever faster computers. Taking this as his starting point, Hanson describes what a world dominated by these ems will be like.

It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative goodness. There are good reasons to think that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness. Surprisingly, however, much debate in philosophical aesthetics has proceeded as though artistic value is a kind of predicative goodness. As I shall argue, recognising that artistic value is attributive goodness has important consequences for a number of debates in aesthetics.