How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who (...) think that a certain kind of understanding—objectual understanding—is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive. (shrink)

This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive (...) accuracy. On the other hand, antirealists argue that the success of science does not warrant belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. This is because the history of science is a graveyard of theories that were once successful but were later discarded. The author eventually settles on a middle ground position between scientific realism and antirealism called "relative realism.". (shrink)

Life-saving health resources like organs for transplant and experimental medications are persistently scarce. How ought we, morally speaking, to ration these resources? Many hold that, in any morally acceptable allocation scheme, the young should to some extent be prioritized over the old. Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer and Ezekiel Emanuel propose a multi-principle allocation scheme called the Complete Lives System, according to which persons roughly between 15 and 40 years old get priority over younger children and older adults, other things being (...) equal. They defend this ‘modified youngest first’ principle in part by appealing to the greater social investment that has been made in 15-year-olds than in younger children. Ruth Tallman has proposed a distinctive defense of modified youngest first, one that appeals not at all to social investment. We find this defense wanting. Tallman’s argument depends on the idea, which we try to show to be implausible, that allocations should maximize the number of people in the midst of a possibly complete life who actually complete their lives. Moreover, Tallman does not justify the priority modified youngest first gives 15-year-olds over, for example, 5-year-olds. Tallman fails to dispel a serious shortcoming with modified youngest first: its fundamental unfairness to pre-adolescents. (shrink)

Musical life became disrupted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many musicians and venues turned to online alternatives, such as livestreaming. In this study, three livestreamed concerts were organized to examine separate, yet interconnected concepts—agency, presence, and social context—to ascertain which components of livestreamed concerts facilitate social connectedness. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling was conducted on 83 complete responses to examine the effects of the manipulations on feelings of social connectedness with the artist and the audience. Results showed that in concert (...) 1, where half of the participants were allowed to vote for the final song to be played, this option did not result in the experience of more agency. Instead, if their preferred song was played (regardless of voting ability) participants experienced greater connectedness to the artist. In concert 2, participants who attended the concert with virtual reality headsets experienced greater feelings of physical presence, as well as greater feelings of connectedness with the artist, than those that viewed a normal YouTube livestream. In concert 3, attendance through Zoom led to greater experience of social presence, but predicted less connectedness with the artist, compared to a normal YouTube livestream. Crucially, a greater negative impact of COVID-19 (e.g., loneliness) predicted feelings of connectedness with the artist, possibly because participants fulfilled their social needs with this parasocial interaction. Examining data from all concerts suggested that physical presence was a predictor of connectedness with both the artist and the audience, while social presence only predicted connectedness with the audience. Correlational analyses revealed that reductions in loneliness and isolation were associated with feelings of shared agency, physical and social presence, and connectedness to the audience. Overall, the findings suggest that in order to reduce feelings of loneliness and increase connectedness, concert organizers and musicians could tune elements of their livestreams to facilitate feelings of physical and social presence. (shrink)

A comprehensive overview of Slavoj Zizek's thought, including all of his published works to date. Provides a solid basis in the work of an engaging thinker and teacher whose ideas will continue to inform philosophical, psychological, political, and cultural discourses well into the future Identifies the major currents in Zizek's thought, discussing all of his works and providing a background in continental philosophy and psychoanalytic theory necessary to its understanding Explores Zizek's growing popularity through his engagement in current events, politics, (...) and cultural studies Pertains to a variety of fields, including contemporary philosophy, psychology, cultural studies, sociology, political science, esthetics, literary theory, film theory, and theology. (shrink)

A wide range of countries decided to go into lockdown to contain the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic of 2020, a setting separating people and restricting their movements. We investigated how musicians dealt with this sudden restriction in mobility. Responses of 234 people were collected. The majority of respondents (95%) resided in Belgium or the Netherlands. Results indicated a decrease of 79% of live music making in social settings during lockdown compared with before lockdown. In contrast, an increase of 264% was (...) demonstrated for online joint music making. However, results showed that most respondents were largely or even completely unaccustomed with specialized platforms for online joint music making (e.g., JamKazam, Jamulus). Respondents reported to mostly use well-known video-conferencing platforms such as Zoom and Skype when playing together virtually. However, when such video-conferencing platforms were used, they were often not employed for synchronized playing and were generally reported to insufficiently deal with latency issues. Furthermore, respondents depending on music making as their main source of income explored online real-time methods significantly more than those relying on other income sources. Results also demonstrated an increase of 93% in the use of alternative remote joint music-making methods (e.g., recording parts separately and subsequently circulating these digital recordings). All in all, results of this study provide a more in-depth view on joint music making during the first weeks of lockdown induced by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, and demonstrate users’ perceptions of performance and usability of online real-time platforms as well as alternative methods for musical interaction. (shrink)

Goal-directed spatial decision making video games combine spatial mapping, memory, and reward; all of which can involve hippocampal excitation through suppression of an inhibitory neurotransmitter, γ-aminobutyric acid. In this study, GABA was measured before and after 30 min of video game play within a voxel around the hippocampus. It was predicted that all participants would experience a decrease in GABA during gaming as a result of in-game rewards; and, those who were most competitive with the goal-directed spatial decision making game (...) would display lower hippocampal GABA concentrations after gaming. Those who were not competitive, because they were too skilled or not skilled enough, would demonstrate higher hippocampal GABA concentrations after gaming. While there were no significant differences in hippocampal GABA before and after gaming for gamers and non-gamers alike, there was a significant quadratic regression between performance on a spatial working memory task and post-gaming hippocampal GABA concentrations. (shrink)

Vagueness is commonly presented as natural language imprecise meaning that is analyzed as borderline cases and formalized in various ways by ‘classical’ theories of vagueness. A different approach to vagueness is presented here, adopting Dascal’s notion of ‘soft rationality’ and interpreting it as the use of ‘similarity’ rather than ‘analysis’ for the understanding of natural language terms. Soft rationality is suggested as a theory of vagueness that remains within the realm of intensionality, rather than seeking a formalized extensional explanation to (...) vagueness. (shrink)

COVID-19 Lockdown was particularly challenging for most mothers of people with intellectual disabilities, including those with Rett syndrome, leading to feelings of abandonment from healthcare services of their children. Within those days, telerehabilitation has represented a valid alternative to support physical activity and treatment, supporting parents in structuring their children’s daily routine at home. This article aims to describe the well-being level of two groups of mothers of girls and women with RTT who were involved in a home-based remotely supervised (...) motor rehabilitation program, respectively, before and during the COVID-19 Italian lockdown. Forty participants with classic RTT were recruited before the lockdown and randomly assigned to two groups that performed the intervention immediately before and during the lockdown, respectively. The intervention included an individualized daily physical activity program carried out for 12 weeks by participants’ parents and fortnightly supervised throughout Skype contacts to plan, monitor, and accommodate individual activities in the participant’s life at home. The short form Caregivers Well-Being Scale was collected for the mothers in each group 12 weeks before intervention, at intervention initiation, immediately after intervention termination, as well as at 12 weeks after intervention termination. Mothers of participants in the Group 1 showed a stable level of well-being across all four evaluations with a slight improvement during the lockdown, without significant change. Similarly, the well-being level of mothers in the Group 2 showed a statistically significant increase in their well-being between T2 and T3 and its reduction to the pre-intervention level between T3 and T4. The results suggest that the lockdown did not negatively affect the participants’ mothers’ well-being, leading to its improvement. Moreover, the proposed intervention could have supported the mothers in managing the new daily routine at home, positively affecting maternal well-being. (shrink)

Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress are superior to academic disciplines that do (...) not make progress. In other words, other things being equal, it is generally better for an academic discipline to make progress than to make little or no progress, given that an academic discipline that is making little or no progress is an academic discipline that is failing to achieve its epistemic goals. Now, if there is no question among academic philosophers that science makes progress, and significantly so, but there is an open question among academic philosophers as to whether academic philosophy makes progress (and if so, how much), then academic philosophers would have to agree that science is superior to academic philosophy in terms of making progress. I develop this argument in this paper and provide empirical evidence suggesting that the premises would be acceptable to academic philosophers. (shrink)

Aristotle's thesis in "Physics" I 8 is that a certain old and familiar problem about coming to be can only be solved with the help of the new account of the "principles" he has developed in "Physics" I 7. This is a strong thesis and the literature on the chapter does not quite do it justice; specifically, as things now stand we are left wondering why Aristotle should have found this problem so compelling in the first place. In this paper (...) I develop an interpretation which (I hope) will help to remedy this. I believe that Aristotle's problem about coming to be depends on a certain principle to the effect that "nothing can become what it already is" (it is this that is supposed to explain why τὸ ὄν cannot come to be ἐξ ὄντος -- cf. 191a30). The main innovation of the interpretation developed here is its suggestion that we understand this principle as a principle about kinds. So understood, the principle does not make the comparatively trivial point that nothing can become any individual it already is, but rather the more powerful and substantive point that nothing can become any kind of thing it already is. I argue that this is a point which Aristotle himself accepts and that this is why the problem about coming to be raises serious difficulties for him. I also discuss Aristotle's proposed solutions to this problem, explaining how each draws on his new account of the principles and why each is required for any full resolution of the difficulties the problem raises. In this way I hope to show how the interpretation developed here does justice to the very strong thesis with which Aristotle begins "Physics" I 8. I conclude briefly and somewhat speculatively with a suggestion as to why Aristotle might accept the principle on which I have suggested the problem turns. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that arguments from expert opinion, i.e., inferences from “Expert E says that p” to “p,” where the truth value of p is unknown, are weak arguments. A weak argument is an argument in which the premises, even if true, provide weak support—or no support at all—for the conclusion. Such arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments unless the fact that an expert says that p makes p significantly more likely to be true. However, research on (...) expertise shows that expert opinions are only slightly more accurate than chance and much less accurate than decision procedures. If this is correct, then it follows that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. (shrink)

Among all their sensations, agents need to distinguish between those caused by themselves and those caused by external causes. The ability to infer agency is particularly challenging under conditions of uncertainty. Within the predictive processing framework, this should happen through active control of prediction error that closes the action-perception loop. Here we use a novel, temporally-sensitive, behavioural proxy for prediction error to show that it is minimised most quickly when volatility is high and when participants report agency, regardless of the (...) accuracy of the judgement. We demonstrate broad effects of uncertainty on accuracy of agency judgements, movement, policy selection, and hypothesis switching. Measuring autism traits, we find differences in policy selection, sensitivity to uncertainty and hypothesis switching despite no difference in overall accuracy. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key (...) premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

It is a common view among philosophers of science that theoretical virtues (also known as epistemic or cognitive values), such as simplicity and consistency, play an important role in scientific practice. In this article, I set out to study the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice empirically. I apply the methods of data science, such as text mining and corpus analysis, to study large corpora of scientific texts in order to uncover patterns of usage. These patterns of usage, (...) in turn, might shed some light on the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice. Overall, the results of this empirical study suggest that scientists invoke theoretical virtues explicitly, albeit rather infrequently, when they talk about models (less than 30%), theories (less than 20%), and hypotheses (less than 15%) in their published works. To the extent that they are mentioned in scientific publications, the results of this study suggest that accuracy, consistency, and simplicity are the theoretical virtues that scientists invoke more frequently than the other theoretical virtues tested in this study. Interestingly, however, depending on whether they talk about hypotheses, theories, or models, scientists may invoke one of those theoretical virtues more than the others. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, other things being equal, simpler arguments are better. In other words, I argue that, other things being equal, it is rational to prefer simpler arguments over less simple ones. I sketch three arguments in support of this claim: an argument from mathematical proofs, an argument from scientific theories, and an argument from the conjunction rule.

It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...

In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that (...) such circumstantial ad hominem arguments are construed as rebuttals to appeals (administrative) authority (of expertise), or so I argue. (shrink)

As the prevalence of conflict and fragility continue to rise around the world, research is increasingly heralded as a solution. However, current ethical guidelines for working in areas suffering from institutional and social fragility, insecurity or violent conflict have been heavily critiqued as highly abstract; focussed only on data collection; detached from the realities of academia in the Global South; and potentially extractive. This article seeks to respond to that assessment by spotlighting some of the most prevalent challenges researchers face (...) in the pursuit of ethical working practices. It explores the material and epistemic injustices that often shape and underpin research structures and relationships in these contexts. The paper draws on the authors’ experiences of research in conflict-affected and fragile contexts over the last fifteen years and on workshop discussions with researchers based in fragile and conflict-affected contexts conducted in Amman, Bogotá and Dhaka in 2019-2020. The paper works from the premise that achieving ethical research in fragile spaces is not dependent solely on activity at the site of research, but also on decisions made across the entire ecosystem of a research project. It therefore interrogates the full research landscape, from funding models, to research design (including research topics, partnerships, methods, participant selection, and researcher positionality), to dissemination plans and ethical gatekeeping. The paper critically reflects on inequities in the processes of knowledge production about conflict and fragility and the key ethical challenges that researchers encounter. It highlights the need for further guidance, support and accountability to ensure ethical research practices. (shrink)

In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge–in the form of scholarly publications–than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and research impact). Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as such knowledge is (...) explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more successful than non-scientific knowledge. Brown (2017a) raises several objections against my defense of Weak Scientism and I have replied to his objections (Mizrahi 2017b), thereby showing again that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. Since then, Brown (2017b) has reiterated his objections in another reply on SERRC. In this paper, I respond to Brown's objections, thereby showing once more that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. (shrink)

In their attempt to defend philosophy from accusations of uselessness made by prominent scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, some philosophers respond with the charge of ‘scientism.’ This charge makes endorsing a scientistic stance, a mistake by definition. For this reason, it begs the question against these critics of philosophy, or anyone who is inclined to endorse a scientistic stance, and turns the scientism debate into a verbal dispute. In this paper, I propose a different definition of scientism, and thus a (...) new way of looking at the scientism debate. Those philosophers who seek to defend philosophy against accusations of uselessness would do philosophy a much better service, I submit, if they were to engage with the definition of scientism put forth in this paper, rather than simply make it analytic that scientism is a mistake. (shrink)

I reply to Muñoz-Suárez's objection to my argument by analogy with appeals to authority for the following necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strong appeals to intuition: (PAI) When philosophers appeal to intuitions, there must be an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question; otherwise, the appeal to intuition is weak.

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical (...) hypotheses or knowledge closure. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress, the epistemic account of scientific progress, and the noetic account of scientific progress. Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic (...) and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. (shrink)

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ (...) picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth. (shrink)

Over the past twenty-five years, thirty-seven states and the US Congress have passed mental health and substance use disorder (MH/SUD) parity laws to secure nondiscriminatory insurance coverage for MH/SUD services in the private health insurance market and through certain public insurance programs. However, in the intervening years, litigation has been brought by numerous parties alleging violations of insurance parity. We examine the critical issues underlying these legal challenges as a framework for understanding the areas in which parity enforcement is lacking, (...) as well as ongoing areas of ambiguity in the interpretation of these laws. We identified all private litigation involving federal and state parity laws and extracted themes from a final sample of thirty-seven lawsuits. The primary substantive topics at issue include the scope of services guaranteed by parity laws, coverage of certain habilitative therapies such as applied behavioral analysis for autism spectrum disorders, credentialing standards for MH/SUD providers, determinations regarding the medical necessity of MH/SUD services, and the application of nonquantitative treatment limitations under the 2008 federal parity law. Ongoing efforts to achieve nondiscriminatory insurance coverage for MH/SUDs should attend to the major issues subject to private legal action as important areas for facilitating and monitoring insurer compliance. (shrink)

Decolonizing the Body explores the traumatic physical and emotional effects of colonization and systemic racism on the body and mind. Written by a woman of color for women of color, it offers body-centered somatic practices to free women from internalized oppression, so they can reclaim confidence, dignity, and self-worth.

In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic and (...) an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism. (shrink)

The authors of the feature article argue against implied consent in all episiotomy cases, but allow that opt-out consent might be appropriate in limited circumstances.1 However, they do not indicate how clinicians should assess whether the pregnant person is capable of consenting in this way during an obstetric emergency. This commentary will focus on how capacity should be determined during these circumstances, suggest next steps for clinicians if capacity is deemed uncertain or absent, and discuss the appropriate role for opt-out (...) consent in labour. Previous studies investigating the extent to which pregnant persons retain decision-making capacity during labour have shown poor recall, a component of capacity, about consent processes during obstetric emergency procedures in 14%–49% of cases.1 2 As the feature article acknowledges, this does not mean that pregnant persons should be assumed to lack decision-making capacity during labour. Although pain, labour intensity, exhaustion and medications can make consenting processes during labour more difficult and it is possible that these factors will result in the impaired ability of the pregnant person to make informed and voluntary decisions about treatment options, this possibility of impaired capacity should not be taken as the expected outcome nor should it be used as an excuse to skip consenting procedures.1 2 The default to treat labouring patients as able to make their own decisions still stands, although signs that a person lacks …. (shrink)

A method of iteration of Prikry type forcing notions as well as a forcing for adding clubs is presented. It is applied to construct a model with a measurable cardinal containing a club of former regulars, starting with o(κ) = κ + 1. On the other hand, it is shown that the strength of above is at least o(κ) = κ.

In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then (...) the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...) judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (...) and are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned. (shrink)

The shift away from paternalistic decision-making and toward patient-centered, shared decision-making has stemmed from the recognition that in order to practice medicine ethically, health care professionals must take seriously the values and preferences of their patients. At the same time, there is growing recognition that minor and seemingly irrelevant features of how choices are presented can substantially influence the decisions people make. Behavioral economists have identified striking ways in which trivial differences in the presentation of options can powerfully and predictably (...) affect people's choices. Choice-affecting features of the decision environment that do not restrict the range of choices or significantly alter the incentives have come to be known as “nudges.” Although some have criticized conscious efforts to influence choice, we believe that clinical nudges may often be morally justified. The most straightforward justification for nudge interventions is that they help people bypass their cognitive limitations—for example, the tendency to choose the first option presented even when that option is not the best for them—thereby allowing people to make choices that best align with their rational preferences or deeply held values. However, we argue that this justification is problematic. We argue that, if physicians wish to use nudges to shape their patients’ choices, the justification for doing so must appeal to an ethical and professional standard, not to patients’ preferences. We demonstrate how a standard with which clinicians and bioethicists already are quite familiar—the best-interest standard—offers a robust justification for the use of nudges. (shrink)

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic-continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical (...) texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...) study show that participants were more inclined to judge that an agent ought to perform an action than that the agent can perform the action. Overall, participants said that an agent ought to perform an action even when they said that the agent cannot do it. I discuss the implications of these results for the debate over OIC. (shrink)

This paper addresses a dichotomy in the attitudes of some clinicians and bioethicists regarding whether there is a moral difference between deactivating a cardiac pacemaker in a highly dependent patient at the end of life, as opposed to standard cases of withdrawal of treatment. Although many clinicians hold that there is a difference, some bioethicists maintain that the two sorts of cases are morally equivalent. The author explores one potential morally significant point of difference between pacemakers and certain other life-sustaining (...) treatments: specifically, that the former are biofixtures, which become part of the patient in a way that the latter do not. The concept of the pacemaker as biofixture grants pacemakers a unique moral status that gives reason to treat a pacemaker the same as other parts of the patient that are necessary to sustain life. The author employs this biofixture analysis to affirm the intuition that deactivating a pacemaker in a highly dependent patient at the end of life is, in moral terms, more analogous to active euthanasia than it is to standard cases of withdrawal of treatment. The paper concludes with consideration of potential implications for further implantable medical technologies, such as ventricular assist devices and total artificial hearts. (shrink)

We prove several results giving lower bounds for the large cardinal strength of a failure of the singular cardinal hypothesis. The main result is the following theorem: Theorem. Suppose κ is a singular strong limit cardinal and 2κ λ where λ is not the successor of a cardinal of cofinality at most κ. If cf > ω then it follows that o λ, and if cf = ωthen either o λ or {α: K o α+n} is confinal in κ for (...) each n ε ω.We also prove several results which extend or are related to this result, notably Theorem. If 2ω ω1 then there is a sharp for a model with a strong cardinal.In order to prove these theorems we give a detailed analysis of the sequences of indiscernibles which come from applying the covering lemma to nonoverlapping sequences of extenders. (shrink)

The original “Dutch Protocol”—the treatment model comprised of puberty blockers, cross‐sex hormones, and surgery—was intended to improve the mental and physical health of pediatric patients experiencing distress over their sexed bodies. Consequently, both researchers and clinicians have couched eligibility for treatment and measures of treatment efficacy in terms of the interventions’ effects on outcomes such as gender dysphoria, depression, anxiety, and suicide. However, recent systematic reviews have concluded that the scientific evidence supporting these interventions is uncertain, leading to significant international (...) differences in what treatments are offered to youth. Against this backdrop, a different argumentative approach has emerged in support of gender‐affirming care. This approach appeals not to reductions in patient morbidity or mortality but to patient autonomy, where medical intervention is pursued as a means to the satisfaction of a patient's “embodiment goals.” In this article, I raise objections to autonomy‐based justifications for pediatric gender‐affirming care, concluding that these arguments misunderstand the place of autonomy in clinical decision‐making and, consequently, put patients at risk of medical harm. (shrink)

Kelsey Lucyk analyzes how the media and the institution of sport have entrenched certain ideals about masculinity meanwhile reinforcing homophobic attitudes towards gender roles in sports. This article focusses primarily on analyzing Canadian sports and makes use of the concept of muscular Christianity to explain hegemonic masculinity as found in the Canadian institution of sport.

Imagine a drug—let's call it Curebitt—that is safe, cheap, and very effective: take a pill once a day and you will be healthier. Curebitt's taste is so unpleasant, so bitter, however, that a significant proportion of patients cannot bring themselves to ingest the pill regularly. Now suppose that after some time, another drug, Curesweet, hits the market. This drug is clinically equivalent to Curebitt and costs the same, but it is much more palatable, so adherence rates for it are significantly (...) higher than for Curebitt. Should physicians continue prescribing Curebitt, now that Curesweet is available? No, prescribing the bitter pill puts patients at a greater risk of nonadherence and ultimately results in reduced clinical benefit for a significant proportion of patients, whereas prescribing Curesweet benefits more patients and increases the probability that any given patient's health will improve. The Curebitt versus Curesweet scenario draws our attention to how a physician can fail her patients by prescribing drugs with lower adherence rates when equivalent drugs with higher adherence rates are available. What does this fictional case tell us about the real world? A lot. We know that adherence rates vary with out‐of‐pocket costs. Name‐brand drugs carry higher out‐of‐pocket costs than their generic counterparts; as a result, when name‐brand drugs are prescribed rather than their generic counterparts, fewer patients receive health benefits. If prescribing Curebitt is unethical, then so is prescribing the name‐brand drug. (shrink)